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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Individual actors in the study of international relations
In theories of world politics the place of individuals, most notably politicians, but also 
generals and diplomats, has so far remained rather underdeveloped. Traditionally, students of 
international relations have been anxious not to imitate the tendency of some historical studies 
to explain international politics by concentrating their attention on the behaviour of "great 
men" in history: e.g., kings, generals and popes. On the contrary, efforts have been made to 
attempt to discover underlying patterns of behaviour which were to be explained by the 
national interest of states, their capabilities, and by their geographical position. From this the 
view has emerged that the role of individuals ought at best give us some spicy details of the 
processes under study, but that it would hardly add to the understanding of international 
relations which was already given by an approach that did not take individuals into account. 
Of course, it has always been legitimate to study national politicians and their foreign policies 
in their own right, but it has usually been claimed that such an analysis would not substantially 
improve our understanding of world politics.
Part of this tendency may be explained by the eagerness of students of international 
relations to give their field an identity of its own. One regularly hears the argument that 
international politics cannot be a discipline with an object of its own, only a field of subjects 
that should be approached by use of theories that were developed in other disciplines. In order 
to retort to these remarks students of international relations tried to picture world politics as 
a realm of its own, with its proper logic. The projection of an international society that is 
essentially different from domestic society because of its anarchical character, allows one to 
think of international relations as having a different nature than, say, international history. This 
leads to the interpretation of world politics as an empirical discipline which studies nation­
states that act under the cogency of the so-called security dilemma. This resembles a situation 
in which states defend their national interest of survival, because they basically cannot trust 
one another in a world that lacks an overriding international authority1.
Nevertheless, the emphasis on such variables as the nation-state and the international 
political system implies a shift of attention away from individuals in two respects. First, 
allowing nation-states to rationally pursue a certain interest, exempts international politics from 
the moral responsibility of individual politicians, and soldiers, for that matter, for the courses
1 See, e.g., Martin Wight, Power Politics, second edition edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten 
Holbraad, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1986 (1st edition, 1978), pp. 100-104.
of action their countries decide to adopt. As long as an empirical analysis of international 
relations speaks of world politics as a realm of necessity and duress, it discharges individuals 
of their moral responsibility2.
Second, and more important for this study, individuals are neglected as fruitful 
variables for explaining world politics. An emphasis on relatively few variables, such as the 
characteristics of nation-states and of the international political system opens up the possibility 
of complying with a highly valued objective within a certain conception of scientific research, 
namely parsimony: much variance in international behaviour could be dealt with by a handful 
of factors only. Moreover, it allowed for the use of rather easily accessible data, such as 
newspapers and statistical reports. This view is, of course, understandable, but may be partial. 
After all, the studies which have been undertaken do not explain die whole of reality. 
Moreover, ostensibly at least, individuals ¿2 play a part. This being the case, we must try to 
qualify our claims.
It is often claimed that international relations as a field has much to gain from 
contributions by other academic disciplines1. As a matter of fact, increasing attention has been 
paid over the last IS years to the role of individual variables in international relations4. Very 
few of these works, however, put the difficult question whether individual characteristics are 
a crucial condition for die understanding of world politics. They prefer to elaborate on themes 
of what principal individuals on the international scenery look like, and of what they do. They 
thus fail to establish a link between the main body of literature on international relations.
Oddly enough, this upswing in attention for individual politicians is parallelled by an 
upsurge in writings that seem to put forward once more the case for international relations as 
a realm of its own. Over the last 10 years structural realism, or neorealism, has become a 
popular term to label that tendency in writings on international relations theory that tries to
2
2 See Michael Walzer, Just and Uniust Wars. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1977, pp. 3-4; Charles R. 
Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1979, pp. 
27-34; Marshall Cohen, ’Moral Scepticism and International Relations’, in Charles R. Beitz, Marshall 
Cohen, Thomas Scanlon, and A. John Simmons (eds.), International Ethics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton NJ, 1985, p. 11. Stephen Krasner formulated a similar kind of criticism of the bureaucratic 
politics model of foreign policy making in ’Are Bureaucracies Important ? (Or Allison Wonderland)’, 
Foreign Policy. (7), 1972, pp. 162-163.
3 Cf. James E. Dougherthy and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International 
Relations. A Comprehensive Survey. Harper and Row, New York, second edition, 1981, p. XVI.
4 E.g. L.S. Falkowski (ed.), Psychological Models in International Politics. Westview, Boulder, 
1979; Gerald Hopple (ed.), Biopolitics. Political Psychology and International Politics. Frances Pinter, 
London, 1982; Christen Jonsson (ed.), Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics. Frances Pinter, 
London, 1982.
pick up the traditional realist conception of the world as consisting of nation-states pursuing 
their national interest as they are captured by a security dilemma that forces them to strive for 
survival in an anarchical society. More than that, it attempts to supply this view of the world 
with a scientific rigour that the discipline allegedly previously lacked. Neorealism5 should 
therefore not be opposed to traditional realist thinking, as it does not challenge the picture of 
the world that realist had provided, and has guided research in international relations over the 
last 40 years*. Neorealism should be seen as a reinforcement, and extension, of realism’s 
scientific foundations7. Nevertheless, neorealism implicitly ignores the possibility of the 
relevance of variables other than structural ones.
The state of the art, therefore, resembles a kind of schizophrenic situation: on the one 
hand, we find a prestigious and popular approach, neorealism, that does not attribute a 
significant role to individual; on the other hand, a growing volume of literature on individual 
policy makers that nevertheless neglects the possibility to connect individual variables with 
processes of world politics, stressing individuals and their characteristics instead, but nothing 
more. In this context one of the purposes of this study is to try and advance the matter of the 
relative role of the individual. Two types of arguments have been put forward to show that the 
role of individual variables in the study of international relations does not constitute a problem 
at all. The first type refers to notions from the philosophy of science;the second to the 
existence of different levels of analysis.
(1) Philosophy of science. One could acknowledge that neorealism and an approach 
that puts emphasis on individuals resemble two different points of view within the philosophy 
of sciences. In fact it has been stated that neorealism seems to lend itself readily to a positivist 
format of empirical laws’, whereas, for instance, the cognitive psychology approach to
3
5 Neorealism is an unfortunate term. Actually, the Munich school of international relations, which 
emphasizes the interdisciplinary character of the field and stresses the role of individual variables, called 
itself neorealist long before the term found its opposite meaning in the Anglo-Saxon world. Cf. Gottfried 
Karl Kindermann (ed.), Grundelemente der Weltpolitik. Eine Einfiinmg. Piper, München, 1986 (1st 
edition 1977), esp. pp. 42-43.
* John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics. A Critique. Frances Pinter, London, 1983, 
passim.
7 Cf. Vasquez, Power Politics, p. 23, suggests the same appreciation of the behavioural revolution 
in the field of international relations.
* E.g. Robert O. Keohane, ’Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, in Ada W. 
Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The State Of the Discipline. The American Political Science Association,
(continued...)
individuals in world politics gets very close to an interpretative concept of science. The 
cognitive psychology approach claims that behaviour can be understood by the way individuals 
interpret their surroundings, and how they, by interpreting, help to constitute, that is, sustain 
and change, those surroundings9. Not so much 'objective’ data on nation-states form the basis 
of an explanation of world politics, but rather the individual’s subjective interpretation of such 
’facts’, and the way they decide to deal with them. In this view both approaches are 
irreconcilable. It would be tempting to give in here, and to let each scholar follow his or her 
preferred approach. This would be not only just wrong, but scientifically unsound as well. For 
one thing, neorealism itself aims at giving traditional realist notions a more rigorous 
foundation. This implies that it is legitimate to ask whether die neorealist approach succeeds 
in that objective. This study suggests that neorealist rigour leads to the neglect of variables, 
such as the perceptions and expectations of political elites, that are nevertheless necessary to 
give a satisfactory analysis of those events neorealism claimed it could understand without 
having to refer to these variables. In this context, a study of neorealism ask three questions:
(1) whether the neorealist approach manages to explain political events sufficiently; (2) whether 
it manages to guide empirical research in an adequate way; and (3) whether research along the 
lines of the cognitive psychological approach produces better explanations of the same political 
events10.
Mansbach and Vasquez have argued that the traditional realist paradigm is severely 
defective in explaining political reality. For them a new paradigm that explains world politics 
better than realism is still lacking, but should be developed because realism could not explain 
America’s participation in the Vietnam War, nor the rise of transnational actors, nor the 
erosion of die Cold War, nor the 1973 Arab oil embargo of some Western states11. 
Moreover, Vasquez demonstrated, employing data-based techniques, that ’of 7,678 hypotheses
4
V-continued)
Washington, 1983, p. S10; James N. Rosenau, ’A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of 
Cascading Interdependence’, International Studies Quarterly. (28), 1984, p. 252.
* E.g. Roger Tooze, ’Economic Belief Systems and Understanding International Relations’, in 
Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), Belief Systems and International Relations. Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1988, pp. 132-133.
10 The three criteria were formulated by Imre Lakatos in ’Falsification and the Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programmes’, in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth 
of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cambrdige, 1970, p. 116, quoted in Richard W. Mansbach 
and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory. A New Paradigm for Global Politics. Columbia University 
Press, New Yoik, 1981, p. 12.
11 Mansbach and Vasquez, In Search of Theory, pp. 6-13.
that were statistically tested between 19S6 and 1970, those that accepted Q realist assumptions 
were more frequently falsified’, and that ’of the statistical findings that did exhibit high 
correlations, the realist ones tended to contain more trivial findings than the nonrealist 
ones’12.
What should be ascertained, therefore, in this study is, first, to what extent neorealism 
has succeeded in saving traditional realism from such criticism by turning international 
relations enquiry into a more rigorous scientific endeavour; second, to what extent the 
emphasis on individual variables coming from cognitive psychology produces additional 
understanding of political events to neorealism (and realism, for that matter). It is not within 
the scope of this research to produce an alternative paradigm altogether.
(2) Level of analysis. It thus seems of no avail to explain away the problem of the 
individual in theories of international relations by simply classifying it as belonging to a 
different paradigm. However, another way of shelving the problem can be found in directing 
the individual to belong to a different level of analysis. In an influential article J. David Singer 
distinguished between three possible levels of analysis at which research in international 
relations could be conducted: the individual, the ’nation-state-as-actor’, and the systemic 
level13. As a matter of fact, the nation-state and the international system have become the 
most popular levels of analysis in the practice of international relations enquiry, and, indeed, 
are now often taken for granted14 . This can partly be understood in terms of the 
epistemological debate touched upon above: Singer identified analyses at the individual level 
with a phenomenological approach to world politics. He therefore disposed of this level of 
analysis, as it would disregard outside factors which may ’objectively’ influence the situation 
under study15. Phenomenology apart, one could as well do away with the individual level, 
because it requires too many vague data which are hard to capture in an accurate, systematic, 
fashion, while the other two levels of analysis rely on data that are more easily accessible: the
5
12 John A. Vasquez, ’Colouring It Morgen thau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis’, British Journal 
of I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Studies. (5), October 1979, table 9, discussed in Mansbach and Vasquez, In Search of 
Theory, pp. 13-14.
13 J. David Singer, ’The Level-of-Analysis Problem’, World Politics. October 1961.
14 Robert A. Isaak, ’The Individual in International Politics: Solving the Level-of-Analysis Problem’, 
Polity. (7), 2, 1974, p. 266; cf. Steve Smith, ’Theories of Foreign Policy: An Overview', Review of 
International Studies. (12), 1986, pp. 13-19.
15 Isaak, ’The Individual in International Politics’, pp. 268-269.
national and systemic levels of analysis are thus the most comprehensive, despite tbe inevitable 
loss of detail16. Philip Tetlock argues that the level of analysis problem cannot be solved by 
a theoretical debate. Only the formation of one’s empirical interest can shed some light on the 
relative importance of the various levels of analysis. He maintains that the relative importance 
of any given level of analysis depends on how specific and detailed an explanation of events 
we seek17. This brings us, however, dangerously close to a position in which one is 
indifferent to their relative weight; one would be allowed to state that three different analyses 
at three different levels tell three different stories. One would then consider this not to be a 
problem as one would be interested in a certain event only, so that reliance on one specific 
level of analysis would suffice. This is the position of Kenneth Waltz who claims that his use 
of variables, like the structure of the international political system, allows him to formulate an 
elegant theory of international relations, that is, at the system’s level, which, according to him, 
should be distinguished from a theory of foreign policy, which operates on a different level 
altogether1*. In this way, a recourse to three different levels of analysis as an analytical 
device, has resulted in the existence of different bodies of literature, that concentrate their 
efforts on one level of analysis only.
Political scientists have tried to find a way of interrelating the various levels of analysis 
in the concept of linkage. Linkages between levels were indicated by lines of influence or 
reciprocity, or by institutions which had developed, such as international organizations and 
other transnational actors19. This approach coincided with a shift of attention away from the 
traditional ’high politics’ of power and security to what were called ’issue areas’ in which 
states were but one actor in a limited, though ’multi-levelled’, complicated whole30. The idea 
that powerful states held leading positions in all issues in world politics thanks to their military 
and economic might was replaced with die recognition that different issues areas may have 
different power structures and that leaders in one issue area need not be leaders in a different
6
Jsaak, ’The Individual and International Politics’, p. 267.
17 Philip E. Tetlock, ’Psychological Research on Foreign Policy. A Methodological Overview’, in 
Ladd Wheeler and Philip Straver (eds.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology. Volume 4, 
SAGE, Beverley Hills, London, New York, New Delhi, 1983, p. 46.
'* Kenneth N. Waltz, Theories of International Politics. Addison Wesley, Reading MA, 1979.
'* See e.g. James N. Rosenau, T.inkape Politics. The Free Press, New York., 1969; Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld (ed.), Conflict Behavior and I ink«y#t Politics. McKay, New Oik, 1973.
30 Cf. Gavin Boyd and Charles Pentland (eds.), Issues in Global Politics. The Free Press, New 
York, London, 1981.
one. It is thus that Keohane and Nye described the real world to fall somewhere between the 
two idealtypes of ’realism’, which for them implied a hierarchy of issues when security had 
taken precedence, and of ’complex interdependence’, where multiple issue areas have multiple 
power structures, and here security issues do not dominate the scene21.
But, as a whole, the linkage approach ignored the individual level, and concentrated 
on nation-states and the international system instead, while adding a new category of 
transnational actors as an extra layer that deserved attention. This is recognized by Keohane 
and Nye themselves, as they looked back on the little progress that has been made by issue- 
linkage studies since 1977. They conclude that the original model with its explicit emphasis 
on transnational and intra-govemmental struggles had been replaced by models that employ 
nation-states as actors22.
Even though one has tried to develop typologies of issue areas23, actual research 
within the linkage approach has produced rather poor results. Mansbach and Vasquez argue 
that this is due to the fact that, while the linkage approach challenged traditional realism’s 
emphasis on power and security, it continued to sustain another assumption of realism, that 
is, the division between international and domestic politics. They claim that one should not & 
priori start with a set of levels of analysis, but with a new conception of issues that will make 
it possible to detect all potential actors involved at all possible levels of analysis24. Mansbach 
and Vasquez try to incorporate this new conception of issues into a different paradigm for 
international relations in which attention can be paid to the role of individuals as welF.
This is not the place to discuss their alternative to realism in full length. Here it is 
important to note that recent alternatives to realism, like linkage and issue-linkage theory, tend 
to continue to emphasize traditional levels of analysis in international relations, the nation-state
7
11 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition. 
Little, Brown, Boston, 1977, pp. 23-37.
22 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, '"Power and Interdependence" Revisited’, International 
Organirarinn (41), 4, 1987, pp. 735-736. The negligence of intra-govemmental processes by linkage 
theory and its consequences for the analysis of Italian foreign policy is discussed by Carlo Maria 
Santoro, L’Italia e II Mediterraneo. Ouestioni di Politics Estera. Franco Angeli, Milano, 1988, pp. 34- 
35.
23 See e.g. James N. Rosenau, ’Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in James N. Rosenau, 
The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. The Free Press, New York, 1971, pp. 143 ff.; or William 
Zimmerman, ’Issue Area and Foreign Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory’, 
American Political Science Review. (67), 2, 1973, pp. 1204-1212.
14 Mansbach and Vasquez, In Search of Theory, pp. 69-70.
29 Mansbach and Vasquez, op.cit.. pp. 273-280.
and the international system. The type of reasoning that they employ hampers an approach that 
aims at establishing the relative importance of the individual level of analysis. It goes without 
saying that somewhere individuals are involved, as, in the end, it is individual behaviour that 
will be observed. What would be an acceptable road to ascertain its contribution to the 
explanation of global politics? The fundamental problem is how to make clear the role of 
individuals in relation to other explanatory variables. It is obvious that individuals behave in 
a context36, and that thus variables at levels other than the individual can provide important 
insights. It is, however, too easy, even though, as a matter of fact, it is done only too often, 
to just describe certain contexts and then assume that one has made clear the relative 
importance of such variables.
1.2 How to take account of individual actors in world politics
What would be a correct way to establish the relative weight of individual variables? 
One possibility would be to set up an ambitious research project that involves both statistical 
analyses of collected data and the extensive scrutinizing of several case studies with the help 
of one methodological approach. One such example is Michael Brecher's International Crisis
It is my contention that, if one starts with a well-argued case-study, one should be able 
to investigate all problems involved in applying different approaches at different levels of 
analysis, and to appreciate the extent to which each contributed to the understanding of 
international relations. In this context Graham Allison’s study of the 1962 Cuba missile 
crisis3  is still the main example of how a case-study can tell us under which conditions 
certain kinds of explanation hold better than others, despite criticism of Allison’s use of three 
’conceptual lenses’29, and despite the accumulating evidence that his empirical claims may
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36 Cf. Jean Bloodel, Political Leadership. Towards » General Analysis. SAGE, London etc., 1987, 
pp. 17-18; the discussion about bow to establish the relative weight of political leaders resembles closely 
the debate on die place of the individual in international politics.
17 Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, Crises in the Twentieth Century. 
Volume I: H«~»hnntr nf International Crises. Volume 11: Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises. Oxford, 
Pergamon Press, 1988.
* Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Little, Brown, 
Boston, 1971.
29 Emest J. Yannella, ’"Reconstructed Logic" and "Logic-in-use" in Decisionmaking Analysis: 
Graham Allison’, Polity. (8), 1, 1975, pp. 156-172.
not all be correct30.1  still believe that Allison is correct in claiming that different conceptual 
models may highlight ’features that might otherwise be overlooked’ and may make ’persuasive 
the importance of certain factors that might not otherwise be so’31. I therefore propose to 
select an appropriate case-study in order to define the relative insights offered by the neorealist 
and the cognitive psychology approach. The former operates at the level of the nation-state and 
the international political system, while the latter searches for explanations at the level of 
individuals and small groups. It should provide us with the opportunity to examine to which 
extent these approaches, that have been flourishing independently from each other over the last 
decade, can complement one another in the understanding of international relations. Moreover, 
it will thus be possible to assess the influence of variables at the individual level.
At first glance, it seems rather odd to use a case study for the assessment of a 
theoretical approach to international politics that aims at explaining recurrent patterns of world 
politics across time. It would seem unsound to judge such an approach by one observation 
only. As a matter of fact, it is a common objection to case studies that they cannot serve to 
test a theory’s robustness, because that would require n-number observations. It can be argued, 
however, that, under certain conditions, a case study can contribute to theory formation, by 
constructing so-called crucial cases32. Two such crucial case studies can be distinguished: on 
the one hand, "most-likely" cases, which are expected to closely fit a theory, if its validity is 
not to be jeopardized; on the other hand, "least-likely” cases, which are expected not to fit at 
all. A "most-likely" case which does not fit the expected pattern will therefore raise questions 
about a theory’s validity, while a "least-likely" case, which can be explained by a theory after 
all, will strengthen it33.
Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956, eventually culminating in the 1956 
Suez crisis qualifies as such a crucial case. This is borne out by some puzzling aspects of the 
Suez crisis. In the Autumn of 1956, France and Great Britain, in connivance with Israel,
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30 See for an overview of this literature: Steve Smith, ’Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 
Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Millennium. Journal 
of International Studies. (19), 1, 1980, pp. 21-40.
31 Allison, Essence of Decision, p. 255.
32 Harry Eckstein, ’Case Study and Theory in Political Science’, in Fred I. Greens tern and Nelson 
W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science. Volume 7. Strategies of Inquiry. Addison Wesley, 
Reading, 1975, pp. 113-123. Eckstein shows that another type of case studies can contribute to theory 
formation: well-chosen case studies van be used to assess the probable validity of theories, in case large- 
scale testing will be costly in terms of time or resources; Eckstein, ibid.. pp. 108-113.
33 Eckstein, ibid.. pp. 118-119.
launched a military operation in the Suez Canal area, in response to President Nasser’s move 
that Summer to nationalize die Suez Canal Company, after two diplomatic conferences to bring 
the crisis to a peaceful solution had failed. In the face of a hostile national and international 
opinion, as well as strong economic and political pressure from the United States, France and 
Great Britain called a halt to hostilities within two days, and during the following months were 
forced out of the territory they had been able to capture.
The way this crisis has been dealt with so far in the literature illustrates precisely the 
problems of international relations theory, as outlined above: some analyses, mainly of a 
historical character34, of the Suez episode put the explanation of events either in the light of 
a clash between personalities, while contributions from international relations point to the 
context of the changed nature of the international political system. The conflict between the 
United Kingdom and Egypt has often been described as the personal crusade of Prime Minister 
Sir Anthony Eden against President Gamal Abdul Nasser35, or as a conflict between the 
temperaments of Eden and die American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. On the other 
hand, it is commonplace to see in the humiliation of die French and the British at Suez the 
confirmation of their expired role as a great power in an international political system that had 
undergone a transformation from a multipolar into a bipolar world.
It should be doubtful whether clashes between personalities provide the key to a 
complete understanding of the dynamics of a conflict that lasted as long as four months. Some 
recent historical analyses implicitly or explicidy underline the role of the complete British 
Cabinet and the Egypt Committee, the executive group installed for this crisis exclusively3*. 
It should therefore be more fruitful to phrase the problem more in terms of the relative 
influence of individuals on foreign policy making. Furthermore, the appealing explanatory 
value of international systemic variables should not be taken at face value either: as a matter
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34 Up until today only two methodical analyses from the point of view of misperception and 
bureaucratic politics exist: Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics. Columbia University Press, New York,
1970, and Jdnsson’s case study of Suez as a failure of communication, Christer Jonsson, Communication 
in International Bargaining Pinter, London, 1990, pp. 91-121. Leon Epstein’s Pritjgfa Ppljtjpg in ft? 
Suez Crisis. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1964, provides an analysis in the context of domestic 
politics.
35 Even Kyle, in his recent voluminous historical analysis, remarks that ’[i]t is also, of course, at 
the hum« level die story about two mm, each of whom came to think that the other was a bit mad’; 
Keith Kyle, Suez. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991, p. S.
*  This is implicit in Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1986, 
as noted by Wm. Roger Louis, ’A Prima Donna with Honour’, Times Literary Supplement. 31 October 
1986, pp. 1207*1209. This is explicit in David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis. Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford. 1988.
of fact, Suez remains a puzzling episode that raises more questions about the nature of change 
in the international political system than that it is explained by it. Three aspects that have 
seldom been alluded to are relevant in this respect.
First, British policy makers were well aware of changed power-relations in the world. 
The Suez Base Treaty, concluded with Egypt in 1954, calling for the dismantling of the 
impressive military base at Suez, was a product of such perceptiveness. The development of 
thermonuclear weapons, and the British lack of such arms, had bereft the base, linchpin of the 
defence of the imperial lines of communications, of its strategic primacy. British withdrawal 
was thus an indication of its acceptance of its new secondary role in world affairs, even though 
many in Britain hoped, and were confident, that this minor role would only be temporary, until 
Britain would possess its own nuclear arsenal. It is therefore curious that in 1956 the British 
deemed it opportune to move back into territory they had been so eager to get out of only two 
years earlier.
Second, it seems plausible to state that at Suez Britain and France were to come to 
terms with a new bipolar world in which military adventures could not be embarked upon 
without the permission of the new leaders, the Soviet Union, and, especially, the United States. 
This cannot explain, however, why until that moment the United States had approved of, or 
at least not vehemently protested against, British and French military operations in the world. 
France had been supported by the United States in her war-effort against the Viet Min in Indo 
China, and was almost relieved at Dien Bien Phu by American military aircraft, in 1954, were 
it not for British opposition.
Similarly, by 1956 France was deeply involved in a struggle against the Algerian 
independence movement F.L.N. without much protest coming from Washington. Actually, a 
shift in the American attitude towards the Algerian problem was not to take place until after 
Suez37. Likewise, until deep in 1956 Britain had been engaged in small-scale wars that had 
not met with much American dissent: for instance, on Cyprus it was conducting a guerilla war 
against Greek Cypriot resistance fighters, who were striving for the accession of Cyprus to 
Greece. In the Middle East in the Autumn of 1955 the United States seemed to accept British 
military intervention in order to repel long-term American ally Saudi Arabia from the Buraimi 
Oasis of Muscat, as well as from parts of the territory of Abu Dhabi. Weak American protests
11
37 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace. Algeria 1954-1962. Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979 (1st
edition 1977), p. 247.
were not raised until February 19563*. It is curious that Britain and France were able to act 
upon some form of great power prerogative to initiate military intervention up until 1956, and 
that they had to be called to a halt later that year, although, presumably, the international 
political configuration had not significantly changed by the time Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal Company in July 1956.
Third, even if one labels Suez as a watershed in international relations after 1945, thus 
implying the reduction of the United Kingdom and France to the ranks of secondary powers, 
some questions remain about its consequences; whether it is parallelled by a reduction in 
freedom to intervene with force. The decade following the Suez crisis, however, witnessed 
British military interventions in Oman (July 1957), Jordan (July 1958), Kuwait (June-July 
1961), Cyprus (December 1963), East Africa (January 1964), and Malaysia (from 1963 to 
1966)*. It is therefore unclear at first sight what Suez has meant both as an effect of the 
reduction of Great Britain to secondary power status, and as a cause of reduction of British 
military discretion. One should be very cautious indeed about the effects of changes in the 
configuration of the international system on die occurrence of military conflict.
Obviously then, a first glance at the Suez crisis, its prelude, and its aftermath raises a 
lot of questions regarding the exact way systemic variables constrain individual actors in world 
politics. Yet, neorealist writers claim that die Suez crisis perfecdy fits their sophisticated 
systemic theory of balance-of-power*. It could thus be argued that Anglo-American relations 
between 1945 and 1956, culminating in the Suez crisis, constitute a crucial "most-likely” case 
study: neorealist theory should be able to account for the pattern of Anglo-American 
interactions in that period, roughly on the basis of die change from a multipolar to a bipolar 
international system, and the parallel change in status of the United Kingdom and the United 
States. This study will show that neorealist theory does not provide a sufficient understanding 
of this period. Rather it will be argued that systemic constraints operate through the perception 
of individual foreign policy makers within each country. By consequence, it will be necessary 
to supply a systemic theory of world politics with tools from cognitive psychology, in order 
to understand how states act upon constraints and opportunities offered to them by the system.
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”  James H. Wyllcie, The Influence of British Arms. An Analysis of British Military Intervention 
Since 1956. Allen and Unwin, London, 1984.
40 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The origins of war in neorealist theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History. 
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It is the purpose of this study to give both systemic and individual variables their place 
in an analysis of Anglo-American relations between 194S and 1956 in general, and British 
foreign policy during the Suez crisis in particular. It should therefore be an attempt to estimate 
the explanatory value of neorealist and cognitive psychology approaches to the study of 
international politics. Such a case study might be liable to the reproach that, although a crucial 
case may test the validity of a theory, it may not necessarily proof the soundness of an 
approach that is based on insights from cognitive psychology. To this respect, I would like to 
underline that this study is not aimed at discrediting neorealism, but at outlining its strenghts 
and weaknesses, while exploring the possibility of supplying it with those tools from cognitive 
psychology that could contribute to an assessment of the role of individual foreign policy 
makers41.
1.3 Research questions:
All these considerations add up to two major research questions: (1) To what extent can 
neorealism explain Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956 in a satisfactory way?
(2) In what measure do tools from cognitive psychology, that put emphasis on the influence 
of individual foreign policy makers, complement a neorealist analysis of that period42? The 
former entails an assessment of neorealism as an approach to international relations; the latter 
requires an evaluation of the possibility of analyzing the impact of individuals on international 
politics. By corollary, this study also aims at an appreciation of approaches such as 
"Operational Code" and "Groupthink"43. Inevitably, this study is to shed some light on
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41 Another approach which puts an emphasis on the role of individuals is rational choice theory, but 
this study does not deal extensively with it. Appendix 1 will give an overview of its potential relevance 
to this study.
42 This monograph primarily deals with political processes in the United Kingdom, although it would 
have been as relevant to have included France as an empirical case. Omitting the latter is due to
practical difficulties. As opposed to Great Britain, where most Government documents (should) become
available to the public after 30 years, France practices a much more restricted policy in these matters. 
French secondary sources that are available do not allow for an analysis as intended here. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis will be limited to the British side, although references to French decision making 
processes will be made where possible.
45 In its empirical analysis this study will make extensive use of the so-called ’Operational Code- 
Constnict’ and the ’Group think-phenomenon’ (cf. Chapters 4, 6, 10-17). These methods are both 
examples of research designs that concentrate on a limited number of critical independent variables, 
which can be applied to various cases and may thus contribute to theory-building; cf. Alexander L. 
George, ’Case studies and theory development: the method of structured, focused comparison’, in Paul 
Lauren (ed.), Dmlnmacy. New Approaches in History. Theory and Policy. The Free Press, New York,
1979, pp. 43-69.
postwar Anglo-American relations in general, and on the Suez crisis in particular. An analysis 
of Suez with tools from international relations and cognitive psychology cannot be but a 
secondary purpose. In this context, the limits of such an analysis should be pointed out.
1. It is not meant to be a historical analysis. Suez is one of the most investigated episodes 
of British foreign policy. I do not wish to add another detailed account of what exactly 
happened between Nasser’s announcement of the nationalization of Suez Canal Company on 
26 July 1956 and die cease-fire of 6 November 1956, which put an end to the hostilities that 
had started at 29 October 1956, when Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, and dropped para­
troops near the Suez Canal in order to allow British and French troops to intervene with heavy 
bombings two days later, and with a true armada on 5 November 1956. Moreover, I am not 
interested in the collision between France, Britain and Israel as such, only as a product of the 
decision making process44.
If this study is to shed new light on known facts, it will occur as a by-product of an 
approach that tries to deal with the Suez episode using two different perspectives within 
international relations theory. Its aims, however, are primarily theoretical and methodological. 
However, this should not cause it to suffer from a possible negligence of historical evidence: 
it is all too tempting in political science not to be too precise with the available historical 
evidence related to one’s case-study. A sound basis of historical research is, therefore, a 
necessary condition for the plausibility of the empirical evidence presented in this study.
2. It is not meant to be a study in psvcho-politics. Although much emphasis wUl be laid 
on the cognitive belief system of the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, this study is 
not conceived as a political biography of Eden, nor as an assessment of his personality. Even 
though some aspects of both will have to be touched upon, such as in answering the question 
of how Eden's belief system was shaped by his political career, one should not expect definite 
answers to often raised questions, such as Eden’s true motivation when he resigned from 
Neville Chamberlain’s Government in 1938, or the influence of his notorious bad tempers on 
his policies.
3. Institutional constraints on behaviour. The main issue of this study remains to shed 
some light on the question of whether it is possible to ascertain to what extent individuals 
affect world politics. Due attention will be paid to the impact of insitutional variables that 
constrain the behaviour of individuals, such as domestic politics and the organizational context
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in which policymakers have to operate. These factors, however, are not the focus of this study, 
but rather serve as control variables on the influence of individual variables.
1.4 Outline of the study
This study consists of four parts. Part I deals with the strength and weaknesses of 
neorealism. In chapter 2 the question will be answered whether it is possible at all to speak of 
a neorealist approach to international relations; next, the matter will be addressed to which 
extent neorealism can be said to have strengthened traditional realist claims by giving them 
more scientific rigour. Chapter 3 assesses the explanatory value of neorealism for an analysis 
of Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956. It is concluded that an analysis of the 
impact of changes of the structure of international system on its units should include a 
systematic incorporation of processes of perception at the level of the foreign policy elite.
Part II discusses the feasibility of such an endeavour. In chapter 4 it will be argued that 
cognitive belief systems of individual decision makers may provide an important clue to 
understanding the influence of individual perceptions on international politics. The 
"Operational Code Construct” is selected as an appropriate tool for such an analysis. In chapter 
5 and 6 several factors are discussed which might interfere with the relation between individual 
perceptions and international politics, such as bureaucratic politics, domestic politics, 
personality, and small group dynamics.
Part III offers an empirical analysis of Anglo-American relations between 1951 and 1955. 
Chapter 7 deals with the general attitude of the British foreign policy elite towards international 
affairs, while chapter 8 presents the cognitive belief system of Sir Anthony Eden. Both 
chapters give several clues as to the likely behaviour of members of the British Government 
in general, and of Eden particular, in the event of a foreign policy crisis. Chapter 9 involves 
an examination of the nature of international crises and the determination of the exact moment 
of the start of die Suez crisis.
Part IV offers an analysis of British decision making during the Suez crisis. Chapters 10 
through 15 identify six decisional conflicts in which British decision makers are faced with 
stress-arousing dilemmas. Each chapter attempts to reconstruct the decision making process 
in the United Kingdom during the crisis. In that attempt, four variables will be taken into 
account: the individual cognitive belief system of Sir Anthony Eden, the groupthink- 
phenomenon, organizational constraints as well as considerations of domestic politics. Chapter 
16 presents an assessment of the relative weight of each variable at the various stages of the
15
decision making process. Finally, chapter 17 discusses the extent to which tools from cognitive 
psychology succeed in explaining parts of the Suez crisis that neorealism could not account for.
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PART I: THE CHALLENGE OF NEOREALISM
Introduction to Part I
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Over the last decade it has become normal practice to speak of a neorealist approach 
to the study of international relations. In order to assess its stengths amd weaknesses, however, 
an attempt should be made to describe the characteristics of such an approach, and to identify 
neorealist authors. The original debate on neorealism' has been confusing, because the 
identification of the approach and of its followers became the target of much criticism: various 
authors, using diverging approaches, had been put together and, supposedly, quotes from their 
works had been chosen to fit the argument that such a thing as neorealism existed.
In order to avoid similar misunderstandings, this study starts from the claim that 
neorealism comes very close to an approach that aims at imitating the natural sciences' 
approach to science. Chapter 2 will thus use the characteristics of a positivist approach to 
organize the debate around neorealism. Once the characteristics of a positivist approach to the 
study of international relations have been formulated, it becomes possible to have a serious 
debate about the question to what extent neorealism adheres to such an ideal and in what 
measure neorealist authors (want to) come close to such an approach. The introduction of 
positivism does not aim at an analysis and assessment from the point of view of the philosophy 
of science, but is meant as a pragmatic solution to the problem of identifying neorealism.
Next, chapter 2 answers the question whether neorealism has succeeded in preserving 
the premises of traditional realism and in adding more scientific rigour to it. It will be argued 
that neorealism has indeed done so, and even managed to incorporate areas that were no 
primary concern of traditional realism, such as international economic relations.
In chapter 3 the neorealist approach is applied to die so-called crucial case of Anglo- 
American relations between 194S and 1956. Emphasis is put on the Suez crisis and on the 
1945-1951 period. Unfortunately, neorealism offers a partial understanding only. It is argued 
that a neorealist analysis has to take perceptions and expectations of individual foreign policy 
makers into account.
1 See the special issue of International Organization (38), 2, 1984.
Chapter 2: The challenge of Neorealism
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2.1 The emergence of neorealism
For almost five decades now realism has been the dominant approach to the study of 
international relations. Despite the various criticisms that have been raised against it, its tools 
are still widely employed throughout the world. The realist conception of world politics 
concentrates around the two interrelated notions of state sovereignty and international anarchy. 
States are independent entities that operate in an environment where a central authority is 
absent. Because there is no institution on which states can rely that enforces the rules, states 
have to look after themselves in order to survive. Because no agent checks on the behaviour 
of neighbour states, each state has to remain mistrustful of other states: these are the elements 
of the so-called security dilemma, which forces states to live under conditions of competition 
and conflict1.
This conception of world politics relies on three assumptions: (1) that states are the 
most important actors in world politics, (2) that world politics can be analyzed as if states were 
carefully calculating, utility maximizing, unitary, rational actors, and (3) that states will seek 
power in order to survive in such an anarchical world, and therefore will calculate their 
interests in terms of power2.
Even though few realists explicitly rely upon these three assumptions, all of them work 
within the terms of the security dilemma. On the whole, realism has produced three types of 
theories3: there is first the theory of world government, conceived of as a social contract 
between states that abolishes their sovereignty and establishes a single sovereign government. 
There is second the theory of balance of power, that points to an overall equilibrium among 
states which emerges out of their struggle for power. There is third the collective security 
theory that argues that states should reach a formal agreement to take collective action against 
any kind of aggression. According to Lijphart, all other notions of international relations, such 
as the concept of world society, international law, or geopolitics, are derived from this hard 
core of thinking based on the security dilemma4.
1 Arend Lijphart, ’The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations’,
International Studies Quarterly. (18), 1, 1974, pp. 42-44.
3 Robert O. Keohane, ’Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond’, in Ada Fünfter 
(ed.), Political Science: the State of the Diwninljfi* APSA, Washington DC, 1985, p. 508.
3 Lijphart, ’Structure of the Theoretical Revolution’, pp. 44-49.
4 Lijphart, ibid.. pp. 49-53.
We should note, however, that two of these three notions, namely that of world 
government and of collective security are more of a prescriptive than of a descriptive kind, and 
thus seem to reflect the discipline’s strong normative commitment to world order and the need 
to limit conflict. This confusion of descriptive and prescriptive elements, and the observation 
that only balance-of-power theory seems a major contribution of realist thinking to the 
understanding of world politics, have been a main source of concern for students of 
international relations.
The fact that realism has been the dominant approach within the study of international 
relations is often held to account for the field’s poor philosophical basis as well as for its scant 
accomplishments as an empirical discipline, two types of complaints that were common in the 
1960s5 and 1970s6 respectively. Empirical analyses that were guided by realist assumptions 
tended to reject the hypotheses formulated, or at best to produce only trivial findings7. Basing 
themselves on these outcomes, Mansbach and Vasquez argue for the formulation of a new 
paradigm for world politics, and try to develop one around the concept of issue. In their 
appraisal of realism, however, they do not pay attention to the important question whether 
perhaps the alleged poverty of the realist discipline can be explained by its lack of scientific 
rigour.
As a matter of fact, it seems that part of the discipline’s theoretical and empirical 
limitations can be explained by the lack of attention that has so far been paid to the ontological 
and epistemological questions that underlie any study of international politics: neither the 
nature of international reality, nor the place of individuals in that setting, nor the route to be 
followed in order to obtain empirical knowledge have been systematically discussed by realist 
writers. Yet research is obviously conducted, or at least guided by some implicit ideas about 
these questions.
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(eds.), Diplomatic Tnveadgations. Essavs in the Theory of International Politics. Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1966, p. 20.
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to distracting exercises that might justify the habit. The results are often trivial and embarrassing’, Harry 
Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr, Patterns of Authority. A Structural Basis for Political Enquiry. John 
Wiley and Sons, New York, etc., 1975, p. 30.
7 Richard A. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory. A New Paradigm for Global 
Politics. Columbia University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 13-14.
The fact that realist assumptions have been, and still are, employed so widely, can be 
understood, in part, by the close relationship between the study of international politics and 
the practical application of its findings to the formulation of foreign policy. This stimulated the 
development of, often insightful, studies formally geared to giving policy advice. It thus 
inhibited the detachment of students from their subject, as well as the development of empirical 
analyses conducted on the basis of ’scientific’ criteria. In such a situation it is not surprising 
that realism should have become the dominant framework of research, as it allows students to 
base their work on easily available national data from newspapers and from statistical reports*. 
However, before rejecting realism altogether, as Mansbach and Vasquez suggest, it should be 
asked whether realism would have done better, if it had followed certain ’scientific’ rules more 
closely. A new wave of writings, neorealism, has indeed asked that question.
The emergence of this new current in international relations theory has received much 
attention of late, and has been given several labels, such as modern realism, new realism, 
structural realism, and the one this study has adopted, neorealism9. The appearance of 
neorealist studies can be understood as the product of a changed Zeitgeist, underlying the 
research agenda of the field. Since the late 1970s North-South relations have been less in 
vogue while East-West themes have become more popular; international commercial and 
monetary problems are now described as clashes of interests between nation states rather than 
as the product and cause of transnational processes that used to be a popular topic a decade 
ago; moreover, some events of the late 1970s and the early 1980s suggested that the use of 
military force remained an important element of world politics, even in an era of nuclear 
deterrence: one only has to look at the direct and indirect military interventions by the 
superpowers in Africa, Central America and South West Asia10.
Neorealism is seen as the saviour of the old realist tradition, because it supplies realist 
notions of world politics with truly scientific tools. Two elements in the discussion on 
neorealism seem to justify this interpretation. First, there are attempts to give typically realist 
concepts new, and more rigorous, operational formulations. Thus Gochmann and Leng wished
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Richard Little, 'Structuralism and Neo Realism’, in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds.), 
International Relations. A Handbook of Current Theory. Frances Pinter, London, 1985, pp. 74-89; and 
Michael Nicholson, ’Methodology’, in Light and Groom, o p . cit.. pp. 90-99.
10 Joseph S. Nye, ’Neoliberalism and Neorealism’, World Politics. (40), 2, 1988, pp. 236-237; 
Joseph Grieco, ’Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation’, International Organization. (42), 3, 1988, pp. 
290-292.
to give more analytical and empirical substance to Morgenthau’s notion of policy makers’ 
prudence in militarized conflicts between nation-states11. There are also efforts to formulate 
notions about the formation of alliances between nation-states, a traditional realist subject of 
study12. A third example comes from recent attempts at giving quantitative indicators to the 
position of nation states in the international political system13.
Second, the role of the political philosophers who have always been considered the 
Founding Fathers of the discipline of international relations is being reevaluated. There is 
specifically a strong debate over the question whether neorealists are entitled to embrace 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau as their predecessors14. Discussions of a 
theoretical character are thus very alive.
It therefore seems legitimate to ask whether, for instance, Rosenau is correct in stating 
that neorealism lends itself ’readily to a natural sciences’ format’11, and whether it is true that 
neorealism is able to correct die shortfalls of realism by fitting it into such a scientific 
jacket16. It should thus be possible to construct operational formulations to distinguish 
between objective ad subjective aspects of international political life, and to incorporate 
international economic processes, without having to give up the old realist emphasis on power, 
security, and the national interest17. Neorealists, therefore, make explicit and try to systemize
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11 Charles S. Gochmann and Russell J. Long, ’Realpolitik and the Road to War. An Analysis of 
Attributes and Behavior’, International Studies Omc««»rlv (27), 1983, pp. 99 ff.
15 Stephen M., Origins of Alliances. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987; Wallace J. Thies, 
’Crises and the Study of Alliance Politics’, Armed Forces and Society. (15) 3, 1989, pp.
11 E.g., Erich Weede and Joachim Kummer, ’Some Criticism of Recent Work on World System 
Status, Inequality and Democracy’, International Journal of Comparative Sociology. (26), 3/4, 1985, 
pp. 135-148.
14 R.B.J. Walker, ’Realism, Change, and International Political Theory’, International Studies 
Quarterly. (31), 1987, pp. 65-86; Daniel Gast, ’Thucydides and Neorealism', International Studies 
Quarterly. (33), 1, 1989, pp. 3-27; Michael C. Williams, ’Rousseau, Realism, and ‘Realpolitik*’, 
Millennium. (15), 2, 1989, pp. 188-204. Another example is Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, who explicitly 
argues that his expected utility theory of war initiation is an applied version of a theme that runs through 
the work of classical authors, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory 
to the Study of International Conflict’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History. (18), 4, 1988, p. 629. A 
critical analysis of the debate around Thucydides is given by Michael Doyle, ’Thucydidean Realism’, 
Millennium. (16), 3, 1990, pp. 223-238.
15 James N. Rosenau, ’A Pre-Theory Revisited’, p. 252.
'* Richard K. Ashley, ’The Poverty of Neorealism’, International Organization. (38), 2, 1984, p.
230.
l7Ashley, Ibid..
notions that have since long been present within the dominant approach to international 
relations.
We need now to see how ar neorealism enables us really to overcome the weaknesses 
of realism. If this were the case, then the raison d’être for an alternative paradigm would be 
less clear than Mansbach and Vasquez suggest. In what follows, therefore, neorealism will be 
put to the three tests that were discussed in Chapter 1: (1) Can neorealism explain international 
political reality ? (2) Does neorealism prepare the grounds for relevant research, that is, can 
it contribute to an understanding of Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956, and, 
specifically, of British foreign policy during the Suez crisis ? (3) Are there any alternative 
approaches that seems better able to provide satisfactory answers ?
2.2 Can a study of international relations follow positivist guidelines ?
The claim that neorealism follows ’scientific prescriptions’ actually means that 
neorealists proceed from the idea that the social sciences can and ought to conform to the 
standards set by the natural sciences1'. The philosophy of sciences invoked by this claim is 
called positivism. Before one can assess to what extent neorealists are also positivists, one 
should set out the premises of positivism. Any philosophy of science will discuss the questions 
of (1) the nature of reality, and (2) the correct road to arrive at knowledge about that reality. 
In this paragraph the core of positivist thinking about these ontological and epistemological 
questions will be presented, followed by a reconstruction of how a positivist view of 
international relations could be formulated as an ideal-type, which will next serve as a point 
of reference for an assessment of the neorealist position.
2.2.1 What is the nature of reality ?
Because positivism believes that the goal of research should be the formulation of 
theories that explain newly discovered laws, it is indispensable that reality display a pattern of 
regularity: only if certain events occur again and again, will it be possible to discover laws, 
and to allow for the falsification of hypotheses and theories19. Regularity is the basis for the 
belief that causation exists, and that thus explanation and prediction become possible . The
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11 David Papineau, For Science in the Social Sciences. Macmillan, London and Basingstoke, 1978,
p. 1.
19 Vernon Van Dyke, Political Scicace-.A Philo»fflfoc»l Amlvs« Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1960, pp. 27 ff.; Arnold Brecht, Political Theory. The Fourth™«: nf Twentieth Century 
J, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, p. 14.
important point is that there must first be an element which causes the pattern of regularity; 
second, that there are elements (often called data, or phenomena, or events) that allow for the 
observation of the pattern of regularity, although they need not be constituents of the pattern 
of regularity30.
When applied to the study of international relations a pattern of regularity can be found 
in the traditional realist conception of world politics as an immensely durable anarchy. 
Constant anarchy imposes self-help conditions on states which require them to struggle for 
their mere existence. In doing so, states maintain this anarchical situation21. It comes as no 
surprise that in such a conception of international political reality most attention will be paid 
to problems of conflict between nations. Implicitly, as Wight observes, this situation is 
regarded as a ’realm of recurrence and repetition; it is the field in which political action is 
most regularly necessitous’22. Because dominant approaches develop symbols and 
metaphors23, it is worth noticing that the 1648 Treaty of Westfalia has come to symbolize the 
construction of the modern system of nation-states, and that the Hobbesian metaphor of the 
state of nature has become widely employed to characterize the international political 
system34.
24
30 This does away with one of the most common objections to the ’scientific’ model, namely that 
every historical event is unique by itself: positivism would thus be irrelevant, it is said, because, unlike 
an experiment, a segment of history can never be repeated. The positivist would retort that, while to 
a certain extent every historical event is unique, because of the number of variables which can never 
be expected to arrange themselves in the same order again, it is also the case that any explanation has 
implicit reference to a general law: the observer’s interpretation will depend on generalized assumptions 
about historical cause and effect, which could not be possibly deduced from the particular sequence he 
wishes to explain. One is therefore looking for certain constant factors that can be detected out of 
similarities in certain historical events; Walter Runciman, Social Science and Political Theory. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2nd. edition), 1969, pp. 8-11; Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific 
Man versus Power Politics. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1946,p. 127; R.K. Atkinson, 
Knowledge am» pTPl.n«rinq in History. An Introduction to the Philosophy of History. The Macmillan 
Press, London and Basingstoke, 1978, p. 12; Brecht, Political Theory, pp. 88-91.
21 Cf. Barry Buzan, ’Peace, Power and Security; Contending Concepts in the Study of International 
Relations*, Journal of Peace Research. (21), 2, 1984, pp. 109-125; Rosenau, ’A Pre-Theory Revisited’; 
Lijphart, ’The Structure of Theoretical Revolution’.
22 Wight, ’Why is there no International Theory?’, p. 26.
23 According to Kuhn, quoted by Lijphart, ’The Structure of Theoretical Revolution’, p. S3.
34 Lijphart, ibid.. p. 44; several authors have warned against the use of this metaphor, either because 
international reality does not reflect a Hobbesian state of nature, or because it is based on a biased 
reading of Hobbes’s text; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1977, p. 41; Donald Hanson, ’Thomas Hobbes’s "Highway to 
Peace*’, International Organization. (38), 2, 1984, esp. pp. 331-332.
Traditionally, in the study of international relations three types of factors surface as 
constituents of such a pattern of regularity: characteristics of the individual, the nation-state, 
or the international political system. In studies of international affairs, the effect of these causal 
factors, and thus the pattern of regularity of world politics itself, is revealed by the behaviour 
of nation-states.
1. The individual. One way of explaining the recurrence of war is to point to the 
characteristics of human nature and behaviour. Basically, one can claim that the human species 
is inherently aggressive, or thirsty for power. In order to achieve a more peaceful world, one 
will have to induce, or wait for, changes in man’s nature25. But, as Steiner explains, this is 
an illogical possibility, because the view that world politics anarchical, implies that man is 
incapable of acquiring knowledge that could enable him to change himself or his condition in 
any fundamental way26.
2. The nation-state. One can also look for causes of international conflict by examining 
the characteristics of nation-states. The proposition is that certain types of countries are more 
likely to engage in warfare than others27. Types of countries can be distinguished on the basis 
of the character of the regime or on die relative stability of the regime. An example of the 
latter is the popular explanation that wars occur because unstable regimes try to raise domestic 
support by starting a fight against another country2*.
The former type of distinction is shown by those authors who claim that the ideology 
of the regime will make a state more or less war-prone: both capitalist and socialist states are
25
* Kenneth N. Waltz, Man. the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis. Columbia University Press, 
New York and London, (2nd. edition), 1959, pp. 16-19.
* Miriam Steiner, ’Human Nature and Truth as World Order Issues’, International Organization. 
(34), 3, 1980, pp. 340-342.
77 Waltz, Man. the State and War, pp. 80-85.
* This research tradition was very popular in the late 1960s, but was still pursued in the 1980s; 
e.g., Raymond Tanter, ’Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-1960’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution. (10), 1, 1967,-pp. 41-67; Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ’Domestic and Foreign 
Conflict’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Conflict Bpfavjnf «M Linkage Politics. The Free Press, New 
York, 1970, pp. 107-123; Edward L. Kick, ’World-System Properties and Military Intervention-Internal 
War Linkages’, Journal of Political and Military Sociology. (11), 2, 1983, pp. 185-208.
said to be inherently both peaceful and aggressive!29. Similarly, liberal theoreticians claim that 
only democracies will promote international trade and, thus, peace30.
A third way to distinguish types of countries is to look at their relative geopolitical 
disposition. A school of international relations, geopolitics, is based on the assumption that 
certain geographical characteristics will induce to military conflict31.
3. International political system. A third factor that explains the way international 
relations are conducted is the nature of the international political system. Because in an 
anarchical system, ’any state may at any time use force, all states must constantly be ready 
either to counter force, or to pay the cost of weakness, The requirements of state action are, 
in this view, imposed by the circumstances in which all states exist*32. The advantage of this 
type of analysis is that it becomes possible to ignore the controversial issue of human 
nature33.
Within a positivist framework international relations will have to work with discernible 
basic elements in order to proceed from the basic idea of an anarchical regularity to empirical 
observations. The nation-state is just such an atomistic unit one that can serve as such a basic 
element34. It is worth noticing that the image of the international political system as a body
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29 In several theories of imperialism, such as Lenin’s, aggression of capitalist states is explained by 
an internal characteristic: their mode of production; cf. Doyle, Empires, pp. 23-24; similarly, the 
foreign policy of socialist states is often explained by their allegedly expansionist ideology; e.g. 
Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc. Unitv and Conlict. Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
1971.
10 E.g., Robert Gilpin, (with the assistance of Jean M. Gilpin), The Political Economy of 
International Relations. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, pp. 56-58.
31 Recently, geopolitics seems to have been renamed ’Political Geography’, as evidenced by the 
appearance of a new journal, Political Geography Quarterly. Although such notions as the scientific 
frontier, (Robert Stnuisz-Hupl, Geopolitics. The Struggle for Space and Power. Arno Press, New York, 
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geopolitics’. Journal of Peace Research. (25), 2, 1988, p. 192. Examples of recent geopolitical writings 
include Patrick O’Sullivan, Geopolitics. Croom Helm, London, 1986, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game 
Plan. A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest. Atlantic Monthly Press, 
Boston, 1986.
32 Waltz, Man. the State and War, p. 160.
33 Steiner, ’Human nature and truth’, p. 336.
34 Richard K. Ashley, The Political Economy of War and Peace The Sino-Soviet-American Triangle 
and the Modem Security Probl<«n«tiqug- Frances Pinter, London, 1980, pp. 304-305, 242-248.
in which nation-states act like atoms33, is often invoked: nation-states are the units (atoms) 
of analysis through which patterns of regularity can be discovered. Each national state will 
have its own interest, and its power capabilities will be ultimately determined by economic 
strength, which forms the most important tool for the explanation of a state’s behaviour36. 
By implication, it is considered less relevant to examine the characteristics of the foreign policy 
elite, or of political leaders, or of individuals in general, in order to understand world politics. 
Individual behaviour can be reduced to an individual’s own basic, pessimistic, nature, to the 
characteristics of the country they happen to live in, or to the constraints imposed by the 
international system. It is unnecessary to look at individuals’ beliefs, or reasons, or motives: 
knowledge of world politics can be acquired by looking at nation-states the behaviour of which 
reveals the working of basic causal forces in international relations.
2.2.2 The correct wav to understand international reality
Basically, two ideas about the acquisition of scientific knowledge prevail in the social 
sciences, and by consequence, also in the field of international relations. On the one hand, 
scholars believe that theory and generalizations come through the accumulation of data. This 
can be called inductive enumeration. On the other hand, one finds scholars who wish to clearly 
separate the collection of data from their explanation by the formulation of theories. This view 
can be labelled deductive falsificationism. One of the fundamental problems of the study of 
international relations up until the mid-1970s has been its reliance either on the mere collection 
of empirical data, or on a more narrative way of presenting arguments. The power of 
neorealism lies in its adoption of deductive falsificationism.
1. Inductive enumeration. This conceives of science as an empirical discipline that 
grows thanks to slow, modest, and piece-meal accumulation of data. Theory is derived from 
these data as soon as a certain threshold has been reached that permits the formulation and 
testing of a generalization. Theory is almost expected to emerge out of the empirical 
generalizations that are accumulated and merged into even greater generalizations37. For the 
study of international relations this implies that quantitative techniques are appropriate in order 
to analyze a reality which is supposed to be based on the regular behaviour patterns of nation­
states, as they try to survive in an anarchical political system. Much of the postwar history of
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35 Or billiard balls.
36 Ashley, op. cit.. pp. 282-283, Rosenau, ’A Pre-Theory Revisited’, p. 248.
37 Cf. M.J. Jackson, ’The Application of Method in die Construction of Political Science Theory’,
Canadian Journal of Political Science. (5), 1972, pp. 404-406.
the study of international politics can be written as the collection of data on international 
conflict. It has been argued that most research within this framework has yielded very poor 
results3*. It is therefore no surprise that many studies did not develop truly sophisticated 
theories at all*.
2. Deductive falsificationism. In this vision the mere accumulation of data can never 
produce any theory. It can help to make one think of possible explanations of the findings, but 
such a theory is created in the minds of men, and never follows automatically from 
correlations between data. As long as it stays in the mind of the individual researcher, it 
remains unverifiable for other scholars. It is therefore important to take explanation out of this 
context of discovery and to bring it into the context of justification. In this way it is made 
falsifiable by more research which can be conducted, in principle, by anyone. This requires 
the deduction of falsifiable observations from certain theoretical premises. This implies that 
one criterion to judge the soundness of an empirical theory is its consistency and its being non- 
tautological. Moreover, a theory should be framed in universal terms, because then it will 
become easier to falsify. In this view the accumulation of data serves as a check on predictions 
that can be deduced from a theory. Very few works in international relations up until the 
emergence of neorealism have employed the epistemology of deductive falsificationism. Those 
scholars that did not devote themselves to the collection of data often worked within a 
narrative, historical approach to provide the evidence that support their claims40. The 
theoretical poverty of traditional realism is shown by the fact that even realism’s classical 
textbook, Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations, cannot be considered to contain an empirical
28
* Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, passim.
*  One can therefore sympathize with Goldmami’s claim that it seems imaginary to speak of the 
existence of "realist" theory, Kjell Goldman, ’The Concept of ’Realism” as a Source of Confusion’, 
Cooperation and Conflict. (23), 1, 1988, p. 1-2, 7.
40 For die distinction between traditionalists and behaviouralists, see, for instance, James E. 
Dougherty and Robot L. PfaltzgrafT, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations. A 
Cnrnnrehensive Study. Harper and Row, New York, 1981, chapter 1. I think it is wrong to identify 
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with Rengger though, that many traditionalists should be reinterpreted in light of their use of historical 
interpretation, which would place them into the world of phenomenological hermeneutics, rather than 
positivism; N J .  Rengger, ’Serpents and Doves in Classical International Theory’, Millennium. Journal 
of International Studies. (17), 2, 1988, p. 215-217.
theory of international relations41. Morgenthau did not present his ideas about the 
international struggle for power as an axiomatic set of formulations from which expectations 
about the empirical world can be deduced. Moreover, Morgenthau's analysis cannot be 
reconstructed in such a way, so that his claims cannot be judged either on their inner logic, 
or on their value as generators of empirical hypothesis42. The theoretical richness of realism, 
measured by the criteria of a positivist approach, thus seems rather limited. We must examine, 
therefore, whether neorealism, which aims at giving realist notions a more sophisticated basis, 
has performed any better.
2.3 Does neorealism follow the positivist approach ?
One can safely say that neorealism is following a positivist approach only (1) if one 
can conclude that its adherents all conceive of international relations as a pattern of regularity,
(2) if all deem it possible to formulate general theories about such a stable environment, (3) 
if they claim that this stable pattern of behaviour is caused by characteristics of man, the 
nation-state, or the nature of the international political system, (4) if the only units of analysis 
need to be nation-states, that look for ways to improve their power position, and (5) if, in 
order to understand these phenomena, students will either follow the path of inductive 
enumeration, or of deductive falsificationism.
Such an assessment assumes that we know who those neorealists are. The ’discoverer’ 
of neorealism, Richard Ashley, came to his conclusions after having read the works of Kenneth 
Waltz, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin, Robert Tucker, George Modelski, 
’and many others’43. I propose to take these authors into consideration and to estimate to 
which extent they conform to the positivist picture. This method should provide a safeguard 
against giving an unbalanced view of the authors, and against picking out just the passages that
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41 At least, such is J. W. Nobel’s thesis, in his The Utopia of Realism. Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory 
of Power Politics and his Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War. Amsterdam, Jan Mets, 
1985 (a dissertation written in Dutch), notably pp. 36-46, 74-88. Nobel is severely criticized for his 
notion of epistemological criteria by R.H. Lieshout, ’Over het "Kritisch* Toepassen van "Zuivere’ 
Theorieen’, Acta Politica. (20), 4, 1985, pp. 451-464; Lieshout’s judgment of Morgenthau’s theory, 
however, gets only more severe.
42 Lieshout, ’Over het "Kritisch' toepassen van "Zuivere" Theorieen’, pp. 454-460.
43 Amongst whom we expect to find the economist, Charles Kindleberger, who is mentioned as a 
neorealist, but who remains absent in Ashley’s footnotes and analysis; Ashley, ’The Poverty of 
Neorealism’, p. 227.
happen to fit the argument44. It will be shown that all alleged neorealists conceive of 
international relations as a permanent anarchy, that most of diem find the cause of that 
regularity in the characteristics of nation-states, although some of them, stress the nature of 
the international political system, that all of them make use of the nation-state as unit of 
analysis, that none of them engages in inductive enumeration, but that most of them adopt 
deductive falsificationism instead as the route to theory formation, although, regrettably, few 
are explicit about these matters.
2.3.1 A pattern of reeularitv
All neorealist spokesmen see international relations as an anarchical environment which 
is likely to remain its main feature for a long time to come. Actually, some of them, such as 
Robert Tucker and Robert Gilpin, explicitly want to show that world politics has been of an 
essentially anarchical nature for quite some time, which is not likely to be replaced very soon. 
Tucker’s main thesis is that this will be so despite the call for more equality of distribution of 
wealth in the world43. For him international relations constitute a self-help system in which 
nation-states enjoy legal equality, expressed in the principle of sovereignty, but where they 
have to face factual inequality at die same time. In such a society competition rather than 
cooperation is the rule. Even though anarchy is institutionalized in and possibly to a certain 
extent mitigated by international law, the basic dilemma is not overcome, because rights in 
international law tend to reflect the distribution of power within the system46. Pressure for 
redistribution by Third World countries is not likely to provoke the often predicted change of 
the international system: Following his analysis of the politics of international redistribution 
since die period of decolonization, Tucker argues that the prime movers in that demand for 
more equality will still be nation-states: ’it is through the existing framework of states, 
sovereign and independent, that disparities in income and wealth are to he reduced, if they are 
to be reduced at all’47. Therefore, it is not the essential structure of the international system
30
44 Gilpin tliinlni Ashley has done just this, Gilpin, ’The Richness of the Tradition of Political 
Realism’, International Organization. (38), 2, 1984, pp. 287-289. The danger of using the ’positivist 
litmus test’, however, would be the imposition of a rigidity on authors that they themselves might never 
opt for, cf. Quentin Skinner, ’Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History and Theory. 
(8), 1, 1969, pp. 3-53.
45 Robert Tucker, The Inequality of Nations. Basic Books, New York, 1977, p. 178.
*  Tucker, ibid.. p. 1-15.
47 Tucker, ibid.. p. 105.
that has been challenged by the call for egalitarianism, but the distribution of wealth and power 
within that system4*. Tucker’s analysis of global distributional politics reveals that the extent 
to which more equality is reached depends on the ’ability and willingness of the respective 
states to bear the costs’49. Tucker has thus saved realism from the well-known criticism that 
it could not cope with North-South relations. He shows that redistributional problems can still 
be analyzed in terms of international anarchy and the interests of nation-states30.
Robert Gilpin is convinced that the nature of international politics has not changed 
since the days of Thucydides31. For him world politics has always been and still is a struggle 
for wealth and power among independent actors in an anarchical world32. Although they 
discuss time-spans not as vast as Gilpin’s, George Modelski and Kenneth Waltz basically agree 
that since the late Middle Ages international politics can be characterized as an anarchical 
system of nation-states which have displayed regular patterns of behaviour ever since33. Waltz 
goes furthest when he recognizes that international politics is a ’bounded realm or domain’ 
where ’law-like regularities’ can be observed34. Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane are less 
explicit about regularities of behaviour that can be observed in international politics, but both
31
41 Tucker, ibid^ p. 117.
49 Tucker, ibid.. p. 77.
30 A similar, perhaps even more sophisticated analysis is offered by Stephen Krasner, in his study 
of attempts by Third World countries to change dependency relations with the First World. Exactly 
because Third World countries lack the power capabilities to impose their preferences on the First 
World, they try to modify the existing order by the piecemeal foundation of international regimes that 
somehow improve their position. Nevertheless, exactly because they depend, in the end, on the First 
World’s willingness to tolerate international forums it produces undesired results. For Krasner the gap 
between North and South is an enduring character of the international system. Stephen D. Krasner, 
Structural Conflict. The Third World Against Global Liberalism. University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1984, pp. 12 ff., 313.
31 Gilpin, ’The Richness of the Tradition of Political R ealism’, pp. 297-298.
* Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1981, pp. 4-5.
55 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics. Macmillan, Houndmills, etc., 1987, p. 1; 
Modelski, ’The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State’, Comparative Studies in Society 
and History. (20), 1978, pp. 214-235; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Addison 
Wesley, Reading, 1979, p. 95, makes a distinction between Medieval anarchy and the modern world 
system in which nation-states have become the relevant actors rather than Medieval Princes, but he states 
that the game has always been the same, and that the nation-state is likely to remain the most important 
actor for a long time.
34 Waltz, ibid.. p. 116.
stress the importance of the context of an anarchical political system in which nation-states 
have to operate” .
2.3.2 Basic causal factors
Some neorealist authors look at the characteristics of nation-states in order to explain 
behaviour within this permanent anarchy, while others stress the importance of the 
international political system. None of them tries to account for international politics in terms 
of characteristics of individuals, even though some do say that, in the end, only individuals 
act36. The point is, however, that a parsimonious analysis of world politics only needs nation­
states and system-structure.
1. Nation-state. Robert Tucker, in his analysis of challenges to the present international 
distribution of power and wealth, explains the dynamics of world politics in terms of 
characteristics of nation-states57: relatively less well-to-do states will challenge the status quo, 
while the richer ones will tend to defend it. Similarly, Robert Gilpin claims that the recurrence 
of cycles in which states will challenge and try to replace the current leader of the international 
system, the hegemon, can be understood by die qualities of nation-states and by the inherent 
tendency of hegemons to decline. A nation-state, Gilpin says, has a tendency to expand until 
its marginal costs will equal its marginal revenues. Incentives to expand can come from the 
international system, where a hegemon may be in decline, as well as from domestic pressure. 
A state will try to change the configuration of the system, as soon as it estimates that it is 
profitable to do so3*. The succession of hegemons can be explained by die fact that for a 
hegemon the costs of maintaining the status quo rise at a faster speed than its revenues39. This 
is due to the fact that a hegemonic power has to make non-productive investments to keep 
international order, for instance to maintain huge military forces, or to finance foreign aid00.
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33 Stephen Knsner, Defending the Nation»! Interest. Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign
Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1979, pp. 167-170; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony.
Cooperation and Discoid in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, 
p. 62.
36 Gilpin, ’The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, p. 301.
37 Tucker, The Inequality of Nations, p. 117.
* Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 85-107.
39 Cf. The analysis of imperial overstretch by Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. 
Economic and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. Fontana Press London, 1989 (1988).
* Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 156-157.
Although the pace of the decline can be slowed down by technological innovation, its decline 
will inevitably come61.
Stephen Krasner explicitly aims at the restoration of the notion of national interest in 
order to explain the behaviour of nation-states in international politics. In doing so, he argues 
against Marxism, because this approach considers foreign economic expansion to be a state 
necessity62, as well as against liberal theory that conceives of foreign policy as a resultant of 
effective access of various interests to the political arena. While both Marxism and liberalism 
have tended to explain American foreign policy as a passive reaction to external forces63, 
Krasner contends that the national interest is formulated by the nation-state, and constitutes a 
value that remains independent of domestic pressures.
Robert Keohane. finally, argues that cooperation in a relatively anarchical system in 
which a hegemon is absent, can be understood in terms of the self-interest of states to engage 
in mutual cooperation through international institutions, either in the formal arrangement of 
international organizations, or in the informal structure of international regimes64.
2. International political system. Some of the most popular explanations of international 
politics point to the constraining influence of the structure of the international political system 
on the parts within that system63. Although the system’s level has been a traditional concern 
of analysts of world politics66, the issue has received renewed attention since Kenneth Waltz 
did away with many a theory of the international system, by showing that most of them were 
essentially reductionist in the sense that international processes were actually explained by
33
61 Gilpin, ibid.. pp. 168-185.
62 r«mimarJr argues that Krasner does not succeed in proving that his analysis is superior to a 
Marxist one; Cammack, ’Bringing the State Back In?’, British Journal of Political Science. (19), 2,
1989, pp. 269-274.
® Krasner, Defending the National Interest, pp. 26, 38.
44 Keohane, After Hegemony, passim.
69 Even a prudent author such as Arend Lijphart introduces this idea of structural causality when he 
argues that ’the struggle for power into which states are forced by the security dilemma tends to lead 
to an overall equilibrium among them «ngtwiH of inevitable conflict’, Lijphart, ’Structure of Theoretical 
Revolution’, p. 235.
16 Gabriel Almond persuasively argues that most scholars of international and comparative politics 
have tended to neglect the rich tradition in the social sciences that tries to establish the precise 
relationship between national and international factors determining political behaviour; Gabriel A. 
Almond, ’The International-National Connection’, British Journal of Political Science. (19), 2, 1989, 
pp. 237-259.
variables at the level of nation states and not at the level of the system as a truly systemic 
theory would require67.
Some neorealist authors have taken up this challenge, and tried to develop theories that 
would fill the lacuna, by starting from the structure of the international political system as the 
most important factor in explaining international politics®*. George Modelski and Kenneth 
Waltz explicitly stress the influence of the anarchical character of international relations, and 
claim that it is the most important factor in accounting for the behaviour of states.
For Kenneth Waltz, the structure of die international political system disposes its units, 
the nation-states, to behave in certain ways, and not in others, and because they do so, the 
system is maintained. Two elements of this structure are constant: first, world politics is 
anarchy where states strive at least for self-preservation; second, its units perform similar 
functions because they face the same tasks**. This type of analysis suggests a structural- 
functionalist framework. A third element of structure, the distribution of capabilities, varies 
over time across units, and from system to system. This element, the distribution of power is 
important because changes in this distribution will change die configuration within the system 
and will thus change the units’ expected behaviour as well as the outcome of their 
interactions™.
For George Modelski die absence of a strong central authority in international relations 
produces an incentive to the units in the system to create global order. A vacancy in leadership 
generates competition and challenge. Modelski goes even as far as claiming that the presence 
of leadership will make the system non-anarchic71. Modelski contends that it is possible to
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47 Kenneth N. Waltz, ’Theory of International Relations', in Fred G recasts in and Nelson Polsby 
(eds.), The Handbook of Political Science. Addison Wesley, Reading, 1975; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory 
of International Politics, chapter 2.
“  It should be borne in mind, however, that many neorealists refer to the context of the international 
system; for Krasner the achievement of a more equal distribution in the world is severely limited by the 
influence of international anarchy, Krasner, Defending the National Interest, pp. 167-170. Keohane also 
remarks that international regimes can only be understood in the context of an anarchical self-help 
system, Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 62. Similarly, Robert Tucker gives priority to the nature of the 
international system over the characteristics of nation-states in accounting for processes of international 
distribution, Tucker, The Inequality of Nations, p. 168. Likewise, Robert Gilpin, when he discusses 
change in world politics, observes that ’the structure of the international system itself greatly affects the 
capacity and willingness of a group or state to try to challenge the system’, Gilpin, War and Change
* Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 58, 98.
*  Waltz, ifeii, p. 97.
71 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics, pp. 9-18.
explain political history since 1500 as a sequence of cycles in each of which one world power 
has been succeeded by another: ’the prominent role of a world power attracts competitors...and 
its pre-eminent, if largely customary..., authority begins to wear out; the system moves into 
multipolarity. Rivalries among the major powers grow fiercer and assume the characteristics 
of oligopolistic competition’72. As such, the global system went through four full circles with 
Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain (twice), and the United States as world powers 
creating and maintaining world order73. Modelski and Waltz can be said to be the main 
neorealist writers who look predominantly at the nature of the international system in order 
explain behaviour74.
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2.3.3 Methods to get to know that reality
The rather explicit adherence to deductive falsificationism makes neorealism 
qualitatively different from traditional realism. Even those authors who base their analyses on 
a huge set of data on international conflict, such as George Modelski and his disciples, and 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, use these data to test hypotheses that are deduced from theoretical 
axioms. George Modelski argues that the absence of a strong central authority provokes the 
urge for nation-states in the international system to try to impose some degree of order. A 
hegemon is a substitute for a strong central authority. It follows that if the relative power of 
the hegemon, the leader, starts declining, disorder may be its consequence, and new states will 
try take the hegemon’s place, which is often accomplished only after a period of violence75.
72 George Modelski, ’The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State*, p. 217.
73 Modelski, Lone Cycles in World Politics, pp. 39-50; 'The Long Cycle of Global Politics’, pp. 
218-224.
74 Although he is not considered to be a neorealist, Immanuel Wallerstein is reasoning in a way 
analogue to Waltz, when he explains the characteristics and the behaviour of nation-states by referring 
to their structural position in the capitalist world economy; Immanuel Wallerstein, ’The Rise and Future 
Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis’, in Immanuel Wallerstein, 
The Capitalist World Economy. Studies in Modem Capitalism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1980, pp. 1-36. It is true that for Waltz the basic cause lies in the security dilemma of states, whereas 
for Wallerstein the root of world politics lies in the nature of the capitalist world economy; however, 
both authors approach international relations in a similar way, because both stress that (a) political 
behaviour is constrained by the system’s structure, and (b) the dynamics of world politics is determined 
by economic capabilities and their fluctuation. This similarity is appreciated by Robert Gilpin, (with the 
assistance of Jean M. Gilpin) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, 1987, pp. 67-72. This is overlooked by Wendt who separates ’Neorealists* from 
’World-system theorists’ in their treatment of the international system; Alexander Wendt, ’The Agent- 
Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’, International Organization. (41), 3, 1987, pp. 335- 
336.
73 Modelski, ’The long Cycle of Global Politics’, pp. 218-225.
Similarly, Robert Gilpin claims that the anarchical character of die international system 
provides a set of constraints and opportunities for nation-states to pursue their interests. 
Because nation-states are assumed to respond to opportunities to expand, states will wage an 
attempt to change the configuration of the system when they estimate it profitable. In choosing 
that moment they are helped by the inherent characteristic of hegemonic states to decline 
because their marginal costs to maintain the status quo will inevitably start exceeding its 
revenues. Challengers of the status quo will expand until the moment at which their marginal 
costs will equal their marginal revenues7*.
Whereas Gilpin sets out to explain the recurrence of large-scale wars between great 
powers, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita attempts at formalizing parts of Gilpin’s argument and at 
formulating a general theory to explain why and when wars start. Bueno de Mesquita claims 
that an actor’s expectation to gain from initiating a war (not necessarily the expectation to win 
a war) explains the occurrence of armed conflict. His axiomatic, deductive approach was tested 
with a large data set on international conflict, which confirmed his hypotheses; moreover, it 
was found that wars thus initiated, are usually won by the actor with a net gain expectancy77.
Kenneth Waltz provides an axiomatic, deductive account of how the nature of the 
international political system constrains die behaviour of nation-states. Because there is no 
central authority in world politics, nation-states have to look after themselves if they want to 
survive, and this makes them effectively contribute to counterbalance the power of the 
strongest state, no matter what their individual motives are, that is, whether or not they seek 
domination, or deliberately try to achieve a balance7*. In systems that are not structured by 
the principle of self-help, where security is thus not the highest good, different forms of
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* Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, pp. 28-38, 84-107, 186-187.
77 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Tran. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981; Bueno de 
Mesquita refined his model in ’The War Trap Revisited’, American Political Science Review. (79), 1,
1985, pp. 157-176; Patrick James’s recent study gives an assessment of Bueno de Mesquita’s approach 
as well as a confirmation of its conclusions, Patrick James, Crisis and War. McGill Queen’s University 
Press, Montreal, 1988; Nicolson’s study, however, produces a refutation of the original model, Michael 
Nicholson, ’The Conceptual Bases of The War Trap", Journal of Conflict Resolution. (31), 2, 1987, 
pp. 346-369.
"  Were they not to do so, then structure would catch up with them, as it were, and they would ’fare 
badly’, Waltz, ’Reflections on "Theory of International Politics*: A Response to my Critics’, in Robert 
O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics. Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 331.
behaviour can be expected, such as bandwagoning, that is, die joining of the strongest party 
rather than counterbalancing it19.
Some neorealists explicidy defend deductive falsificatiomsm as the correct way to 
formulate and test theories of international relations. It is therefore not surprising that three 
criteria for the judgment of the soundness of theories are presented: (1) Axiomatic consistency: 
before one can even think of testing one’s hypothesis one must ascertain the logical consistency 
of one’s theory. In order to make this open to anyone, formal explicit reasoning is to be 
preferred, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argues. He considers axiomatic consistency to be the only 
objective criterion available10. (2) Critical Testing: after having established the internal logic 
of a theory, one should infer hypotheses from it and put them to a number of distinct and 
demanding tests in order to open up the theory to falsification*1. (3) Prediction: although 
rarely any social science theory is tested for its ability to forecast future events, eventually one 
expects such a theory to do so, if only to avoid the suspicion that ’the theory was made to fit 
the data’ or that the theory was no more than a tautology*2. George Modelski insists that his 
explanation of world politics since the Late Middle Ages can be projected into the future*3.
We can therefore safely conclude that neorealist writers, on the whole, perceive 
international relations as a pattern of regularity, namely anarchy, which forces nation-states 
to strive first and for all for their own survival in that system. Causes of patterns of regular 
behaviour in such an environment can be found in the characteristics of nation-states as well 
as in the nature of the international system. It is for the purpose of this thesis very important 
to notice that none of these neorealists is trying to explain international politics by referring 
to the behaviour of individuals. Individuals appear neither as a ’constituent factor’ of regularity
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79 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 116-126. Waltz’s theory has been tested and 
confirmed for patterns of alliance formation in the Middle East by Stephen M. Walt, Origins of 
Alliances.
10 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict. A 
Personal View’, International Studies Quarterly. (29), 1985, pp. 128-129; ’The Contribution of Expected 
Utility Theory to the Study of International Conflict’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History. (18), 4, 1988, 
p. 633; For a critical view of axiomatic deduction as a valid criterion, Robert D. Spegele, 
’Deconstructing Methodological Falsificationism in International Relations’, American Political Science 
Review. (74), 1980, pp. 104-122.
"  Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 14-16; 116-117.
c  Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ’The Contribution of Expected Utility Theory’, p. 649.
°  Modelski, 1 -nno Cycles in World Politics, pp. 39-40. He actually predicts a new global war for 
around the year 2030.
(which could have been hypothesized in their aggressive, or power-seeking, nature), nor as a 
central unit of analysis, a role that is strictly reserved for the nation-state14. Moreover, in 
their epistemology, neorealists tend to rely on deductive falsificationism rather than inductive 
enumeratism. In sum, neorealists seem to have entered the positivist realm of analysis. It still 
has to be ascertained, however, whether in this way they will be able to preserve traditional 
realist notions of international relations and to explain world politics in a more satisfactory 
way.
2.4 Neorealism as the saver of traditional realism
To what extent do neorealism’s epistemological and ontological notions actually offer 
a restoration of the shaky foundations of the realist tradition within the study of international 
relations? Actually, neorealism has been able to do away with some of the criticisms that have 
been brought against traditional realism throughout the years. In the 1970s, in the aftermath 
of the Vietnam-war and the 1973 oil crisis, scholars became worried about the impossibility 
to explain these phenomena with realist tools. Several fundamental flaws in the realist approach 
were indicated:
First, realism was paying attention to situations of military conflict only, and thus 
could not deal with die impact of O.P.E.C. in 1973, nor with increasing cooperation between 
states. Second, by consequence, realism, putting all its money on the high politics of war, 
ignored that international economic processes could be as essential. Third, by concentrating 
on die nation-state, realism could not account for the role of transnational actors, like 
multinationals and international organizations. Fourth, realism seemed rather limited in arguing 
that power is the basic motive behind states* behavior in world politics*.
As a matter of fact, neorealism (1) re-establishes the central place of anarchy as an 
explanatory factor of international politics, (2) manages to incorporate global economic 
processes into its domain, and (3) restores the central role of national states as actors on the
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** Knsner quite explicitly states that a (neo)realist account of Third World pressure on the First 
World to concede them more favourable international regimes should not put emphasis on the beliefs 
and attitudes of policy makers, as they can only be significant within the structural constraints imposed 
by die balance-of-power. One should therefore analyze the final policy decisions of states and not policy 
makers’ beliefs or attitudes; Knsner, Structural Conflict, p. 306.
“  James E. Dougherthy and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Contending Theories of International 
Relations, pp. 124-127. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 23-37.
stage of world politics. All three achievements are strongly interrelated, and their strength 
originates in the adoption of deductive falsificationism.
1. The central place of anarchy
Traditionally, criticism of the realist conception of international relations as Hobbesian 
state of nature in which conflict would prevail, is based on contending the empirical validity 
of such an assumption. It found its most articulate spokesman in Hedley Bull*6, who basically 
claimed, first, that it was conceptually wrong to think of anarchy as a situation of disorder*7 
in which war would eventually be inevitable, and second, that in the real world the elements 
that would characterize world politics as such a state of nature were simply absent**:
First, even though history seems to confirm that states are always preparing for war, 
this does not point to permanent disorder. For Bull, the occasional occurrence of war illustrates 
that international law and balance-of-power politics do function as well as limitations of 
military conflict. A rudimentary form of international society therefore exists as opposed to 
complete anarchy. Furthermore, it is not true that no moral rules can be formulated and 
obeyed in world politics. Bull points out that traditions of positive law and morality have been 
a continuous feature of international political life. Moreover, a whole variety of international 
organizations exists which can be considered devices for the promotion of compliance with 
established norms*9.
Although Bull's observations may be correct, he is not challenging a theory here, but 
merely calling into question a description, or a set of regularities, supposedly derived from 
Hobbesian assumptions about the state of nature90. This point has been taken up explicitly by 
those neorealists, such as Waltz, Bueno de Mesquita, and, to a certain extent, Gilpin, who
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M Hedley Bull, ’Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin 
Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations. Essays in the Theory of International Politics. Allen and 
Unwin, London, 196, pp. 35-50; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Order: Hedley Bull, ’Hobbes and the 
International Anarchy’, Social Research. (48), 4, 1981, pp. 717-738.
17 Bull, ’Society and Anarchy’, p. 35, esp. footnote 2. James Richardson, ’The Academic Study of 
International Relations’, Unpublished manuscript, pp. 51-52.
** Recent interpretations by Bull and R.J. Vincent, however, place Hobbes’s idea of a state of nature 
in the context of international society rather than anarchy, see Walker, ’Realism, Change and 
International Political Theory’, p. 73.
** Bull, ’Society and Anarchy’, pp. 41-42; cf. Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International 
Relations, pp. 46-48.
*° I owe this point to Michael W. Doyle.
claim to set forth a deductively formulated theory of international politics. They emphasize that 
it is illegitimate to test a theory by examining the empirical validity of its assumptions. For 
Waltz ’a theory contains at least one theoretical assumption. Such assumptions are not factual. 
One therefore cannot legitimately ask if they are true, only if they are useful. Theories must 
be evaluated in terms of what they claim to explain’91. Although some claim that the 
untouchability of assumptions will necessarily lead to the impossibility to challenge a theory 
on its empirical claims either92, it will be shown in section 2.5 that neorealist theory can be 
criticized for its limited explanatory power. What matters here is the question whether the 
neorealist conception of anarchy provides a basis for the explanation of international politics.
What is nowadays explicitly accepted in neorealist writings is the view that anarchy, 
or the absence of central authority, and the implied security dilemma, no longer exclusively 
mean the perpetual preparation of war93, but that anarchy need not exclude cooperation 
between sovereign actors94. Underneath, however, a shift in the nature of the dynamics of 
international politics can be observed: power is no longer conceived as the driving force 
underlying all international politics, but is incorporated in the main feature of actors within an 
anarchical system, namely, that they will strive for security rather than for power itself. This 
means that not just competition can be an outcome, but cooperation too95.
This is borne out in Waltz’s theory of inter-state behaviour: a balance-of-power system 
will reduce the likelihood of military conflict, whether states strive for power, or barely seek 
survival, but, as a matter of fact, in such a system states will have to assure their security first,
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91 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 117-118.
93 Weltman claims that 'empirical investigation merely confirms the implications of the premises 
under which it was undertaken. It can never be more conclusive than those premises themselves’; John 
J. Weltman, ’On the Interpretation of International Thought’, Review of Politics. (44), 1, 1982, p. 29. 
This would imply that only immanent logic and formal deduction can be relevant criteria in appraising 
a theory, as is maintained by, for instance, Bueno de Mesquita, Towards a Scientific Understanding 
of International Conflict’.
”  Herbert Butterfield phrased the situation on which mutual mistrust is the main feature of 
international politics as ’Hobbesian fear’, Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations. Collins, 
London, 1951, p. 19. Goldman observes that realists have too long equated anarchy with war and 
conflict, Kjell Goldmann, The concept of realism as a source of confusion’, Cooperation and Conflict. 
(23), 1, 1988, p. 8.
94 Cf. R J. Vincent, ’Hedley Bull and Order in International Politics’, Millennium. Journal of 
International Studies (17), 2, 1988, pp. 195-214; Richard K. Ashley, ’Untying the Sovereign State: A 
Double Reading of the Anarchy Problématique’, Millennium. Journal of International Studies. (17), 2, 
1988, p. 239.
91 Goldmann refers to this shift, when he observes that security will incite nation-states to be 
satisfiers rather than maximizers for power, The concept of "realism* as a source of confusion’, p. 8.
before they can even think of pursuing other goals, such as ’tranquility, profit, and power’96. 
Security thus becomes a central element of the dynamics of the anarchical system as important 
as power: not only does it cover the traditional theme of conflict between nation-states, as in 
Waltz’s work, but it also allows for die analysis of a whole new field of international 
processes, because anarchy no longer excludes cooperation among nation-states as a way of 
attaining the aim of security97. This is most clearly shown in the study of international 
institutions which hosts two related approaches, the study of international regimes and the 
application of game theory to the study of international politics’*.
(a) International regimes theory. International regimes are usually broadly defined to 
refer to ’sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’" .  In 
such a conception both formal international organizations, international conventions, 
international law, and less formal arrangements, such as morality, or public opinion, could be 
considered regimes. In practice, however, most studies of international regimes focus on 
formal arrangements between nation-states100. This limitation is explained by the fact that 
rules and norms, the core of a regime, are imbedded in practices, the most important of which 
still is the sovereignty of nation-states101. Nevertheless, by providing information and 
stabilizing expectations of nation-states, international regimes reduce uncertainty between them 
and lower transaction costs. It is significant that many regime studies are framed in neorealist
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York, Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 334.
97 This is most explicit in Keohane, who seeks ’to demonstrate that realist assumptions about world 
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which promote cooperation’, After Hegemony, p. 67.
N Keohane argues that neorealism ignores international institutions; Robert O. Keohane, ’Alliances, 
Threats and the Uses of Neorealism’, International Security. (13), 1, 1988, p. 174. The point is rather 
that many studies of international institutions, such as international regimes and game theory, effectively 
follow neorealist prescriptions.
99 Stephen Krasner, ’Structural Causes and Regime Variables: Regimes as Intervening Variables', 
International Organization. (36), 2, 1982, p. 186.
■® Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ’"Power and Interdependence' Revisited’, 
International Organization. (41), 4, 1985, pp. 740-741.
101 Robert O. Keohane, ’International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly.
(32), 1988, p. 386.
terms: nation-states, caught in the security dilemma of an anarchical environment are prepared 
to engage into cooperation with other states through international institutions like international 
regimes. Exactly because of international anarchy and the subsequent autonomy of the nation­
state transaction costs are never negligible, 'since it is always difficult to communicate, to 
monitor performance, and especially to enforce compliance with rules’102. International 
regimes provide these elements, and thus seriously reduce the pressure from the security 
dilemma109. As such, international regimes are beneficial to smaller powers, which consider 
them barriers to arbitrariness by stronger powers, as well as for great powers, that want to 
establish a stable environment, to which regimes undeniably seem to contribute104. It is 
ironical that the study of international regimes, that started out as an element of 
interdependence theory, which itself was highly critical of die realist tradition, has facilitated 
the coming of neorealist literature over the years, as the authors of Power and Interdependence 
themselves observe109. Nevertheless, it can be concluded106 that international regime 
theory, which analyzes world politics with neorealist tools, is an improvement of the old realist
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,<D See, for instance, J.A. Finlay son and M.W. Zacher, ’The Gatt and the Regulation of Trade 
Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions’, in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes. Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 1983, pp. 273-315; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony, chapter 10; V.K. 
Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade. University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1985; C. Lipson, ’Bankers’ Dilemmas: Cooperation and Rescheduling 
Sovereign Debts’, in K. Oye (ed.), Cooperation under Anarchy. Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1986, pp. 200-225.
104 Robert'O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ’Two Cheers for Multilateralism’, Foreign Policy. 
(60), 1985, p. 152.
m Keohane and Nye, ’‘Power and Interdependence* Revisited’, p. 733.
106 Joseph Grieco argues that this incorporation of cooperation does not properly reflect the
importance and value of a realist conception of anarchy. According to him, nation-states are moved not 
just by a concern over defection from cooperation, which option is supposed to make international
regimes less attractive to states; such an emphasis would rely too much on die maximization of power 
by nation-states. Because of their concern over security, states, the realist argument goes, act upon the
relative gains by others as well. Grieco forgets, however, that exactly the exigencies of the security 
dilemma can incite a state to engage in cooperation, precisely because it reduces uncertainty in some 
areas of world politics -if only temporarily; Joseph M. Grieco, ’Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: 
A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism*. International Organization. (42), 3, 1988, pp. 
487, 497-503; see also, Joseph M. Grieco, Cooperation among Nations. Europe. America, and Non- 
Tariff Barriers to Trade. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1990, pp. 27-50. This implies, according to 
me, that Keohane in After Hegemony does refer to the prime dynamics of world politics, i.e., the 
security dilemma, which allows regimes to be formed; contrary to what Rosenau claims in his critique 
of Keohane’s book, James N. Rosenau, ’Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-driven 
Actors in World Politics’, International Ortn.niT.tinn (40), 4, 1986, p. 874.
view of anarchical conflict, because it allows for cooperation to take place. Another approach 
that opens up this possibility is game theory.
(b) Game theory analysis. A number of recent writings explicitly deals with the question 
of how nation-states will ever be prepared to cooperate under the conditions of the security 
dilemma, the traditional interpretation of which stated that no state can improve its security 
without reducing that of others. Apart from the school of regime analysis, several works have 
appeared of late that, in order to investigate the possibility of cooperation under anarchy, 
present their analysis in a formalized fashion107. It is fashionable to frame the research 
problem in terms of the iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma Game, under which conditions nation­
states will prefer to defect from cooperation no matter what the other party does. It is 
suggested that a solution for this situation can be found, if nation-states adopt a Tit-for-Tat 
strategy, that is, sticking to one’s promises as long as others do so too10*.
What is important here, is the observation that those scholars who try to apply insights 
from game theory to the study of international relations build their work on the central notion 
of traditional realism, that is, international anarchy and the consecutive security dilemma. 
However, their reliance on game theory permits them to allow for both conflict and 
cooperation to take place109. Furthermore, they tend to concentrate on the pay-offs or nation­
states, who thus remain the central actors o the game. Interestingly, game theory is linked to 
regime studies in as far as international institutions can provide the organizational setting in 
which Tit-for-Tat strategies can be furthered110.
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Books, New York, 1984; Robert Jervis, ’Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics. 
(30), 1978, pp. 167-214; Robert Keohane, After Hegemony, esp. Chapter 5; John C. Harsanyi, 'Game 
Theory and the Analysis of International Conflict’, in Harsanyi, Essays on Ethics. Social Behavior, and 
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Rivalry. Columbia University Press, New York, 1987; David A. Lake, Power. Protection, and Free 
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317-318; Joanne Gowa, ’Anarchy, Egoism, and Third Image: ’The Evolution of Cooperation’ and 
International Relations’, International Organization. (40), 1, 1986, pp. 168-171.
109 Jervis, ’Realism, Game Theory and Cooperation’, p. 319.
1,0 Grieco, ’Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation’, pp. 493-495.
Neorealism has thus come a long way in overcoming the criticism against traditional 
realism that its myopic view of an anarchical environment limited its research focus to military 
conflict. By keeping anarchy as the analytical point of departure, but allowing for cooperation 
between nation-states by embracing international regimes and game theory, neorealism opens 
the way to respond to a second objection to classical realism, that is, its lack of attention for 
economic processes.
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2. The incorporation of global economic processes
From die acceptance of cooperation under die structural condition of international 
anarchy it is only one step further to the recognition that neorealism thus has left behind its 
traditionally exclusive emphasis on military issues, die domain of ’high politics’, and has 
opened up to analyses of international economic processes. In fact, many of the empirical 
studies that rely on international regime theory and game theoretical analysis deal with case 
studies from die field of international economics. Traditionally, however, realists have been 
reproached for their negligence of other spheres than the politico-military one111. With their 
serious attention to economic areas, neorealists, when discussing international regimes, get 
very close to Keohane and Nye’s original conception of interdependence, which they meant 
to be a redefinition of the concept of power in international relations, by breaking it up in 
various domains and dimensions112. For some commentators this feature of encompassing 
international economics within the field even constitutes the main characteristic of
111 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, p. 24; Mansbach and 
Vasquez, In Search of Theory, pip. 10-11: for a defence of die primacy of power politics over 
economics, see Martin Wight, Power Politics, pp. 102-103.
112 Keohane and Nye tried to refine the idea of mutual dependence as a source of power in world 
politics by distinguishing between symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependence. The latter indicated 
that states, although dependent on each other, could be dependent in an unequal way, varying with the 
nature of die area of dependence. This could provide one state with a source of influence, and, 
eventually, power over another state; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, pp. 8-19. This 
intention has recently been confirmed by the authors, who acknowledge how close they have thus 
remained to the realist tradition themselves, and, as a matter of feet, contributed to the broadening of 
the basis of neorealism, because no-one picked up their call for an alternative framework, called 
'complex interdependence*, for which they had given the main outlines; Keohane and Nye, ’’Power 
and Interdependence* Revisited’, pp. 727, 733. It is therefore incorrect of Kenneth Waltz to state that 
interdependence usually suggests little more than that everything affects everything else; Waltz, Theory 
of International Politics, pp. 156-157. It is true that interdependence has become a catchy song that 
sometimes plays the tune that Waltz repudiates; one such example is Charles Beitz’s erroneous claim 
that international distributive justice can be based on Rawlsian principles of domestic justice, just 
because the world is interdependent; Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. Part HI.
neorealism113. The clearest example of the incorporation of global economic processes in 
realist thought is Gilpin’s recent study of the interaction between international politics and 
international economics114. In his analysis he puts emphasis on the influence of the 
international system, and, as Roger Tooze shows, develops an argument along the line of 
positivist epistemology“3. And indeed, as Gilpin is interested in the political economy of 
international relations rather than in the political economy of the world system he remains 
perfectly within a realist analysis which stresses the interaction between national states116. 
In this way both criticisms that realism could not deal with global interdependence nor with 
other tools than military behaviour are done away with. By arguing that nation-states are still 
dominant actors rather than transnational actors, neorealists incorporate the importance of 
power within global economic interdependence: interdependence simply means different types 
of conflict, fought with various type of power, not just military117. Susan Strange points to 
this aspect, when she observes that instead of competing for territory states now engage 
increasingly in a competition for market shares, which requires less expenses for military 
security111. This observation indicates another reason why neorealists have turned to 
international economics: conflict between states is more and more of an economic kind, rather 
than politico-military119.
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113 See, for example, R.J. Vincent, ’Hedley Bull and Order in International Politics’, p. 204.
1,4 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations.
115 Roger Tooze, 'The Emergence of a New International Political Economy: a Realist View’, 
Millennium. Journal of International Studies. (16), 3, 1988, pp. 523, 525.
114 Susan Strange, ’Defending Benign Mercantillism’, Journal of Peace Research. (25), 3, 1988, p.
273.
1,7 Tucker, The inequality of nations, pp. 80-81.
n< Susan Strange, ’The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’, International Organization. (41), 4,
1987, pp. 551-574.
119 This change may be complementary to Michael Doyle’s explanation of relative peace between 
liberal democracies for more than two centuries. He attributes this absence of armed conflict to the 
inrr»jging afy*ptanrj» of Kant’s three principles of perpetual peace by these states; Michael W. Doyle, 
’Kant, Liberalism and Foreign Affairs. Parts 1 , 2 ’, Philosophy and Public Affairs. (12), 3/4, 1983, pp. 
205-235, 323-353; Doyle, ’Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review. (80), 
4, 1986, pp. 1151-1170, which article essentially claims that a competition for markets is possible 
without a resort to force.
3. The restoration of die nation-state as principal actor
It has since long been stated that the traditional realist emphasis on the state as a 
central actor is a serious misconception, either because states are not the only significant actors 
on the international scene, or because states are not the unitary actors they were often held to 
be: the recent swing to studies that hold cooperation under anarchy to be possible reintroduce 
the emphasis on nation-states as principal actors, and even the notion that states rationally try 
to pursue an interest of their own130. It has been shown in section 2.3 that this can be 
explained by neorealism’s epistemological view that assumptions that underlie theories, such 
as the rationally acting state, need not be true, only be useful. Most studies within the 
framework of international regimes deal with formal inter-state relations121, or with 
institutions and norms as the outcome of rationally calculated behaviour of states122.
The reemergence of the centrality of national states is closely linked to the 
reinterpretation of international cooperation to be fitting within the framing of interdependence 
as an analytical tool of (neo)reaIism. Neorealism, as a matter of fact, assumes transnational 
actors to be irrelevant for die main events of international relations. Even if military power has 
become less important relative to economic power, it is through the nation-state that the old 
game will be played: ’interdependence simply means new kinds of conflicts, the solution of 
which still depends on die state as the ’formative state of consensus"’123. Gilpin asserts that 
national states are still crucial actors in world politics regardless of their mutual dependency: 
’[d]despite the emergence of the multinational corporation and international finance are still 
nationally based and, despite the increase in economic interdependence, few economies are 
tightly integrated into the world economy (-) Interdependence is a phenomenon to be studied, 
not a ready-made set of conclusions regarding the nature and dynamics of international 
relations’134. The message is, therefore, clear: in international political economy and 
international relations alike, nation-states are to stay in the spodight125.
130 Cf. Ashley, ’Untying the Sovereign State’, p. 236.
121 Keohane and Nye, ’’Power and Interdependence* Revisited’, pp. 740-741.
122 Cf. Kntochwil and Ruggie, ’International Organization: a State of the Art of an Art of the State’, 
International Organization. (40), 4, 1986, pp. 762-763.
m Tucker, The Inequality of Nations, pp. 80-102, quote from pp. 80-81.
124 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, pp. 16, 18.
125 This is especially true for recent studies of international trade. For an overview, see Benjamin 
J. Cohen, ’The Political Economy of International Trade’, International Qrpnipting. (44), 2, Spring
1990, pp. 261-281.
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The conclusion must be that neorealist scholars have succeeded in giving realist notions 
a more rigorous, that is, scientific, foundation. Their explicit reference to theory formation and 
the application of deductive logic to support their claims certainly brings the discipline of 
international relations at a higher intellectual level, leaving behind the empiricist part of the 
discipline, where as many data as possible were collected and made subject to analyses of their 
correlations. Neorealist authors have thus brought some basic notions of the field within what 
Thomas Kuhn calls the context of justification126. In doing so, neorealism has formulated a 
response to critics of traditional realism: it broadened the assumption of anarchy to mean 
security rather than mistrust, thus allowing for cooperation to take place, which opens the way 
for the incorporation of international economic processes. It thus made the distinction between 
’high’ and ’low’ politics less dramatic. Furthermore, it provides for a reinterpretation of the 
concept of interdependence which privileges the position of the nation-state and for a 
redefinition of power in international relations, which retains its central role.
2.5 The explanatory power of neorealism
From these premises neorealists have set out to deal with those issues that at one time 
were indicators of traditional realists’ lack of explanatory power: predominantly, of course, 
this involves attention to issues of international political economy, but security problems as 
well. The latest step is the suggestion that American involvement in Vietnam can be explained 
in neorealist terms127, while the Vietnam has been the phenomenon par excellence that 
realism could not deal with m.
It should be stressed that the strength of neorealist works comes predominantly from 
their ontological and epistemological coherence. No emphasis on anarchy, nation-states, their 
utility maximizing behaviour, etc., would be possible, had all this not been grounded in an 
epistemology of deductive reasoning that stresses axioms and assumptions, thus relieving 
neorealism from proving that nation-states are, or behave as if they were, rational actors, or 
that international relations do indeed resemble an anarchy. Assumptions are just useful tools
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126 Cf. R.H. Lieshout, ’De 'Harde' Kern van de Zaak’, Acta Politica. (24), 4, 1989, pp. 461-482.
117 David L. Anderson, ’Why Vietnam ? Postrevisionist Answers and a Neorealist Suggestion’, 
Diplomatic History. (13), 3, 1989, esp. pp. 427-429.
■* Mansbach and Vasquez, In Search of Theory, chapter 1.
to approach reality139. It is therefore not enough to reproach Waltz for not having formulated 
a theory of the state130, or for not stipulating the origins of a state's interests131. States are 
assumed to be there and to be motivated by survival, an interest that follows from the security 
dilemma. Other interests can be pursued, but are not necessary for theory formation. One 
should only ask whether these restrictions in assumptions allow neorealists to explain what they 
seek to explain. It follows from this that in order to criticize neorealists it is not enough to 
merely point out their unreal assumptions. Neorealists should be judged in terms of what they 
seek to explain133. Only if important areas remain unexplained, it will be useful to ask 
whether alternative modes of explanation offer complementary insight without touching the 
neorealist core argument, or whether they offer a complete and better understanding of 
phenomena. Only in this way can it be ascertained whether neorealism’s unrealistic 
assumptions actually hamper the understanding of international politics. Let us therefore now 
turn to the question whether neorealist theories succeed in explaining the phenomena they seek 
to explain.
Waltz’s theory of balance of power, in which states will act to counter the growing 
power of another actor, is simple133, clear, and seems to follow deductively from its 
premises134. Its strength, however, carries its weakness at the same time. It offers an 
explanation of under what conditions military conflicts are more likely to occur, that is, in a 
system of multipolarity rather than in bipolar one. But that is about all it can be expected to
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129 Waltz observes that ’we can freely admit that states are in fact not unitary, purposive actors. 
States pursue many goals, which are often vaguely formulated and inconsistent (•). But all of this has 
always been known, and it tells us nothing about the merits of balance-of-power theory’. Theory of 
International Politics, p. 119.
130 E.g., Wendt, ’The agent-structure problem’, pp. 342-343.
111 Keohane and Nye, ’"Power and Interdependence* Revisited’, pp. 745 ff.; Jervis makes the same 
reproach to game theory, Jervis, ’Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation’, p. 322.
132 Cf. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118.
133 Robot Cox questions the relevance of parsimony as a criterion to judge competing theories, 
’Postscript 1985’ to his ’Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory’, 
in Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and its critics, p. 245. Nye thinks Waltz has sacrificed too much in 
order to attain parsimony, ’Neorealism and Neoliberalism’, p. 243; Waltz offers no explicit defence of 
parsimony as a central value, but nevertheless emphasizes the elegance of his approach, ’Reflections on 
’Theory of International Politics*’, p. 330.
134 The clearest statement of this deductive logic can be found in Kenneth N. Waltz, ’The Origins 
of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History. (18), 4, 1988, pp. 619-620.
say. In Waltz’s words: ’although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are 
fought, it does explain war’s dismal recurrence through the millennia’135.
One should first wonder if one should be satisfied with a theory that offers such 
general explanations; what is more, it should be doubted whether the probability of the 
recurrence of military conflict follows directly from Waltz’s hard logic. According to me, 
there is no compelling reason why the security dilemma of states that strive for survival causes 
multipolar systems to be relatively more unstable than bipolar ones.The reasons that Waltz 
produces136 point to the conclusion that the explanation of relative stability is to be found at 
the unit level instead of the system’s level: bipolar models are more stable because for the two 
states involved ’the benefits of a calculated response stand out most clearly and the sanctions 
against irresponsible behavior achieve their greatest force’, as well as because they are less 
interdependent. In multipolar systems ’dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and 
definitions of vital interests easily obscured’. Thus Waltz concludes that in a multipolar world 
miscalculation is the principal cause of war, while in a bipolar world overreaction is the main 
risk. This expansion of his theory, however, takes him far away from the usually celebrated 
parallel of system’s theory with the micro-economic theory of the market137. Competition 
under a market structure, the adaptation to which makes states survive or perish, is the 
dominant descriptive analogy for international politics in his work13*. However, by 
presenting miscalculation and overreaction as the sources of causes of conflicts, Waltz relies 
on socialization processes rather than on market processes. Actually, Waltz mentions 
socialization himself as one of the two processes through which the constraining influence of 
the structure of the international system is felt, but does not develop on this theme139.
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135 Waltz, ibid., p. 620.
134 Waltz, ibid.. pp. 622-624.
117 A critique of Waltz’s parallel of international politics with market behaviour is provided by 
Timothy McKeown, ’The Limitations of "Structural* Theories of Commercial Policy’, International 
Organization. (40), 1, 1986, pp. 43-64.
'* This prejtirm is best exemplified by Waltz’s observation that ’a state can behave as it pleases, 
but it will fare badly if some of the other parties are making reasonably intelligent decisions’; Waltz, 
’Reflections’, p. 331.
'* He irtntre that socialization ’encourages similarities of attributes and of behavior’, Theory of 
Tntftmatirm»! Politics, p. 76; socialization is also mentioned on pp. 128-129. A similar view is presented 
by O u r * and Snyder, although they do not think it a problem for Waltz’s parsimonious theory. 
They suggest to link miscalculation and overreaction to Jervis’s theory of misperception; Thomas J.
and Jack Snyder, ’Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in 
Multipolarity’, International Organization. (44), 2, 1990, pp. 137-168. Waltz’s negligence of
If one is to understand conflict, one has to look at miscalculation and overreaction, that 
is, processes at the unit level, at the elite-level, that act as a filter through which systemic 
forces operate. What then remains of the inherent logic in multipolar and bipolar systems ? 
Moreover, Richardson shows that the historical record of bipolar systems is not as stable as 
Waltz suggests and that one could think of several ’logical’ arguments in favour of 
multipolarity as a promotor of relative stability140.
It should therefore be concluded that first there is no inherent logic about the relative 
stability of either bipolarity or multipolarity, and that, at best, the matter is still an empirical 
question to be verified. Second, there is reason to believe that the explanations of military 
conflict of either type of system require variables at the unit level. These include socialization 
processes at the level of political elites. What is left of Waltz’s impressive deductive power is 
a relatively small skeleton of hypotheses to be tested.
This skeleton, moreover, is of a highly static nature: Waltz’s deductive reasoning 
cannot explain change from one type of system to another141. For example, it does not follow 
from Waltz’s theory that World War Two would witness the change from a multipolar to a 
bipolar world, neither can it shed any light on the many efforts that have been made to 
describe international political history in different types of systems, such as uni-, bi-, and 
multipolar worlds. This adds up to saying that Waltz uses structure as an independent variable, 
but is not able to account for the phenomenon itself42.
Even though Waltz could retort that changes in the configuration of the system are 
explained by changes in the relative capabilities of the elements of the system14*, it implies 
that if one wants to know more about international relations than the relative merits of multi- 
and bipolarity respectively, one will have to take refuge in processes that occur within the units 
of the system. Fortunately for Waltz, a neorealist explanation of such phenomena is available
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socialization is to a certain extent, discussed by Howe, 'Neorealism revisited: the neorealist landscape 
surveyed through nationalist spectacles’. International Journal. (46), 1991, pp. 348-351.
14t Richardson, ’The academic study of international relations’, pp. 60-61
141 Actually, Ruggie complains that Waltz allows but for one systemic change: from medieval 
anarchy into the modem states system, Ruggie, ’Continuity and Transformation’; Waltz implicitly does 
away with this criticism by pointing out that balance-of-power politics has persisted throughout history, 
in ancient Greece, India, and among Italian city-states. Waltz, ’Reflections’, p. 341, thus arriving at the 
classical position that international politics has not fundamentally changed since the days of Thucydides.
141 Wendt, The agent-stnicture problem in international relations theory'. International Organization.
(41), 3, 1987, p. 347.
M Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 97-99; ’A Response to My Critics’, p. 331.
in the works of scholars such as Gilpin, Modelski, and, to a certain extent, Kennedy, so that 
Waltz’s framework is supplemented with theories that help account for changes within and 
across various types of system144.
Gilpin’s theory provides a clear account of major wars over the last five centuries by 
pointing at the rational behaviour of national states that tend to challenge the position of a 
hegemon as soon as the latter tends to decline, a characteristic inherent to hegemonic powers. 
However, if one puts the theory of hegemonic cycles to the question of how much insight it 
does give into the explanation of international history, one has to admit that relatively few 
phenomena are accounted for: Gilpin notes this himself when he observes that most wars are 
not fought because of structural causes (such as hegemonic wars), but are the product of an 
escalation process, in which elites’ perceptions play an important role145. Gilpin, therefore, 
considers structural theories of hegemonic war to be at best partial, and complementary to 
others, ’such as those of cognitive psychology and expected utility’144.
A further problem is that theories of hegemonic conflict cannot indicate when a 
hegemon is exactly a hegemon. Kennedy’s analysis shows the existence of a bipolar world at 
the beginning of the 20th century with the United States and Russia as main contenders. At the 
same time, British decline had unmistakably set in. But what does a theory of hegemonic 
cycles explain if allows for the flexibility of 50 years in order to assure that a transformation 
of the configuration of the international system has taken place ? Was the United States a 
hegemon in 1900, 1917, 1939, or 1945 ? Did Britain conclude its downfall in those years? 
Apparently, one should draw the conclusion that an objective hegemon need not be an effective 
hegemon. There is no compelling systemic reason why ascending powers will assume that role. 
The performing of hegemonic functions requires the will to do so147.
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144 It is in this sense that Nye considers Gilpin’s analysis to be the substantive saviour of Waltz’s 
approach, ’Neo realism and Neoliberalism’, p. 245.
145 Robert Gilpin, ’The Theory of Hegemonic War’, Journal of Ioteriigciplinarv History. (18), 4, 
1988, pp. 592-593.
144 Gilpin, ibid.. pp. 605-606.
147 This is the core of Susan Strange’s analysis of America’s present hegemonic position; ’The 
Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony’.
2.6 Conclusion
Neorealist theories of military conflict can only partially explain die history of 
international relations. Neorealists would be among the first to accept that and call for 
complementary theories of foreign policies of national states which would give additional 
strength to structural theories of world politics. However, I have claimed that neorealists 
cannot even sustain their own empirical claims without incorporating processes at the level of 
political elites. This fault will be illustrated by an analysis of Anglo-American relations 
between 1945 and 1951 in the following chapter.
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Chapter 3: Can neorealism explain Anglo-American relations ?
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3.1 Introductory remarks
So far, we have discussed neorealism mainly from a theoretical point of view. It is as 
important to determine to what extent neoreal ism succeeds in explaining a so-called crucial 
case study. It has been argued that Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956 constitute 
such a case. The analysis will start from Waltz’s parsimonious theory of international politics. 
Successively, other neorealist notions will be added, first, the theory of hegemonic war, such 
as offered in the works of Gilpin, Modelski, and Kennedy; second, international regime theory 
which supposedly gives a more detailed explanation of international relations than the narrow 
approach of Waltz. It will be contended that a regime analysis of the various issue areas 
relevant to the United States and the United Kingdom allow for the interpretation that Great 
Britain was not completely submitted to the whims of the new postwar hegemon, and that 
therefore it was not completely irrational of die British foreign policy elite in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s to think that Great Britain was a world power with important ’responsibilities’ 
after all, and, moreover, that her position was recognized by the United States1. These 
perceptions would subsequently prove crucial for the understanding of the foreign policies of 
the Churchill and Eden Governments in the mid-1950s.
3.2 Parsimonious neorealism
3.2.1 Waltz’s theory of international politics
The classic interpretation of the Suez crisis depicts it as the moment when Great Britain 
and France learned their lesson: they no longer belonged to the great world powers, but had 
sunk back into the ranks of minor powers that are dependent on consent o the world’s leader 
before engaging into military adventures. This type of analysis entails a claim about both a 
change in the configuration of the international political system and about the specific way in 
which the constraints of that system on its units actually operate. Suez was to symbolize the 
transformation of the international political system from a multipolar world into a bipolar 
world, that took place during the Second World War. The leading powers of the prewar
1 In this sense, it is wise to follow D.C. Watt’s advice not to read back into political developments 
of the early postwar period from today’s perspective of Great Britain having sunk back into the ranks 
of the «nullw powers. Such an attitude would imply the ignoring of the precise nature of the power 
relationships and perceptions of them at the time. It could be claimed that a neorealist analysis will foil 
prey to exactly that trap. D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain’s Place. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, etc., 1984, pp. 22-23.
period, Great Britain, France, and Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Japan and Italy, had been 
eclipsed by the United States, and, a few years later, the Soviet Union. As such, the old 
leaders had to comply with the rules of die game of international politics, and had to accept 
the primary importance of the security interests of the new leaders.
Waltz explicidy refers to this change as an illustration of his systemic theory. He 
observes that die states who lost their great power status in the course of the Second World 
War had to follow the commandments of the new structure2. Those degraded states must adapt 
to new circumstances, so runs the argument of selection: states, if they are interested in 
survival in an anarchical world, have to act according to changed realities: ’even though 
constrained by a system’s structure, a unit of the system can behave as its pleases. It will, 
however, fare badly if some of die other parties are making reasonably intelligent 
decisions” .
In practical terms, this implies that reality will catch up with a state that prefers to 
ignore the realities of the international system. This line of argument is troubling for two 
reasons. First, it almost adds up to saying that France and Britain had to meet with their Suez, 
as a kind of punishment for their aspirations to be a world power. Second, it may indicate that 
Waltz’s theory of inter-state behaviour becomes impossible to falsify: if states of minor 
importance develop behaviour that is inconsistent with their place in the system, then this can 
never be brought against Waltz’s theory, because his answer can always be: ’Yes, but wait and 
see: sooner or later that state will meet its fate’4.
Nevertheless, to Waltz the immediate postwar period and the Suez crisis are a 
confirmation of his theory that a bipolar world will bring stability through the mechanisms of 
the international system:
’the United States could dissociate itself from the Suez adventure of its principal allies 
and subject one of them to heavy financial pressure (-). Enjoying a position of 
predominance, the United States could continue to focus its attention on its major 
adversary [the Soviet Union], while disciplinating its two allies (-). Opposing Britain 
and France endangered neither the United States nor the alliance, because the security 
of Britain and France depended much more heavily on us than our security depended 
on them’5.
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2 Kenneth Waltz, ’Reflections on Theory of International Politics”’, p. 332.
3 Waltz, jfe&, p. 331.
4 This seems to place this part of Waltz’s theory outside the context of justification.
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, ’The Origins of War in Neoiealist Theoiy’, pp. 621-622.
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This line of reasoning is flawed mainly for two reasons. First, the truth is that the 
alliance was thoroughly shaken by the Suez crisis. At the time, it was feared that the 
organization would split because of the internal riff between its principal members. Moreover, 
to the French, the lack of American support at the time of Suez meant that it would never be 
certain when the United States were ever to defend France’s vital interests, which sensation 
eventually led to the French decision to develop an independent nuclear force, and to leave the 
military structure of NATO6.
Second, instead of asking why the Americans did stop their allies at Suez, it is more 
interesting to ask why the United States did not stop British and French colonialist practices 
before 19567: it is true that the Americans encouraged the British to withdraw from India in
1947 and the French to leave Indo-China in 1954. They strongly disapproved of an imminent 
British military intervention in the 1951 Abadan oil crisis, but, on the whole, they did not 
seem too worried about large French and British colonial and semi-colonial possessions and 
practices*.
A neorealist could reply that despite the fact that the attitude of the world’s leading 
state did not correspond to the theory’s expectations, the capabilities of France and Britain 
were would be another important factor to take into account: this would reveal that the United 
Kingdom and France no longer had the economic capabilities to sustain the interventionist 
policies of a great power. This interpretation, however, conflicts with numerous British 
military actions in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, well into the 1960s, until the Wilson 
Government decided to cut off British responsibilities east of Suez. A neorealist explanation
6 Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister at the time Suez, in a speech to the French National 
Assembley at the time that the French ’force de frappe’ was discussed in 1962, draws a parallel between 
1917, 1941, and 1956, and concludes that one can never rely cm the forthcoming of American help for 
French vital interests, ’Du dégagement du neutralisme*, printed in Démocratie 62. Supplément 
19.7.1962. p. IV, at the archives of the Organisation Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste. Paris, file 
E5 134BD. His Foreign Secretary Christian Pineau suggested that De Gaulle could take France out of 
NATO only because of the American attitude at the time of Suez; Christian Pineau, 'Rapport Introductif 
a Table Ronde: Guy Mollet, l’Europe et les problèmes internationaux’, in Fondation Guv Mollet. 
Témoignages et débats sur Guy Mollet, Arras, 1986, p. 38. Kohi shows how the Suez crisis hastened 
the development of French nuclear weapons. They had been asked for already after the French defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, and in early 1956 a study committee under General Paul Ely had been set 
up, Wilfrid L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1971, pp. 
35-37, 44. For an overview of French dissatisfaction with NATO in 1955-6, see Alfred Grosser, La 
Quatrième République et sa Politique Etrangère. Arman Colin, Paris, 1961, pp. 386-389.
7 Just like they forced the Dutch out of Indonesia between 1946 and 1949.
* It should be recalled from Chapter 1 that the United States did not interfere with French policies 
in Algeria until after the Suez crisis.
of postwar Anglo-American relations with Waltz’s parsimonious approach must therefore 
remain rather limited: (a) it is true that Waltz can observe a change in the configuration of the 
system, but this observation alone is of little help, because (b) it cannot predict the moment 
at which a leading power will draw the line and will restrain other powers, and, by 
consequence, it cannot explain why the United States did not stop Great and Britain and France 
until 1956; (c) it cannot explain many events in die period 1945-1966 which, at first sight, 
seem to defy systemic expectations of behaviour of the principal actors.
3.2.2 Cycles of hegemonic conflict.
A systemic theory, such as Waltz’s, cannot offer but a very rudimentary condition 
under which international political behaviour takes place9. Theories that portray international 
relations as a recurrent pattern of conflict where newly expanding states are challenging and 
eventually replacing a declining hegemon, offer a backup of Waltz’s systemic theory. 
Basically, such an approach, advocated by Gilpin, Modelski, and, arguably, Kennedy, explains 
the dynamics of world politics in terms of the changing economic fortunes of nation-states as 
well as the pressure which may come from both inside nation-states and from the international 
system. Actually, the importance of geopolitical and technological factors is stressed by those 
authors, but capabilities seem to be their most important variable10.
The advantage of their approach over Waltz’s is that they are able to account for 
changes of the configuration of the international system, and for the behaviour of some of its 
elements. Their type of analysis, however, carries two disadvantages: first, they cannot say 
when a hegemon is a exactly a hegemon. They therefore describe relatively large periods of 
history without much precision. In chapter 2 the problem of American hegemony was already 
alluded to: no theory of hegemony can explain why the United States did not take up its role 
as world leader until 1945. Kennedy shows that an analysis of capabilities would indicate that 
already around the turn of the century bipolar world had come into being with the U.S.A. as
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10 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, pp. 111-130,252-253. Modelski’s theory even 
revived the old geopolitical theory that world history should be considered as a struggle between 
maritime and land-based powers; Modelski suggests that world leaders will always be dominant naval 
powers; cf. Richard Rosecrance, ’Long Cycle Theory and Internationa] Relations’, International 
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its probable leader11. The end of the First World War provided the opportunity for the United 
States to assume a role of leadership, but the Americans opted once again for an isolationist 
foreign policy, because of domestic political considerations12, and even in 1945 it was not at 
all obvious that the United States would not return to isolationism13. Indeed, one of the aims 
of British foreign policy immediately after World War Two was to ensure continued American 
participation in world affairs. Consequently, theories of hegemonic cycles will remain rather 
imprecise about the exact state of international politics at a certain moment.
Second, hegemonic cycle theorists can explain international history only by making use 
of the class of middle powers, which is hard to identify with precision, that may be declining, 
ascending, or challenging a hegemon. By intuition it sounds very attractive, but it becomes 
very hard to identify hegemons with precision. A small overview of recent attempts to classify 
the United Kingdom in these essential terms, may be illustrative. The common understanding 
is that the position of the United Kingdom as a world leader has been seriously declining since 
the late 1890s14, and that by 1945 it had ceased to be a world power. Thompson’s so-called 
Relative Power Capabilities Score, an elaboration of data from the Correlation of War project, 
suggests that in 1946 Great Britain was not a minor power at all. Actually, Thompson argues 
that the international situation of 1946 resembled much more the (multipolar) situation of 
181615. However, in a later study of capabilities, in cooperation with Karen Rasler, the
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David Barber, The Presidential Character. Predicting Performance in the White House. 3rd. edition, 
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs NJ, 1985, pp. 13-18, 35-39, 46-47.
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14 Cf. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 252; or, John Darwin, ’Imperialism in 
Decline? Tendencies in British Imperial Policy Between the Wars’, The Historical Journal. (23), 3, 
1980, pp. 657-679.
u William R. Thompson, ’Polarity, the Long Cycle and Global Power Warfare’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. (30), 4, 1986, p. 595.
United Kingdom is classified as a minor power in 1945“ . An even more peculiar conclusion 
is drawn by Patrick James and Michael Brecher in their analysis of international crises. They 
present a capability score and a classification of nation-states relative to that score, and 
conclude that between 1945 and 1962 the world system can be described as bipolar, while 
from 1962 onwards one could speak of a polycentric world, in which Great Britain forms one 
of the centres17. The difference can be attributed to Britain’s acquisition of thermonuclear 
weapons in the early 1960s, but is seems odd to consider Britain a more important 
international actor in 1962 than in 1945.
It is clear that this confusion about the classification of nation-states and the difficulties 
in explaining when a hegemon will take the role its capabilities prescribe, makes it very 
difficult to provide a theory of hegemonic cycles that explains more than very general 
developments over a long time-span, often meaning decades or even centuries. One should 
wonder whether this serves to understand, say, postwar international relations. Actually, the 
rather tricky business of classifying makes it difficult to speak of clear a distinction between 
multipolarity and bipolarity, with obvious implications for a theory such as Waltz’s.
In conclusion, it is very doubtful that parsimonious realism, either in the form of 
Waltz’s theory, or in the form of hegemonic cycles theory, can offer more than a general 
context of Anglo-American relations since die Second World War11. Moreover, it cannot 
answer certain important questions about deviances from predicted behaviour of the hegemon 
and its less powerful ally.
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11 No attempt is made here to assess the validity of an analysis based on game theory; so fur, game- 
theoretical analyses of the Suez crisis have been suggested by Michael Nicolson and by Shupe and 
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Michael Nicolson, Formal Theories in International Relations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
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and others, ’Nationalization of the Suez Canal. A Hypergame Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution. 
(24), 3, 1980, pp. 477-493.
3.3 International regime theory
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3.3.1 Introduction
Is it possible to analyze Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956 in terms of 
international regime theory ? What we somehow want to arrive at is a qualification of the 
dependency relationship between the two countries. Too often, however, international regimes 
studies pick ’low politics’-issue areas, which, by their very nature, are more likely to produce 
cooperative outcomes19. Security regimes form a neglected area of study: very few attempts 
have so far been made to interpret security relations between states in terms of international 
regime theory20. It is wise, however, to present Anglo-American relations as the evolution 
of a security regime; in principle such an analysis could start in 1776, but for the purpose of 
this study it will be limited to the period between 1945 and 1956.
I suggest to make a distinction between three dimensions of the security regime 
between the two countries. First of all, the economic dimension refers to the financial and 
economic relations between the United States and Great Britain, and to how these may 
influence their political relations. Secondly, the geopolitical or strategic dimension relates to 
certain structural facilities, such as strategic possessions, military bases, that may be relevant 
in arming oneself against a third party, in this case the Soviet Union. Thirdly, the diplomatic 
dimension refers to inter-nation communication that is not directly derived from the first two 
dimensions.
The noteworthy point is that all three dimensions may produce different power 
structures for different issue-areas. Moreover, a source of power in one issue-area is not
19 Christer Jònsson, International Aviation «nd the Politics of Regime Change. Frances Pinter, 
London. 1987, p. 4. This nature of regime research is the very reason why Jònsson chose international 
aviation as his subject of study, as it covers aspects of both high and low politics.
30 Exceptions are Jdnsson's case study of international aviation, ibid.; Robert Jervis, ’Cooperation 
under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics. (30), 2, 1978; Jervis, ’Security Regimes’, International 
OrganiTntifwi (30), 4, 1982; Roberto Vellano, ’Deterrenza e difesa nell’era nucleare: il caso della 
Strategie Defense Initiative’, in Luigi Bonanate, Anna Cafarena, and Roberto Vellano, Dopo l’Anarchia. 
Saggi sul superamento dril’il~»r"e anarchica delle relazioni internazionali e sul rischio di ricadérvi, 
Franco Angeli, Milan, 1989, pp. 133-239. Moreover, according to me, both analyses of M.J. Peterson, 
’Political Use of Recognition: The Influence of the International System’, World Politics. (34), 3, 1982 
pp. 324-352, and Paul W. Schroeder, ’The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the 
Structure’, World Politics. (35), 4, 1986, pp. 1-26, about the influence of the international political 
system should be considered implicit analyses of security regimes.
necessarily effective when applied to others21. Hegemonic theory predicts that a hegemon 
imposes a hierarchy of issue structures, and that be has leverage in most of the issue areas32.
The central question of this section will be whether the security regime of the United 
States and the United Kingdom did as a matter of fact reflect this widely accepted change from 
a multipolar to a bipolar international system, as neorealists would maintain. It will be 
contended in this section that such a presumed systemic change was reflected in some issue 
areas, but not in others. More specifically, it will be shown that the United Kingdom managed 
to keep some degree of leverage over the United States, most notably in the geopolitical- 
strategic dimension, and to a lesser extent, under die diplomatic dimension. The implication 
is the occurrence of a complex relationship of interdependence between the two countries that 
cannot be characterized by an asymmetry unequivocally favouring the United States. Even 
more important is the notion that a full appreciation of this security regime of complex 
interdependence requires the incorporation of perceptions of political elites of the exact place 
of one’s country in such a world in which dependency is not that clear.
This conclusion is inherent to regime theory itself, but is seldom acknowledged. 
Regime theory manages to give reasonably accurate descriptions of political processes, but 
cannot explain why regimes tend to acquire a dynamics of their own once they seem to work: 
regimes sometimes continue to function although little profit can be expected by individual 
states adhering to the regime. A hegemon’s adherence can be explained by its interest in the 
status quo, but why do other states remain loyal to the regime as well ?2> The important point 
is that the establishment of a regime shapes interests and expectations as much as it reflects 
them. This implies that the analysis of the evolution of regimes cannot rely on structural or 
functional explanations only, but need to incorporate what are called cognitive explanations, 
that is, those that take elite perceptions into account24.
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3.3.2 Economic Dimension of Postwar Anglo-American Relations
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On the whole, economic relations between the United States and the United Kingdom can be 
described as an asymmetrical relationship in favour of the Americans, thus giving them a 
source of influence over the foreign policy of Great Britain. However, it will be shown that 
it is wrong to assume that this leverage could instantly be translated into making the British 
perfectly conform to American interests. During almost the entire period up until Suez the 
British economy was in a deplorable state, its foreign debt gigantic, and assistance could only 
come from the United States. In order to finance its war-efforts, Britain had liquidated over 
1 billion pound sterling of overseas investments and had increased its foreign debts to 3 billion 
at the same time. Britain owned many sterlings to notably India (1,1 billion), Egypt (400 
million), and Iraq (70 million)29.
During the war a lot of the war-effort had been paid for through the Lend-Lease Act, 
which basically allowed the British to buy now and pay later. Its abrupt termination by the 
United States in August 194S caused acute liquidity problems, and the British had to ask for 
a loan of 3,75 billion dollars, to which the United States agreed only on the condition that the 
Pound would be made convertible one year after ratification of the loan, which eventually 
meant July 1947.
British officials expected that other countries would write off some of the British debt 
in order to help with England’s economic recovery, but apart from the United States, which 
cancelled the Lend-Lease debt, no sterling creditor in Asia or the Middle East was willing to 
follow. This set the economic stage for Britain’s withdrawal from Greece, Turkey and 
Palestine in 1947, simply because limitless British money seemed to be wasted there, while 
at home bread, dairy products, sugar, meat and petrol were under restriction, and holidays 
abroad were forbidden26.
This dominance of the United States could have served them in attaining certain 
political objectives. Three examples of attempts to influence British economic policies will be 
discussed: first, the Americans tried to open up the British system of preferential trading with 
their colonies and dominions, in which transactions were being paid in pound sterling. This 
was part of the American effort to make the British dissolve their Empire. Second, when this
25 W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing, British War Economy. London, 1949, chapter 19; Richard
N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy. Oxford, 1956; both quoted in Wm. Roger Louis, The British
Empire and the Middle East. 1945-1951. Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 12.
* Louis, ibid.. pp. 11-15.
effort to convert the British to a policy of economic multilateralism failed around 1947, and 
the Cold War started to dominate world politics, the United States tried to make the United 
Kingdom give up its substantia] trade with the Eastern bloc as an economic part of its 
containment policy. Third, die United States made an effort to reduce the strength of British 
oil companies in the Middle East.
(A) Preferential trading
The common interpretation of the Marshall plan of 1948 is that the United States used 
the European dependency on those funds as a political leverage to create compliance with the 
postwar international order. This order is often characterized as the Bretton-Woods system in 
which international institutions, such as GATT, IMF and IBRD, promoted a stable 
international monetary system and free trade. The United States thus succeeded opening up 
foreign markets to American products27. Expenditures such as die Marshall Plan, which, after 
all, was a grant, and not a system of loans, as well as the American acceptance of European 
efforts at economic integration in the late 1940s, which basically meant the acceptance of 
discrimination against American products, are interpreted as short-time sacrifices by the 
Americans with an eye on obtaining a fully multilateral trade system at some later stage2*.
This picture, however, ignores the fact that the United States tried to establish an even 
more complete multilateral international economy in the years immediately following the 
Second World War, but failed. In other words, their abundant economic power did not serve 
them in finding their optimal solution. From the moment they entered the Second World War 
the United States tried to dismantle the Imperial Preferential Trading System that connected 
the United Kingdom with its colonies and dominions. The Americans tried to use the Lend- 
Lease Act to undermine the British position especially in the Middle East, by setting up a non- 
military assistance programme, formally meant to improve the stability of Middle Eastern 
regimes29.
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Already during the negotiations on Lend-Lease in 1941, the United States tried to tie 
Lend-Lease to the removal of discriminatory British trade policies and to commit the United 
Kingdom to liberal multilateral trade principles. Another attempt was made during the 1944 
Bretton Woods negotiations on postwar monetary arrangements. But both in trade and money 
the United Kingdom managed to resist a liberal regime by emphasizing the need of national 
control over economic and monetary policies or the purpose of postwar recovery.
The moment for the Americans did come in 1946 when the British had to negotiate a 
3,75 billion dollars loan for their economic survival. Great Britain, because of its economic 
weakness, had to accept the conditions of the loan. As a first step to embracing a liberal, 
multilateral world order, the British agreed to make the pound sterling convertible in 1947. 
The implementation of this measure, however, was halted only 6 weeks after its initiation, 
because of the massive drain on British reserves30. The hegemon was not able to impose its 
design of a world order of free trade, because of the dislocations of the war: European 
economic weakness prevented this, and, by consequence, made the British resistant to change 
their own preferential trading system. Ikenberry argues that the United States did not want to 
become directly involved in administrating Europe, and therefore, in its implementation of the 
Marshall Plan, conceived of a relatively independent, economically integrated, Europe as a 
third force between the Soviet Union and herself. The British, however, wanted to retain their 
own Imperial system, and wanted to keep their special position in between the United States 
and Europe, and therefore resisted those American efforts31.
In this period, between 1947 and 1950, Great Britain, France, and the emerging 
Federal Republic of Germany tried to persuade the Americans to remain politically and 
militarily committed to Europe, by underlining the communist threat, which led the Americans 
to modify their multilateral trade ideas to the point of accepting a watered-down version of the 
original plans, in which Keynesian policies and welfare state arrangements in European 
countries were accepted33.
The important point to keep in mind is that not even extreme economic weakness, such 
as Britain’s, or Europe’s in general, need give enough political leverage to a political hegemon 
to impose its will. Although, of course, it should be realized that this analysis is only valid if 
supported by indications that the American foreign policy elite perceived Europe and Britain
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to be of crucial political and economic importance33. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 will show how 
important a tool of British diplomacy the furtherance of this American perception has been.
(B) East-bloc trading
Between 1947 and 1954 the United States tried to persuade Western Europe to engage 
in economic warfare by cutting off trade with the Soviet Bloc. The traditional view is that, by 
adopting the 1948 European Cooperation Act, the United States linked economic and military 
aid to Western Europe’s trade policies. However, no aid to Western European countries was 
ever cut off, because the United States accepted their allies’ trade policies, even to the point 
of granting formal exemptions, especially in order to accommodate urgent Western European 
needs for raw materials from die Soviet Bloc34.
Western Europe, and Britain in particular, had a strong interest in trading with the 
Soviet Bloc, because the exchange of industrial products for raw materials was an important 
means to save dollars. Newly released documents however, show that in 1948 the United 
States started to confer with Great Britain about the question of how to impose export-controls 
on Western Europe, thus confirming British perceptions that they functioned as a go-between; 
furthermore, the British successfully resisted American pressure to stop the export of industrial 
products (products on so-called List 1-B). The British Cabinet accepted an embargo on 
strategic goods (List 1-A), as a means of keeping a source of influence on the Americans in 
order to prevent them from imposing a complete trade embargo of the Soviet Bloc” . The 
Korean War meant an increase of American pressure on Europe to start a re-armament 
programme. Events in Korea induced the American Congress to link military aid for that re­
armament programme with trade policies, which found its final expression in the Battle Act 
of October 1951 which forced Western Europe to cut off trade with the Soviet Bloc. Sorensen 
argues, on die basis of British documents, that at the time of the Korean war the United States 
was able to coerce Britain and the rest of Western Europe to accept economic warfare against 
the Soviets by threatening to reduce military aid and to cut off the exports of those American 
goods that could be processed into goods that Western Europe could then export to Eastern
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Europe. After that war, however, Britain and the rest of Western Europe managed to resist all 
new initiatives to extend trade controls and managed to persuade the Americans to dismantle 
controls after 1954*.
(C) Oil production
In the field of oil production the United States was better able to reach its objectives, 
although this took quite some effort. Originally the idea was to establish an Anglo-American 
cartel with an International Petroleum commission, but this was never realized because of 
domestic pressure in the United States against such an arrangement. The agreement which 
eventually secured American oil interests was implemented through private companies rather 
than governmental agencies. The arrangement involved the dissolution of the so-called Red- 
Line agreement of 1928 which had set sharp restrictions on American access to oil production 
on the Arab peninsula17. At the same time, however, the position of the United Kingdom, 
severely weakened by the end of the Red-Line agreement and by the foundation of Aramco, 
was not one of complete dependency on the whims of the United States, because the Americans 
had agreed to the continued existence of the sterling area.
By 1949 the British Government was able to force those countries that were short on 
dollars, such as the Scandinavian countries, to buy sterling oil. Because that period was 
characterized by over-production, this meant that British companies sold at the expense of their 
American competitors. Further protective measures by the Attlee Government in December 
1950 led to pressure of American oil companies on the Truman Administration to force a 
change in British protectionism, but despite an attempt to cut off all Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) assistance to Britain, it only led to the suspension of ECA help for those 
projects that sustained the British oil industry. Eventually, the Korean War ended the period 
of overproduction of oil3*. Nevertheless, although the American Government was successful 
in breaking the British dominant position in Middle Eastern oil production, it could not simply 
impose it own terms and had to take into account the oil interests of Great Britain.
The economic relationship between the United States and Great Britain was, in 
conclusion, clearly asymmetrical. Nevertheless, full political benefits from this asymmetry
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were not readily available to the Americans. The British managed to keep their system of 
preferential trading with their Empire, and were successful at postponing a boycott of 
substantial trade with the Soviet bloc and China until Congressional pressure forced the 
Truman Administration to threaten its allies with sanctions if trade were not cut off.
It is dear that the basis for this situation limited asymmetry lies with American 
perception that the United Kingdom (and Europe) was essential for its own security policy. It 
is therefore obvious that, when one speaks of mere economic dependencies and capabilities, 
it is not sufficient, as hegemonic theories do, to point to, for example, the simple fact that in 
1948 American industrial production totalled 48% of global industrial production. The United 
States could not impose a liberal multilateral trade order in 1945. Apparently, weaker states 
can have some bargaining power over their dominant partner39.
3.3.3 Strategic/geopolitical dimension of the postwar Anglo-American Security Regime
If the British economy in the early postwar period was strongly dependent on the United 
States’ willingness to help the British with their economic recovery, the strategic dimension 
of the security regime of both countries presents a much less asymmetrical picture40. 
Although certain developments, such as the British withdrawal from Greece and Turkey, the 
retreat from India, and the giving up of the Palestinian mandate, illustrated that the United 
Kingdom lacked the economic resources to maintain its pre-war Empire, other aspects 
indicated that Britain was not yet completely subordinated to American hegemony: Britain 
retained strong spheres of influence, that provided a source of influence on the United States 
in certain diplomatic conflicts. Most importandy, the United Kingdom was allowed to keep its 
privileged position in the Middle East, a privilege that was to become the source of important 
misperceptions on both sides, when in the mid-1950s American influence in that area was 
expanding.
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One of the clearest indicators of British weakness is the absolute power the Americans 
had in sharing nuclear power with the United Kingdom shortly after the war. On the one hand, 
the British Government favoured the promotion of world cooperation on atomic issues, 
although this would put an end to the relative advantage in nuclear technology Britain had over 
other countries. On the other hand, Britain wished to preserve the special relationship they had 
enjoyed with the Americans in producing the atomic bombs. In two working agreements, 
concluded by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1943 and 1944, the United Kingdom had allowed the 
United States certain reservations about sharing knowledge, which enabled them to deny 
Britain essential information after the war as well. Truman referred to these agreements when 
he refused cooperation in 1946, after the Attlee Government had announced its plan to 
construct a large nuclear pile in England and had asked the United States for technological 
assistance. Truman thus nullified an agreement on nuclear cooperation, concluded with Attlee 
in November 194541.
The deplorable state of the British economy caused the United Kingdom to withdraw 
its troops from Greece and Palestine, and to stop its financial assistance to Turkey. In 1946 
the British had 40,000 troops in Greece and paid for most of the Greek government’s army, 
which fought against the armed branch of the Greek communist party KKE in the north of 
Greece. Some people go as far as to characterize Greece since 1944 as a British colony42. At 
the same time British troops in Palestine numbered about 100,000 men. Here the British were 
caught in the dilemma of having to accept a large wave of Jewish immigrants, who caused a 
lot of tension with the Palestinian and Arab population, whereas the British preferred to retain 
their friendship with Arab rulers in order to keep their informal empire in the Middle East 
intact. The maintenance of this force cost between 30,000,000 and 40,000,000 pounds a 
year43. Moreover, the British supported Turkey financially and diplomatically in its effort to 
stand up against Russian claims on Turkey’s North Eastern provinces and demands for a naval 
base near die Dardanelles. Turkey’s stability and independence was seen as crucial to the 
protection of British interests in the Middle East44.
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British economic weakness thus caused a reduction of its overseas commitments. 
Abroad, this situation was perceived as the beginnings of the final dissolution of the British 
Empire41. It is, however, important to realize that in those early years after the Second World 
War, British policymakers considered this to be a reduction of their financial burden in order 
to be better able to maintain an influential position throughout the Empire. It is indeed the 
contention of Louis’s study that the period of the Attlee Government should be interpreted as 
an attempt to transform Britain’s formal rule over most of the Middle East into an informal 
empire in which Britain’s military and economic necessities would be safeguarded by offering 
development to modern Arab nationalists46. In this context it is therefore crucial to realize 
that to British eyes the 'giving up’ of Greece and Turkey implied an understanding with the 
United States that the Middle East was a British region of influence and that they intended to 
continue ruling it.
It was all part of an effort to make the Americans realize that the Soviet Union was 
threatening the precarious balance in Europe and the Middle East, and that American 
reluctance to assist their European allies would be fatal. That explains why the British gave 
such short notice to the Americans of their halting of economic assistance to Greece and 
Turkey47, urging them to step in immediately4*.
The Labour Government thus perceived to have secured British predominance over the 
Middle East. Moreover, this view was shared by the United States Government: in talks with 
die British in October and November 1947, the United States recognized that ’the security of 
the Eastern Mediterranean and of die Middle East is vital to the security of the United States’,
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and that this required that Great Britain keep its strong strategic, political and economic 
position in those areas. An internal memorandum acknowledged British ’primary responsibility’ 
for the areas, which implied ’that the British should have mutually satisfactory political and 
economic relations of a long-term nature with the countries in the area, as a foundation for 
their military position’49.
An example of how the British managed to expand their sphere of influence in the 
Middle East is their success at turning the former Italian colony of Libya into a British client 
state. Usually, the creation of Libya is heralded as one of the few examples of successful 
UNO-mediation in the resolution of colonial questions30. It now seems clear that the British 
managed to convince the Americans in 1949 that they would be defending the Middle East 
from a Soviet attack and that therefore strong military bases in weak Libya would be crucial. 
The United States agreed to setting up a weak federal state, in which the United Kingdom 
would dominate the Eastern province of Cyrenaica, in order to avoid Egyptian dominance over 
her neighbour. An even more compelling indicator of British leverage at that time is the - 
reluctant- American agreement to Libya joining the sterling area, traditionally an issue of 
discord between die British and Americans51.
This geopolitical predominance, conceded by the Americans, must find its power basis 
somewhere. Basically, this British influence on the United States finds its source in the 
impossibility for the Americans to implement a global policy of containment without British 
cooperation at least until the mid-1950s. The American weakness in their military lines of 
commands is nicely illustrated by the Anglo-American bilateral aviation regime concluded at 
Bermuda in 1946. This treaty dealt with air routes, capacity and frequency levels, and fares51. 
This agreement poses a puzzle because it grants a relative advantage to Great Britain. On top
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of that, the British had resisted American attempts in 1944-1945 to impose a multilateral 
aviation agreement. The bilateral Bermuda agreement was to become the norm for most other 
bilateral aviation agreements53.
The solution to this puzzle lies in die ’issue structure’ of international aviation, which 
was favourable to Great Britain after the World War. Despite American superiority in 
aeronautical know-how and ability to generate traffic, the ’objective’ power bases for the 
imposition of an aviation regime, Britain had a stronger bargaining position, because the 
United States lacked route rights as well as landing rights for refuelling at bases located 
strategically along trunk routes. Only Britain could grant those rights because of its extensive 
overseas colonies and Commonwealth connections14.
This very lack of landing and fuelling rights points to America’s inability to implement 
a strategy of containment from 1947 on without British cooperation. This was alluded to by 
George Kennan already in 1946, when he observed that containment on a world scale was 
beyond American resources". This dependency was to last until well into the 1950s. In case 
of Soviet aggression the United States would have to rely on its medium range bombers to 
counter such a move. By the end of 1950, the United States possessed only a small number 
of intercontinental bombers (38 B-36s) and had to rely on its large number of medium range 
bombers (477). In order to retaliate against a Russian attack, therefore, die Americans were 
highly dependent on the use of bases in Great Britain. They were thus very worried about the 
possibility that the Soviet Union would try to quickly neutralize Britain by destroying her air 
bases by surprise96.
The relevance of British bases in die Middle East was their vicinity to important 
Russian industrial centers that could be reached by those medium range bombers37. The direct 
practical weight of this dependency was shown during the 1948-1949 Berlin Blockade crisis 
and the first months of the Korean War. When Marshall Sokolovsky walked out on the Allied
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Control Council at 20 March 1948 and thus opened the Berlin crisis, one of General Curtis 
Lemay’s contingency plans involved the help of Great Britain in closing off certain trade routes 
to the Soviet Union, if the Russians were to open fire on trains that could be sent to Berlin in 
order to test Russian resolve51. More importantly, the planes that formed the air-lift, which 
was to challenge the Russian ring around West-Berlin, flew predominantly from British bases. 
Similar use of British resources was made when at the beginning of the Korean War nuclear 
weapons were ostensibly flown into Britain as part of a ’normal rotation’ as a warning against 
Stalin that die United States meant serious business39.
3.3.4 Diplomatic dimension of Anglo-American security regime
Great Britain, despite its economic weakness, was thus able to exert a certain amount 
of political pressure on the United States, because it possessed some amount of leverage in the 
strategic and diplomatic issue-areas. The Americans realized themselves that they could not 
dictate their terms to the British: Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s mission to Washington in 
December 1950 to dissuade President Truman from deploying nuclear weapons in the Korean 
War, should be interpreted in this context: Secretary of State Dean Acheson recommended 
Truman not to ignore British views ’since we can bring American power into play only with 
the cooperation of the British’40.
More importantly, at the time of the Korean War this British advantage was perceived 
at Whitehall as well. This is shown by the minutes of the permanent Under Secretary at the 
Foreign Office, Sir William Strang. He thought it possible to exert concessions from the 
United States because it was ’equally true that the Americans cannot do without us (-). Though 
the Americans often behave as though our views and interests were of little regard to them,
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in the last resort, they know they must rely on us. This strengthens our position in dealing with 
them’“ .
The crucial point, of course, is that this British strategic and geopolitical advantage 
could be an asset only if the United Kingdom and its Commonwealth and Empire were 
perceived to be essential for the defence of a free world against Communist aggression. This 
presumes that a perception of communist aggression prevailed. At this point, the British 
possibly accomplished its most precious aim. Much of postwar British diplomacy had been 
directed at persuading the Truman Administration that Communism was threatening the West, 
and that Britain and its Empire were an essential element of Western defence. It is to this 
attempt at persuasion that we now turn62.
The future of die British Empire and Commonwealth was one of the principal issues 
that strained war-time relations between the United States and Great Britain has been. On 
various occasions, the Americans had made it clear that they were not fighting the war for the 
preservation and restoration of the British Empire. In the American press the colonial issue 
was a regular topic of discussion, usually in die context of the establishment of a postwar 
international society, in which nations that were still under colonial rule would be granted 
eventual independence*3. The British had been very worried about this permanent feature of 
American foreign policy, and one could argue that they considered it a main task to attempt 
to ’educate’ the Americans on the merits of the British Empire. The success of these efforts 
eventually produced the structural misperception in London that one could persuade the 
Americans to respect certain British interests simply by providing them with information about 
these interests.
Louis shows how American anti-colonialism was strongly balanced with security needs: 
during the war the United States did not support the ’Quit India now’-movement because they
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deemed British predominance in India essential for the war against Japan. Similarly, they 
accepted that Libya became a British protectorate in 1950, because they accepted British 
presence in the Middle East as crucial in the battle against communism64. In this context the 
genesis of the United Nations Organization, and especially the installation of its Trusteeship 
Council can be interpreted as the result of an effort by the British to on the one hand prevent 
the Americans from imposing their anti-colonialist sentiment on the U.N. principle of self- 
determination, and, on the other hand involve the Americans in a certain kind of colonial 
tutelage themselves, by urging them to take on the responsibility of administrating certain trust 
territories themselves63.
During the Second World War the Foreign Office held the view that the Americans 
did not really understand the matter of the Empire that well. In the Autumn of 1942 already, 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden thought that ’the American position is becoming highly 
absurd (-), for while they apparently contemplate disappearance of the Dutch Colonial Empire, 
and perhaps our own, they have guaranteed the integrity of French territories, which is more 
than we have done*. In December of that year, Colonial Secretary Stanley wrote to the Cabinet 
that ’it is, indeed, certain that much criticism is the result of a most complete ignorance 
regarding conditions in British colonial territories’66. The British Government had been 
alarmed by warnings from their Washington Embassy that the United States were considering 
Great Britain increasingly as a Junior partner. An article in Life by Henry Luce that Autumn, 
which was very critical of British colonialism, caused that much panic at the Foreign Office, 
although Eden considered it ’too extravagant to be credited’, that a concerted effort was made 
to change American public opinion about the British war effort and about the benign influence 
of her Empire on the population of its colonies67.
The decision not to include existing colonial empires in the U.N. Trusteeship system, 
and to reserve this agency for former mandates of the League of Nations and for colonies of 
the Axis-powers, should therefore be considered a success of British diplomacy. The British 
had been very anxious for the trusteeship-system not to harm their Empire. In January 1945 
Eden reassured Churchill that ’there is not the slightest question of liquidating the British
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Empire’, and judged the trusteeship system a useful way of convincing the Americans that they 
should accept colonial responsibility themselves61. This conviction to draw the United States 
into some kind of colonial arrangement helps to understand Lord Hankey’s proposal towards 
the end of May 1945 to turn Syria and the Lebanon into a trusteeship and to involve the 
Americans in its administration in order to resolve the critical situation in which British troops 
were interfering with fights between French troops and the Syrians that month69.
Similarly the Labour Government’s retreat from Empire, as evidenced in India, Burma, 
and Palestine, was not meant as a first step toward its total dissolution, but as a way out of a 
precarious economic situation, while keeping intact the rest of the Empire, even though 
influence would be more of an informal than of a formal nature. As a matter of fact, the 
Empire and its sterling trading area was considered a necessary condition for economic 
recovery. The attempts of the Attlee Government at involving the Americans in Western 
security served therefore two essential aims: first, the easening of die financial burden of 
Britain’s worldwide commitments,and second, getting the Truman Administration to recognize 
British predominance in die Middle East and Africa. Both aims required playing the 
Communist card.
The Communist danger was to make the Americans realize that they should not 
withdraw in isolation, but should take responsibility for the defence of Western Europe. At the 
same time, this would bring home to the United States that they needed the strategic assets of 
the British Empire for this defence70. The explicit recognition of the British position in the 
Middle East in 1947 when the United States took over British responsibilities over Greece and 
Turkey, should therefore be considered as a success of Ernest Bevin and Clement Attlee, 
although the. British withdrawal from Palestine later that year was obviously much more 
difficult to explain to the strongly pro-Jewish Americans71.
The foundation of NATO can be considered as the completion of what amounts to an 
effort to make die Americans pay for the continuation of the British Empire. Recent studies
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have challenged the traditional view that the Americans created NATO as a response to a 
perceived Soviet threat to American security, and imposed it on its allies. New evidence 
suggests that Great Britain played an influential role in cajoling the Americans into accepting 
the need to guarantee Western security72.
In 1947 the Joint Planning Staff of the British military forces, together with Attlee, 
Bevin, and Minister of Defence Lord Alexander, originally developed a conception of defence 
that would combine the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, which would enable 
the British to avoid further commitments that would not be directly related to their three 
’pillars of defence policy’ that had to be defended at all costs: the United Kingdom, the sea 
communications to the United States and the Dominions, and the Middle East. At that time the 
British were rather reluctant to commit themselves to other arrangements, such as those that 
were being discussed at the Western European treaty negotiations. However, when in January
1948 Holland and Belgium argued that Communism was a much greater threat than Germany, 
the British gave up their reluctance and used the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 
February 1948 and Soviet pressure on Norway to sign a non-aggression pact in early March 
1948, to further the idea of a North Atlantic security system73.
Later that year, in order to secure Congressional approval of NATO, as well as of the 
Military Assistance Programme, which would extend American military aid to Europe, the 
United Kingdom engaged in a publicity campaign in the United States in order to show that 
Communism was a threat to the whole world and that Britain would be a reliable ally of the 
United States with substantial contribution of its own, such as the suppression of the 
communist insurgence in Malaya at that time74.
On the other hand, it was not the case that British policymakers were just scheming 
to make the Americans pay for their recovery as a world power. An analysis of perceptions 
at the Foreign Office at that time clearly shows that the Soviet Union was perceived to be a
75
72 See for an overview of the literature, Folly, ’Breaking the Vicious Circle’, p. 60, footnotes 3-5.
B Folly, ’Breaking the vicious circle’, esp. pp. 64-68. The British originally conceived of NATO 
as Britain, America and ('anaAa having control over strategy, so that their claim of a special relationship 
would gain credit, and it would seem that the U.K. was a world power nearly of America’s standing; 
Folly, pp. 69-70.
74 Anstey, ’The projection of British socialism’, pp. 442-443. It must be admitted, however, that 
not all Foreign Office propaganda was directed at convincing the Americans that British imperial policy 
served at fighting Communism: in Mau Mau revolt in Kenya provoked a Foreign Office propaganda 
rjfnpaign in the United States directed at projecting the Mau Mau revolt as a tribal uprising which had 
nothing to do with Communism; A.S. Cleary, ’Hie myth of the Mau Mau in is international context’, 
African Affairs. (89), no. 355, 1990, pp. 227-245.
real threat, and therefore not just a handy bogey-man to obtain guarantees of American 
assistance, but it was, of course, a convenient and deliberately sought side-effect75.
That die appeal to communist aggression did not always guarantee success is shown 
by the way Great Britain tried to influence American policies towards Iran between 1945 and 
1951. An attempt was made to defend the British privileged position -and that of the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company- by pointing to potential Russian aggression. The United States, however, 
was unwilling to defend the interests of this British enclave at Abadan, and urged the British 
Government to give in to Iranian demands for a greater share in the profits of the Anglo- 
Iranian Oil Company (not in the least to further the position of Aramco). When Iran 
nationalized the oil refinery at Abadan and the British had flown troops to Bahrein and Kuwait 
in order to secure British oil interests, the United States blocked a military operation by 
exerting strong pressure on the Attlee Government76.
3.4 Conclusion
The extent to which neorealism offers a satisfactory explanation of postwar Anglo- 
American relations seems to be rather limited. While parsimonious neorealism. in the works 
of Waltz and of the theoreticians of cycles of hegemonic conflict, offers some necessary insight 
into changing power configurations of the international system, it can only prove that die 
British position is declining while the American one is rising. However, it cannot indicate with 
certainty the nature of their relationship nor of their world position. It might not even be able 
to distinguish a multipolar from a bipolar system.
International regime theory is better able to describe Anglo-American postwar 
relations, but is has to take account of the perceptions of the political elites if it is to explain 
the dynamics of international regimes. Moreover, its traditional emphasis on studies of 
international trade have caused a neglect of aspects of power and influence which underlie 
interdependent relations. It was shown that although Great Britain was economically dependent 
on the United States to a large extent, the United States could not use that advantage to impose 
its will in order to create a postwar world order that would fit its own purposes. This is 
explained by die fact that in different issue-areas, notably the strategic/geopolitical one, the 
United Kingdom still was in a relatively strong position. This created to a certain extent a
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reversed dependency relationship as to the Middle East, which was fully recognized by the 
United States. It is therefore wrong to say that the United Kingdom lacked influence and 
prestige. It still had quite some leverage over the United States77.
The important contribution of regime theory is the notion that regimes not only reflect 
influence relations and expectations, but create them as well. It is therefore not that 
extraordinary that, by the time the Attlee Government was replaced with the Churchill 
Government in 1951, the impression took hold that, thanks to the sterling area, Britain was 
back on its way to the top. At the Foreign Office Sir Oliver Franks wrote to Attlee in July 
1950 that only two years before, Britain had been one of many European countries, but had 
acquired new vigour and strength thanks to the Commonwealth and the stronger currency, and 
now had an improved overseas payment position: ’we are out of the queue, one of two world 
powers outside Russia. This has been recognized by the recent exchange of messages’7*.
It should be realized that the position of British influence in the Middle East is crucial 
to this perception. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin thought that loss of it would lead the United 
States ’to write us off as a first class power’7®. International regime theory explains why these 
perceptions could be held: a weak economic position was compensated for by a strong 
strategic/geopolitical position. However, elites’ perceptions are essential. The Americans would 
recognize British predominance in certain areas only, notably the Middle East, because they 
perceived a Communist threat and perceived the British role in containing that threat as crucial. 
It has been shown that the British tried to direct that threat perception to their own benefit, by 
extracting recognition of their influential position in certain parts of the world.
By the time, therefore, that Anthony Eden became British Foreign Secretary for the 
third time in 1951, it is still correct to speak of a complex, interdependent relationship between 
American and Britain rather than of an English dependency on the United States. Precisely 
because the -what has been called- security regime between Great Britain and the United States 
after 1945 shapes as well as reflects power and expectations, it appears logical and inevitable 
to put an emphasis on elite perceptions if we want to understand the evolution of this security 
regime between 1951 and 1956. This brings up the question of how we can analyze elite
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perceptions in a systematic way. The next chapter will therefore discuss the nature of 
individual cognitive beliefs, several methods of identifying them as well as ways of connecting 
individual beliefs to foreign policy decision.
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PART H: THE CONTRIBUTION OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
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The Anglo-American security-regime between 1945 and 1956 cannot be understood 
unless one makes reference to the role of political elites. It has been argued that policymakers’ 
perceptions are shaped by the way a security-regime is actually operating. In turn, these 
perceptions are the basis of mutual expectations that actors hold towards the regime. In other 
words, the actual working of a security-regime, and thus of constraints imposed by the 
structure of the international political system, is mediated through individual policymakers’ 
perceptions. This interplay between structural constraints and individual perceptions can 
provide a clue to understanding the relative freedom of action of Great Britain and France until 
1956 and their stubborn neglect of American opposition to a military solution to the Suez- 
conflict. If this is the case, it is important to find tools that can assess the role of these 
perceptions and subsequent expectations with a bit more precision.
Part II discusses the possibility of using cognitive belief systems of individual 
policymakers as an appropriate way to describe these perceptions and expectations. Chapter 
4 thus provides an overview of several techniques to measure cognitive belief systems. It is 
argued that the so-called Operational Code construct is a suitable technique, and that the 
Brecher-model is very helpful in developing a research design.
It can be objected, however, that the role of individual perceptions should not be 
measured by cognitive belief systems, because these perceptions and expectations can be better 
accounted for by other factors. These factors include a policymaker’s personality, the 
institutional setting he belongs to, as well as small group processes that come into play, as 
major foreign policy decisions are often taken by a number of policymakers rather than one 
individual. Chapters 5 and 6 provide a discussion of the relative importance of such factors, 
and address the question to what extent they make the incorporation of cognitive belief systems 
superfluous.

Chapter 4: The role of cognitive beliefe
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4.1 Introductory remarks
Cognitive belief systems of policymakers are a proper device to understand the 
perceptions and expectations, that guide their attitude towards the constraints of, for instance, 
a security-regime. The employment of belief systems implies that we are entering the 
borderland between political science and social psychology1. Traditionally, political scientists 
have been rather sceptical about the borrowing of tools from the field of social psychology. 
Three types of arguments are usually pronounced. First, even though many attempts have been 
made to apply laboratory experiments and simulations to situations relevant to foreign policy 
decision making, such as bargaining and negotiations, or to decision making under stress, most 
works have been discredited for their dissimilarity with the real world of decision making2. 
Second, early studies that incorporated psychological factors concentrated on psychological 
aberrations or pathological needs of individual politicians, like Hitler and Stalin, but were 
criticized for their negligence of systematically studying the link between such factors and 
foreign policy formation3. The third, and most powerful, line of attack points to the 
irrelevance of the individual level, and therefore of psychological variables, because of the 
efficiency of variables at the national or systemic level4. Nevertheless, in this chapter it will 
be argued that cognitive belief systems are occasionally indispensable to the explanation of 
events at the level of both the nation-state and the international political system.
1 See for a general overview of the field, Philip E. Tetlock, ’Psychological Advice in Foreign 
Policy. What do we have to contribute?’, American Psychologist. (41), 5,1986, pp. 557-567. Actually, 
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Chapters 2 and 3 have shown however, that the individual level of analysis may be needed rather 
quickly, if one is not to remain with relatively abstract and uninformative analyses.
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4.2 Cognitive beliefs
One of the principal reasons why one should focus on the role of cognitive belief 
systems is that they serve as a mediating device between an individual and his physical and 
social environment5. The assumption is that an individual cannot absorb all environmental 
stimuli that he encounters, and therefore has to develop a mechanism, call it a filter, or a set 
of lenses, which helps him in organizing incoming information. He therefore knows how to 
note certain stimuli rather than others, and how to interpret them. These interpretations then 
serve as a basis for action. Cognitive beliefs are one such device. A belief system, therefore, 
is an individual’s view of what the world around him looks like in its essence. It consists 
therefore of a more or less coherent whole of opinions about his environment and can as such 
contain both descriptive and prescriptive notions about that environment. This conception of 
a belief system has been questioned on three grounds.
1. Ideology. The term belief system is often considered identical to ideology and thus 
superfluous*. Sometimes this reflects a political stand: a belief system represents a whole of 
ideas that should not be professed; but usually one intends to convey that beliefs serve as a 
mask behind which a politician hides his real motives7. Others object to the idea that beliefs 
and ideology would be interchangeable: to them an ideology offers more than an analysis of 
the surrounding world, because it contains above all an idea about what die world should look 
like as well as a programme of action in order to arrive at tat ideal*.
2. Political culture. Some critics argue that belief systems are only a reflection of 
political opinions, values, and attitudes that one can find throughout society as a whole. Behind
5 Harold and Margaret Sprout are the pioneers of the study of the interaction between physical and 
social environmental factors and politics, see e.g. their The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1965.
* E.g. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 'Assumptions and Dilemma’s in the Study of Americans' Foreign 
Policy Beliefs: A Caveat’, International Studies Quarterly. (30), 4, 1986, p. 460.
7 This is thought to be true for the field of international politics especially. According to Morgenthau 
the true nature of foreign policy is 'concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations’, Hans 
J. Morgenthau, Politic« among Nations. The Straggle for Power and Peace. 5th edition, Alfred Knopf, 
New York, 1973, p. 88, quoted by Richard Little and Steve Smith in, ’Introduction', Little and Smith 
(eds.), Belief Systems and International Relations. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988, p. 3.
* E.g., John MacLean, 'Belief Systems and Ideology in International Relations: a Critical 
Approach’, in Little and Smith (eds.), ibid.. pp. 64-68.
this claim lies the controversy between sociologists who see a belief system as a product of 
society, and psychologists, who think the individual to be its source9.
3. Cause or effect ? The idea that a belief system serves as a filter of information is 
disputed on epistemological grounds. The principle of a filtering function implies that an 
individual’s subjective world can be separated from an objective, and measurable, outer world. 
But cognitive beliefs should be considered as both a product and producer of that outer world. 
By implication, a belief system can never serve as an independent variable in a research 
framework. At best, it can be an instrument of descriptive value10.
Some of these problems are slightly exaggerated and tend to hamper die development 
of relevant research. I propose that the conception of belief systems as an attribute of 
individuals is a correct way out of these objections. Ideology has connotations that bring the 
belief system beyond the individual level. They are alike, because both refer to prescriptive 
as well as descriptive opinions, and because both entail some guidance for political actions. 
An ideology, however, refers to beliefs held by collectivities, such as a group or a party, and 
is much more explicit in its philosophical sources11.
A belief system should be separated from political culture, because it seems rather 
limited to explain the behaviour of foreign policy makers by referring to generally held 
attitudes in their society. It seems more practical to concentrate on the opinions of individual 
politicians and to consider both ideology and political culture as elements belonging to a wider 
context, which may serve to formulate a correct interpretation of the intentions of a given 
cognitive belief12. For instance, holding the belief that the promotion of human rights is an 
important goal of one’s foreign policy, may be interpreted differently in the Netherlands and 
in North Korea.
If these boundaries are not clearly drawn, it will be difficult to arrive at insightful 
empirical analyses. This is evident in Margot Light’s study of Soviet foreign policy, which she
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9 Richard Little, ’Belief Systems in the Social Sciences’, in Little and Smith (eds.), ibid.. pp. 36-49.
10 In the follf>c»«nT» of essays, edited by Litde and Smith, three authors are of that opinion: Dillon, 
Mac Lean, and Tooze.
" Cf. Holsti, ’Foreign Policy Makers Viewed Psychologically’, p. 122, footnote 3.
12 This is borrowed from Quentin Skinner, who shows that political culture forms a linguistic context 
in which the development of political philosophy should be interpreted, Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and 
Understanding in the History of Ideas’, History Mid Theory. (8), 1969, pp. 3-53.
attempts to explain by referring to Marxist-Leninist ideology13. Nowhere, however, does she 
mention the opinions of Soviet leaders, although she calls her analysis a belief system 
approach. No attention is being paid to die literature that argues that Soviet foreign policy, 
already since Stalin, has followed a perfectly realist line, despite its ideology14. Similarly, 
Barbara Roberson is expanding on Islam, but hardly tries to connect islamic beliefs to the 
foreign policy of individual countries13. Neither ideology nor culture can therefore 
meaningfully substitute for belief systems.
The controversy over die functioning of a belief system as a filter mechanism is self- 
defeating too. If one does not accept their filtering capacity, at least in the snort run, one 
excludes belief system from empirical analysis and one forces oneself to return to (neo)realist 
premises. This is exemplified by Michael Dillon’s analysis of the role of Thatcher’s belief 
system at the time of the Falklands War16. Dillon’s conclusion is that Thatcher’s beliefs were 
a product of her environment and that they cannot therefore be used to explain that 
environment. I think that as long as it is possible to discern a time sequence with not too 
distant moments, it will be possible to detect changes in a belief system due to its environment 
and to measure the influence of the belief system on specific decision making situations. The 
so-called process tracing method serves exactly that purpose17. Having thus limited the 
boundaries of belief systems to the attributes of individual politicians, it becomes possible to 
introduce diem as filter mechanisms in foreign policy decision making situations.
4.3 How to identify cognitive belief systems
Steve Smith distinguishes between six approaches that have been used in the field of 
international.politics to give an operational definition to the concept of belief system1*:
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13 Margot Light, ’Belief Systems and Soviet Foreign Policy’, in Little and Smith (eds.), ibid.. pp. 
109-126.
14 Cf. Fernando Claudin, The Conunimist Movement- From Comintern to Cominfnrm Part I: the 
crisis of the communist international. Part H; the zenith of Stalinism. Monthly Review Press, New York 
and London, 197S; R.N. Berki, 'On Marxian Thought and the Problem of International Relations’, 
World Politics. (24), 1, 1971, pp. 80-105.
15 Barbara Allen Roberson, ’The Islamic Belief System’, in Little and Smith (eds.), ibid.. pp. 85- 
108. Actually, Roberson seems to suggest an implicit theory of stability of Arab regimes.
11 Michael Dillon, ’Thatcher and the Falklands’, in Little and Smith (eds.), ibid.. pp. 167-189.
17 See die introduction to part III of this study.
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"  Steve Smith, ’.......’, in Little and Smith (eds.), ibid.. pp. 17-27.
images, the openness of belief systems, historical analogies, the operational code, cognitive 
mapping, and Michael Brecher’s research model. Unfortunately, Smith does not intensively 
discuss the problem of how these methods allow us to discover relationships between individual 
belief systems and the behaviour of nation-states. Moreover, Smith suggests that all six are 
independent research methods. I believe that this can be said of the operational code, cognitive 
mapping, and Brecher’s model only. Images and historical analogies are at best elements of 
an individual’s belief system, whereas the openness of a belief system refers to a hypothesis 
about the behaviour of individual politicians with a certain belief system rather than to an 
independent research strategy.
1. Images. The concept of images has been developed by Kenneth Boulding in the 
1950s'9. It entails the premise that decision makers act in accordance with the image they 
have formed of their adversaries and themselves. Boulding suggests that these stereotypical 
ideas about other nation-states find their origin in popular wisdom. One would expea the 
dynamics of international conflict to be affected by such ideas30. It has been shown that a 
negative image of one’s adversary is often parallelled by a positive self-image21. Some 
authors go as far as claiming that in the age of television international politics has changed into 
a struggle for the shaping of images22. Few systematic studies of national self-image have so 
far been conducted23. Naomi Bailin Wish finds a correlation between the national role 
conceptions of political leaders and the foreign policy behaviour of their countries. For 
example, those who believed that their countries were influential and performed a leadership 
role, were more active on the international scene24. Unfortunately, images of one’s adversary
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Ann Arbor, 1956.
30 Ole R. Holsti, ’The Belief System and National Images: John Foster Dulles’, in Ralph K. White 
(ed.), Psvrhnlnpv and the Prevention of Nuclear War. New York University Press, New York, pp. 322- 
323.
21 Holsti, ibid.. p. 328.
22 Alpo Rusi, ’Image Research and Image Politics in International Relations. Transformation of 
Power Politics in the Television Age’, Cooperation and Conflict. (23), 1988, pp. 29-42.
33 E.g. Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, ’A Framework for Research on Foreign 
Policy Behavior’, Journal of Conflict Resolution. (13), 1, 1969 pp. 75-101; K.J. Holsti, ’National Role 
Conception* in the Study of Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly. (14), 1970, pp. 232-309; 
C. Jönsson and U. Westerland, ’Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis', in Christer Jönsson (ed.), 
Cnpiitiva Dynamics and International Politics. Frances Pinter, London, 1982, pp. 127-157.
34 Naomi Wish, ’Foreign Policy Makers and their National Role Conceptions', International 
Studies Quarterly. (24), 4, 1980, pp. 532-554.
and oneself do not yet add up to a complete belief system: images undoubtedly are an 
important part of any belief system of foreign policy decision makers; they are a component 
of the operational code and of Brecher’s model of analysis. They should, however, be supplied 
with ideas about history, international relations, and about the means available to a politician 
to implement his policy goals.
2. The openness of belief systems” . A belief system’s openness refers to the extent 
to which decision makers are prepared to correct their cognitive ideas when new, 
contradictory, information is reaching them*. It has been found that foreign policy makers 
rarely readjust the images of their opponents, despite the availability of evidence that would 
justify such a correction27. It has been suggested that die preparedness to correct one’s view 
of the world when confronted with new information is depending on the extent to which a 
politician’s power is connected with his old, incorrect, ideas2*. It will be clear from these 
considerations that die relative openness of belief system forms an interesting source of 
hypotheses about die behaviour of individuals with certain types of belief systems. It is 
nevertheless not correct to suggest that die concept of openness refers to an approach to 
identify belief systems.
3. Historical analogies. It has been very popular to point to role of historical analogies 
drawn by individual policy makers when dealing with an international problem. Recent work 
comes from Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, who set out to test their hypothesis that 
decisionmakers will make use of analogies with the past when trying to evaluate the problems 
the are currently confronted with29. Unfortunately, their prize winning book is concentrated 
on giving advice on the relevant use of historical analogies in decision making processes. Only 
a minor attempt to analyze under which conditions politicians prefer to rely on the past, is
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irrelevant as a filter mechanism. In that case, it will become difficult to employ an individual’s belief 
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analysis of the operational codes of Henry Kissinger, John Kennedy, and John Foster Dulles; Douglas 
T. Stuart and Harvey Starr, 'The ’Inherent Bad Faith Model’ Revisited: Dulles, Kennedy and 
Kissinger’, Political Psychology. (3), 3/4, 1981-1982, pp. 1-33, esp. 27-28.
26 Cf. Tetlock and McGuire, ’Cognitive Perspectives on Foreign Policy’, pp. 256-258.
27 Holsti, The Belief System and National Images’, p. 328.
21 R.H. Lieshout and Johan K. de Vree, ’How organizations decide. A systems-theoretic approach 
to the ’behaviour" of organizations’, Acta Politica. (20), 2, 1985, pp. 134-135.
29 Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time. The Uses of History for 
Derisim!makers The Free Press, New York, 1986.
made when Neustadt and May allude to the possibility that historical analogies satisfy an 
impulse to action, and thus may give direction to the course of the decision making process50. 
A systematic study of the role of perceived parallels with past events is still lacking, despite 
important past contributions31. However, one should be aware that historical analogies are 
at best an element of an individual’s belief system, but do not present a complete picture of 
an individual’s cognitive ideas.
4. Operational Code. This basically entails a classification of an individual’s cognitive 
ideas about history, international relations, power, opponents, and about the correct means to 
accomplish one’s goals32. The most popular hypothesis deducted from the operational code 
construct predicts that in a decision making situation policy makers will be guided by their 
most central cognitive beliefs.
5. Cognitive Map. As opposed to the deductive classification of the operational code, 
the cognitive map of decision makers is obtained by induction. One observes which causal 
assertions a decision maker utters during a decision making situation. By utilizing grafen- 
theory, it will be possible to discover an individual’s value hierarchy, which serves as an 
important indicator of the considerations on which the final policy option is chosen.
6. Brecher’s model of analysis. This research strategy, which elaborates the pioneering 
work of Harold and Margaret Sprout, is designed to portray the psychological and operational 
environment in which policy makers have to operate. The Brecher-model tries to estimate the 
relative influence of individual cognitive ideas and these environmental variables on the 
structure of the decision making process. The model stresses the importance of images and 
historical analogies as elements of individual belief systems.
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Gardner, ’Averting World War III: Beyond the World War I, World War II Analogies’, SAIS Review. 
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Anwmr..n Pf»Krir«l Sriaicft Review. (81), 3, 1987, pp. 701-716. A formalized model of the employment 
of historical analogies by policymakers can be found in Philip A. Schrodt, ’Parallel Event Sequences 
in International Crises’, Political Behavior. (12), 2, 1990, pp. 97-123.
® 'The classification was originally formulated by Alexander L. George, ’The Operational Code : 
A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies 
Quarterly. (13), 1969, pp. 190-122. It has been elaborated by Ole R. Holsti, ’’Operational Code* Belief 
Systems: A Code-Book’, Final Report to the National Science Foundation, 1976.
It has been shown that only three techniques exist that identify an individual’s cognitive 
belief system. Other approaches are at best elements of these belief systems, or hypotheses that 
can be formulated about the behaviour of individuals with a certain type of belief system. In 
order to determine the appropriate technique for an understanding of British foreign policy 
during the 1956 Suez crisis, I will discuss the operational code, the cognitive map and the 
Brecher-model in the next sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Operational code versus cognitive mapping
The formulation of a cognitive map allows one to identify the structure of causal 
assertions a policy maker utters about a specific policy problem. With the help of grafen-theorv 
complicated considerations are reduced to and schematically represented by the relationships 
a policy makers perceives to exist between policy goals and means33. Cognitive mapping 
clearly is an inductive technique. Relevant variables are not formulated beforehand, but should 
emerge from a decision maker’s utterances at the decision making situation. By consequence, 
verbal accounts of decision making situations form the most relevant data, whereas very often 
one cannot find important considerations but in limited summaries of meetings. On the other 
hand, a cognitive map is supposed to indicate which considerations have led to a specific 
decision34.
Unlike the cognitive map, the operational code stresses the importance of a 
classification of cognitive ideas that might influence the formulation of foreign policy33. An 
operational code is formulated by looking at a politician’s public and private declarations 
uttered until die moment of the decision making situation one is interested in. Once identified, 
an operational code will provide clues about the way a policy maker will define a problem, 
which policy options he will be open to, and how he will reach a decision.
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’Decision making in the face of uncertainty: attributions of Norwegian and American officials’, Journal 
of Peace Research. (23), 4, pp. 341-356; Daniel Heradstveit and Ove Narvesen, ’Psychological 
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Cognitive Map’, Cooperation and Conflict. (13), 1978, pp. 77-92.
14 Heradstveit and Narvesen, ibid.. p. 87.
35 George The "Operational Code"; Alexander L. George, ’The causal nexus between cognitive 
beliefs and decision nuking behavior. The "Operational Code" construct’, in L.S. Falkowski (ed.), 
Psychological Models in International Politics. Westview, Boulder, 1979, pp. 95-124.
Assumptions from cognitive psychology. Both the operational code and cognitive 
mapping are grounded in three theoretical premises of cognitive psychology. The first premise 
refers to the relative complexity of an individual’s cognitive abilities. The second relates to an 
individual s tendency to maintain consistency in his belief system. The last assumption deals 
with bigger importance of some beliefs rather than others. Recently, these assumptions have 
been criticized for depicting man as rather passively responding to stimuli from his 
environment. New approaches tend to conceive of man as a much more active entity 
approaching the world in an almost scientific manner.
1. Complexity versus simplicity. It has been found that individuals, who demonstrate 
cognitive complexity in their view of the world, are better able to deal with unfamiliar 
situations, as they are better able to empathize, and thus anticipate the behaviour of, other 
individuals. Its relevance to the analysis of foreign policy making lies in the suggestion that 
a foreign policy maker will be able to consider a broad range of policy alternatives, when he 
has a differentiated view of his international environment36. The link between cognitive 
complexity and the quality of foreign policy decision making has been qualified over the last 
15 years with the introduction of the occurrence of international crises and decision makers* 
experience in foreign affairs as intervening variables between individual characteristics and 
policy outcome. In a series of analyses of communication between nations during international 
crises it was found that, on the whole, those crises that eventually ended in armed conflict 
showed a reduction of cognitive complexity of both parties prior to the outbreak of hostilities, 
while those leading to a peaceful solution showed an increase in the cognitive complexity of 
the communications between the nation-states involved. Moreover, the latter scores for 
cognitive complexity were on the average significantly higher than the former37.
Integrative complexity is characterized by discrimination, differentiation, and 
integration. The first concept refers to an individual’s ability to distinguish between stimuli. 
Differentiation implies his capacity to see various dimensions of one stimulus. Integration 
means that an individual can combine different stimuli and their dimensions into various 
interconnected schemes that serve as a filter of incoming information. Even though an
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individual may be able to differentiate between dimensions, he need not be capable of 
integrating them into varied combinations3*. The same methodology has been applied to an 
analysis of surprise attacks. It was found that the decision of die attacking party to terminate 
negotiations and to strike first was reflected by a reduction of die integrative complexity of his 
communications to the other,party39.
Next, a politician’s experience in foreign affairs was added as an intervening variable: 
because their curiosity was raised by Andrei Gromyko’s performance in seven foreign policy 
crises, Wallace and Suedfield examined six politicians who served their country in foreign 
affairs over twenty years. The outcome, however, was inconclusive: only two leaders displayed 
increased integrative complexity, while the other four remained at the same level or even 
showed a reduction. Moreover, no significant increase in integrative complexity over the years 
could be found, which would have indicated die occurrence of learning effects from longevity 
in office. Learning, if it occurs at all, must have taken place before taking office. Equally 
plausible would be the explanation that high or low integrative complexity may depend on 
stable individual traits, rather than on learning40.
It is extremely important that research into integrative complexity contributes to the 
systematic gathering of data about international politics. Moreover, an important component 
of the process of information processing is captured by this technique. It should, however, be 
borne in mind that the exact place of integrative complexity in the decision making process 
remains rather unclear. The same is true for its contribution to the understanding of 
international politics. The main problem is whether decreasing integrative complexity is an 
indicator or a cause of deteriorating relations between nation-states41. The problem of 
separating dependent and independent variables in crises research is an old one that still needs 
to be resolved. It seems to me, however, that this can be done only if systematic analysis, such 
as the research on integrative complexity, is supplemented by historical case studies in which 
die decision making process is followed step by step, which would be the first prerequisite for
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a separation of independent and independent variables, by at least disconnecting them in time, 
if only because most international crises do not involve one decision only, such as to attack 
or not, but a series of often minor decisions, each possibly affected by and, on their turn, a 
potential cause of reduction of integrative complexity.
2. Tendency to maintain consistency. Man is supposed to display a strong tendency to 
see what he expects to see and to assimilate incoming information to previously formed ideas 
about the world. He thus maintains a balance in his view of the world. This phenomenon 
should not be considered necessarily irrational, distorted or closed-minded, because, starting 
from the axiom that no-one can process all stimuli that he encounters, one must have a 
mechanism of selection and organization. Consistency-seeking can become detrimental when 
the absorbing of new information does not logically follow from his pre-existing beliefs, or 
when the latter are not adequately grounded in experience or knowledge. If this is the case, 
consistency seeking may become detrimental to decision making42.
Consistency-seeking is closely connected with the issue of integrative complexity: a 
relatively complex cognitive style will help to avoid unsound striving for consistency, that is, 
not based on illogical methods. Similarly, a tendency to think in much more simple schemes, 
such as in times of international crises, coupled with one’s natural tendency to seek 
consistency, may cause closed-mindedness.
3. The presence of master beliefs. Nevertheless, one still does not know where to look 
if one wants to anticipate the nature of a politician’s closed-mindedness. Which ideas will he 
be likely to cling to? Which will be abandoned? A third assumption is needed in order to 
answer these questions. It is assumed that certain beliefs are more important than others, or 
that a cognitive belief system is characterized by a hierarchical structure43. An entire system 
of beliefs is structured around a so-called master belief. It is assumed that these beliefs will 
direct the acceptance and interpretation of new information.
These three assumptions of cognitive psychology have been the subject of much 
discussion lately. It has been argued that this view of man as a consistency seeker depicts him 
as an almost passive victim of previously formed ideas. Instead, man should be viewed as a 
’problem solver’, or ’naive scientist’, who is eager and active to understand the origins of the 
behaviour of others. In that process of comprehension, he spontaneously thinks along similar
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lines as a scientist who approaches a problem44. In doing so, man is supposedly interested (1) 
in understanding the attributes of other actors (2) in understanding the causes of important 
events and (3) in predicting historical trends and the behaviour of other persons. Of course, 
man is not an experienced scientist, and his efforts are thus likely to till prey to certain errors 
and biases. These are investigated by attribution theorists. Their most important findings relate 
to (a) the so-called fundamental attribution error, and (b) the reliance on so-called availability 
heuristics45.
(a) the fundamental attribution error. This refers to the tendency to put emphasis of 
situational factors when explaining one’s own behaviour, while underlining dispositional 
variables when explaining the behaviour of others. In conflictual situations one tends to 
interpret the ’good’ behaviour of one’s opponent in terms of special circumstances which 
forces him to change behaviour. His ’normal, bad’ behaviour is seen as stemming from his 
true, e.g. aggressive, characteristics46.
(b) ’availability heuristics’. Decision makers usually rely on low effort techniques for 
dealing with situations that pose a challenge to their organization. They often apply rules-of- 
thumb in order reach a decision. One of these is the tendency to judge a situation according 
to its availability, that is, the evoking of past experiences which the new situation appears to 
resemble. Decision makers are thus able to decide quickly without having to go through the 
motions of weighing the pros and cons of various alternatives, or even the effort to come up 
with alternatives in the first place47.
The paradigms of the cognitive miser and the naive scientist are not as far apart in 
their practical elaborations as is suggested by their proponents. The fundamental attribution 
error resembles the hypothesis of the relative closedmindedness of politicians with certain 
belief systems: the characteristic of John Foster Dulles’s belief system, as measured by his
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operational code4*, displays this phenomenon, which has been labelled thereafter the ’inherent 
bad faith model’49. Exactly because attribution theorists analyze errors and biases of decision 
makers as a ’naive scientist’, they get quite close again to the mechanism of cognitive 
consistency seeking30. Knowledge of cognitive psychology remains indispensable for the 
understanding of the way decision makers process large amounts of information in foreign 
policy making. The so-called information-processing paradigm recognizes thus both the 
filtering quality of previously developed beliefs and the capacity of individuals to appreciate 
the importance of discrepant information and to adopt an attitude of openness if present beliefs 
are challenged31. Belief systems, therefore, remain an important tool of the researcher, but 
he should not be entrapped in the suggestion that operational code, cognitive map, or Brecher- 
model provide definite predictive power52.
Both the operational code and the cognitive map are based on the three assumptions 
of cognitive psychology mentioned above. The idea that a master belief plays a central role in 
an individual’s striving for consistency poses the question how to identify such a master belief. 
The operational code defines that belief to be of central importance that remains stable over 
time and from which other cognitive beliefs can be deducted. The cognitive map, however, 
as a tool which analyses an actual decision making situation, recognizes that belief as central 
that is connected with the highest number of causal assertions within the network of beliefs that 
a decisionmaker displays during that situation.
At face value, both approaches seem to complement each other, provided that the 
relevant data are available: one could formulate expectations about the stand a decision maker 
is likely to take, based on his operational code, which, it should be remembered, is based on
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material up until the decision making moment one is interested in. These expectations can then 
be tested with a cognitive map drawn up from the material that deals with the decision making 
situation directly. Unfortunately, this ideal situation will never occur due to serious 
methodological problems connected with the cognitive map approach.
Firstly, die master belief of an individual’s cognitive map is found by counting the 
number of causal assertions that arrive at and depart from a cognitive belief. The belief which 
is connected with most other beliefs, is defined as the map’s central or master belief. However, 
frequency can never be a sufficient or necessary condition for identifying a central belief, 
especially if it based on the sum of both positively and negatively loaded causal assertions. 
Secondly, existing cognitive map studies33 show that in a representation of an individual’s 
cognitive map instrumental variables tend to be overrepresented at the expense of goal 
variables. It is therefore unrealistic to claim that a cognitive map is able to calculate the rank 
order of a decision maker’s actual preferences at the time of decision making34.
The operational code, however, is not free of methodological difficulties either. 
Master beliefs are detected by looking for an individual’s most persistent beliefs over time. A 
comparative analysis of existing operational code studies shows that two types of operational 
codes exist, each organized around a different master belief: one type of belief system is 
centered around a policy maker’s view of his principal opponent in world politics; a second 
group is structured around a policy maker’s ideas about the nature of international politics33. 
However, it could well be the case that someone’s belief system changes over time, if only
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American Policy Makers’, World Politics. (30), 1,1977, pp. 115-140; Ariel Levi and Philip E. Tetlock, 
’A Cognitive Analysis of Japan’s 1941 Decision for War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution. (24), 2, 1980, 
pp. 195-211; John Hamwee, and others, ’The Assumptions of British Nuclear Weapons Decision­
makers’, Journal of Peace Research. (27), 4, 1990, pp. 359-372.
34 Axelrod’s analysis of the cognitive map of a member of the Eastern Committee of the British 
Imperial War Committee suggests that the British ability to put pressure on the Persian Government is 
the map’s master belief; however, without taking into account the concept of ’British utility’, it remains 
impossible to understand any policy choice; Robert Axelrod, ’Decision for Neoimperialism: the 
Deliberations of the British Eastern Committee in 1918’, in Axelrod, Structure of Decision, figure 4-2, 
pp. 88-89; Bonham and Shapiro’s laboratory experiment with U.S. Middle East experts regarding a 
hypothetical Syrian invasion of Jordan, is an improvement as it offers several possible definitions of 
’American utility’; however, the cognitive map of a Middle East specialist does not contribute to 
understanding policy choices because it cannot indicate which foreign policy goal is the most important 
one; Bonham and Shapiro, ’Explanation of the Unexpected. The Syrian Intervention in Jordan in 1970’, 
in Axelrod, The Structure of Decision, figure 6-2, pp. 126-127. One should therefore be careful in 
employing the frequency criterion, because of its possible neglect of goal variables that might appear 
more central than sheer frequency suggests.
33 Ole R. Holsti, ’A Typology of "Operational Code* Belief Systems’, paper presented to the 
Conference on Approaches to Decision Malting’, Oslo, April 1977.
because learning takes place permanently during an individual’s life-time: either gradually, 
because of an accumulation of experiences36, or suddenly after a dramatic event57.
Studies of Secretaries of State John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson, and Senator 
Frank Church demonstrate that cognitive belief systems do change in the course of a political 
career31. Within the concept of the operational code this is not a real problem as long as a 
change of master beliefs is followed by a consistent change of other cognitive beliefs. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory value of the operational code may be severely limited when in 
principle the possibility exists that at the decision making situation the operational code is 
supposed to help understand, a politician radically changes his belief system. Despite this 
limitation the operational code is to be preferred to the cognitive map because the latter 
approach may not reveal master beliefs, and thus makes it much more difficult to formulate 
hypotheses about a politician’s behaviour at decision making situations.
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4.3.2 Michael Brecher’s model of analysis
In 1975 Michael Brecher initiated an ambitious research project, the International 
Crisis Behavior Project, which aims at the establishment of a set of empirical data in which 
one can find important characteristics of all international crises for the 1930-1980 period39.
56 See, e.g., Milton Rokeach, 'Inducing Change and Stability in Belief Systems and Personality 
Structures’, Journal of Social Issues. (41), 1, 1985, esp. pp. 160-164.
57 Cf. Jimmy Carter’s account of the anger the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provoked in him, and 
how this made him change his ideas about the nature of his opponent, James Carter, Keeping Faith. 
Memoirs of a President. Bantam, New York, 1982. Several analyses point to the coincidental, perfect 
timing of Carter's belief system change in accordance with changes in domestic public opinion: e.g., 
Thomas G. Hart, ’Perceiving ’Afghanistan": Some Questions about the Applicability of Theoretical 
Insights in Analysing Perceptions in a Current Crisis’, Jdnsson, Cognitive Dynamics and International 
Politics, pp. 80-85. The sudden, radical change of a belief system because of an international event, or 
crisis, of course, contradicts the very hypothesis inherent to cognitive map and operational code: 
namely, that these events trigger, and are filtered into, existing beliefs. Little systematic research into 
this possibility has been done. It is implicitly borne out in e.g., Christopher New, Perceptions of China: 
The Influence of Expatriate Attitudes on Britinh and American Foreign Policy Towards China. 1925-37. 
M. A. Thesis, The Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna, 1986.
31 Holsti, ’The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political leaders’, pp. 126, 129-132, 
David S. McLellan, ’The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Dean 
Acheson’s Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs’, Canadian Journal of Political Science. (4), 1, 1971, 
pp. 52-75; Loch K. Johnston, ’Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior: Senator 
Frank Church at Midcareer', in Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas W. Milbum (eds.), A Psychological 
Examination of Political leaders. The Free Press, New York, 1977, pp. 80-119.
* Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Sheila Moser, Crises in the Twentieth Century. 
Volume I: Handbook of International Crises; Volume II: Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises. Pergamon 
Press, 1988.
Next, Brecher intends to complement this set of data with 25 qualitative case studies of 
international crises*0, making use of his own model of analysis61. His research strategy 
attempts to measure to influence of a decision maker’s operational and psychological 
environment on his policy decisions. Simplifying Brecher’s work, one could say that his 
method of analysis prescribes four steps:
(1) A division of the case into a pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis period. In order to 
make such a distinction, a crisis is defined as a situation during which policy makers perceive, 
first, a threat to fundamental values, second, a high probability of the occurrence of military 
action, and third, a limited amount of available time. The start of both pre-crisis and crisis is 
recognizable because of certain symbolic events.
(2) A description of the psychological environment. Brecher distinguishes between the 
attitudinal prism and images. The former refers to the government’s general orientation to 
international politics, one’s place therein, and one’s opponent. The latter regards the more 
immediate ideas of the relevant policy makers.
(3) A search for crucial decisions taken during the crisis and for information that can 
shed light on the decision making process.
(4) An attempt to answer die research questions that are the core of the Brecher model, 
and that form the basis of its comparative value. Its central question discusses the influence 
of increasing stress on four aspects of the decision making process, that is, the processing of 
information, die consulting of experts outside the decision making unit, size and structure of 
the decision making unit(s), and, lastly, open-mindedness towards alternative options. Changes 
in the level of stress is measured by changes in the perception of threats, available time, and 
the probability of the use of military force.
All case studies employing the Brecher model of analysis try to test the hypothesis that 
an increase in emotional stress will reduce the quality of the decision making process: the locus 
of decisionmaking will contain a reduced number of participants at an ever higher level.
%
* Five cue studies have so far been conducted: Michael Brecher, with Benjamin Geist, Decisions 
in Crisis: Israel. 1967 and 1973. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980; Karen Dawiska, The 
Kremlin and the Prague Soring: Decisions in Crisis. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984; 
Alan Dowty, Middle East Crisis: U.S. Decision Making in 1958. 1970. and 1973. University of 
California Press, Berkeley, 1984; Geoffrey Jukes, Hitler’s Stalingrad Decisions. University of California 
Press, Berkeley, 1985; Avi Shlaim, The United States and the Berlin Blockade 1948-1949. A Study in 
Crisis Decision M aking. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983. For a review of these case 
studies, see J.L. Richardson, ’New Insights on International Crises', Review of International Studies.
(14), 4, pp. 309-316.
*' Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, ’A framework for research on foreign policy behavior’.
Decision makers will isolate themselves from outside experts and will be guided by their ideas 
about their opponent and international politics in general.
Brecher’s model of analysis is an important attempt at linking individual cognitive 
beliefs to decision making processes during international crises. Unfortunately, the research 
design presents a rather limited classification of cognitive ideas, in which instrumental beliefs, 
that discuss proper means and timing of action, are lacking. Moreover, the vague notion of 
the attitudinal prism supplements more detailed, individual, images, but the precise link 
between these variables remains unclear. It will be shown that this hampers empirical research 
aimed at the exact role of individual cognitive beliefs.
4.4 The behaviour of nation-states and belief systems
Until now the most important question has still been circumvented: why would we 
need individual belief systems if we want to explain the behaviour of nation-states ? In this 
section I will show that individual cognitive belief systems may be helpful, and sometimes 
indispensable indeed, if one wants to explain international politics at the level of the nation­
state, and even at the level of the international system. At the same time, the relative 
usefulness of Brecher-model and operational code wOl be illustrated.
4.4.1 The link between belief systems and international politics: die Brecher-model
In his study of the Russian blockade of West Berlin from 24 June 1948 to 5 May 1949 
Avi Shlaim tries to apply the Brecher-model to processes of crisis decision making. His main 
conclusion is that an increase of emotional stress among American policy makers resulted in 
higher quality foreign policy decisions62. For the purpose of this study at this moment 
attention should be paid to the relation between belief systems and international politics*3.
The crisis period starts when at 24 June 1948 the Soviet Union closes off all 
connections over land with West Berlin. The pre-crisis, however, had set in at 20 March 1948 
when Marshall Sokolowski walked out on the Allied Control Council as a protest against the
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® Shlaim’s study was chosen because his contribution to the collection of essays edited by Little and 
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Blockade crisis, Shlaim, ’Truman’s Belief System: Russia and the Berlin Blockade’, in Little and Smith 
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Western attitude towards reunification of the occupied zones. The end of the crisis-situation, 
and the beginning of the post-crisis situation, is characterized by the Truman Administration’s 
decision at 27 July 1948 not to escalate the conflict, but to wait and see and to meanwhile 
continue operating the air lift that had been improvised in April, but had become operative on 
a large scale on 26 June 1848. The post-crisis situation would last until 5 May 1949 when the 
Russians removed their blockade64.
The next step is to describe the images of key decision makers, President Truman, 
Secretary of State Marshall, and the Head of die American occupation zone in Germany, 
General Clay, as well as the attitudinal prism over die American Government65. 
Unfortunately, Shlaim does not deal with the problem of the interrelationship between images 
and attitudinal prism. He concentrates on the perception of the opponent: crucial is the 
pessimistic view of the Soviet Union and its intentions in world politics, coupled with the 
conviction that the United States should take the lead in stopping Soviet expansionism. Berlin 
was interpreted as a test-case: it was considered the last opportunity to make it clear to 
Moscow that further aggression would not be tolerated. This image would determine the 
American attitude during the crisis66.
A methodological problem is created by the almost perfect coincidence of the 
individual images of Truman, Marshall, and Clay with attitudinal prism of the American 
Government67. It could thus be claimed that it would have sufficed to examine Governmental 
declarations instead of reconstructing the images of key decision makers: belief systems do not 
seem to add to an understanding of the crisis. This presumed irrelevance of belief systems is 
caused, on the one hand, by the little attention the Brecher-model pays to the difference 
between individual images and governmental prisms, and, on the other hand, by the inaccurate 
analysis of two key decisions. The decision to stay in Berlin, despite the accepted impossibility 
to defend West Berlin if the Soviets were to press on, can be understood only if somehow 
individual belief systems are taken into account: it was Truman’s decision on the basis of a 
consideration that was by no means shared by the State Department or the Pentagon. Similarly, 
the decision not to escalate to conflict, but to continue the air-lift, is only explicable if 
reference is made to the category of instrumental beliefs. Shlaim indicates that U.S. key
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decision makers perceived three options: to withdraw from Berlin, to challenge Russian resolve 
by sending a military train through the Corridor to West Berlin, or to set up an air-lift6*. An 
explanation of the decision not to escalate should be looked for among decision makers’ 
instrumental beliefs about appropriate means and timing. These beliefs are lacking in a vague 
categorizing of belief systems such as in the Brecher-model. They can be found, however, in 
the operational code.
Nevertheless, the important point is that the imprecise components of attitudinal prism 
and individual images make it more difficult to indicate the precise relevance of cognitive 
belief systems for an understanding of American foreign policy at the time of the Berlin 
blockade. Two crucial choices, however, cannot be explained unless individual cognitive 
beliefs are taken into account.
4.4.2 The link between belief systems and international politics: the usefulness of the 
operational code
An important example of an operational code study that tries to investigate into the 
relation between cognitive beliefs and international politics is Harvey Starr’s study of Henry 
Kissinger’s belief system and U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the 1970s69. Starr first 
formulates Kissinger’s operational code by examining his academic publications until the 
moment of his appointment as President Nixon’s National Security Adviser in 1968. Next, 
Kissinger’s cognitive beliefs are compared with his public utterances on the Soviet Union and 
China in that function, and, from September 1973, as Secretary of State.
The notion of an international status quo that can be threatened by so-called
revolutionary states at any time, is central to Kissinger’s operational code. International politics 
is predictable as long as no revolutionary state threatens the status quo. Under those 
circumstances negotiations are the best tool for a statesmen to accomplish his goals, basing 
himself on the predictable behaviour of other states. When the legitimate international order 
is threatened, however, military conflict becomes a legitimate means of preserving or restoring 
the status quo70.
Starr subsequently analyzes Kissinger’s perceptions of China and the Soviet Union for
the 1971-1976 period,employing Evaluation Assertion Analysis, a quantitative research
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technique, that was developed by the psychologist Charles Osgood. Over 600 public statements 
of Kissinger are categorized on four dimensions: his perception of Chinese and Soviet hostility, 
of their power, of their success, and his overall appreciation of these two countries71. It is 
thus possible to characterize Kissinger’s belief system as relatively open: his evaluation of the 
Soviet Union and China depends on their foreign policy. He does not consider them to be 
inherently aggressive or peace-loving. He judges them according to his criterion of whether 
the international status quo is threatened by their foreign policies; a negative image of the 
Soviet Union is developed only when she starts interfering with developments in Angola and 
the Horn of Africa in 1975 and 197672.
In order to answer the question whether Kissinger’s cognitive beliefs are a necessary 
tool for understanding American foreign policy towards China and the Soviet Union, Starr 
compares the dynamics of Kissinger’s perceptions with the scores of American foreign policy 
towards both countries on the intensity of conflict-scale, developed by Edward Azar and 
Thomas Sloan73. Starr’s hypothesis that an improvement in Kissinger’s evaluation of the 
Soviet Union and China will be followed by a more positive attitude of the American 
Government (and reversely), is falsified74. Starr concludes therefore that belief systems cannot 
be a sufficient, but at best a necessary, condition for the explanation of U.S. foreign policy.
Starr should be praised for his methodological precision. He distinguished between the 
sources on which he based Kissinger’s operational code and the data that served his analysis 
of Kissinger’s perceptions as a foreign policy maker. The separation of dependent and 
independent variables is not always respected in studies of cognitive ideas and international 
politics73. He seems to have adopted Alexander George’s process-tracine-method that should 
be followed if one wants understand die relation between beliefs and behaviour: the decision 
making process should be followed step by step; at each step it should be checked whether and
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how cognitive beliefs select, and guide the interpretation of, incoming information, suggest or 
exclude alternative options, and thus implicidy structure the decision76.
Starr seems to have made a distinction between different relevant periods in order to 
compare fluctuations in perceptions with fluctuations in policies, but, according to me, has 
made an important mistake. He has implicidy concluded that Kissinger’s view of the opponent, 
i.e. China and the Soviet Union, forms his master belief, and thus his most important sense 
of direction for formulating foreign policy. His own analysis, however, bears out, according 
to me, that die nature of international politics better qualifies as Kissinger’s master belief: 
international order can in danger at any moment by a state attempting to change the status quo. 
This determines the best way to approach an opponent. In comparing Kissinger’s perception 
to American foreign policy, Starr should not have limited his analysis to the 1972-4 period, 
but should have added a period during which the Soviet Union and China threatened the 
international status quo. Real congruence between Kissinger’s belief and American policy 
would be expected to be found in a policy change after a perception change in terms of the 
master belief. Such a drastic change seems to have occurred in 1975-6, when the Soviet Union 
was challenging the international status quo with her African policies. This should then explain 
Kissinger’s and America’s much tougher attitude towards the Soviet Union in those years.
4.5 Conclusion
First, individual belief systems can contribute considerably to explanations of 
international politics, provided that research problems are formulated in the following terms: 
’can outcome Y be understood without reference to the cognitive beliefs of X?’77. The 
Brecher-model and the operational code are potentially very useful for the evaluation of the 
role of cognitive belief systems and decision making processes. The case studies discussed 
above show two very important points:
(1) Sometimes foreign policy cannot be understood unless individual cognitive beliefs 
are introduced: the decision to stay in a defenseless Berlin in 1948 and not to escalate the 
conflict cannot be understood with (neo)realist tools alone, and have to be seen in light of 
Truman’s, Marshall’s and Clay’s individual belief systems.
(2) Cognitive belief systems may be a variable that links different levels of analysis in 
the study of international relations. Kissinger’s perception of a change in the nature of the
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international system explains America’s hard line towards the Soviet Union. If the nature of 
the international system is an important master belief within the belief systems of foreign 
policy makers, then an analysis of those systems may contribute to an explanation of the 
interaction between, on the one hand, so-called ’hard data’ on the position of nation-states in 
the international system and, on the other hand, the way politicians perceive these ’hard data’ 
and act upon them. Thus one could be one step closer to making use of the insights from both 
(neo)realist theory and different approaches to international relations, such as decision making.
Second, Starr’s analysis demonstrates that cognitive psychology can be useful not only 
in the rather limited area of international crisis decision making, but as well when more long­
term policies are concerned.
Third, both the operational code and the Brecher-model have made it abundantly clear 
that it is important to be absolutely clear about one’s research question. Certain decisions 
should be the center of attention to which cognitive beliefs should be attached.
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Chapter 5: Review of alternative approaches
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5.1 Introductory remarks
An analysis on the basis of cognitive belief systems not only has to prove its usefulness 
in competition with neorealism1. It also has to confront the claim that the perceptions and 
expectations of the foreign policy makers can be better accounted for by other variables than 
individual cognitive beliefs. Three types of variables can be distinguished. First, variables that 
are related to the individual decisionmaker, other than his cognitive belief system. Second, 
variables that belong to the institutional setting that foreign policymakers operate in. Third, 
a factor that takes account of the condition that major foreign policy decisions are often taken 
in small groups. This chapter discusses the former two types of variables, while chapter 6 will 
deal with small group dynamics.
5.2 Individual variables, other than cognitive beliefs
Generally, two types of argument could be brought against the use of individual belief 
systems for the understanding of international politics. The first type points to individual 
characteristics that lie beyond the reach of cognitive beliefs and that would make them 
superfluous. People who consider the physical condition of leaders an important element of 
their functioning actually claim that, under certain conditions, idiosyncratic characteristics of 
foreign policy makers may explain their behaviour. The physical malfunctioning of individuals 
makes them act differently from how one would reasonably expect them to act. For the 
neorealist this would mean that he can freely admit that in exceptional cases individuals are 
important, because of an individual’s physical condition, but, on the whole, individuals act 
within terms of the security dilemma.
The second type of argument denies a central place to individual belief systems. 
Writers in this school argue that individual beliefs are the product of deeper-lying motivations 
which form part of someone’s character-structure. By implication, it would be much more 
efficient to try to establish a link between foreign policy making and individual character or 
motivations.
1 For a neorealist, the individual does not constitute an independent variable that contributes to the 
explanation of international politics. The individual that participates in international affairs is thus 
considered an exponent of the nation-state he or she belongs to; cf. Martin Hollis’s discussion of "plastic 
man", Models of Man. Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1977, pp. 3-9.
5.2.1 Physical condition
Little research has as yet been conducted on the relationship between fitness and 
political performance2. Vaguely, die conviction is getting hold that politicians need a certain 
amount of stamina, if they want to be successful in politics. Much has been made of the 
perseverance of European Commissioner Sicco Mansholt at die common agricultural policy 
negotiations: he would use his role as a chairman to continue discussion well into the night 
persuading his colleagues to adopt his proposals after prolonged discussions had exhausted 
them completely. Similar heroic views exist of Sir Winston Churchill's physical endurance 
during the Second World War. However, Churchill's leadership became a subject of scepticism 
after he had suffered from a stroke in 1953.
Unfortunately, little is known about the real impact of certain physical disabilities on 
political performance. Robertson attempts to describe the potential implications of fatigue, 
illness, and the use of drugs, by presenting short case studies of Adolf Hitler, John Kennedy, 
and Anthony Eden. His analysis, however, remains inconclusive3.
The case of Anthony Eden, of course, is extremely relevant for the purposes of this 
study. Some people dismiss Suez as the product of a madman4, but, British sensitivities apart, 
if Eden’s physical or mental health can be proven to have been of importance during Suez, it 
would have serious consequences for this study. The present analysis started from the idea that 
it would be interesting to scrutinize a case which seems so easily explicable in neorealist terms 
as a logical consequence of the change from a multipolar to a bipolar world, from the point 
of view of individual cognitive factors. To find that Suez could be explained by a physical 
problem of Sir Anthony Eden would in itself be a point in case, but could easily be wavered 
by neorealists with their claim that physical factors are idiosyncratic that indeed do occur 
occasionally, but which do not undermine neorealist theory as such.
The case of Sir Anthony Eden. It is well-known that Eden suffered from a badly 
executed bile-conduct operation in 1953, which required another operation in the United States 
in order to save his life. It is public knowledge too that because of the effects of the first
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operation, Eden would occasionally suffer from sudden fevers accompanied by emotional 
reactions, like anger, irritability, and anxiety. Eden took medicine to suppress these 
consequences, but, unless his medical files will become public, the exact state of his physical 
health, or the psychological consequences of his treatment, will remain unknown. It is 
therefore unsound to simply claim that at the time of Suez Eden was mentally unfit to deal with 
the situation. All important policy crises produce anxiety and may thus influence the decision 
making process; the very fact that crises produce emotional stress is the rationale of applying 
social-psychological approaches to the study of international politics. It seems therefore an 
exaggeration to put Eden immediately into die category of ’madman’ cases, when it is save to 
presume that probably most participants at the meetings of the Cabinet Committee that took 
the major decisions, will have experienced a reduction of their cognitive abilities and emotional 
stability.
Moreover, we know that Eden had experienced these fevers regularly since 1953, yet 
we usually judge his diplomatic performances of 1954 as among his finest5. It is too easy, and 
for many former participants at Suez convenient to describe Eden as mentally weak, because 
it removes part of the responsibility from themselves. An example of the latter is McDermott’s 
constant use of descriptions like ’he worked in a sort of frenzy which sometimes touched 
hysteria’6.
The records give three clues to moments at which Eden was indeed suffering from his 
weak physical health. At the beginning of October 1956 Eden wrote to Foreign Secretary 
Selwyn Lloyd, who was at that time engaged in negotiations with Egypt at the United Nations 
in New York, that he had ’been struck down by a tiresome virus with a high temperature, [that 
he] hope[d] to be about again in a day or two’, and let him know the next day that the 
temperature had turned normal again7. Actually, that very day, when visiting his wife, who 
was in hospital because of a miscarriage, Eden fell ill again and had to stay at the hospital. On 
9 October 1956 Eden tells Lloyd that the temperature had been 105 degrees Fahrenheit at its
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7 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Public Record Office, FO 800/741, Eden to Lloyd (at UN), Telegram 1063,
6 October 1956; Telegram 1070, 7 October 1956.
height*. The important point is that this date of physical and, presumably, mental weakness 
cannot be connected to any crucial decision. It occurred after the crucial day that Dulles made 
his notorious anti-colonialist speech (2 October 1956), which, it will argued, was the definite 
incident that persuaded the British to go it alone without consulting the Americans. Similarly, 
Eden was back in good shape by 13 October 1956 when General Maurice Challe secretly flew 
from Paris to London to suggest an Anglo-French intervention in case of an Israeli attack.
Another case of 105 degrees Fahrenheit occurred on 4 November 1956, when the 
United Nations General Assembley condemned die Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and 
Israel with a vote of 64 to 5*: it happened in coincidence with the vote at the UN, and thus 
may have been caused by it, or may itself have caused another blow to Eden’s health; 
moreover, it coincided with an important Cabinet meeting. However, as will be discussed in 
detail in chapter 10, there is no trace of an attempt by Eden to impose a decision on the 
Cabinet. Actually, the die had already been cast two days before, when the so-called Egypt 
Committee decided to go ahead with die invasion. On November 4th, Eden’s presumed anxiety 
about the UN-vote may have stiffened his attitude, but it does not explain the full Cabinet’s 
decision to insist on the military operation.
A last example of Eden’s bad health at the time of Suez can be reconstructed only with 
some difficulty. In his biography of Eden, James quotes Eden’s diary as mentioning ’physical 
pain* on Tuesday 21 August 195610. On the next day, however, Eden is apparently examined 
by his doctor, Dr. Kling, who declares him to be in good health: ’it was really all a matter of 
nerves’11. We know, from a letter by V.E. Key to the Secretary of State for War, Anthony 
Head, that on the day of Eden’s pains a small group of ministers thought it a good thing to 
take some provocative action against Egypt12. The third week of August was a critical week 
indeed, because the London conference was about to come to an end, and it was not clear what 
the British attitude should be if the Conference was to reach a conclusion that would not satisfy 
British demands. This is therefore a situation in which the point could be made that Eden’s
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physical suffering may have influenced his stand at the Ministerial meeting at 11.15 A.M., just 
before the Cabinet meeting of 11.30, although we do not know when his pains actually set in.
It is rather difficult to establish a connection between physical health, emotional 
stability, and performance at decision making situations on die basis of the primary sources 
presently available. It seems, however, that the occasions at which such a relationship could 
have been possible do not prove a strong nexus: first of all, because no crucial decision was 
taken under such known circumstances, and second, because at no stage was action taken by 
an ill Eden on his own. On every occasion, several colleagues took part in the decision making 
process. No decision can thus be explained by illness alone, but has to be supplemented by, 
at least, an analysis of group dynamics.
5.2.2 Personality
The term personality suggests that an individual will display certain stable elements that 
underlie and guide many of his actions and reactions, both emotional and intellectual. Although 
much disagreement exists about the concept of personality, and about die question whether 
personality is an individual characteristic, or a construct of researchers put on top of 
individuals, many studies have been undertaken to identify components of the personalities of 
politicians13. For the study of foreign policy, the question whether some personal 
characteristics are more prevalent than others among members of the foreign policy elite, 
seems quite relevant. Unfortunately, very few studies in political science, and in international 
relations in particular, have tried to assess the link between personality and foreign policy 
decision making.
Basically, two types of arguments can be made. First, it is possible that a cognitive 
belief system is itself a product of an individual’s motivational structure: cognitive beliefs must 
find their origins somewhere14. The idea is that early childhood socialization leads to the 
acquisition by the individual of dominant motives. Later in life, he tends to develop a political 
belief system compatible with his specific motivational structure13. Second, it may the case 
that an individual’s motivational structure will determine his response to an external stimulus, 
independent of his cognitive belief system. In either case, die cognitive belief system is no 
longer a relevant factor.
13 This section draws heavily from Blondel, Political Leadership, pp. 128-136.
14 Cf. Fred I. Greeostein, Personality and Politics. Markham, Chicago, 1969, pp. 4-5.
11 Cf. Stephen Walker, ’The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis 
of the Operational Code Construct’, International Studies Quarterly. (27), 1983, p. 189.
107
Both visions suggest that a politician will project (or needs to project) his deeper 
drives, his motives, into some project, the accomplishment of which provides a relief from his 
inner tensions. Usually, a distinction is made between three types of motivation that direct 
political behaviour: the need for power, the need for affiliation, and the need for 
achievement16. In the psychological study of politics the most popular version of this theory 
proposes that certain individual politicians will, first of all, search for the enlargement of their 
personal power in order to compensate for negative feelings of low self-esteem17.
Alexander and Juliette George’s study of Woodrow Wilson’s performance as a 
President of Princeton University, as Governor of New Jersey, and of President of the United 
States is an example of a useful application of this hypothesis to empirical analysis1*. They 
show how Wilson’s career displayed a regular pattern in which dramatic accomplishments 
shortly after taking office, were followed by a period of contention and controversy, and 
eventually resulted in a defeat under circumstances that offered ample possibilities for success. 
The Georges demonstrate how ego-defence mechanisms, that were related to Wilson’s need 
for power, furthered his extreme unwillingness to compromise19.
Lebow’s comparative analysis of the outbreak of World War One, the 1950 decision 
to extend the Korean War to North Korea, and the 1962 Sino-Indian war, suggests that 
explanations of foreign policy making based on motivational structure are more comprehensive 
than those that make use of belief systems30.
However, the relationship between motivational structure, cognitive belief system, and 
political behaviour may be too complicated to allow for a clear distinction: Walker and 
Falkowski argue that it is too simple to suggest that cognitive beliefs need not be examined. 
According to them, environmental stimuli, such as a political crisis, can lead to two different, 
though interrelated processes: on the one hand, a politician’s personal needs (power, affiliation,
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discussed by Harold Lasswell, in his Power and Personality. W.W. Norton, New York, 1948; 
LassweU’s hypothesis has been developed by Alexander George, ’Power as a Compensatory Value’, 
Journal of Social Issues. (24), 3, 1968, pp. 29-49; see also, Tom Brydar, ’A Preface to the 
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“ Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: a Personality 
Study. Dover Press, New York, 1956.
"  As discussed in Greenstein, Personality and Politics, pp. 73-86.
*  Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis. Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1981, chapters 5 and 6, esp. pp. 102-111, 222-228.
achievement), are aroused as the individual uses his cognitive belief system to interpret and 
cope with the new situation. Cognitive beliefs are therefore expected to have some independent 
influence, e.g. through emotional reactions. On the other hand, these aroused motives, may 
contribute to the cognitive rigidity of the politician’s belief system and may thus account for 
his handling of the situation21. Beliefs and motives do not exclude each other: ’motives as 
enhancing the impact of beliefs upon behavior rather than competing with beliefs for influence 
over behavior’22.
This suggests that first reactions to an external threat can be extremely important, and 
may be caused by motivational structure. This is the conclusion of Thomas Mongar’s study 
of John Kennedy’s role during four foreign policy crises3 . Morgan stresses the importance 
of initial reactions to a new situation. He labels the situation in which the decision maker is 
convinced that he has struck a bargain with one’s opponent, which is suddenly not respected 
any longer, the ’abrogation syndrome’. This may provoke feelings of anger which may then 
direct immediate decisions. This supposedly explains why Kennedy, when he first heard of the 
Soviet missile base on Cuban soil, became very angry, and took the most important decision 
within the course of two minutes, namely, to have those missiles removed34.
In political science two important attempts have been made to do empirical research 
into the link between the personality of individuals and their political behaviour. James David 
Barber tries to give a comparative analysis of American Presidents since Woodrow Wilson, 
while Lloyd Etheridge and Graham Shepard focus on policy conflicts between leading figures 
in the American foreign policy elite since the beginning of this century. An analysis of their 
approaches will show that cognitive beliefs remain an indispensable tool for the study of 
foreign policy, even if personality factors are taken into account.
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(A) James Barber and the Presidential character
To Barber the crucial difference in the performance of American presidents can be 
anticipated in an understanding of character, world view, and style23. Character is defined 
as the way a President orients himself towards life. Worldview relates to his primary political 
beliefs. Style is the expression of elements like rhetoric, personal relations and the attitude 
towards ’homework'. Barber’s approach relies to a large extent on theories of personality 
development: character is formed in childhood, worldview during adolescence, and style in 
early adulthood.
Barber succeeds in formulating a very parsimonious measurement of the Presidential 
character by making use of a two variables typology. He simply asks whether a President is 
active, and whether he enjoys political life*. Thus he is able to construct a typology of 
Presidential character: American Presidents can be classified as Active-Positive, Active- 
Negative, Passive-Positive, or Passive-Negative. It is Barber’s contention that each Presidential 
type displays particular characteristics which bear specific dangers to his performance at the 
White House.
It is to Barber’s credit that he is able to predict to a certain type of President will 
approach a policy problem in a certain way. For example, he expects an Active-Negative 
President to be predominantly interested in his own power position, when weighing several 
policy alternatives. Unfortunately, however, Barber cannot tell when this is more likely to 
happen, neither along which lines a President’s character may cause problems, when applied 
to a specific case.
Alexander George observes that Barba1 puts too much emphasis on the explanatory 
weight of character, and pays relatively little attention to the other variables that he 
distinguished: world view and style. By consequence, Barber neglects that better explanations 
can sometimes be given, if a President’s world view is taken into consideration, as in the case 
the way Herbert Hoover handled the Great Depression in the early 1930s27.
As a matter of fact, Barber has operationalised his concept of worldview in a rather 
limited way: h amounts to ’primary political beliefs’, that encompass ideas about causality, 
human nature and moral conflict. Nowhere in his study does Barber explicitly make use of
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* Barber thus is one of the few political scientists engaged in empirical research into what Blondel 
labelled the energy factor of political leadership. See footnote 2.
17 Alexander L. George, ’Assessing Presidential Character’, World Politics. 1974, pp. 255 ff.
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worldview as an independent variable. This is unfortunate, because Barber’s analysis thus 
remains a rather general one, while attention to worldview and style could have evidenced 
propensities of choice in decision making situations2*.
Character may thus provide some additional insight into the way top level politicians 
will define and approach a problem, but it can never give a satisfactory understanding, unless 
cognitive beliefs are invoked as an independent variable39.
(B) Interpersonal stvle studies
Some psychological studies suggest that motivational structure is expressed in a 
politician’s interpersonal style, that is, the way he deals with other people30. Applied to 
foreign policy decision making, interpersonal style suggests that foreign policy makers relate 
to other states in ways that are straightforward extensions of their styles relating to people in 
their daily lives31. Two dimensions appear important in this respect. First, the degree of 
dominance a policy maker seeks over policy making subordinates and decisonmaking peers. 
Second, whether a policy maker adopts an extrovert or introvert attitude to his environment. 
Etheridge and Shepard then, making use of biographical material, classified decision makers 
in American foreign policy into the categories of high and low dominance, and of introvert 
versus extrovert. Next, they looked for disagreements over foreign policy32, Etheridge for 
the 1898-1968 period, while Shepard replicated this study for the years 1969-1984. It was 
hypothesized that those politicians who scored high on dominance would be advocating the
3 George, ’Assessing Presidential Character’, p. 245.
29 Barber concedes that worldview is given relatively little attention in his analysis. He thinks that 
cognitive beliefs may provide a better explanation than character, but expresses severe doubts about the 
importance of ideologies: ’scholars tend to concentrate on ideas, because their own world is a world of 
ideas’, Barber, The Presidential Character, p. 527; the problem rather is that Barber puts a premium 
on parsimony: to him, it is either character, or ideas, that manage to predict performance. This 
separation will lead, however, to the neglect of the interrelationship between personality and cognitive 
beliefs. Both variables may be relevant in order to understand decisionmaking situations.
30 Lloyd Etheridge, ’Hardball Politics: A Model’, Political Psychology, (1), 1, 1979, pp. 3-26; 
Graham H. Shepard, ’Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1969-1984: A Second Test of 
Interpersonal Generalization Theory’, International Studies Quarterly. (32), 1988, pp. 91-123.
31 Lloyd Etheridge, ’Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy, 1898-1968: A Test of 
Interpersonal Generalization Theory’, American Political Science Review. (72), 2, 1978, pp. 434-451; 
Shepard, ’Personality Effects on American Foreign Policy’, p. 92.
32 Etheridge and Shepard limited their research to disagreements over force-related issues and to 
intra-elite quarrels over cooperative policies towards the Soviet Union. Etheridge discusses 49 cases of 
the former and 13 of the latter category. Shepard analyzes 108 force-related issues and 78 cooperation 
issues.
threat or actual use of force in crisis situations; likewise highly introvert individuals were 
expected to propose cooperative policies towards the Soviet Union relatively seldom.
Shepard’s analysis of intra-elite conflicts on foreign policy shows that the direction of 
disagreement can be predicted in 77 percent of the cases relating to the use of force, thus 
confirming the results of Etheridge’s study. However, concerning cooperation with the Soviet 
Union only 42 percent of the predicted nature of conflicts was confirmed, while Etheridge’s 
original study had explained 85 percent.
It is important to note that Etheridge and Shepard manage to go one step further than 
B arba, as they are able to give precise predictions of policy stands of politicians, whereas 
Barber could only give an inclination, an attitude of American Presidents towards their job. 
As such, it seems possible to establish a link between motivational structure of individuals and 
their political behaviour. However, there are some problems with this approach. First of all, 
as Shepard notes himself, die relationship between personality and policy stand may be 
spurious, because an equally valid prediction can be obtained if one relies on the bureaucratic 
position of the individual policy maker as a predictor (at least for the 1969-1984 period)33.
Second, the positions individuals take, may be explained by their personalities, but 
these positions themselves do not yet tell us anything about the outcome of the specific 
interpersonal conflict. Studies of small group dynamics show that policy makers often change 
their opinion during the course of the decision making process. As most major foreign policy 
decisions are taken during a series of meetings, this factor may be relevant.
Third, interpersonal style cannot explain why certain situations are judged to be so 
dangerous in the first place. Such an understanding can only be obtained if one makes 
reference to a politician’s view of the world, that is, his cognitive belief system.
In sum, although Barber, Etheridge and Shepard must be praised for their 
accomplishment to give a sounder basis to the link between personality and policy making, 
their analyses cannot provide a ground for saying that cognitive beliefs is irrelevant to the 
study of international politics.
5.3 The institutional setting
The importance of individual cognitive beliefs may be reduced by individual 
characteristics, such as health and personalities, but also by factors related to the institutional 
setting in which foreign policy makers have to operate. Three such institutional elements can 
be distinguished: first, considerations of domestic politics may set constraints on the decision
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making process; second, the organizational context in which foreign policy decisions are taken 
and implemented, may affect policy making, through the operation of bureaucratic politics or 
organizational processes.
5.3.1 Considerations of domestic politics
As in most democratic countries politicians will have to account for their policies at 
Polling Day, it is assumed that part of a politician’s behaviour can be understood by his desire 
to be re-elected. It is therefore suggested that considerations of a domestic nature will play an 
important role in the foreign policy process34. By implication, cognitive beliefs are considered 
to be of secondary importance, as foreign policy makers will first of all be guided by electoral 
considerations35.
Hampson goes furthest in this type of reasoning36. In a comparative analysis of three 
American foreign policy crises, all related to Cuba37, he shows that electoral considerations 
significantly affected a President’s response to a crisis: on two occasions this resulted in a 
President showing resolve, while on a third occasion the vicinity of elections caused the 
President to make an effort to avoid that the crisis came out in the open. Hampson concludes 
that cognitive beliefs of decision makers cannot be but a partial guide to the understanding of 
the policy process. Instead, he proposes a theory of political risk aversion, suggesting that a 
politician’s top priority value will always be his own political position: ’anything which poses 
a direct, immediate threat to this value will be taken most seriously, more than a direct (or 
indirect) medium term, or long term political threat’31.
William Quandt has refined this proposition suggesting that the foreign policy of an 
American President will be tightly linked to both the electoral calendar and his own expertise
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34 As a matter of fact, this factor is close to an individual’s motivational structure: the more a 
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33 For a thorough analysis of the subject, see Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. 
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* Feo Osier Hampson, ’The Divided Decison Maker. American Domestic Politics and the Cuban 
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37 The 1962 missile crisis, the 1970 Cuenfuego crisis, and the 1979 Cuban brigade crisis.
* Hampson, ibid.. p. 104, emphasis in original.
in foreign affairs39. Quandt presents a cycle of performance, making a distinction between 
first-term and second-term Presidents. The former start relatively inexperienced in foreign 
affairs and will be interested in getting re-elected. The latter will have some expertise in 
foreign policy making, but know that they cannot be elected for a third term. This leads 
Quandt to expect that first-term Presidents will run the risk of making mistakes during their 
first year, that their second year’s performance will be influenced by the Congressional 
elections of November, that Presidents in their third term will search for a foreign policy 
success with an eye on the coming election year, while during that election year they will try 
to avoid trouble at the foreign front. Second-term Presidents display a different pattern; the 
first 18 months they will be able to take new foreign policy initiatives, but towards the second 
half of their second year they will have to take Congressional elections into account. There­
after, a President will become a ’lame duck’, because, not being eligible for a third term, he 
will gradually lose authority. Fearing a similar process both Truman and Johnson postponed 
their announcement not to run for a second term until the last possible moment. Unfortunately, 
Quandt does not systematically produce the evidence that would sustain his claims, and history 
suggests that quite some postwar Presidents do not fit the pattern40.
Nincic tries to assess to what extent American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union 
has been influenced by electoral considerations*1. Starting from die assumption that policy 
makers will judge it less risky to exaggerate than to underestimate the Soviet threat, he finds 
that election years show a significant increase in spending for the development and production 
of strategic weapons, accompanied by a reduction in the conclusion of agreements between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as well as a reduction in the number of summits. Nincic’s 
theory is radically different from Quandt’s: whereas the latter predicts a fourth year of 
avoiding trouble, the former emphasizes an aggressive foreign policy towards, at least, the 
Soviet Union. Both analyses, of course, share the assumption that a decision maker will take 
public opinion into account.
114
* William B. Quandt, ’The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy’, Political Science 
Quarterly. (101), 5, 1986, pp. 825-837. An elaboration of his argument can be found in his Camp 
David: Peace Makiny and Politics. Brookings, Washington DC, 1986, pp. 9-29.
9
40 Quandt does not elaborate the pattern of second term Presidents. As a first term President Richard 
Nixon planned his foreign policy successes such as the SALT I treaty, and his journey to China to fall 
in his fourth year, thus trying to maximize electoral benefits. It seems odd indeed why in Quandt’s 
approach a President should not try to have a foreign policy success in the fourth year rather than the 
third.
41 Miroslav Nincic, ’U.S. Soviet Policy and the Electoral Connection’, World Politics. (42), 3,
1990, pp. 370-396.
The extent to which domestic political considerations play a role in foreign policy 
decision making in Western democracies depends on, first, the way their political systems 
respond to societal demands, and, second, on the existence of policy networks of interests 
groups specifically oriented towards foreign policy issues42. Much work on the influence of 
public opinion on foreign policy concentrates on the policy process in the United States. This 
can be described as a relatively open system in which specific interest groups and public 
opinion have a certain effect on foreign policy making. Foreign-policy making in the United 
Kingdom is much less open43. British policymakers are less likely to take mass opinion into 
account. The role of Parliament, compared to the American Congress, is of a much more 
passive nature. The nature of British political system gives an important role to the majority 
party in Parliament. If domestic considerations of domestic politics are to influence British 
foreign policy makers, it is likely that these will be related to preserving a majority in 
Parliament rather than to satisfying the public. Sometimes, a back-bench revolt may therefore 
set constraints on British foreign policy44. Although it is difficult to spell out the various 
conditions under which domestic considerations will play an important role on British foreign 
policy making, an analysis based on cognitive belief system should be open to their possible 
impact.
5.3.2 The oreanizational context
Two waves of literature, the first in the late 1950s and early 1960s45, the second in 
die early 1970s46, have provided a different approach to the analysis of international politics. 
These works put emphasis on political processes within the institutions of the nation-state and 
claim that organizational processes decisively influence both the formation and the 
implementation of a country’s foreign policy, and thus international relations. This ’discovery’
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of the relevance of certain national political actors was one of the foundations of the wave of 
criticism of traditional realism that treated the nation-state as a unitary actor that rationally 
pursued its national interests. The need to incorporate different organizational processes made 
it far more difficult to rely on die concept of national interest, because its definition could vary 
with the different outcomes of the organizational processes. Moreover, not only does this 
approach challenge the old concept of the nation-state, but it tends to play down the importance 
of the cognitive beliefs of political elites as well.
Basically, two ideas exist of how organizational processes influence foreign policy 
outcomes. One is usually called bureaucratic politics, the second organizational processes. Both 
ideas found their most articulate statement in Graham Allison’s analysis of the 1962 Cuban 
missile crisis47 and Morton Halperin’s account of the decision to deploy an Anti Ballistic 
Missile system by the Johnson Administration4*. What are their basic propositions?
1. Standard operation procedures. The organizational process model, as it has been 
labelled, considers foreign policy to be a product of outputs of large organizations, such as the 
State Department, the Armed Forces, etc.. Because such large, complex organizations have 
to coordinate many different subagencies, standard operation procedures have usually been 
developed in order to be able to deal swiftly with problems these organizations have been 
asked to resolve. This device, however, has an important negative consequence, that is, the 
tendency of organizations to come up with die first solution to a problem that seems good 
enough (satisfying behaviour). In foreign policy making this implies, first, that an organization, 
when asked to develop alternative policy options, or contingency plans, will be tempted to 
present the plan that had been in the drawer since a long time. An example of this can be 
found by routine procedures of mobilization. Levy shows how in July 1914 the Russian 
decision makers were caught by the dilemma of not mobilizing at all or mobilizing along both 
the Austrian and die German border, while they just wanted to deter Austria from attacking 
Serbia after die murder of die Grand Duke at Serajewo that Summer. Russian standard 
operational procedures, however, did not provide for a partial mobilization against Austria
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Politics and Foreign Policy. Brookings, Washington, 1974.
only. The Russians knew, however, that mobilization of their troops along the German border 
would alarm Germany and provoke further escalation in the form of German mobilization49.
Second, when asked to implement a certain policy decision, these organizations will 
rely on their standard operational procedures30. Allison thus shows that the Americans were 
able to deduce that the Soviet Union was constructing a missile site on Cuba before its 
construction had been completed, because its building fell under the Soviet Air Defence 
Command that built up the launching spot according to the same procedures under which it had 
been constructing missile basis within the Soviet Union for years. The transport of the missiles 
themselves, however, fell under the Soviet military intelligence GRU, which always handled 
its business under secrecy. The missile basis was thus discovered without having seen the 
missiles31.
2. Bureaucratic politics. The most important element of the bureaucratic politics 
proposition is the observation that a nation’s foreign policy is not formulated by the top 
decison maker, such as the President of the United States, but is the product of a complex 
process of interaction of many participants within the bureaucracy32. The President cannot 
command, but has to persuade bureaucratic organizations to follow his preferred course of 
action. The position taken by the participants at the decision making process is a product of 
their function: ’since national security interests per se are essentially non-operational and 
therefore inadequate guides for action, most participants in the national security policy process 
turn to other sources for clues to the requirements of security and the best means to protect 
and enhance it. Other concerns and other interests become synonymous with the national 
security interests’33. The position individuals will take can therefore be predicted by making
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use of Richard Neustadt’s adagium ’Where you stand, depends on where you sit*4. Public 
choice theories have stipulated various assumptions that account for the behaviour of members 
of bureaucratic organizations15.
A policy outcome can never be predicted because it depends on the bargaining process 
between the various organizations. Moreover, the infighting does not stop once a decision has 
been taken. In the phase of implementation, organizations try to further their own interests. 
As an example of the first case the rift between the Indian professional military and the civilian 
top caused Prime Minister Nehru not to belief a warning by the military that the Indian army 
would not be able to repel the Chinese from the Himalayan area that they had occupied on 8 
September 1962. Nehru ordered a counter attack relying on the assurances from the civilian 
branch of government. The military in the field sabotaged the execution of the order, as they 
knew it was going to be a major disaster56.
An example of die influence of bureaucratic politics during die phase of 
implementation comes from the abortive attempt in 1980 to rescue American hostages in 
Tehran. Once the decision to embark on a rescue mission had been taken, each of the military 
services insisted on having responsibility for that part of the operation that was going to 
employ that particular service’s material. As a consequence, the U.S. Navy provided both the 
helicopters and their pilots, because they had to take off from a carrier in the Persian Gulf, 
whereas the U.S. Air Force provided the transport planes that had to start their journey from 
air bases in Saudi Arabia. One helicopter collided with one C-130 transport plane. The engines 
of two helicopters broke down because of the heat, and one helicopter was lost in a dust storm 
in the Iranian desert. This failure can be explained by the fact the Navy helicopter pilots had 
been trained to sweep mines, not to operate in distant deserts37.
Bureaucratic politics and standard operational procedures thus seem to offer important 
insights into die study of international politics. Moreover, because by implication they tend to 
reduce the relative weight of the top decision makers, because one can never at forehand know
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what the outcome of the interaction between the various organizational interests involved will 
be. It is obvious, therefore, that this approach belittles the importance of decision makers’ 
cognitive beliefs. If one can explain the puzzle of Suez by looking at these organizational 
variables then our journey will have to end there. However, the primary importance of the 
bureaucratic politics model for the explanation of international politics has come under strong 
attack3*. As most of the literature centers around Allison’s analysis of the Cuban missile 
crisis, it is used as an entry to the re-evaluation of the bureaucratic politics model.
Allison wants to answer three important questions regarding the Cuban missile crisis: 
(1) why did the Soviet Union install missiles on Cuba? (2) why did the United States respond 
with a blockade, and not with, for example, a diplomatic move, or a surgical air strike? (3) 
why did the Soviet Union decide to remove the missiles? In order to answer all questions 
Allison presents three different ways to respond to these research questions. First, he offers 
the classical realist approach which he labels the rational actors model; second, the 
organizational process model; and third, the bureaucratic politics model. Allison’s innovative 
models, however, hardly give a satisfactory answer to his three fundamental research 
questions, a point which is seldom stated that explicidy. The only real explanatory contribution 
comes from the organizational process model in answering the question of why the United 
States responded with a naval blockade rather than with a surgical air strike: the surgical air 
strike never was a serious option until the second week of the crisis, because the Air Force, 
when asked to produce a plan for such an operation, was caught by surprise, because in its 
contingency planning it had anticipated full scale attacks on Cuba, but no operations of such 
a limited nature. The Air Force standard operational procedures therefore limited the options 
available to die decison makers. It still does not explain, however, why no diplomatic move 
was seriously considered39.
All other evidence that Allison presents, deals with aspects at best tangent to the 
decision making process. The Russian negligence of secrecy when constructing a missile site, 
set the time constraints of the crisis: the United States became aware that within a short time 
SAM missiles could become operational against American territory. Although the Russian 
negligence itself can be explained by standard operational procedures, it does not answer either
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51 For an overview of the critical literature, see Steve Smith, ’Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: 
A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision Making’, Millennium. Journal 
of International Studies. (9), 1, 1980, pp. 21-40.
59 Cf. Hampson, ’The divided decision maker’.
the question of why the Soviet Union installed the missiles, or why the Americans responded 
as they did.
The exact date of discovery can be traced back to both the organizational routine of 
U 2 flights60, to the bickering between the Air Force and the CIA over the administration of 
the flights over Cuba and to the CIA’s fear of losing control over the U 2 programme if 
another plane would be lost to the Soviet Union61. These observations nevertheless lack 
explanatory power in answering the fundamental question of why the U.S.A. responded as she 
did, or why she responded in the first place.
Moreover, Allison himself notes, when analyzing the Executive Committee decision 
making process, that in the course of various sessions, no member defended consistently the 
same policy option throughout the crisis: this seems to contradict his bureaucratic politics 
model which expects decision makers to take the positions that reflect their organizational 
interest62.
It is therefore crucial to recognize that the evidence seems to suggest that the decision 
making process is not necessarily exhaustively understood by the bureaucratic politics and 
organizational process models63.
It may be useful to make a distinction between a number of elements that seem relevant 
to ascertain the likelihood that the models of bureaucratic politics and organizational process 
become highly relevant64. First of all, one should pay attention to the decisional structure. 
The bureaucratic politics paradigm pictures the top-level decision maker as simply one more 
bureaucratic player. However, if a President decides to be involved in the decision making 
process, he can be an almost omnipotent player. Reversely, one could hypothesize that
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°  Caldwell discusses a comparative analysis of 11 case studies that reveals that in only two cases 
did the bureaucratic politics model provide the best explanation of events, Dan Caldwell, ’Bureaucratic 
Foreign Policy Making’, American Behavioral Scientist. (21), 1,1977, pp. 102-104. Brenner shows that 
Halperin’s (1974) careful analysis of ABM deployment does not explain why MacNamara agreed to it 
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’Bureaucratic Politics in Foreign Policy’, Armed Forces and Society. (2), 2, 1976, pp. 327-328.
64 Based on Jerel A. Rosati, ’Developing a Systematic Decision Making Framework. Bureaucratic 
Politics in Perspective’, World Politics. (33), 1981, esp. pp. 245-251.
bureaucratic politics will be a more influential factor, if the President decides to remain at 
some distance from the issued.
Second, one will have to take the decisional context into account. The nature of the 
issue is highly likely to affect the importance of bureaucratic factors. Especially international 
crises are likely to be handled by the higher levels of the governmental hierarchy. It seems 
much more likely that in those situations the President will be able to influence the decision 
making process66.
Finally, the decision making process itself should be appreciated. It must be clear from 
the evaluation of Allison’s models that even though die President may have decided to 
participate in the decision making process, for instance, because the issue at stake has been 
defined to be of crisis dimensions, bureaucratic politics and organizational processes may still 
be relevant for two reasons. The very perception of an issue to be a crisis, as well as the 
timing of its occurrence may have been influenced by organizational processes. Next, the 
search for and awareness of policy alternatives may be affected by those factors67 and may 
thus influence the decison making process.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that an analysis based on the models of 
bureaucratic politics or organizational processes does not relieve the researcher from the need 
to pay attention to cognitive beliefs of individual decision makers. On the other hand, every 
analysis of decison making processes based on cognitive belief systems should be open to the 
role of those models at the various stages of decision making. They can severely affect the 
timing, and perception, of a threatening situation, and may produce certain policy options 
rather than others, when organizations are asked to come up with alternatives68. However, 
because of the emphasis this study lies on die contribution of cognitive belief systems to an 
analysis of foreign policy making, the organizational context, just as considerations of domestic 
politics, will be considered a variable that constrains that process.
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“  Cf. Ole Holsti, ’Foreign Policy Makers Viewed Psychologically’; This shift from lower to higher 
levels of decision making is analyzed by Avi Shi aim in The United States and the Berlin Blockade.
47 As well as their implementation.
* Rosati thus tries to develop 3 types of decision making structures, called Presidential Dominance, 
Bureaucratic Dominance, and Local Dominance, ’Developing a systematic decision making framework’, 
p. 247.
Chapter 6: Small group processes
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6.1 Introductory remarks
So far this study has stressed the importance of the cognitive belief systems of 
individual politicians in order to understand certain problems of international politics. A case 
could be made that in certain types of political systems, such as dictatorships, individuals are 
the key decision makers in foreign policy. Various techniques, such as the operational code 
or the cognitive map, could thus serve as methods that could ascertain the specific role of these 
individual politicians in foreign policy outcomes1. An obvious remark would be that in 
countries where such autonomy for political leaders is absent, for instance in countries with 
cabinet decisionmaking, or where the political leader is dependent on soliciting the 
collaboration of various agencies with other means than the authority that springs from his 
formal position, important foreign policy decisions are actually made by small groups of top 
level decision makers2.
From time to time, students of international politics have looked at social psychology 
in order to incorporate the effects of a small group setting on foreign policy decision making3. 
Unfortunately, little systematic work has been done: the importance of a small group setting 
is often mentioned without an analysis of how precisely it affected die foreign policy outcome. 
One cause of this neglect is the perceived or real incompatibility of much experimental 
psychological work on small groups with the reality of foreign policy decision making.
Objections to the application of knowledge from psychological experiments are 
fourfold. First, it is often pointed out that in real world foreign policy settings it is impossible 
to control for variables that can be controlled for in experimental settings. Moreover, the 
cognitive tasks real world decision makers are facing are much more complex than the 
problems experimental groups are supposed to solve. Second, unlike politicians confronted 
with a foreign policy problem, individuals, who are asked to participate in experimental
1 OleR. Holsti, 'Foreign Policy Makers Viewed Psychologically:"CognitiveProcess* Approaches’, 
in James N. Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns. The Free Press, New York, 1976, pp. 127 
ff..
2 Hermann and Hermann have made an attempt to develop a strategy in order to determine different 
decision making units; Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, ’Who Makes Foreign Policy 
Decisions and How: An Empirical Enquiry’, International StiiHiw Quarterly. (33), 3, 1989, pp. 361- 
387.
3 An early example is Joseph de Riven, The Psvchol^f l  Him««.«! of Foreign Policy. Bobbs 
Merrill, Coiumbus, 1968.
research are not responsible for the outcome of the group’s deliberations. The stakes are much 
higher in the real world. Third, the stress that is experienced during foreign policy crises is 
reproduced only rarely, or insufficiently during experimental settings. A last objection to the 
application of evidence from laboratory experiments points at their often contradictory 
evidence. Why, students of international relations could say, should this material be used if 
pychologists are not unified themselves about the specific effects of small group processes4.
This is not sufficient reason to put experimental evidence aside completely. One should 
avoid randomly borrowing from laboratory experiments and searching for corresponding 
evidence in foreign policy settings. It makes more sense to try to apply well-developed theories 
about group processes during policy making to one‘s own set of research questions. One such 
theory stands out; Irving Janis’s theory of groupthink3. In this chapter Janis’s theory as well 
as ’t Hart’s recent refinement6 will be examined, especially in the context of the role of 
individual cognitive belief systems.
The basic proposition of Janis’s theory of Groupthink is that small, cohesive groups 
will engage in excessive concurrence seeking. That is, when confronted with a pressing 
decisional situation, participants will rate the value of the group itself, and their membership 
of it, higher than anything else. This is likely to cause a relatively poor decision making 
quality, and may eventually lead to a policy fiasco. When originally formulated in 1972, this 
was a rather provocative thesis, as cohesive small groups were supposedly effective safeguards 
against conflict-ridden decision making situations7.
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5 Janis, op.cit..
* Paul’t Hart, fimimthmk in Govern™-"» ft gfudv r»f Small Groups and Policy Failure. Swets and 
Zeitlinger, Amsterdam, 1990.
7’t Hart notes how social psychological theory had ignored both sociological evidence of detrimental
effects of «"«11 cohesive groups and the potentially positive effects of conflict within small groups, ’t 
Hart, Groupthink in Government, p. 6.
Groupthink builds on the findings of an early study by Maier and Solem*. They 
demonstrated that group members often know and express the correct answer to a problem, 
while the group as a whole unanimously decides to adopt an incorrect answer9. Apparently, 
either pressure from the group’s majority or self censorship may cause a group not to examine, 
or just superficially, alternative, and possibly correct, solutions to a problem. Janis came to 
this proposition by way of induction aft«1 having analysed several major foreign policy 
decisions of die United States, some of them resulting in success, others in failure10. The 
causal model that was developed on the basis of these case studies was next applied to the 
analysis of how a small group of politicians could get entangled in a cover-up, such as 
Watergate11.
Ever since it has been formulated in the early 1970s, groupthink has become a popular 
term, often employed to explain policy making by relatively small groups. Unfortunately, very 
little systematic research has been done into either the theoretical considerations on which it 
is grounded or its empirical relevance in explaining policy outcomes12. This is exactly what 
has been attempted by ’t Hart. This chapter will therefore first examine the original 
formulation of groupthink theory by Irving Janis; then, criticisms that has been formulated 
against it will be discussed); next, ’t Hart’s refinement will be examined; finally, the 
implications of small group dynamics for an analysis of the 1956 Suez crisis will be assessed.
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implications of Janis’s groupthink thesis, Groupthink in Government, pp. 14-15; he also presents an 
overview of case studies to which the groupthink hypothesis has been applied, ibid.. pp. 12-14. To this 
list should be added his own analysis of the Iran-Contra scandal, ibid.. pp. 215-271; ’t Hart's original 
dissertation included an analysis of die Dutch failure to anticipate a German invasion in an appropriate 
manner in 1940; Paul’t Hart, Gmunthink in Government. A study of «mall grout* and policy failure, 
dissertation, Leiden University, 1990, pp. 317-361.
6.2 Janis’s theory of groupthink
Groupthink refers to the phenomenon that decision making groups reach early 
agreement about an important problem that has to be resolved. This is called concurrence- 
seeking. The crucial point, of course, is the term early agreement. It is implied that agreement 
is reached before all aspects of a correct decision making procedure have been taken into 
account.
1. Consequences of groupthink. It is suggested in groupthink theory, first, that bad 
procedures will be caused by groupthink and, second, that bad procedures will lead to 
unsuccessful policy outcomes. Indicators of defective decisionmaking procedures can be found 
in an incomplete survey of alternatives and objectives, a failure to examine the risks of the 
preferred option, a failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives, poor information search, 
a selective bias in processing information at hand, and a failure to work out contingency 
plans13. The more symptoms of defective decisionmaking are present, the more likely it is 
that the selected policy will be unsuccessful. However, the presence of even all these 
symptoms cannot be a sufficient condition for the occurrence of policy failure14: fortune may 
still on the policy makers’ side.
2. Identifying groupthink. Janis has formulated eight indicators of the presence of 
early concurrence-seeking, headed under three types13:
(A) The overestimation of the group. This can be observed in (1) the group’s illusion of 
invulnerability. This refers to a feeling among group members that they can handle any 
kind of trouble; (2) a belief in the inherent morality of the group, or the absence of 
any doubt that motives and actions might not be principled or justifiable.
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(6) Closed-mindedness, as evidenced in (3) collective rationalizations that result in 
discounting information that might contradict the group’s analysis of the situation; and 
(4) the development of stereotyped views of outgroups, which facilitates the 
discrediting of their communications.
(C) Pressures toward uniformity, as shown by (5) self-censorship by individual group-
members: each member tends to minimize the importance of personal doubts and 
counterarguments, resulting in (6) a shared illusion of unanimity; (7) direct pressure 
on those members who express doubt and strong arguments against the overall 
consensus; (8) the emergence of self-appointed mindguards who withhold adverse 
information from the group.
3. Causes of groupthink. Janis distinguishes between three antecedent conditions that 
may provoke groupthink: high group cohesiveness, structural faults of the organization, and 
third, the presence of a provocative situational context.
(a) High group cohesiveness. Early concurrence-seeking is predominantly explained by 
the extreme cohesiveness of the decisionmaking group. The members of the group are 
inclined to attach a higher value to group unity, and therefore consensus, rather than 
a systematic resolution of the problem confronting them. To Janis, the eight symptoms 
of groupthink form a coherent pattern that points to a collective effort by the group 
members to face an external challenge together. A shared illusion of invulnerability 
and collective rationalizations serve to suppress feelings of personal inadequacy; a 
belief in the group’s moral cause as well as its stereotyped view of opponents help its 
members to overcome value conflicts, especially when military action is seriously 
considered; the forms of pressure toward uniformity and the resulting illusion of 
unanimity are devices to improve individual confidence and self-esteem which have 
become dependent on group unity16. Not only highly cohesive groups are groupthink- 
prone, but moderately cohesive groups as well17.
(b) Structural faults of thft nrpanizatinn Four elements are mentioned. First, the insulation 
of the group from direct contact with persons in the organization that are not members
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in Strategic Decision Making’, in Johannes M. Pennings (ed.), Organizational Strategy and Change. 
New Views on Formulating and Implementing Strategic Decisions. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1985, 
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of the group". Second, the absence of a tradition of impartial leadership: a leader is 
not constrained to avoid pushing for his own preferred alternative by any established 
norm in the organization that favours open discussion19. Third, a lack of established 
norms that set methodical procedures of decision making30. Finally, homogeneity of 
group members’ social background and ideology21.
(c) Presence of a provocative situational context. First, small groups are usually installed 
in order to cope with a newly arisen threatening situation. The higher the level of 
stress generated by such a threat, coupled with low hope of a better solution than the 
leader’s, the more probable it is that early concurrence seeking will occur. Second, 
group members may be suffering from low self-esteem that has been developed before 
the group confronts the new threat. Such low self-esteem might have been provoked 
by (1) recent failures, (2) excessive difficulties at resolving other, contemporary, 
policy problems, (3) moral dilemmas which do not seem to offer policy options that 
respect ethical standards22.
To summarize Janis’s argument, one could say that small decision making units tend 
to display early concurrence-seeking which can result in defective decision making which in 
turn may produce policy fiascoes. This phenomenon can be measured in real-world situations 
by eight operational variables, so-called symptoms of groupthink. Early concurrence-seeking 
is explained by the need of highly cohesive groups to maintain group unity in order to keep 
intact individual members* self-esteem. The probability of provoking of this causal sequence 
is augmented if two elements are present, that is, certain structural faults of the organization 
and a provocative situational context.
It would be wrong to underestimate Janis’s contribution to decision making theory. He 
has presented the first elaborate attempt to incorporate an important variable, that is so easily 
invoked, but so rarely examined in a systematic way, into explanations of government
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and Mann, Decision Making, pp. 131-132.
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11 Janis, Groupthink. pp. 248-250.
22 Janis, ibid.. pp. 250-254.
behaviour. Moreover, he has provided valuable explanations of foreign policy outcomes that 
had been puzzling scholars for a long time. He has thus contributed significantly to blending 
insights from social psychology and political science.
6.3 Flaws in Janis’s theory of groupthink
Nevertheless, his work has provoked criticism from students of both disciplines. Four 
types of issues have been raised against his model. The first three reflect the concern of social 
psychologists that Janis did not try to ground Groupthink in evidence from social psychology 
in a systematic way. The fourth reflects the concern of political scientists that to a certain 
extent the aspect of power relationships is neglected in Groupthink23. They regard (1) the 
causal chain of his theory, (2) the exact role of cohesion, (3) the importance of leadership 
behaviour, and (4) the place of politics in his analysis.
1. The causal chain of groupthink theory. The original groupthink study suggested that 
three antecedent conditions (group cohesion, organizational structure, and a provocative 
situational context) further the occurrence of early concurrence-seeking, which may lead to 
defective decisionmaking, which may consequently result in unsuccessful policies. 
Unfortunately, Janis only implicitly theorizes about the relative importance of each antecedent 
condition. A reformulation, based on close-reading, suggests that cohesion and a provocative 
situational context should be considered as independent variables that may cause groupthink, 
while the way in which a small group is organized could be defined as an intervening variable 
which can act as a moderator or reinforcement of the negative influence of the independent 
variables2*.
Unfortunately, the exact role of the provocative context is not clarified. One does not 
know whether both high stress and group cohesiveness are necessary conditions for groupthink 
to occur. By intuition, the claim that high stress will contribute to defective decision making 
seems plausible. Evidence from social psychology, however, points to positive effects of 
moderate levels of stress on the problem-solving capacity of individuals23. Evidence from 
Janis’s original case studies makes the matter all the more puzzling: during the 1962 Cuban
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missile crisis high levels of stress were experienced by a highly cohesive group, yet no large 
number of symptoms of groupthink could be observed; the weeks preceding the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 could not be characterized as highly stressful26 for the 
ingroup around Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the American Pacific Fleet, yet, 
according to Janis, this small group fell prey to groupthink and ignored clear warnings that an 
attack was at hand27. Apparently, Groupthink can occur without a provocative situational 
context, which implies that groupcohesiveness is the most crucial variable.
A second flaw in the causal chain is the exact nature of concurrence seeking. After all, 
concurrence seeking is an element inherent to any decision making situation involving more 
than one participant. At some point, one needs to reach agreement on an issue, stop discussing 
it, and move on to the next matter. Concurrence seeking thus need not be counter­
productive2*. Groupthink therefore becomes a problem if during consequential decision 
making situations early, that is, premature, concurrence-seeking takes place29.
The nature of the operational definition of groupthink, its eight symptoms, forms a 
third flaw in the theory's causal sequence. First of all, are all symptoms equally important ? 
It has been suggested that nearly all symptoms should be observable if one wants to speak of 
groupthink30. Secondly, are all symptoms that are distinguished by Janis, manifestations of 
concurrence-seeking ? Longley and Pruitt have argued that the illusion of invulnerability and 
unanimity should be seen as indications of a phase that precedes concurrence-seeking. 
Similarly, a belief in the group’s inherent morality and the phenomenon of stereotyping 
outgroups are unrelated to concurrence-seeking as such: they can be themes on which 
concurrence can be reached, but do not form part of the process of concurrence-seeking31.
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31 Longley and Pniitt, ’Groupthink. A Critique of Janis’s Theory’, pp. 79-81.
This would imply, first of all, a much more refined picture of the different stages of group 
decision making, and, second, that collective rationalizations, self-censorship, direct pressure 
on dissenters, and self-appointed mind guards count as most relevant symptoms of the 
phenomenon.
2. The role of cohesion. Groupcohesiveness thus seems to be Janis’s most important 
antecedent condition. Nevertheless, its weight has been put into question by several laboratory 
tests of the groupthink-hypothesis32. The Flowers study could not find any direct relationship 
between cohesiveness and groupthink, defined as number of solutions to a problem proposed 
by the group. Rather, directive leadership seemed to account for the relatively poor number 
of solutions produced. Although the Flowers test points to the role of a variable that is still 
unspeficied, leadership, its experimental design is severely weakened by its procedure in which 
participating leaders were told at forehand encouraged to restrict discussion and to inform the 
group of their own opinions at the very beginning. Possibly, the outcome of the study could 
have been predicted beforehand33.
In his attempt to put Janis’s thesis on a stronger social psychological basis, ’t Hart 
argues that first of all, group cohesiveness may be beneficial for group decision making as 
communication among group members will be more positive, frequent, and intense: moreover, 
several studies show a large problem-solving capacity of small groups34. Second, he suggests 
that group cohesiveness can be the product of different sources: it can be based on functional 
or emotional interdependence between group members, on a conflict with an out-group, on the 
high prestige a group is enjoying, or on the focus of groupmembers on their leader33. It is 
implicitly suggested that cohesiveness may operate through various mechanisms. Functional 
interdependence points to the influence of organizational structures that may play a role; 
emotional interdependence seems much closer to Janis’s original conception in which the group 
provides emotional stability to individual members in a situation of high stress. Finally, if
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34’t Hait, Groupthink in Government, pp. 37-38.
35’t Hart, ibjdL, pp. 34-36.
cohesiveness is linked with hierarchical relations within the group, then the potential role of 
high status members, and in particular the group’s leader becomes important.
Ail this adds up to saying that cohesiveness is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient 
condition for groupthink to occur. It may contribute to the phenomenon, but the precise 
interaction with other variables remains to be specified*.
3. The role of leadership. Despite the inconclusive evidence from laboratory 
experiments, it seems attractive by intuition to pay attention to the potential influence of 
leadership within the group. Leaders may impose their definition of the problem on the group 
and may structure the debate in such a way that no open discussion becomes possible. Fodor 
and Smith tried to account for differences in the quality of decisionmaking between various 
small groups by assessing the relative influence of groupcohesiveness and leadership?7. 
Directive leadership was defined by making use of the so-called Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT) for measuring an individual’s need for power3*. Cohesion among group members was 
established by promising a reward to the group, in terms of free theater tickets, if it performed 
best. It was found that groups with leaders who scored low on dominance performed 
consistently better than groups with highly dominant leaders, irrespective of their level of 
cohesion.
Although Fodor and Smith, unlike Flowers and Courtwright, used a correct research 
design with control groups, one has to remain doubtful about what these laboratory 
experiments actually mean for an analysis of real-world foreign policy decision making in 
small groups. Even if one accepts that the prospect of earning free theater tickets will be 
enough to create high cohesiveness among group members39, it is hard to accept this research 
design as resembling Janis’s groupthink-hypothesis. First, it is hard to imagine that the task 
that was assigned to the various experimental groups (a company’s decision whether or not to
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market a microwave oven) resembles the stressful situations of Janis’s policy studies40. 
Second, the precise mechanism by which the leader’s influence is exercised, remains 
unclear41. It appears that this factor operates especially through the way the decision making 
process is structured. This theme will be picked up shortly.
4. The place of politics in groupthink theory. Small groups that are confronted with 
a decisional problem are regularly described as responding to an sudden, external threat as if 
they were waiting for it in some kind of vacuum. However, an individual’s perception of threat 
is determined not only by the external stimulus, but by domestic political considerations and 
by the institutional framework in which he, and the group he belongs to, is operating42. 
Undoubtedly, these individual aspects of threat perception will have some bearing on the way 
they perform in a small group. It must make a difference whether group members are cohesive 
by affiliation or by function. Groups that are functionally interdependent may be ridden with 
divisions based on divisions between several branches of the organization that are brought 
together in the group. In either case, a formal or informal hierarchy among group-members 
may exist. On the whole, therefore, a study of small group decision making should not only 
look for the interests all members have in common in finding a correct solution posed by an 
external problem, but should also pay attention to conflicting interests that may exist between 
group-members, which might find their origin in domestic or organizational politics.
The structuring of decisionmaking
The groupthink phenomenon, redefined as premature or early concurrence-seeking, 
refers to a procedural phenomenon. Both cohesion and leadership may contribute to what 
amounts to reaching agreement too soon. Longley and Pruitt claim that the impression among 
group members that a norm has been formulated is an essential ingredient of premature 
concurrence-seeking. They claim that both the timing of the decision to act is important and 
the presence of a dominating faction within the group are essential elements in accounting for
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early concurrence-seeking43. Three factors seem relevant to setting the stage for early 
concurrence-seeking: the number of group members, anticipation of external threat, and the 
attitude of group leader(s).
1. Number of participants. On the whole, the larger the group, the more likely it is 
that discussion will monopolized by an increasingly smaller number of participants44. It has 
been suggested that an optimum number of participants exists, ranging between four and seven, 
that would serve to avoid the domination of discussion by a small number of participants. At 
the same time, 20 is sometimes referred to as the maximum number of participants if any 
decision is to be reached at all. In government, however, if many different views are to be 
heard from various interests, the number is not easily limited to seven. Meetings of the 
National Security Council in the United States nowadays have 12-15 participants. The number 
supposedly allows for both secrecy and the inclusion of relevant agencies and experts45. It is 
therefore crucial to make a distinction between active and passive members of a small decision 
making unit. The active members will establish and eventually legitimize the course of action 
to be followed.
2. Anticipation of threat. Experimental research from social psychology suggests that 
it makes a difference whether participants enter a small group meeting with clear ideas in mind 
about the nature of the problem and what should be done about it, or without having 
formulated an articulate opinion on the issue. Individuals who are asked after their opinion 
before entering the group setting, are much more active in the group and will conform to a 
group norm only after lengthy discussion. Those individuals, however, that participated at a 
group meeting without having been explicitly asked to pronounce their opinion beforehand, 
reached consensus much faster and without elaborate discussion46.
133
43 Longley and Pniitt, ’Groupthink. A Critique of Janis’s Theory*, p. 81.
44 Eugene Bums te in and Michael L. Berbaum, ’Stages in Group Decision Making: The 
Decomposition of Historical Narratives’, Political Psychology. (4), 3, 1983, p. 552. They refer to 
research conducted by R.F. Bales, who found that in an eight-persons group, five participants would 
account for 5% of communications initiated, the most active participant initiating 40% of group 
communications, the second most active 20%, and the third most active 15%. It is suggested that this 
tendency will only be reinforced in large organizations, as most experiments were conducted among 
peers, among whom status differences were less pressing. Interaction/Process Analysis: A Method for 
the Study of Small Gmuos. Addison Wesley, Cambridge MA, 1950.
49 Jonathan N. Roberts, Decision-Making during International Crises. Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 
1988, pp. 116-118.
46 Kanneth Bettenhausen and J. Keith Mumighan, ’The Emergence of Norms in Competitive 
Decision-Making Groups’, Administrative Science Quarterly. (30), 1985, pp. 354-355.
The development of norms within a small group is thus contingent on opinions 
previously held by its participants as well as on chance: when die news broke that Nasser had 
nationalized the Suez Canal Company, Eden was in the middle of a dinner in the honour of 
die King of Iraq. A first crisis meeting was held after the party had been interrupted. It is 
therefore not unlikely that the dynamics of that first meeting were partly depending on the fact 
that, presumably, not all participants at that meeting had well-prepared ideas about the 
probability of such a situation, and of its implications. At the same time, chance determined 
the composition of that small group, as those members of the Government that were present 
at the function were included, next to those that could be found in London instantly47. It is 
implied that anticipation of an external threat is an important consideration when analyzing the 
first small group meeting.
3. The attitude of group leader(s). If group composition and anticipation are important 
factors, the attitude of the group leader is even more relevant in structuring the decision 
making process. The fundamental problem is whether the group leader is contained by 
formally or informally established procedures and norms that regulate the group process4*. 
Absence of such devices may allow the leader to impose his own perception on the group. This 
may be detrimental especially when first discussions are started with a statement by the group’s 
leader as it is likely to structure the group’s definition of the situation49. It should be 
emphasized, however, that one should not focus one’s attention on the formal group leader 
only. The presence of high status group members seems to be as important: the initial decision 
in early 1961 to launch an invasion in the Bay of Pigs resulted from an early endorsement of 
the idea by high status group members30.
In sum, it should be admitted that Janis’s theory of groupthink is still deficient in 
certain regards. He has remained imprecise about the exact causal chain that explains why a
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small group engages in early concurrence-seeking and thus in deficient decision making. The 
interrelationship of group cohesiveness and group leadership has remained unclear. It seems 
that group cohesiveness may explain much less than Janis anticipated. Finally, the importance 
of power relations within the group may be a factor of influence.
6 .4 ’t Hart’s Refinements
Groupthink has become a popular theme in analyses of foreign policy decision making. 
Unfortunately, many of those studies did not go beyond the point of looking for the presence 
of symptoms of groupthink and of evidence that defective decision making had taken place. 
It has been argued above that the incompleteness of real-world studies of groupthink is partly 
due to flaws in Janis’s original statement of the theory. Only recently, an effort has been made, 
first, to ground groupthink properly on insights from social psychology, and second, to 
incorporate politics into the model31. One could distinguish between five different types of 
improvement th a t’t Hart has thus added to a theory of Groupthink: (1) A distinction between 
three different pathways to groupthink, (2) the addition of two new elements of defective 
decision making (risktaking and entrapment) as well as (3) a new antecedent condition 
(intergroup conflict), (4) a differentiation between groups that are more or less likely to fall 
prey to groupthink, and (5) the formulation of two distinct types of groupthink, one resulting 
in collective avoidance of imminent disaster, the other producing collective overoptimism about 
the feasibility of a potentially disastrous policy alternative.
1. Three distinct pathways to groupthink. On the basis of the experimental literature 
of social psychology, ’t Han finds that cohesiveness may not be a necessary condition to the 
occurrence of premature concurrence-seeking at all. He suggests that Janis’s original theory, 
that spoke of group cohesiveness as the cause of groupthink, is but one of three different 
causal chains leading to early concurrence-seeking.
A second cause of groupthink lies in processes of deindividuation. This term is used 
to explain extreme behaviour by collectivities, both crowds and small groups32. It refers to 
an individual’s loss of self-awareness and self-identity, when individuals become too closely 
connected with the group. As a consequence, the individual is less able to be aware of his own 
behaviour, does not obey personal or social standards, and is thus unlikely to correct it, and 
more prone to react to immediate stimuli, emotions and motivations. Originally, this was
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explained by anonymous individuals entering large crowds, but of late deindividuation has been 
observed in small groups that have no bonds with the outsiders they react against53.
A third cause of groupthink is a tendency for groupmembers, who experience high 
internal or external stress, to start looking for strong leaders among group members. This is 
more likely to occur, when clear decision making procedures are absent, or when the formal 
leader does not display sufficient leadership34.
Unfortunately, despite this attempt to take the emphasis of groupthink away from 
group-cohesiveness, it is not that easy to disconnect these three pathways to groupthink. 
According to me, both deindividuation and a search for leadership remain two causal factors 
that are closely related to groupcohesiveness, in spite o f ’t Hart’s claim that ’each one is in 
itself a sufficient "cause” of groupthink’53. First of all, in his discussion of deindividuation 
’t Hart can only connect this notion, that had been developed for individual behaviour in large 
crowds, to small group decision-making by linking it to group-cohesiveness: a highly cohesive 
group makes it more likely that an individual will take the group as a point of reference rather 
than his individual traits56. It has thus become impossible to see deindividuation as a separate 
cause of groupthink.
Second, the third pathway to groupthink, a search for strong leadership under 
circumstances of high stress, seems still intimately linked to group-cohesiveness. At an earlier 
stage in his study, ’t Hart distinguished between concurrence-seeking based on compliance (the 
individual obeys commands and rules), identification (the individual conforms because he needs 
to preserve valued relationships with influencing group members), and internalization 
(individual compliance because his value system parallels the leader’s)57. If, when under 
stress, individual group members start looking for a strong leader, then they are identifying 
their individual survival with the survival of the group, and the latter’s survival with the 
decisive act of a leader. Group-cohesiveness has thus re-entered the picture.
Despite the distinction between three pathways to groupthink, the crucial role of 
cohesion remains the pivot of the analysis. As such, Janis’s formulation of the causal flow of 
groupthink-theory has not seriously challenged. Of course, leadership can be a significantly
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different factor leading to groupthink, if conceived as the directive attitude of a group’s formal 
or informal leader.
Fortunately, by introducing compliance’t Hart is able to account for this phenomenon. 
He correctly observes that several reasons can be thought to explain an individual’s conformity 
to the group: he may accept the group’s system of values completely (internalization); he may 
be interested in maintaining valuable contacts with important group members (identification), 
or he may simply obey the group’s leader (compliance)**. This makes the attitude of a 
group’s leader a crucial factor, as he determines to a large extent the agenda, the number of 
participants and the flow of information and advice39. Unfortunately, ’t Hart does not separate 
’the search for leadership under stress’, a phenomenon closely related to group cohesiveness, 
from compliance. Instead, he heads both under ’anticipatory compliance’, which seems the 
most important factor in his explanation of the Iran-Contra affair. Nevertheless, both types of 
conformity reflect different processes: the former, ’search for leadership’, an emotional 
investment in the group, the latter, ’compliance’, a calculated individual interest in 
participating in the group.
2. New elements of defective decision-making. According t o ’t Hart, risktaking and 
entrapment are the main dangers that small groups which engage in early concurrence-seeking 
are likely to fall prey to. The former consequence is likely to occur in single decisionmaking 
situations. The latter is related to recurring decisionmaking situations60.
Risktaking. The introduction of risktaking (and of recklessness) is based on a review 
of the experimental literature of social psychology. It has indeed often been suggested that 
groups are more prepared to take risks than individuals. Two types of explanations are usually 
offered61: on the one hand, it could be that dominant participants of a group have higher 
risktaking attitudes than other group members. Group risk taking would thus be explained by
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individuals conforming to direct pressure. On the other hand, it could argued that a group is 
inclined to take more risks because responsibility for the decision will lie with the group as a 
whole rather than with die individual participant. For the individual it is thus much less painful 
to go along with a risk-involving action62. Both explanations are examples of the most well- 
known effect of small group dynamics, that is, that in the course of a decision process 
individuals will give up their private opinion and will conform to die norm that has meanwhile 
emerged within the group as a whole63. It is not necessarily the case that groups will become 
highly risktaking. In general, the group process tends to reinforce the pre-existing beliefs of 
groupmembers. Riskavoiding-oriented individuals will stimulate an even more riskavoiding 
group; risktaking individuals will be reinforced in their attitudes during the group process*. 
Either outcome may produce defective decisionmaking: excessive riskavoidance may make it 
impossible to deal with external threats, while excessive risktaking will cause decisionmakers 
to ignore contradicting evidence.
Entrapment. This refers to the tendency to hang on to a previous decision in spite of 
decision makers’ awareness of the availability of information that would make them reconsider 
the adopted course of action. Both risktaking and entrapment are to a certain extent part of 
Janis’s symptoms of defective decisionmaking*. It is to ’t Hart’s credit to have made a 
distinction between those situations in which risktaking will be a danger, and those in which 
entrapment is likely to occur.
3. Inter group conflict as antecedent condition. As a correction to Janis’s emphasis on 
external and internal stress as indicator of a provocative situational context, ’t Hart discusses 
another situational factor, that is, the relation of the small group with other groups in the 
operational environment. Groupthink is more likely to occur if the decision making group is 
part of an intergroup environment that is characterized by strong competition between groups.
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Intergroup conflict will make it more probable that group cohesion is increased, especially 
when success is anticipated, or that individual group members will start looking for a strong 
leader*. Although the existence of intergroup conflict may be an important factor in 
understanding the occurrence of premature concurrence-seeking, the exact place of group- 
cohesiveness remains unspecified. Apparently, intergroup conflict will enhance group 
cohesiveness and thus contribute to groupthink. However, a s ’t Hart notes himself, it is still 
unclear whether intergroup behaviour stimulates group-cohesiveness, or highly cohesive groups 
tend to engage in competition with other groups67.
4. Likely victims of groupthink. It has remained implicit in Janis’s groupthink theory 
that the phenomenon seems relevant to only certain types of decision making units rather than 
others. The very fact that most case studies come from major foreign policy decisions suggests 
that groupthink is relevant to non-routine situations. It is therefore worthwhile asking to which 
extent small groups dealing with such situations actually occur in government nowadays, ’t 
Hart argues that small groups will be the most important decision making units only rarely: 
these situations will probably relate to long term policy planning, project management, crisis 
management, and the dealing with highly politicized issues61. On the whole, governmental 
groups are unlikely to display strong cohesion. Bargaining and conflict between groups seems 
to be the case due to departmental or political division^*.
5. Two types of groupthink. The final contribution o f ’t Hart to a refinement of Janis’s 
Groupthink-theory is his distinction between two different types of groupthink. Both, of 
course, are characterized by premature concurrence-seeking, but each has a distinct flavour: 
one can be called collective avoidance, the other collective overoptimism. Either may result 
in excessive risktaking or entrapment. This analysis is grounded in an innovative aspect, the 
perception of the group by the individual participant. Assuming that weightier decisions, will 
be more consequential for decisionmakers, ’t Hart claims that an individual group member will 
calculate his behaviour on the basis of his expectation of the outcome of the decision. If an 
individual participant expects a fiasco, he will be motivated not be associated with the decision. 
If he expects a success, he will be motivated to be part of it, and thus to cooperate70.
** *t Hait, ibid.. chapter 7, esp. pp. 105-111.
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* Ifeii, p. 136.
•  ifeiiL. PP- 151-155.
139
"  ibi&. PP- 181-182.
Both motivations are the basis for two different types of early concurrence-seeking. 
In the case of collective avoidance (or ’groupthink I’), the lack of opposition stems from an 
individual calculus of personal interest. Individual participants remain silent, or leave sessions, 
because they do not want to become associated with failure. In the case of collective 
overoptimism (or ’groupthink O’), it is in the individual’s interests to be identified with the 
likely success of the adopted policy, ’t Hart hypothesizes that this latter form of groupthink 
is triggered by the perception of opportunity, such as honeymoon periods of new 
Administrations, the planning of big projects and military contingencies, while the former is 
provoked by crisis situations, small groups are suddenly confronted with71.
The significant suggestion then is that outcomes at the group-level can be explained 
by individual calculations related to the way that their position or prestige will be affected by 
their affiliation with the group’s policy72. However, it still has to be shown to which extent 
this weakens Janis’s argument.
’t Hart illustrates his point in explaining the silence of Director of Central Intelligence 
Admiral Turner when the Carter Administration decided to go ahead with the operation that 
was supposed to rescue American hostages in Tehran in April 1980. Turner was in possession 
of a CLA-report that was highly critical of the operational plan, ’t Hart argues that Turner did 
not speak up because it was far more secure for him and his organization ’not to rock the 
boat’73: because the CIA was not directly involved either in planning the rescue mission or 
in its execution, it would not be held accountable for its -probable- failure.
For two reasons, his account is not completely persuasive. First of all, from the point 
of view of individual calculus, it could be said that Turner did have an interest in securing the 
success of the mission. It was known that Carter had personally drawn the issues of the 
hostages into the political arena74. Part of the perceived pressure to act was grounded in
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electoral considerations73. Failure of the mission could ruin Carter’s chances to be re-elected. 
It is known that Turner wanted to remain Director of the C.I.A.76, and thus had an interest 
in Carter’s re-election. It could be argued that Turner thought that not being associated with 
failure gave him the best chance of surviving an electoral victory of both Carter and Reagan. 
According to me, this could only explain his silence after the initial decision to bring matters 
to a head, as the best way to secure his position under such circumstances. It does not explain 
why Turner did not back Vance in his opposition against a rescue mission at the crucial 
meeting of 7 April 1980, when Carter first said that he wanted action.
The second reason why the account is unpersuasive, is the presence of many elements 
of processes at the group-level: according to Brzezinski’s account, during the following 
meetings at which the implementation of the rescue plan was discussed, Turner did speak about 
aspects of implementation77, that is, despite his knowledge of the critical C.I.A.-report, thus 
representing, what Janis calls, a self-appointed mindguard. Moreover, ’t Hart shows that 
Turner felt that his opposition would disturb the growing sense of faith in the mission, and that 
his criticism would probably not change the probable decision anyhow71. Both considerations 
are perfect examples of what Janis has called self-censorship and illusion of unanimity: 
Turner’s calculations were a product of his perception of an emerged consensus among the 
other participants. Such calculations cannot explain why he did not speak up at the earlier, 
crucial meeting when Vance opposed Carter’s suggestion to bring matters to a head.
The relationship between individual calculations and group-processes is thus 
complicated and remains an undeveloped theme. The crucial point, however, is that even if 
some members of a small group do not want to be associated with what they expect to be a 
certain fiasco, and thus will remain silent or leave the group, it must have been the case that 
the remaining members of the group have fallen prey to overoptimism. That is, the two distinct 
types of groupthink cannot be two separated types. Theoretically, it is possible that a decision 
is taken by a group, some members of which have calculated that their interest lies with not 
being associated with it, because of perceived failure, while all others have calculated that their
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interest lies with being associated with it because they perceive outstanding success. It is very 
hard, however, to imagine that no discussion will take place and it must be assumed that at 
least some members will speak out, if only because calculated individual silence presumes the 
perception of an emerged consensus among optimists, as we saw in the case of Turner.
By pointing to individuals’ potential vested interests, ’t Hart has made an important 
contribution to the understanding of individual behaviour during the meetings of small groups. 
The presence of such individual calculations of interests, however, do not preclude the 
operation of processes at the group level, such as groupthink. It may thus be true that the 
behaviour of some participants are better explained by individual calculations rather than their 
sense of belonging to a group, but the actual outcome still presumes processes of groupthink 
among the rest of the participants, unless one accepts that small groups may decide without 
their members having said one word.
6.5 Conclusions and implications
It can thus be safely stated that premature concurrence-seeking can be observed in 
small groups and that this is possibly linked with defective decisionmaking. It has been shown, 
however, that early concurrence-seeking may stem from several analytically distinct sources. 
One is high group-cohesiveness, the originally formulated factor that explains groupthink. 
However, early concurrence-seeking may also be explained by w h a t’t Hart has labelled 
anticipatory compliance of lower status group members with the suggestions of their leader. 
In principle, then, a different cause has been traced, although one should be careful with 
employing the concept of leadership: the search for leadership that is based on the satisfaction 
of emotional needs under stress, may well reflect and reinforce processes of high group- 
cohesiveness. In practice, however, high group cohesion and the preponderance of higher 
status group members will operate simultaneously, as it will be difficult to find a small 
decision making group in government that consists of members of exactly the same status.
The principal implication is, therefore, that due attention should be paid to the role of 
formal and/or informal leaders within a small group79. The crucial role played by leadership 
once more underlines the importance of individual cognitive beliefs. If the attitude of high
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status members is that essential, one should know their views in order to understand the 
dynamics and outcome of the decisionmaking process.
A second implication is the need to develop an analytical model that takes the structure 
of the decisionmaking process into account, ’t Hart made an important distinction between 
’one-off and ’multi-decision’-situations. The implications of such considerations still have to 
be developed: for instance, it seems that each ’multi-decision’-situation has been preceded by 
a ’one-off-situation first; policy makers must have decided to do or not to do something before 
a situation in which more decisions have to be taken, will emerge. Both entrapment and 
risktaking may therefore be at the heart of the same policy fiasco. A theory of decision making 
is therefore needed to develop these considerations. So far, only Irving Janis and Leon Mann 
have offered one that takes social psychological constraints comprehensively into account*0.
However, before a model of decisionmaking can be applied, one needs to have a clear 
view of the crucial decision(s) one wants to explain. I believe that the debate around Janis’s 
groupthink syndrome, and especially around the relative weight of groupcohesiveness, has 
obscured an important aspect of his approach, that is, one of the reasons why one can be 
puzzled by small group decision making. Originally, Jams’s curiosity was aroused by his 
observation that in some foreign policy making groups a disastrous policy was embarked upon 
despite the awareness of participants of knowledge that, if tabled, would have prevented them 
from taking the wrong direction. Sometimes the correct piece of information would even be 
tabled, and not only once, without being picked up by the participants81. I believe that 
students of groupthink should go back to the puzzles that bothered them in the first place. 
Unfortunately, this is easily forgotten; Barrett’s critique of Janis’s treatment of the Johnson 
Administration’s decision to escalate the Vietnam War as a case in which groupthink theory 
may serve as an example. Barrett is completely unaware of the fact that the real puzzle is not 
the question why President Johnson chose to go ahead with his policies, despite of the private 
warnings of close associates that further escalation would be disastrous. Rather, the relevant 
question is why the small cohesive group around Johnson, the ’Tuesday Lunch Group’, 
persisted in its belief that an escalation of the war would bring a solution, despite the 
availability of information that suggested the contrary. If the latter is the initial problem, then 
Barrett’s account of the warnings of six associates of Johnson only reinforces the original
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Janis, ’Problems of International Crisis Management in the Nuclear Age’, Journal of Social issues. (42),
2, 1986, pp. 201-220; Janis, Crucial Decisions.
“ Cf. Janis, Groupthink. p. vii.
puzzle and the potential power of groupthink theory: two individuals who sent warning signals 
to Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and intimate Clark Clifford, were present at several 
meetings of the Tuesday Lunch Group: Janis persuasively shows how these dissenters were 
’domesticated’, thus making their points look irrelevant*2. It is therefore of utmost importance 
to formulate well one’s research questions.
The Suez crisis may be an example of a case to which small group dynamics can be 
relevant. The British Cabinet appointed a small group of Ministers, the so-called Egypt 
Committee, to deal with the crisis. The most poignant question is their failure to anticipate 
American opposition to an Anglo-French intervention, despite die abundance of evidence. 
Small group processes may thus provide an alternative explanation to individual cognitive 
beliefs. For two reasons, however, individual and group variables might be complementary 
rather than mutually exclusive. First, the influential role of leadership in small group settings 
suggests that the leader’s cognitive beliefs will affect the group’s decision: the more the group 
is characterized by directive leadership, the more important die individual’s belief system will 
be. Second, research on small group processes suggested that small groups tend to reinforce 
its members’ preexisting beliefs. It will therefore be necessary to have an idea of the general 
orientation of policy makers to the problem before the actual decision making process starts13. 
The interplay between individual belief systems and small group processes should therefore be 
part of the analysis.
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PART III:
FORERUNNERS OF SUEZ: ATTTTUDINAL PRISM AND OPERATIONAL CODE
Introduction to Part m
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In parts I and H it was argued that neorealism cannot give a sufficient understanding 
of the crucial case of Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956. First, an analysis of 
the Anglo-American security regime between 1945 and 1951 demonstrated the need to 
incorporate perceptions and expectations of foreign policymakers. In order to understand 
certain phenomena, at the level of both foreign policy making and the international system, 
cognitive belief systems of political elites may be a crucial tool of analysis.
Second, the Suez crisis, considered an obvious case in neorealist theory, displays 
several puzzling aspects that reinforce the suggestion that perceptions and expectations of 
politicians have to be taken into account if the actual operation of systemic constraints is to be 
fully funderstood. Two questions come to mind. First, the curious British decision to move 
back into an area that they had agreed to leave only two years before the crisis on the grounds 
that there was no compelling stretegic reason to stay; actually, they had left the area shortly 
before the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Why did the British consider it 
worthwhile to go back in there?
The second puzzling question that has to be answered is the persistent lack of British 
perceptiveness of the American attitude towards the use of force as an answer to the Egyptian 
challenge. America’s opposition to military action had seemed clear in President Eisenhower’s 
messages to die British Prime Minister and in his press conferences throughout the crisis as 
well. Moreover, die British Cabinet itself had deemed it impossible to exert effective pressure 
on Egypt, either economically, politically, or militarily, without the full support of the United 
States. Why then did it decide in favour of military intervention if that support would not be 
forthcoming?
In Part III it will be examined to what extent tools from cognitive psychology can offer 
an understanding of Anglo-American relations that is complementary to neorealism. It will be 
shown that the answers to the puzzle of the Suez crisis find their origin, on die one hand, in 
the cognitive belief system of Sir Anthony Eden, and, on the other hand, in the perceptions 
and expectations of British policymakers that were grounded in the dynamics of the Anglo- 
American security regime between 1945 and 1955. The analysis of the Suez crisis will be 
based on two independent and two constraining variables. Because British decision making 
during the Suez crisis was confined to a limited number of policy makers at the highest level, 
it is assumed that bureaucratic politics will play a less influential role, and that thus an analysis 
should give more weight to individual and group factors. Suez will therefore be analysed with
individual cognitive beliefs and small group dynamics as independent variables. Considerations 
of domestic politics and the organizational context will be treated as variables that may 
constrain the decision making process, and serve to control the individual and group variable.
Irving Janis’s groupthink syndrome will be employed to assess the influence of small 
group dynamics. It will be shown that, at various stages, three small groups have counted as 
the central decision making unit: first, the full Cabinet, second, a crisis unit, the so-called 
Egypt Committee, that was formally appointed to deal with the crisis, and, third, an inner 
circle of senior Ministers who met informally on a regular basis.
The role of individual cognitive beliefs will be examined by making use of part of the 
Brecher-model as well as of the Operational Code construct. The Brecher-model stresses the 
potential influence of policymakers’ general orientation to world politics, the so-called 
attitudinal prism, on the decision making process. In chapter 7 the Anglo-American security 
regime between 1951 and 1955 will be considered the attitudinal prism of British foreign 
policymakers. It is grounded in the perceptions and expectations shaped by Anglo-American 
relations in die immediate postwar period, and will serve to make the British attitude towards 
the United States and the Middle East in 1956 more intelligible.
The Operational Code construct will be used assess the influence of an individual’s 
cognitive belief system on decision making. This approach offers a classification of cognitive 
beliefs that may be of importance for the understanding of the conduct of foreign policy. Two 
of those beliefs that are the principal candidates for the label of master belief, which structures 
the individual’s cognitive belief system. A comparative analysis of Operational Code studies 
has revealed that the ’image of the opponent’ or the ’nature of the international system’ are the 
beliefs most likely to dominate a politician’s view of the world1. The likelihood that foreign 
policy makers may be re-grouped according to their master beliefs makes the Operational Code 
a potential tool of comparative analysis of foreign policy behaviour2.
The methodological advantage of the Operational Code over other techniques, such as 
Cognitive Mapping, is that it allows the researcher to formulate expectations about a 
politician’s handling of a decision making situation on the basis of an analysis of the 
occurrence of previously meditated cognitive beliefs, while the latter can at best inductively
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’Conference on Approaches to Decision-Making’, Oslo, April 1977.
2 It would thus fit the criteria of the method of ’focused comparison’; see chapter 1, footnote 43.
produce his considerations at that time3. Chapter 8 presents the Operational Code of Anthony 
Eden, based on his public and private utterances between 1924 and 195S. It should thus enable 
us to determine his worldview at the moment that the crisis starts, and to formulate 
expectations of his likely attitude towards the conflict.
An analysis of the influence of cognitive beliefs and small group dynamics relies on 
the presence of a crisis situation: first, a crisis situation reduces the influence of bureaucratic 
politics and enhances the role of beliefs and small groups. Second, a crisis situation tends to 
generate a high level of emotional stress, which in turn increases the possibility of the 
occurrence of early concurrence seeking as well as an individual’s reliance on his master belief 
in order to assess the situation. In chapter 9, therefore, it will be discussed whether it is 
possible to determine the beginning of crisis situations and to observe an increase in the level 
of emotional stress among policymakers. This is followed by a discussion of its implications 
for an analysis of the Suez crisis. It will be argued that die Suez crisis should be subdivided 
into six crucial decisions, each of which should be analysed in terms of the independent and 
constraining variables that have been distinguished above. Such an analysis is subsequently 
carried out in Part IV4.
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Chapter 7: The Anglo-American security regime 1951-1955
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7.1 Introduction
One of the valuable contributions of the Brecher-model to the analysis of crisis 
decision-making is its emphasis on the role of the psychological environment in which foreign 
policy makers are operating. This environment to a large extent determines what Brecher calls 
the attitudinal prism of policy makers, that is, their general orientation towards international 
politics. It is the contention of the present chapter that the British perception of what has been 
labelled the Anglo-American security regime between 1945 and 1951 forms the basis of the 
perception of officials of the Churchill Government (1951-1955) of Great Britain’s role in the 
world in general and of her relations with the United States in particular. The perception of 
British policymakers that the Americans had accepted the Middle East as a British sphere of 
influence, which by 1951 still seemed an accurate perception, was the cause of an incorrect 
assessment of a changing American attitude towards British policies in the Middle East. As a 
matter of fact, the British were convinced that they could use the United States as a bogey-man 
in order to extract concessions from countries such as Egypt. It will be suggested that part of 
the answer to the puzzling question of why the British ignored American opposition to military 
action during the Suez crisis can be understood by their conviction that the game in the Middle 
East could still be played according to the rules of the Anglo-American security regime, 
despite signs of the opposite.
This chapter does not aim at a full analysis of the entire foreign policy of the Churchill 
Government, but will concentrate on those areas that are most relevant to the questions that 
guide empirical analysis: the British perception of American policy over Suez, and the British 
decision to move back into an area from which they had deemed it important to leave only two 
years earlier. In section 7.2 a general picture of Anglo-American relations between 1951 and 
1955 will be sketched. Section 7.3 will deal with the Middle East more in detail, in particular 
with Anglo-American policies towards Iran, the Baghdad Pact, and Egypt. The concluding 
section 7.4 will spell out the implications of a ’security regime analysis’ for an analysis of the 
Suez crisis.
7.2 Economic, strategic, and diplomatic dimensions of the regime
It was argued in chapter 3 that the Anglo-American security regime between 1945 and 
1951 can be characterized by British economic dependency on the United States, which, 
however, did not result in a position of complete subordination, because of the amount of
strategic leverage the United Kingdom had over the United States, mainly grounded in an 
American dependency on British air fields for an effective implementation of its deterrence 
strategy. This strategic relationship was a source of British diplomatic influence. Economic 
decline was perceived to be a temporary phenomenon that would be restored with the help of 
trade with Commonwealth nations. Thus, by 1950, British policy makers were convinced to 
be back on the right track both economically and regarding influence as a great power. What 
remained of this optimistic vision, once Sir Winston Churchill had returned to 10, Downing 
Street in October 1951, accompanied by Sir Anthony Eden, who became Foreign Secretary 
for the third time in his career?
1. The economic dimension. The economic position of the United Kingdom in the 
early 1950s continued to be weak, despite Whitehall’s prudent optimism of 1950. Britain had 
set her hopes on the development of a free trade area between Commonwealth and Empire 
nations in which Sterling would be the central currency1. However, the important problem of 
earning dollars in order to pay for essential imports could not be resolved by the creation of 
a Sterling trade area. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, R.A. Butler, travelled to the United 
States several times, hoping to obtain important tariff reductions from the Americans for the 
export o f British products, but his efforts were of no avail. Shortage of dollars led to a balance 
of payments crisis in 1952, and Butler had to beg for swift American financial assistance: the 
Americans, however, were willing to provide only one third of the 900 million dollars that 
were needed2.
More importantly, Britain’s economic weakness was intimately linked with its defence 
expenditures. Part of the deterioration of the British economy since 1950 (when the United 
Kingdom had a surplus in her balance of payments, even when accounting for Marshall Aid) 
was due to American pressure to participate in the rearmament process. At the outbreak of the 
Korean war in 1950, the United States had been surprised by her own military weakness. As 
a matter of fact, her nuclear superiority was its only means of deterring the Soviet Union from
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1 Clark notes how the British developed certain psychological defences against this feeling of being
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weakness on the British war-effort, especially during ’die year we fought alone*. Secondly, a sentiment 
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interfering in the conflict3. The Truman Administration thus embarked on an impressive 
rearmament programme, and put strong pressure on its allies to join in. At the same time, the 
President introduced the Battle Act which linked American economic assistance to the cutting- 
off of trade with East bloc countries, which had been an important source of income for the 
United Kingdom4. In their visit to Washington on 7 January 1952 Churchill and Eden pointed 
out to President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson that a further increase in the 
defence programme would put a heavy burden on the British economy5. At the end of that 
month Butler told Acheson that imminent balance-of-payments problems could make it difficult 
for Britain to carry out the present defence programme. In Lisbon in late February Eden 
repeated these complaints to Acheson6. Moreover, the British felt that an increase in defence 
industry would be detrimental to their export industries, thus increasing the shortage of dollars. 
The British therefore pressed the Americans for financial assistance if a sharp and immediate 
cut in the defence programme were to be avoided. They suggested that the Americans bought 
British warplanes (of the Canberra and Venom type) which Britain could then take out of her 
own defence programme, but the United States refused to do so7.
2. The strategic/geonolitical dimension. During the first three years of the Korean War 
it remained important for the United States not to be too hard to their British Allies, because 
they continued to need British bases for their strategic bomber force against the Soviet Union'. 
Apart from the diplomatic leverage the British obtained from this situation, its implication was 
American confirmation of continued British predominance over the Middle East. Well into 
1954 the American National Security Council observed that ’[e]ven though British and French 
influence in the Near East has declined, the United Kingdom retains substantial interests, 
experience, and security positions so that the United States will need to act in concert with the 
United Kingdom to the greatest extent possible’, although it was ominously added that the 
United States should reserve ’the right to act with others (-) or alone’: the United States was
3 Mare Trachtenberg, ’A "Wasting Asset": American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance,
1949-1954’, International Security. (13), 3, 1988/1989, pp. 23-27.
* Vibeke Sorensen, ’Economic Recovery versus Containment: the Anglo-American Controversy over 
East-West Trade, 1947-1951’, Cooperation and Conflict. (24), 1, 1989, pp. 88-90.
5 FO 800/836.
‘ FO 800/836: US/52/20, US/52/25.
7 FO 800/836, Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, telegram 1087, 10 March 1952.
* Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mould. The United States and Britain. 1945-1959. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1986, pp. 230-232.
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increasingly aware that it would not always be prudent to rely on the British if it wanted to 
safeguard its interests: ’it is important to the settlement of outstanding political disputes that 
the U.S. convince the Arab states that it is capable of acting independently of other Western 
states and of Israel” . Here lies the source of many British and American misunderstandings 
regarding policies towards the Middle East, as will soon become clear.
A second strategic asset that the United Kingdom had been developing for some time 
were its attempts to catch up with the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear 
weapons capacity. In October 1952 Great Britain had become a member of the atomic club and 
with the development of its Venom-bombers it had acquired a substantial deterrent of its 
own*0. The joy over this newly found source of strength did not last very long. That same 
year the United States had exploded a hydrogen bomb, to be followed by the Soviet Union in
1953. Britain did not catch up until 1957. Moreover, the development of thermonuclear 
technology was to have a dramatic impact on the British assessment of the importance of Egypt 
and the Suez Canal Zone, serving as a catalyst of the British withdrawal from die area.
3. Diplomatic dimension. In chapter 3 it was argued that in the 1945-1951 period Great 
Britain managed to use its strengths on the strategic dimension to have some important 
diplomatic successes. The most clamorous result that the British stressed was Prime Minister 
Attlee dissuading the Truman Administration from using nuclear weapons in order to deter a 
Chinese intervention in the Korean war11. The experience of the Korean War gave a strong 
impetus to a feeling among British foreign policy officials that they could exert strong pressure 
on the United States if they played their cards well. In January 1951 the British successfully 
opposed die American idea to condemn the Chinese before the Security Council, while asking 
for ’additional measures’, which would escalate the war, rather than bring it closer to a 
peaceful settlement. The American willingness to listen to their ally provoked the perception 
among important Foreign Policy officials12 that the Americans could not do without the
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British. In the Cabinet Kenneth Younger thought it important to draw the line here ’if we ever 
want to have real influence’ with the United States13.
Under the Churchill Government the attitude of the United Kingdom still constrained 
the decisions of die Eisenhower Administration’s Korea policy to a certain extent: in March 
1953 one of the reasons why the Americans did not (yet) embark upon coercive nuclear 
diplomacy was British opposition to such a move and the disrupting consequences this would 
therefore have on NATO14. It will shortly be shown how the British tried to use their alliance 
with the Americans in the Korean War to obtain concessions from the Americans regarding 
British Middle East policies.
Despite these accomplishments over Korea, the period of the Churchill Government 
was characterized by an increasing number of important diplomatic defeats imposed by the 
Americans. First of all, Britain was actually humiliated by John Foster Dulles during the 
negotiations on the final peace treaty with Japan between 1950 and 195215. Great Britain 
wanted the Japanese to be free to decide whether to recognize the Nationalist or the 
Communist Government of China. The United States insisted on the former, and the British 
opposed this suggestion as they wished to limit the growing American influence over Japan. 
In return, Dulles remarked that ’the British had to realize that their former Empire was a 
pathetic shell and that our help was essential to their survival’16.
A second, possibly more symbolic, example comes from Churchill’s numerous 
attempts after Stalin’s death in March 1953 to organize a conference of the Heads of States of 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. Churchill was afraid that the 
Americans would exclude Britain, and him personally, from a summit with the new Soviet 
leadership. Such an absence would poignantly underline his country’s decline as a world 
power, and Churchill therefore launched a proposal on 11 May 1953 before the Americans
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would seize the initiative. This and die other proposals he put forward throughout the rest of 
1953 were consistently turned down by Eisenhower17.
On the whole then, it could be argued that the United Kingdom’s position vis-a-vis the 
United States was weakening considerably in die early years of Churchill’s Indian Summer, 
as it has been called. Economically, Great Britain was dependent on the United States more 
than ever. It still had some important strategic assets, and its preponderance over the Middle 
East was still recognized by the United States, but it was becoming much more difficult to 
change that strategic currency into diplomatic successes. Nevertheless, the crucial question is 
to what extent the British realized that the tide was changing, and what that implied for the 
American attitude towards their position in the Middle East. It will be shown that the British 
preferred to believe that the Americans would leave them a free hand in that area.
7.3 The Middle East 1951-5: diverging interests and perceptions
The United Kingdom continued perceiving the Middle East as her private sphere of 
influence, and remained convinced that this position of hers was being sanctioned by the 
United States. This attitude had several consequences. First, the British continued their 
attempts to further their own Middle East policy by using the Americans as a bogey-man 
versus the Arab states they had to deal with. At the same time, they played the old trick of 
pointing out the danger of Communist influence in the Middle East to the United States, the 
aversion of which would be dependent on a strong British position. British policymakers were 
therefore unable to learn from an important experience, namely, Anglo-American discord over 
Iran from 1951 to 1953: they refused to appreciate that the United States might have diverging 
interests and that they might pursue a policy that did not fully correspond to British interests. 
On the contrary, British experience with the American attitude over Iran caused a feeling of 
’we should not allow them to treat us like that again’. As a matter of fact, despite warning 
signals that die United States might be in the course of developing a Middle East policy of its 
own, British policymakers continued relying on their traditional tactics.
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Second, British policymakers interpreted two important diplomatic outcomes, the 
conclusion of the Suez Canal Treaty with Egypt in 1954, and the foundation of the Baghdad 
Pact in the same year, as two more examples of their diplomatic brilliance. They were 
convinced to have cajoled the Americans into accepting arrangements that were first of all 
favourable to the interests of the United Kingdom, and remained unaware of the possibility that 
the United States might have interpreted these events in a radically different way.
Third, this inability to assess the American attitude towards the Middle East reinforced 
the dominant British interpretation of Arab nationalism. Traditionally, British policymakers 
held the view that almost any Arab regime that became hostile to British interests, could easily 
be substituted for with another.
Finally, and most important, the British perception that their privileged position in the 
Middle East was being approved by the United States, and their inability to appreciate 
significant changes in the American attitude, form two of the sources of their difficulty with 
understanding the American attitude towards Great Britain and France during the Suez crisis. 
They caused British decision makers to engage in several curious rationalizations of the 
policies of the Eisenhower Administration.
7.3.1 Iranian oil 1951-1953
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (A.I.O.C.) was owned by British interests for 100%, 
and operated from the south-western Iranian city of Abadan, where the world’s largest oil 
refinery was situated. In 1951 it produced the largest share of Middle East oil. It thus meant 
an important source of income for the British Government, who in 1950 received 40 million 
pounds from taxes alone. Its significance for the British economy became more evident after 
Iran nationalized the A.I.O.C. in 1951'*: Great Britain had to buy its oil elsewhere, and 
worse, had to pay for it dollars, of which she possessed so few: this cost the United Kingdom 
about 40 million pounds a month19.
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The story of what Anthony Eden continued to euphemistically call Anglo-American 
cooperation over Iran between 1951-195330, reveals that the Americans would not be pushed 
around by the British if their interests were involved21. The British Government, then still the 
Labour Government of Attlee and Bevin22, tried to rally American support behind the British 
case after the nationalization of A.I.O.C., insisting that the nationalist government of 
Mohammed Mussadiq was driving Iran right into arms of the Soviet Union25. They solicited 
American support for die overthrow of Mussadiq, wanting to replace him with a pro-British 
government, a sport the British had been practicing for decades in Iran. They failed to obtain 
American consent, because American policy makers concerned with Iran, such as Ambassador 
Henry Grady, were not bothered by British oil interests in Iran; as a matter of fact, they 
wanted to break the British monopoly over Iranian oil. Moreover, they had a considerably 
different appreciation of Mussadiq’s Nationalist government. They felt that the genuine 
nationalism of the organizations around Mussadiq would form an effective counterweight to 
Communist influence which operated through the Tudeh party.
The British then turned to what effectively became an economic blockade of Iran, 
hoping to destabilize Mussadiq’s position, and in September 1951 started moving British 
troops, war planes, and warships into the area in order to take the Abadan area, which was 
an island, by force. They were told by President Truman not to proceed, and a military 
operation was called off. What the British obtained was a certain amount of policy coordination 
with the United States in order to reach a settlement with Mussadiq’s government24.
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(continued...)
However, in 1952, after the resumed negotiations had failed, diplomatic relations between 
Great Britain and Iran were broken off, because Mussadiq’s domestic position had seriously 
weakened: several parties accused him of being an American agent, and he therefore decided 
to withdraw from bargaining. At that moment, American and British interests temporarily 
coincided: the Americans no longer saw Mussadiq as an effective agent against Communism, 
and agreed to coordinate his downfall with the British. This change in American attitude can 
be explained by the arrival of the Eisenhower Administration as well, which was much more 
receptive to suggestions that the Soviet Union was trying to stage a change of regime in Iran.
The temporary character of Anglo-American understanding became evident as soon as 
the new regime under General Zahedi had been put into power, and negotiations about the 
nationalization of A.O.I.C. were resumed. The United States forced the United Kingdom to 
accept an agreement far worse than they could have obtained in 1950, had she been willing 
to a 50/50 distribution of net profits between her and the Iranian government. The new 
settlement of September 1954, achieved by constant American pressure on the British to give 
in a bit more at each round of the negotiations, provided for 40% of Iranian oil to be produced 
by American oil companies, leaving only 40% to British Petroleum, thus breaking the British 
monopoly on Iranian oil and opening up the market to American companies.
The events in Iran between 1951 and 1954 could have taught the British some 
important lessons. First, that American and British interests need not coincide in the Middle 
East; second, that the United States would be prepared to exert strong pressure on Great 
Britain not to act unilaterally, such as over Abadan; third, that the United States might have 
a view of Middle East nationalism that would not necessarily coincide with the British 
interpretation; fourth, that, by consequence, the card of a Communist threat, as revealed by 
nationalist movements, might not always be helpful in attracting American support for the 
defence of British interests. Nevertheless, British foreign policy makers would look the other 
way, and continue believing that the United States recognized their privileges in the Middle 
East25. As a matter of fact, the Iran experience would make them apprehensive of American 
diplomacy: we will see how they were eager not let it happen again that the Americans would
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up has hitherto prevented them’, John Colville, The Fringes of Power. Downing Street Diaries 1939- 
1QS5- Volume Two: 1941-April 1955. Spectre, 1987, entry 22 August-25 August 1952, p. 310.
25 In this context, American Secretary of State Dean Acheson's words to Eden’s Private Secretary, 
Evelyn Shuckburgh, after ’a disagreeable couple of meetings (-) about Persia’ should have rung a bell: 
’He said, ‘You m»«» learn to live in the world as it is", which I thought a  very offensive remark, as 
it no doubt was meant to be. This was a bad day’, Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, p. 27, entry 4 
November 1951.
cajole them into an unfavourable agreement with a third party in the Middle East. In this 
sense, Abadan, and Iran in general, would become an interesting point of reference to British 
policymakers.
7.3.2 The concluding of the 1954 Suez Canal Treaty
Indeed, when in early 1953 difficulties with Egypt about renegotiating the Treaty, 
which regulated the presence of British troops in the Suez Canal area, seemed almost 
insurmountable, British policymakers tried to put pressure on the United States to help them 
persuade Egypt to accept an agreement on British terms. They were fully aware, however, of 
the poor result such actions were producing in Iran at the same time. Actually, they were 
afraid that the Americans would put them under constant pressure to give in a bit more to the 
Egyptians until they would be left with nothing26. Eden and Churchill were anxious not to 
allow the Egyptian leader, General Naguib, to play the same game as Mussadiq had played in 
their perception, namely playing off die United States against Britain27. That is one reason 
why the British wanted the United States to join the negotiations themselves: it would make 
it look less as if the United States were playing a mediating role rather than the British big 
uncle who would punish die Egyptians, if they were not going to listen to the British2*. It was 
crucial for them to persuade die Americans to make economic and military assistance to Egypt 
dependent on Egyptian acceptance of the new treaty as the British wanted it. In January 1953 
the British had been successful in preventing the United States from delivering arms to 
Egypt29, but by March the Americans had grown impatient with the British attitude. The 
American Ambassador in London, Winthrop Aldrich, calling at Eden’s office, even feared that 
the Egyptian problem might bring about a general crisis in Anglo-American affairs30, after 
Churchill, in a letter to Eisenhower, had threatened to go it alone and to simply stay in the 
Canal Zone: ’we are not afraid of Neguib’31.
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* This becomes clear from Eden's impressions after a discussion with Eisenhower and Dulles in 
Washington on 6 March 1953, FO 800/839, US/53/49.
17 Eden explicitly warned Eisenhower against this in a letter on 1 April 1953; Geoffrey Aronson, 
From Sideshow to Center Stage. U.S. Policy towards Egypt 1946-1956. Lynne Rienner, Boulder CO,
1986, p. 65.
a  FO 800/839, US/53/53, 18 March 1953.
*  Aronson, From Sideshow to Center Stage, p. 61.
30 FO 800/839, US/53/69, 21 March 1953.
" FO 800/839, US/53/67, Foreign Office to Washington, Telegram 1280, 19 March 1953.
By the Autumn of 1953 the Americans were prepared to give economic aid to Egypt. 
The British first asked Eisenhower to wait until they would have met personally at the 
upcoming trilateral Bermuda summit with the French in early December. When no agreement 
was reached on Bermuda, Churchill stepped up pressure and warned Eisenhower that if the 
United States were to give assistance to Egypt ’we cannot help you any longer over the Far 
East in the face of general feeling of indignation throughout the country’, an argument that 
Churchill had used before to the same purpose that Summer32. This clearly illustrates how 
persistent British policymakers were in thinking that they ’rightfully ruled’ the Middle East, 
and certainly Egypt, and that they merited American support. Moreover, they clearly tried to 
use the strategic and diplomatic leverage they could obtain from providing an essential link in 
the implementation of American strategy of containment. The British did not fail to stress that 
in this context the United States also had an interest in a postponement of a British withdrawal 
from the Canal Zone until Egyptian reassurances had been obtained that the Canal would 
remain a secure route for the Western world in case of major calamities33. And, as a matter 
of fact, not until after the conclusion of the negotiations between Egypt and Britain in July
1954, did the United States announce its willingness to provide 40 million dollars in military 
and economic assistance to Egypt34. Small wonder then that British policy makers perceived 
the conclusion of the Treaty as an important success by all measures. It had seemed as if, in 
the end, sticking it out had produced the American attitude that was deemed necessary to 
persuade the Egyptians to sign a treaty that was favourable to the United Kingdom.
7.3.3 An anti-communist Middle Eastern alliance
British foreign policy makers were unable to understand that since 1953 the United 
States had been developing an attitude towards the Middle East that was increasingly 
insensitive to British interests in and dominance over the area. The United States perceived the
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34 Eventually, the money was not given, because Dulles had decided to use the money as a carrot 
to Egypt to an Egypdan-Israeli settlement. Barry Rubin, ’America and the Egyptian Revolution,
1950-1957’, Political Science Quarterly. (96), 1, 1982, pp. 80-82.
concluding of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty on the Suez canal area as a major achievement of their 
cold war diplomacy. They considered it essential for Egypt to stay in the Western camp and 
thus thought it important that Anglo-Egyptian difficulties should be resolved before these 
would dissociate Egypt from die West” . The 1954 Treaty was thus interpreted differently in 
Washington and London: while the British policymakers thought they had been able to make 
use of United States’ pressure on Egypt in concluding a treaty they found acceptable, the 
Americans perceived die negotiations to be the result of their pressure on both Great Britain 
and Egypt to reach a settlement.
Before 1953 the United States had tried to draw Egypt into a multilateral agreement 
that would arrange the security in the Middle East, the so-called Middle East Command, a 
secondary goal of which was to divert the attention of Arab countries away from the Israeli 
problem. This military structure was deliberately aimed at preserving British predominance in 
the area36 (the Command«’ in Chief was going to be a British soldier37). In 1950 and 1951 
the British position in the Middle East was of such importance to the United States that, when 
tension between Great Britain and Egypt over the British presence in that country increased, 
and the British raised the number of troops in die Canal Zone to 80,000 instead of the 10,400 
permitted by die 1936 treaty, die United States decided to support the British because die Suez 
Canal Zone was considered to be of too high importance in case of a conflict with the Soviet 
Union3*.
The events of Black Saturday (26 January 1952), when Egyptian crowds attacked and 
killed British citizens after British soldiers had killed 43 Egyptians, some of whom had 
allegedly attacked British water supplies in die Canal Zones, marked die beginning of a 
redefinition of American policy towards Egypt: the Truman Administration perceived a 
communist revolution not to be unlikely and grew dissatisfied with the British practice of 
playing off different Egyptian factions against each other. Independently from the United
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11 British foreign policy makers thought this only right: ’In the Middle East the burden of leadership 
falls on us’, Churchill minnrni to Eden, thus giving expression to the conviction that the United States 
had allowed the United Kingdom to dominate over the Middle East, FO 800/807, ME/52/1, 6 January 
1952.
* Aronson, From Sideshow to Center-Stage. pp. 25-36.
Kingdom, the United States contacted the Free Officers of Neguib and Nasser in order to look 
for an Egyptian regime that could guarantee stability and was safely linked with the West. 
British political practices in Egypt were increasingly detrimental to such an objective. Whereas 
the Americans hoped and expected that Neguib and his Free Officers could act like Ataturk 
in Turkey39, and worked to that effect by promising economic assistance to the new rulers, 
the British continued to believe that Neguib’s government was like any other Egyptian 
government; Eden thought they played the ’usual tactic of every Egyptian Government to 
represent themselves as the last bulwark between us and mob disorders (Farouk himself used 
to try to exploit this line)’40.
Although the American Governments of Truman and Eisenhower were prepared to 
judge Egyptian nationalism on its own merits, they preferred to define it as a tool in 
constructing an anti-communist alliance in the Middle East41. The British continued to ignore 
Arab nationalism altogether, and thought they could continue to influence Arab politics as they 
had done before, by maintaining client regimes in Iraq and Jordan, and by playing off different 
factions against each other in Egypt and, apart from the 1951-1953 Mossadiq interlude, in 
Iran. British policymakers thus remained unable to see that the United States grew worried 
about one major cause of discontent in Egypt, that is, the British way of dealing with Egypt, 
and with the Middle East in general.
While in 1953 President Eisenhower was still prepared to support the British position 
in Suez, his Secretary of State was growing impatient with British stubbornness over the Canal 
Zone, and the consequences it would have on security in the Middle East. Dulles thought a 
security arrangement should be the goal of the United States that would comprise those states 
in the Near East that bordered the Soviet Union. However, while increasingly defining the 
American interests in the Middle East to be no longer coinciding with British influence in the 
area, the United States continued to involve the United Kingdom in its policies, thus giving
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the impression to the British that they could hold on to their position. From Spring 1953 on, 
the United States, Great Britain and Turkey had been engaged in coordinated strategic planning 
for the Middle East area. Early in 1954 the United States considered Iran stable enough to start 
an arms assistance programme, while Pakistan and Iraq were actively seeking American 
military aid. These developments strongly distressed the British Foreign Office who feared that 
the United States would reinforce its position in the Middle East at the expense of Great 
Britain. British foreign policy makers wanted to make sure that, if the Americans really had 
to enter the area, the spread of American influence would be contained by formal Anglo- 
American cooperation.
The first results of Dulles’s attempts to create a ’Northern Tier’ was the Pact between 
Turkey and Pakistan of 19 February 1954 and the supply of U.S. arms to Iraq in April of that 
year. At the same time American pressure on Great Britain to reach an agreement with Egypt 
was increased. The British became worried42, but remained convinced that they could make 
the Americans support them over Egypt, even when in June 1954 Eisenhower bluntly told 
Churchill, when the latter, accompanied by Eden, travelled to Washington to discuss the 
Anglo-Egyptian quarrel, that the United States would break with London and pursue a policy 
independent of British concerns if no agreement was reached soon43. The British refused to 
face the possibility that the United States could decide on Middle Eastern matters without the 
United Kingdom. Despite warnings from the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Roger 
Makins, that die British attitude could eventually mean that they might find themselves ’having 
to deal with a powerful, nationalistic and frustrated America’44, Eden looked back on the 
outcome of die way the Canal Treaty was eventually concluded: ’The Americans agreed to the 
use of their economic influence to help as an incentive to induce die Egyptians to make and 
keep an agreement on acceptable terms. This was to be understood by all concerned, but not 
blatantly expressed’45.
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United States officials thought that they could persuade Egypt to conclude a defence 
treaty with Pakistan, and to agree to a Iraqi adherence to such a Pact, insensitive to Egyptian 
objections that this would actually strengthen the position of one of its major rivals for 
leadership in the Arab world. Neguib and Nasser had been disappointed by the American 
decision to grant arms to Iraq while military assistance to Egypt was still conditional on 
Egyptian agreement to participate in some form of security arrangement in the Middle East. 
On top of that, Iraq and Turkey announced the imminent signing of a defence treaty on 11 
January 19SS, agreed upon in February 1954 after an attempt by Egypt to rally Arab states 
behind a revival of the collective security arrangements of the Arab League had failed.
American security policy in the Middle East had assumed that all Arab and Islamic 
states could be unified against the threats of communism. Egypt’s opposition against the cluster 
of treaties that reinforced Iraq’s position in the area, caused the United States to stay out. 
Great Britain had joined the Turko-Iraqi treaty in April 1955, thus establishing the Baghdad 
Pact, in order to preserve its influence in Iraq: the 1930 treaty between the two countries, 
allowing for military bases, was due to expire, and joining the Turko-Iraqi treaty seemed an 
easy way to maintain the British position. It has been claimed that the United States saw this 
as a fait accompli staged by Eden46. No such evidence exists, however. It is much more likely 
that the United States preferred to remain unidentified with the Pact as long as Egypt, their 
model for Arab nationalism, remained opposed to it. It did not prevent the United States from 
cooperating with the pact, for instance, by appointing Loy Henderson as a formal U.S. 
observer. Even if the United States stayed out, Dulles’s objective of creating an anti­
communist alliance in the Northern Tier had been achieved, even more so after Iran and 
Pakistan joined the Pact in the late Summer of 1955.
The American attitude towards Middle East security did not change the British 
perception of the role they and the United States were supposed to play in the Middle East. 
Harold Macmillan, who had become Foreign Secretary in April 1955, when Anthony Eden 
took over from Winston Churchill as Prime Minister, claimed that in August Britain had 
obtained ’a clear promise that if the Arab-Israeli tension could be reduced, America would join 
the Baghdad Pact’47. One month earlier, during the Geneva summit of France, Britain, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, Eden had convinced Eisenhower that tanks should be
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delivered to Iraq by both countries41, which was interpreted as further evidence of U.S. 
support for the way Great Britain was dealing with Iraq and the Baghdad Pact.
Clearly then, until the moment that relations between Egypt and the West started to 
deteriorate in September 1955, when it became known that Nasser had purchased arms from 
die Eastern bloc, the Baghdad Pact was perceived by the British as an American invention: ’we 
had been left with the Turko-Iraqi pact which the Americans started, and then ran out o f 49. 
They were aware that the U.S. were not ready to formally associate themselves with the 
Treaty, but noticed that the Americans were prepared to deliver arms to the adhering Middle 
Eastern countries, and that they were willing to participate in die Pact’s structural 
organizations: not only did they formally appoint an observer, but in addition they were 
secretly present at the meetings of the Pact’s security and economic committee50.
By the Summer of 1955, therefore, British objectives seemed to be within reach: a new 
treaty with Iraq had preserved British bases; her alliance with the Baghdad Pact had affirmed 
its primary position in the Middle East; this Pact had been approved of, and even initiated, by 
the United States51; within reasonable time, die United States would join the Pact themselves; 
since the Summer of 1954 the United States and Great Britain had been involved in secret 
conversations that would have to produce a lasting settlement for the Arab-Israeli conflict52. 
Why would British policymakers consider their position in the Middle East to be seriously 
challenged by die United States that Summer?
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7.4 Conclusion
It has been contended that the British Government under Sir Winston Churchill and 
Sir Anthony Eden still perceived their country to occupy a predominant position in the Middle 
East, and that this position was accepted by the United States, as it had been since the end of 
the Second World War. British foreign policy makers remained unaware of a change in the 
American attitude towards both American interests in the area and the role the United Kingdom 
should play in their defence. More specifically, they were confident that the Americans would 
follow the British lead in the area. The American position regarding a number of important 
issues, such as the concluding of a Anglo-Egyptian treaty regarding the Suez Canal Zone and 
the foundation of the Baghdad Pact, was perceived to be occasionally troublesome, but, in the 
end, in correspondence with British interests, not in the least because of perceived successful 
diplomatic pressure by the United Kingdom.
Moreover, during this period Great Britain engaged in several limited military actions 
in the Middle East without being stopped or forced to undo by the United States. In July 1955 
Britain sent reinforcements to its Protectorate of Aden in order to restore order. In the second 
half of October 1955 troops were sent to the Buraimi Oasis and to some areas of Abu Dhabi, 
in order to prevent Saudi Arabia from occupying the area53; at the same time troops were sent 
to Oman to secure the area for the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, who was challenged by the 
Imam of Oman who, supported by Saudi Arabia, wanted to declare Oman independent. In the 
first half of 1956 Britain was to intervene militarily two more times in Bahrein in order to 
deter Saudi Arabia54. These events testify to the relative freedom of manoeuvre the British 
still enjoyed in defending their oil interests and client regimes in the area.
The general orientation to world affairs of the British foreign policy elite between 1951 
and 1955 thus builds on perceptions and expectations that had already been shaped by the 
dynamics of the Anglo-American security regime between 1945 and 1951. If small group 
decision making tends to reinforce pre-existing beliefs of group members, it seems likely that 
those, who had been part of the foreign policy elite, such as Lord Salisbury, Selwyn Lloyd,
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and Harold Macmillan” , would share, what Brecher would call, an attitudinal prism 
regarding Anglo-American relations. This view would comprise above all the conviction that 
Great Britain held primary responsibility ova: the Middle East, second, that the United States 
would eventually follow a British lead in the area, and, third, that American hesitations could 
be overcome by making use of the argument that Communist forces were increasingly 
influential in the area.
This is not to say that British policymakers still thought of the United Kingdom as a 
power on an equal footing with the United States. The development of the hydrogen bomb by 
the Americans in 1953 would provoke a fundamental reassessment of British position and role 
in the world, and was to have a profound influence on the British readiness to reach an 
agreement with Egypt on die Suez Canal problem in 1954. Eden, as a Foreign Secretary, 
thought that a military base like the one the British had in the Suez area could easily be 
destructed with one hydrogen bomb, and thus had become superfluous. No compelling reason 
therefore existed to try to stay in Egypt. This vision, however, was shared neither by Churchill 
nor by a large portion of his Party. It forms part of Eden’s cognitive beliefs system, and will 
therefore be dealt with in the next chapter, which will deal with his Operational Code. It is to 
his cognitive belief system that we turn next.
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Chapter 8: The operational code of Sir Anthony Eden
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8.1 Introduction
The relative influence of individual cognitive belief systems of politicians is one of the 
main themes of this work. It has been argued that the operational code technique is an 
appropriate device for discovering the cognitive belief system of politicians who deal with 
foreign policy making. This chapter will describe Anthony Eden’s operational code on the 
basis of his public speeches as well as of utterances pronounced in environments of a more 
private nature. The operational code differs from inductive methods to identify an individual’s 
cognitive belief system, such as Cognitive Mapping, because it makes use of a previously 
designed classification of cognitive beliefs that are relevant to foreign policy making. 
Categories are divided into philosophical beliefs, which deal with a policymaker’s assumptions 
and premises, and instrumental beliefs, which refer to matters of strategy and tactics. Table
8.1 gives an overview of this classification1.
Table 8.1: Operational Code Categories
1. Philosophical beliefs
1. The fundamental nature of politics and political conflict, and the image of the 
opponent.
1.1 What is the ’essential’ nature of the political universe?
1.2 What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponents and of other
significant political actors?
1.3 What is the nature of the contemporary international system? Is conflict a
permanent or a temporary feature? Is conflict caused by characteristics of man 
nation-states or the international political system?
2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political 
values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this 
score?
3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent? What is the role 
of chance in human affairs and history?
1 Sjoblom notes that neither George, nor Holsti, justified the choice of categories of beliefs; he 
argues that an actor’s goals are not included and that philosophical beliefs 1-3 are heavily interrelated; 
Sjoblom nevertheless thinks the classification can be defended; Gunnar Sjoblom, ’Some Problems of the 
Operational Code Approach’, in C. Jonsson, Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics. Frances 
Pinter, London, 1982, pp. 37-74.
4. How much 'control’ or ’mastery’ can one have over historical development? What is 
one’s role in ’moving’ and ’shaping’ history in the desired direction?
5. What is the role of ’chance’ in human affairs and in historical development?
2. Instrumental beliefs
1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives of political action?
2. How are the goals of political action pursued most effectively?
3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
4. What is the best ’timing’ of action to advance one’s interests?
5. What is the utility of different means for advancing one’s interests? What resources
can one draw upon in the effort to advance one’s interests?
Source: Holsti, ’A Typology of "Operational Code" Belief Systems’, pp. xii-xiv.
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A previously designed scheme of classification can be very useful as a tool of 
comparative research in foreign policy making. Thus far, comparative analysis of types of 
operational code has been limited to their link with differences in personality2 and to their 
variations in openness3. Unfortunately, very few operational code studies have actually been 
used for the analysis of foreign policy decision making4. In this context, an additional aim of 
this study is to attempt to assess to what extent Anthony Eden’s operational code adds to our 
understanding of British decision making during die Suez crisis. However, before Eden’s 
cognitive belief system can be reconstructed, it is necessary to solve several methodological 
problems.
2 One such example is Holsti’s comparative analysis of existing operational code studies. Holsti 
argues that two beliefs dominate as master beliefs (the nature of the contemporary international system; 
the view of one’s opponent). Belief systems are usually structured around one of these beliefs. Holsti 
makes an attempt to link each operational code ’type’ to differences in character; Holsti, ’A Typology 
of ‘Operational Code" Belief Systems’.
5 Stuart and Starr, ’The "Inherent Bad Faith Model" Revisited’.
4 Examples are Stephen G. Walker, ’The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior. Henry Kissinger’s 
Operational Code and the Vietnam War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution. (21), 1, 1977, pp. 129-168; 
Harvey Starr, Henrv Kissinger.
8.2 Methodological considerations
Three methodological considerations are important in constructing a politician’s 
operational code. First, the problem of sources that include a politician’s assessment of the 
very decision making situation that one seeks to analyze. Second, the possibility that an 
individual’s belief system reflects the role is playing in the policy process3. Third, the danger 
that an operational code is constructed on the basis of the politician’s public utterances, which 
may be tailored to his audience rather than reflect his true opinions*.
(1) Avoidance of rationalizations afterwards. It is important that, in order to avoid 
using sources that might be influenced by Eden’s experiences at Suez, the formulation of his 
operational code is based on those utterances that refer to the pre-crisis period. This implies 
that Eden’s voluminous memoirs cannot be employed here. It is essential to try and reconstruct 
Eden’s way of thinking at the beginning of the crisis. I have chosen to try to cover the period 
between 1924 and 19SS, that is, from the moment that Eden became a Member of Parliament 
for Warwick and Leamington until he took over from Winston Churchill as Prime Minister on
6 April 19SS. This still allows us to deal with Eden’s first attitudes towards Nasser as an 
opponent, as Nasser was part of group of young officers that put aside King Farouk in 19S2, 
and effectively became Egypt’s leader in 1954.
(2) Accounting for role variables. In a very orthodox way of reasoning one could 
object to the operational code approach that it assumes the individual’s cognitive belief system 
to remain relatively stable and coherent throughout time. It would thus not be possible to take 
into account die possibility that a politician can learn from certain experiences, or, much more 
damaging from a methodological point of view, that his thoughts are not as much a reflection 
of his individual belief system but rather a reflection of the role he is playing in the political 
system at a particular moment of his career. It has been suggested that politicians who are 
involved in foreign policy making will reflect opinions that are consistent with role 
expectations that surround the particular job they are occupying in the political system. A 
Minister of Defence is expected to display different attitudes towards a foreign policy problem 
from a Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister7.
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The possible influence of role variables can be accounted for by making a distinction 
between relevant political roles performed by Eden between 1924 and 19S5 while analyzing 
the documents relevant to constructing Eden’s operational code. I thus distinguish five relevant 
periods. (1) 1924-December 1935. In this period Eden became a Member of Parliament for 
the first time, Permanent Parliamentary Secretary at the Home Office, Parliamentary Under 
Secretary at the Foreign Office, and Minister for League of Nations Affairs. (2) December 
1935-March 1938. Eden served as Foreign Secretary under Neville Chamberlain. (3) March 
1938-Mav 1945. In this period Eden willy-nilly became an important member of the internal 
opposition against Chamberlain’s appeasement policy within the Conservative Party. Then he 
became Dominions Secretary* (1939/1940), Secretary of State for War (1940) and, finally, 
Foreign Secretary (1941-1945). (4) Mav 1945-November 1951. Member of the opposition 
against the Attlee Government. (5) November 1951-April 1955. Foreign Secretary under 
Churchill. Obviously, one would expect Eden to have different opinions on collective security 
as Minister for League of Nations Affairs than as Foreign Secretary. As a Foreign Secretary 
who had to compete with Churchill for dominance of foreign policy making, especially from 
1951 until 1955, one can expect different opinions than a stable operational code would 
predict. By making a distinction between these five periods I hope to be able to control for role 
variables.
(3) The problem of honest intentions. Finally, a solution has to be found for the 
problem that an individual’s utterances may not reflect his true intentions. It may rather be the 
case that they are pronounced because of their convenience at the time. Maybe a politician will 
try to please his audience, or will prefer not to show his real thoughts for political reasons. I 
hope to resolve that problem to a certain extent by making a distinction between Eden’s public 
and private statements. It seems reasonable to presume that public statements will be more 
tailored to their audiences than private ones. I assume that beliefs which can be derived from 
the latter type of sources reflect Eden’s cognitive beliefs better, and that the more they differ 
from public statements on the same subjects, the more these public statements were 
pronounced for political reasons. The practical problem caused by this comparison of public 
and private utterances is the lack of private sources for those periods that Eden has not been
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177-212; Glen H. Stassea, 'Individual Preferences versus Role Constraint in Policy-Making. Senatorial 
Responses to Secretaries Acheaon and Dulles’, World Politics. (25), 1, 1972, pp. 96-119.
* Without a seat in the Cabinet.
in office, as most private data can be found in the series British Documents on Foreign Policy.
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8.3 A description of Anthony Eden’s operational code
What follows will be a rough description of Eden’s cognitive beliefs, making use of 
the classification that has been developed by Holsti and George. However, I have decided not 
to present Eden’s operational code by a tedious description of each category separately. Rather,
I will concentrate on its master belief and on the way in which it is related to and conditions 
other categories.
In general, I will show that the central belief of Eden’s operational code consists of 
the idea that any international dispute can be settled if the parties involved recognize and 
respect their respective security interests. Several beliefs follow from this: those about 
international relations, the place of the United Kingdom in world politics, the nature of one’s 
opponents, and the way how to deal with them. I will claim that this cognitive belief system 
can explain to a certain extent Eden’s attitudes towards Germany and Italy in the 1930s and 
the Soviet Union in the 1940s, and as such may provide relevant clues to understanding bis 
policies towards Egypt and the United States in the 1950s. In certain periods, however, 
significant differences in Eden’s attitudes can be observed related to the various roles he is 
performing in the British political system. Moreover, certain differences as to the use of 
military force are apparent in a comparison between public and private utterances9.
8.3.1 The structure of Eden’s belief system
There can be no doubt that, for most of the period covered by the operational code 
[1924-1955], Robert Anthony Eden’s cognitive belief system was guided by the idea that 
conflict is a frequent feature of world politics, but that in the end any conflict can be 
accommodated as long as the parties involved are willing to recognize and respect their mutual 
security interests. A necessary precondition for conflict resolution, however, is the obeyance 
to certain standards of international conduct which in turn form the basis of diplomatic
9 One important question would be whether a duplication of study would result in the same 
construction of Eden’s operational code, cf. David G. Winter and Abigail J. Stewart, ’Content Analysis 
as a Technique for Assessing Political Leaders’, in Margaret Hermann (ed.), A Psychological 
Examination of Political Leaders. The Free Press, New Yoik, 1977, p. 33.1 think the classification of 
the code, as codified by Ole Holsti, makes it fit the criterion of intersubjectivity. Some have
argued that quantitative such as Evaluation Assertion Analysis, could be used as a check on
a qualitative research technique, such as the operational code; e.g., Winter and Stewart, ibid.. pp. 41- 
42; Stuart and Stan, ’The ’Inherent Bad Faith Model* Revisited’, pp. 3-4; Starr, Henrv Kissinger, pp. 
82-93.
negotiation. This view of international relations ran parallel to Eden’s general, although seldom 
referred to, conception of politics, [philosophical belief l . l ] 10. Eden thinks of politics as 
’essentially concerned with conflicting human claims: freedom and order, the individual and 
the state, tradition and change, personal security and adventure, ideals and reality, 
independence and interdependence. The art of statesmanship is to reconcile these claims and 
to build a way of life that gives them fair expression’11.
Within that context the relation of the individual to the state is the most urgent problem 
of politics, and, according to Eden, it exactly in die area that socialism is unable to provide 
a just balance between freedom and order12.
The adherence to standards of international conduct, most notably the observance of 
treaties and the willingness to resort to free negotiations13, furthers the growth of international 
confidence, which is a prerequisite for peace. This concept of the nature of world politics has 
important consequences for Eden’s (1) view of die opponent (2) instrumental beliefs, both 
grounded in (3) some extent of historical optimism.
1. View of the opponent. Because of die predominance of the importance of standards 
of international conduct to Eden, his view of his opponents are derived from this principle 
rather than that the view of die opponent serves as a master belief itself around which other 
beliefs are centered. As long as states and their leaders adhere to certain convention of correct 
behaviour, it will remain possible to come to an agreement with any country. That is, it is 
possible to accommodate international conflict irrespective of the type of political system or 
political ideology of the various international actors: ’International relations are guided not by 
forms of government, but by the manner in which governments observe their undertakings’14. 
This implies that, according to Eden, one can come to terms with both dictatorships, such as 
Italy and Germany, and ideologically different nations, such as the Soviet Union. Indeed, class 
could not be a cause of international conflict as ’the interests of classes are not exclusive, but
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does Eden show some thoughts on this theme.
11 Foreword to Anthony Eden, Davs for Decision. Faber and Faber, London, 1949, p. vii.
12 Speech at a constituency meeting 1946, Eden, Davs for Decision, p. 7; foreword to Freedom and 
Order. Selected Speeches 1939-1946. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1948, p. 5.
11 E.g. Eden, Foreign A ffairs, p. 175, speech at Bradford, 14 December 1936.
14 Eden, Foreign Affairs, speech at Bradford, 14 December 1936, p. 175.
complementary’13. By consequence, Eden would change his cooperative attitude towards other 
nations, once these would have passed a certain threshold of international misbehaviour: Italy 
passed that threshold with its invasion of Abyssinia in 193S, Germany when it started pressing 
for a corridor to Danzig in 1939, and the Soviet Union after its mounted a blockade of the 
Western zones of Berlin in 1948.
To Eden, this respect for a certain type of conduct was almost identical to interpersonal 
contact: ’we want, in our relations with all other countries, to try to maintain a standard of 
honesty, of fair dealing, and of international good faith. Foreign affairs are really not so very 
different in those respects from domestic affairs. Human intercourse is based on good faith, 
on the keeping of promises, on honouring the pledged word between man and man’16.
2. Instrumental beliefs. This view of the nature of the world politics and its 
consequences for the assessments of one’s opponents similarly affects the way in which 
international diplomacy is practiced. Eden preferred personal contacts with the relevant actors: 
’(-) I cannot help feeling that a direct approach to the men concerned is more likely to produce 
results than other methods’17. His approach as a diplomat can therefore best be described as 
pragmatic: ’he was interested in settling problems, in bringing people together, and working 
out agreements (-). His first reaction, when he heard the speeches which the Americans and 
Russians were making to one another in the United Nations in 1951, was that he must 
somehow reduce the shouting and persuade people to talk to and not at one another (-). His 
great specialty was to remember always the third parties and fourth parties in the international 
confrontations with which he was involved (-). His aim, he used to say, was "to grasp definite 
and limited problems’ and try to settle them bit by bit, one by one’1*. Eden believed, indeed, 
that problems should be regarded as they arose, without politicians being guided by political 
doctrines and prejudices: ’all prejudices are equally fatal to good government’19.
This pragmatism of Eden’s is borne out in the way he dealt with international disputes 
as Foreign Secretary or Minister for League of Nations Affairs in the 1930s and the 1950s.
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11 Eden, Foreign Affairs, speech at a dinner party of the Foreign Press Association, 12 January
1937, p. 183.
16 Eden, Freedom and Order, speech at the House of Commons, 25 May 1944, p. 258.
17 Eden, Freedom and Order, speech at House of Commons, 31 July 1939, p. 31.
'* Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, p. 15, 17.
19 Eden, Davs for Decision, speech at the annua] general meeting of his constituency Conservative 
Association, mid 1946, pp. 5-6.
Eden tried to confine the hostility between the disputants to a very specific issue thus ignoring 
all other differences between the countries. This allowed him to solve the 1934 Balkan crisis, 
when Yugoslavia’s King Alexander was murdered by a Hungarian terrorist; to find a solution 
for die Saar-problem, by pressing for an international police force under supervision of the 
League of Nations in order to hold a fair plebiscite on die future of the area in 193520; in 
similar fashion Eden helped solving die dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia over Trieste in 
19S4, succeeded in securing German rearmament after the French Parliament botched the 
European Defence Community in 1954 by incorporating Western Germany into the 1948 
Treaty of Brussels, the common defense pact that constituted die Western European Union, 
and managed to formulate a compromise over Indo-China at die 1954 Geneva conference that 
should satisfy all parties involved21.
3. Modest historical optimism. Both Eden’s conception of the nature of world politics 
and his subsequent views of opponents and the possibilities of diplomacy are matched by a 
sense of optimism as to the possibility of influencing the course of history: for Eden it was 
possible to understand die course of history: ’history is not a series of isolated and disjointed 
incidents, but a continuous process’22; die politician should not ignore historical development, 
nor try to master it completely: ’[cjhange is perhaps the only thing in the universe which is 
constant. By trying to thwart it, you only drive it underground. It becomes fitful and eruptive 
instead of ordered and continuous’; for Eden, politicians should attempt merely to guide 
development23.
This conception of history, change, and the role of chance in human affairs and history 
(philosophical beliefs 2, 3, 4) thus fits Eden’s view that interactions between international 
actors can, to a reasonably large extent, be manipulated and guided towards accommodation 
of their disputes. Indeed, if countries adopted certain standards of international conduct, it 
would be possible to abandon die ’doctrine of force’ which had ruled the interactions between
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22 Eden, Freedom and Order, speech at the Scottish Unionist Conference at Glasgow, 30 October 
1942, p. 169.
21 Eden, Freedom and Order. Address to the Constitutional Club at London, 17 April 1940, pp. 69- 
70. In this context of guided development should one understand Eden's claim that ’circumstances are, 
to a great extent, what we make them’, Foreign Affairs, speech at Haseley Manor, 11 June 1938, p. 
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states for so long. Then ’all outstanding questions would become possible to solve and 
international economic progress would bring happiness to every human being’24.
Eden’s optimism is confined by the limits that history has set on the role a country is 
bound to play in world affairs: *0 nations, like human beings, are fashioned and moulded by 
their past. You cannot wholly escape from your past. You can improve on it,2S. For the 
United Kingdom this meant that its ’foreign policy is to a large extent dictated by our 
geographical position. Whether we like it or not, we are part of Europe. Whether we like it 
or not, we are also the centre of a great Imperial Commonwealth, and so we are, in that sense, 
a World Power too. Our duty is to act as a bridge, and there is nobody who can play that part 
but us-nobody else’26. In general terms, this role imposed by history points to another 
important component of Eden’s belief system, already apparent is his master belief: nations 
can accommodate their disputes as long as they respect certain rules, and as long as they 
recognize their mutual legitimate interests.
3. The role of die United Kingdom in world affairs. Eden’s view of the role of Great 
Britain in world affairs has been reasonably consistent throughout the period covered by the 
operational code. It contains two important elements: (a) its geographical position which makes 
the Middle East and Mediterranean strategically important to preserving the British 
Commonwealth and Empire (b) the recognition that the United Kingdom is not able to play the 
role of policeman of the world, and thus has been dependent on the United States ever since 
the early 1930s.
(a) Geopolitics. Its geography has made the United Kingdom part of Europe as well 
as leader of the Commonwealth. As most members of that Commonwealth are to be found on 
the shores of Indian and Pacific Ocean, the Middle East and the Mediterranean from the 
crucial link between the Commonwealth and its centre. This why Eden has defined freedom 
of communication over the Mediterranean and Red Seas a vital interest of the United Kingdom 
since he had become Foreign Secretary in 1935. During the Second World War Eden 
ftmphasirad that Great Britain’s vital interests lay more in the Mediterranean than elsewhere.
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peace was not equal to the absence of war: ’we do not believe in conflict. We believe in co-operation. 
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26 Eden, Freedom and Order, speech at the House of Commons, 2 December 1942, p. 178.
After that war he still deemed the area essential, most notably because the Suez Canal was of 
vital interest to Great Britain for the transportation of its imports and exports.
Until the explosion of Atomic bomb, Eden was convinced that the Middle East, and 
in particular the Suez Canal area, was the most important strategic area, indispensable to win 
any large-scale war because of the control over die lines of communications. Eden had a clash 
with Churchill over the number of troops that could be afforded to be sent to the area 
(Churchill thought it less vital than Eden), because he was convinced that the Germans (until 
1941 together with the Soviets, thereafter alone) would try to come down to the Canal and the 
Middle Eastern oil wells through the Kaukasus. After the war, however, Eden was one of the 
first to realize, as early as 1945, that nuclear weapons upset traditional military strategy, 
because no natural barrier would be able to stop their delivery, and that therefore the Suez 
Canal would rapidly lose its extreme strategic importance. Eden had thus an early grasp of 
changing British interests in the area, which would eventually lead to his difficult, but 
successful, attempt to convince the Churchill Government of the need to withdraw British 
troops from the Suez Canal zone in the early 1950s.
Despite it changed strategic importance, the Canal and, indeed, the whole of the 
Middle East remained an essential line of communication between the United Kingdom and its 
Commonwealth. Eden judged British economic weakness after the Second World War to be 
of a temporary nature and was convinced that preferential trading with the Commonwealth 
countries, even after Indian independence, would make it possible to rebuild the British 
economy. Both the transport of these trading goods and of oil imports, however, required some 
guarantee that the Suez Canal remain open to free navigation. Ever since the mid-1930s Eden 
called die Canal and the Mediterranean Britain’s arterial road.
(b) Relative power. According to Eden, British influence is first of all based on 
prestige. In its turn, prestige is based not simply on military and economic strength but as well 
on the respect die United Kingdom merits as one of the world’s oldest democracies, as on its 
adherence to international law. However, it is clear that for Eden the Commonwealth and 
Empire form the main source of prestige in Britain’s relations with major powers: speaking 
about Anglo-American and Anglo-Soviet relations, Eden told the House of Commons in May 
1944:
’we cannot say to the world: "you have got to do this; you have got to do 
that”. That is beyond the power of 45,000,000. But what we can do, in our 
own conduct, and by our own leadership, to try to establish and maintain those 
standards of international conduct without which there cannot be peace. That 
I conceive to be die duty of British foreign policy (-). Though I have been in 
many negotiations with these two Powers alone, I have never felt any sense
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of inferiority, and I honestly do not believe that they felt any particular sense 
of superiority (-). The reason, of course, that, although we are only 45 
millions, we have in this island a unique geographical position and a rather 
remarkable experience, and because we are the centre of a great Empire’27.
Both in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s Eden is aware of Britain’s relative weakness: already in 
the 1930s it is recognized that it is unthinkable that Britain will be able to impose it will on 
other nations in the world whenever it feels like it: already in 1932 Eden eventually opposes 
strong measures against Japanese aggression in the Far East, because the British Pacific fleet 
would be too weak for a display of coercive diplomacy. Any effective countering of Japan’s 
aspirations required intimate cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In the late thirties Eden tried to persuade his colleagues that cooperation with the United States 
was indispensable to dealing with the European crisis that was unfolding.
It is exactly the recognition of relative British weakness, despite it still being a great 
power, that determined Eden’s policy dilemma as a Foreign Secretary between 1935 and 1938: 
given the consideration, shown in warnings from the Chiefs of Staff, that Great Britain would 
not have the resources to simultaneously fight three enemies, Japan, Germany and Italy, it was 
essential that the formation of blocs of countries be avoided, in order to prevent those countries 
from creating an alliance of their own. At die same time, the expansionist aspirations of each 
had to be dealt with. This resulted in a precarious policy of approaching Germany in a 
constructive mood which lasted well into 1939, while trying to oppose Italian aggression in 
Africa and the Mediterranean, but up to the point that she would be driven into Germany’s 
arms. I claim that Eden’s different approaches to Hitler and Mussolini can be explained by his 
master belief.
A permanent feature of Eden’s belief system is therefore his recognition of relative 
British weakness, and the importance that Britain seek cooperation with the United States. This 
concept is reinforced when it becomes apparent to him during the Second World War that the 
war would result in increased British weakness. Already in 1942 Eden thinks that the 
Americans should ’fulfill a leading role after the war and thus [] accept worldwide 
responsibility for maintaining peace’2*. The prevention of aggression should then be trusted 
into the hands of those countries that have a monopoly of strength in the world: the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom.
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* Eden, Freedom and Order, p. 179; speech to the House of Commons, 2 December 1942, 
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In sum, Eden's view of bow international relations should be conducted is constrained 
by his belief that other nations should respect Britain’s vital interests. Because of the economic 
importance of the Empire, the Middle East, the Suez Canal, and die Mediterranean are a vital 
interest to the United Kingdom. At the same time, however, Britain is not strong enough to 
impose her will on other nations, and should therefore seek cooperation with notably the 
United States.
8.3.2 Impact of the structure of Eden’s belief system on his view of his opponents
One of the advantages of the operational code’s American intellectual origins is that 
in most operational code studies it has been clear where to look for an opponent in order to 
complete an individual’s cognitive belief system. Usually, the Soviet Union appears as main 
adversary29. It is much more difficult to determine who should appear to be Eden’s most 
important opponent. I have opted to include in my analysis Eden’s views of (1) Italy. 
Germany, and, to a lesser extent. Japan, because they clearly were Britain’s major challenge 
when he was in office in the 1930s, (2) the Soviet Union, because it was to become the West’s 
major adversary after the Second World War, (3) the Middle East, especially the nationalist 
regimes in Egypt and Persia, because Nasser was to become Eden’s ’obsession’, as some 
authors claim, and, finally, (4) the United States, first, because what actually was taking place 
was the decline of British power relative to American power, and second, because of the rather 
peculiar pattern of Anglo-American relations during the Suez crisis.
I will show that (a) Eden’s attitude towards Italy and Germany, and towards the Soviet 
Union until June 1948 fit his master belief well, (b) his attitude towards the Middle East gives 
rise to some puzzling questions as to his handling of die Suez crisis, (c) his view of the United 
States is blurred by the conviction that it would be possible to convince the Americans of the 
special nature of the British Commonwealth and Empire. Not until section 8.4 will I outline 
some expectations regarding Eden’s handling of the Suez crisis, especially regarding his 
dealing with Egypt and the United States, on the basis of the knowledge of Eden’s cognitive 
belief system.
1. Italy. Germany, and Japan. The most puzzling question of Anthony Eden’s attitude 
towards Italy and Germany, is why he remained so positive about the possibility of a
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settlement with Hitler, while he was in favour of curbing Italian aggression almost from the 
beginning. One clue to an answer can be found in Eden’s cognitive belief system, and cannot 
be found elsewhere. Towards the end of the war, in a speech to the House of Commons, in 
which Eden laid down the principles of his foreign policy, he made a remark that can easily 
be understood, now we know his belief system: ’Why did the war become inevitable ? It was 
because Hitler and Mussolini refused to observe the ordinary standards of international conduct 
in the day-to-day conduct of international affairs’30. We know what these standards were: 
’maintain a standard of honesty of fair dealing, and of international good faith (-), the keeping 
of promises, on honouring the pledged word between man and man’31. It should be noted that 
not even in 1944 did Eden speak of the evil of totalitarian dictators threatening democracies, 
or of inherently expansionist tendencies of Italy and Germany. He sticks to his belief that in 
principle the nature of the political system of other nations does not matter, as long as certain 
international rules are observed. Indeed, as Foreign Secretary, Eden was not extraordinarily 
alarmed by German’s remilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936. Even though he thought 
it a violation of the sanctity of treaties (i.e., Versailles), Eden thought that international 
confidence could be restored by negotiation. Similarly, Eden was not alarmed by German 
claims regarding the Sudeten-area in the Autumn of 1937. Discussing the matter with his 
French colleague on 29 and 30 November, Eden said that ’[t]here was a feeling here [UK] that 
the Sudeten Germans had certain grievances, which ought to be dealt with’ and that ’the 
Czechs had certainly not yet done enough’32. Eden still believed that it would be possible to 
reach a settlement with Germany. As late as 10 February 1938, that is, shortly before his 
resignation, Eden wrote a memorandum in which he thought Germany could be induced to a 
’contribution to general appeasement’: at the very least he expected ’that Germany would 
refrain from intervention against us should we be attacked in the Mediterranean or in the Far 
East’. He thought it reasonable to offer Germany colonial compensation for such a pledge13. 
Eden’s attitude towards Germany did not even change after his resignation, as role theory
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would predict, being freed of the duty of daily compromising at the Foreign Office; indeed, 
Eden was reluctant to condemn the 1938 Four Power-settlement of Munich, which he greeted 
in the House of Commons as the beginning of ’new hopes’ and ’better things’, or at least as 
’breathing space’34. Not until the Summer of 1939, when Germany claimed Danzig, did Eden 
show a completely different stand: ’nobody can foretell with precision what the tactics will be 
in the next few weeks. No doubt there will be many moves. We will be lulled and soothed, 
we shall be threatened and provoked, but in essence the Nazis’ purpose remains the same-to 
impose on Poland this year the fate which they imposed upon Czechoslovakia’3*. The latter 
speech indicates, first of all, a change of terminology: Nazis instead of Germany; secondly, 
it clearly points to die recognition that Germany no longer respected the standards of 
international conduct.
Eden’s opinion of Italy had reached that verdict much sooner. Eden, as a Minster for 
League of Nations Affairs, had recognized Italy’s ambitions in Africa early in 193S. At the 
time he acknowledged the use of Italy as a counterweight to German moves towards Austria 
and proposed League arbitration. But when Italy actually invaded Abyssinia in October 1935 
Eden deemed that the League should resort to collective security and impose effective 
sanctions; yet, he was the only member of die Cabinet in favour of an arms boycott36. As 
Foreign Secretary, from December 1935 onwards, Eden had to fight a constant battle within 
the Foreign Office and later against Sir Neville Chamberlain, who became Prime Minister in 
1937, about policies towards Italy. While most people at Whitehall thought Germany and Japan 
to be the main adversaries, which implied that Italy somehow had to be appeased, for instance, 
by de jure recognition of her occupation of Abyssinia (Chamberlain’s theme from 1937 on), 
Eden thought Italy to be the real troublemaker, whose behaviour could trigger a large-scale 
war by inviting Germany to fish in troubled waters.
It is easy to see, knowing Eden’s belief system, why he considered Italy much more 
dangerous than Germany: first, it was threatening the balance of power in the Mediterranean 
and the Middle East, thus threatening the arterial road between Empire and homeland. Second, 
Italy was not a trustworthy party in the game of international relations. In a minute, written 
in November 1936, Eden wondered:
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33 Eden, Freedom and Order, pp. 32-33, speech to the House of Commons, 27 July 1939.
34 James, Anthony Eden, pp. 151-152
’Does any in the Foreign Office really believe that Italy’s foreign policy will 
at any time be other than opportunist ? Any agreement with Italy will be kept 
as long as it suits Italy. Surely nobody can now place any faith in her 
promises. All this is not an argument against seeking to improve Anglo-Italian 
relations, but against placing an exaggerated valuation on any such 
improvement if and when we get it D We must be on guard against increasing 
the dictator’s prestige by our own excessive submissiveness’37.
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Eden therefore does not want to know about de jure recognition: ’to grant him 
[Mussolini] de jure recognition as the result of a bargain seems to me rather sordid and might 
be dangerous to our reputation Q To give him recognition without a bargain [] would I suppose 
be hailed as a considerable triumph for Mussolini Q’3*. Over and over, Eden tried to convince 
Chamberlain to stop appeasing Mussolini. His different assessment of Germany and Italy is 
borne out by his letter to Chamberlain of 9 January 1938:
’0 there seems to be a certain difference between Italian and German positions 
in that an agreement with the latter might have a chance of reasonable life, 
especially if Hitler’s own position were engaged, while Mussolini is. I fear, 
the complete gangster and his pledged word means nothing, fl But all this 
would not alone deter me. What worries me much more is the effect that 
recognition might have on our own moral position’ (emphasis mine)39.
It should therefore be concluded that the difference in attitude of Eden towards Italy 
on the one hand, and Germany on the other hand, is related to (1) his perception of 
international affairs as a world in which the accommodation of conflicts between states is 
possible, as long as certain standards are observed and mutual interests recognized, and (2) the 
central position the Mediterranean and the Middle East in his view of the relation between the 
United kingdom and her Commonwealth and Empire. A rival explanation would be that Eden 
had capitalized on his insistence on collective security through the League of Nations, when 
still a Minister for League of Nations Affairs, indeed had become Foreign Secretary on that 
quality, and thus would be interested in insisting on a hawkish position towards Italy in order 
not to lose popular support. Although this would provide an explanation of his general attitude
37 Documents nn British Foreign Policy. Volume 17, Minute by Sir Anthony Eden, No. 352, R 
6646/226/22, 5 November 1936, pp. 513-514.
* rWiirwaits on British Foreign Policy, volume 19, Eden to Chamberlain, R 248/7/22, 1 January 
1938, p. 711.
39 TWnmants nn Britinh Foreign Policy, volume 19, Eden to Chamberlain, R 306/7/22, 9 January
1938, p. 723.
towards Italy, it can not satisfactorily explain why Eden turned away from collective security 
as the correct approach to Italian aggression, nor can it explain the different attitude towards 
Germany. These can only be understood by Eden's master belief about international affairs.
2. The Soviet Union. Anthony Eden's views of the Soviet Union until 1948 reflect his 
opinion that international relations should not be influenced by the nature of the political 
system of a particular country as long as that country respects certain standards of international 
conduct. Well into die Cold War Eden professes the idea that mutual respect for one's 
legitimate interests would make it possible to remain on speaking terms with the Soviet Union. 
The blockade of Western Berlin would signify a watershed, the sign to Eden that no 'normal 
diplomatic deals’ could be made with the Soviets. This would actually lead to a completely 
different definition of international relations: from 1948-1949 on, Eden considers world politics 
as a conflict between two opposing ways of lives instead of a world where ideology is of 
secondary importance.
After Churchill’s famous Iron Curtain speech at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, 
which was followed by the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Eden, now a Member of 
the Opposition, remained remarkably co-operative towards the Soviet Union: ’[t]here is no 
reason why the two ideologies should not live together in peace if both will accept not to back 
their fancies in every other land. Restraint may be difficult to practice, but surely this is not 
too much to ask as the price for enduring peace', Eden told his audience at Watford, for which 
speech he was reproached by Churchill who thought it far too friendly40. This attitude of 
Eden’s was grounded in the conviction that the Soviets would obey the rules of international 
relations as long as all parties involved respect one another’s legitimate security interest. W.P. 
Crozier reports of a conversation he had with Eden during the War: ’[w]e have to make up 
our minds on Russia: either she was Internationa] Communist in her intentions or she was a 
Peter-the-Great Russia. Personally he [Eden] was convinced that Stalin’s policy was that of a 
Peter-the-Great Russia and that we could, and therefore must, live with her in Europe (•). 
Stalin had convinced him that Russia was, and would be, reasonable in her aims’41. The 
Moscow conference between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain in the 
Autumn of 1943 convinced Eden that the Soviet Union wished to adhere to ’normal’
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diplomacy: ’Q it is a common diplomatic epxerience to find that problems which seem to 
present insuperable difficulties when there is no confidence and no mutual trust can fall into 
a different perspective when once a real basis of goodwill has been established’42. Eden was 
prepared to sympathize with the perceived security dilemma of the Soviet Union, that had 
experienced several invasions from Europe and therefore looked for certain guarantees. To that 
purpose Eden was opposed to a paper on postwar arrangements in Europe that circulated in 
Whitehall which envisaged a Western European Union under British leadership in the 
framework of the British Empire43. Eden argued that this would ’invite Russian animosity and 
a counter alliance in Eastern Europe. Frank co-operation and friendship with Russia is the 
proper course’44. He more than once declared that Russian foreign policy was dominated by 
the German attack and by the wish not to see that happen again. He even stated that fears of 
Soviet domination over Europe were caused by wartime German propaganda. Well into 1948, 
even after events in Czechoslovakia, Eden repeated that ’while firmness and vigilance are 
indispensable, neither threats nor bluster are going to get us anywhere. To be unshakable in 
essentials, to be patient in explanation of what is our point of view, even at the cost of endless 
repetition, to be cool and to leave the door open for agreement, these should be our present 
directives’43.
This is not to say that Eden had an extremely naive attitude towards die Soviet Union. 
He recognized the shaking up of the European balance of power at an early stage of the 
Second World War. In January 1942 he wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet, in which he 
warned that ’[o]n the assumption that Germany is defeated and German military strength is 
destroyed and that France remains, for a long time at least, a weak power, there will be no 
counterweight to Russia in Europe 0- Russia’s position on the European continent will be 
unassailable Q. Russian forces would end the war much deeper into Europe than they began 
it in 1941 Q. It therefore seemed prudent to tie the Soviet Government to agreements as soon 
as possible’46. Eden was by consequence prepared to recognize the Soviet annexation of the
41 Eden, Freedom and Order, p. 223, speech to the House of Commons, 11 November 1943.
43 Written by Alfred Duff Cooper, 1st Viscount of Norwich, Minister of Information.
44 Eden paraphrased by John Colville, John Colville, The Fringes of Power- Downing Street Diaries. 
Volume Two: 1941-April 1955. Hodder and Stoughton, Sevenoaks, 1985, pp. 131-132, entry 21 August
1944.
45 Eden, Davs for Decisions, pp. 184, press article 16 September 1947. These words are repeated 
in his speech to the House of Commons, 5 May 1948, ibid.. p. 198.
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Baltic states for the sake of an Anglo-Soviet treaty in April 194247. Interview at die time by 
W. Crazier, he defined the issue as
’Q did we or did we not desire to co-operate with Russia with regard to the 
future of Europe ? He [Eden] believed that Russia was willing to co-operate 
and that we could work together and he held that this would be of immense 
importance. If we now refused what Russia desired and maintained she was 
entitled to on the grounds of her bare security we should run the risk of 
alienating her and preventing what ought to be a most fruitful co-operation in 
the future. Further, we could not, of course, prevent Russia from absorbing 
these (Baltic) States if she desired to O’4*.
Clearly, then, Eden was prepared to deal with other nations on the basis of the 
recognition of their mutual legitimate security interests. A fundamental change in his 
assessment of the Soviet Union did not occur until the Soviets started die Berlin blockade in 
June 1948. Eden believed it to be a complete break with the past Soviet conduct: ’if there ever 
was a time to stand firm, it is now; if ever there was a course in which to stand firm, it is 
this’49. But, more importantly in terms of his belief system, Eden believed that the Soviet 
Union was undermining international stability, firstly by seeking to undermine the authority 
of a State from within (Germany), and secondly ’bv a direct challenge to accepted international 
agreement’ (italics mine)*.
The Berlin blockade seems to mark a turning point in the structure of Eden’s belief 
system: no longer does he consider the political system of the opponent as irrelevant to the 
conduct of international relations: The Berlin blockade has shown that ’two opposing ways of 
life confront each other. Sometimes there is open conflict. Sometimes there is what is called 
cold wart. But the challenge is always there’. The Soviet Union has made the United Nations, 
which Eden originally judged to be the institution through which the three Great Powers of the 
Second World were going to prevent or curb new forms of aggression, unworkable by what
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he called ’Soviet abuse of the veto’31. The fact that the Soviet Union no longer respected the 
rules of international conduct, and its attitude towards the United Nations ’has strengthened 
the need for regional arrangements’ (presumably NATO or the 1948 regional defence treaty 
of Brussels)52.
In sum, Eden’s view of the Soviet Union are marked by a rather constructive nature 
until the events of the Berlin blockade: Eden believes that the Soviet Union will respect the 
rules of international conduct, as long as the West recognizes her security interests, and as 
long as the Soviet Union respects the West’s. The Berlin Blockade, to Eden a violation of an 
international agreement, is the dividing line. Eden’s subsequent definition of international 
relations as divided into two opposed camps, is a rather puzzling development, that cannot be 
accounted for by looking at his belief system, although he still refuses to see war as the 
inevitable outcome: negotiation from strength, ’the only basis which they understand’, might 
still bring the Soviets to their senses33.
3. The Middle East. It has already been shown that the Middle East and, especially 
the Suez Canal, was pivotal to Eden’s view of the world’s geopolitical configuration. In his 
view, the Middle East is the crucial connection between the United Kingdom and the largest 
part of the Commonwealth and Empire. I prefer not to deal with Eden’s attitude towards Egypt 
at this moment (I have dealt with them in chapter 7 in the section on the conclusion of a new 
Canal treaty with the Egyptian Government). Here I wish to note that those few public 
references that Eden makes to the Middle East, that do not stress the geopolitical importance 
of the area, show a remarkable assessment of the damaging role British interference with 
domestic politics in the Middle East could have on British influence in the area. At the same 
time, however, in private communications, Eden displays a much tougher attitude to the area 
whenever he feels that vital British interests are at stake.
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When in the Summer of 1945 the Persian Government asked the British and Soviet 
Government to withdraw their troops from their respective zones of influence*4, the British 
Government indicated its willingness to comply. Eden hailed Foreign Secretary Bevin’s 
decision, recognizing that ’the last thing we want is a recurrence of the practice of zones of 
influence and matters of that kind which there were in Persia long ago, and which made us so 
intensely unpopular in that country for a generation’53. A few months later, when the Soviet 
Union refused to withdraw her troops until a satisfactory settlement regarding joint Soviet- 
Persian oil well exploitation, and autonomy for Persian Azerbeidjan would have been reached, 
and indeed the first Cold War confrontation was near hand, Eden judged it bad policy to work 
out a deal with die Soviet Government that impose a government on Persia that would fit both 
the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union*: ’supposing we and the Russians did agree that 
one party was better than another, is it really our business to impose that party on Persia, and 
ought we to? 0  In the time of Edward Grey, in 1906, we tried to do that sort of thing. It was 
a terrible failure and we ourselves absolutely detested by every section of the Persian 
people’57.
It therefore seems that Eden was well aware of the negative consequences British 
interference with Middle Eastern regimes could have on British long term interests. This 
indeed, as has been shown, was one of the reasons why in the 1952-1954 period he wanted 
to conclude a treaty with Egypt, providing for the withdrawal of British troops from the Canal 
Zone: Eden thought it unrealistic to assume that Great Britain could simply impose its will on 
Egypt, and tried to convince die Churchill Government of this point. From this perspective, 
it is not unexpected that Eden’s public reaction both to Persian Prime Minister Mussadiq’s 
decision in April 1951 to nationalize British owned oil installations in his country, and to 
Egyptian pressure to renegotiate the 1936 Suez Canal Treaty with the United Kingdom, was 
firm, but not calling for military intervention: Eden thought the British should stay in Abadan 
and take the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague5*. Eden’s private
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utterances at the time, however, suggest a very different, much tougher attitude. Gifford, the 
American Ambassador in London, reports of a conversation with Eden over lunch in May 
1951.
’Eden told Morrison he felt oil sit[es] in other parts of [the] Near East w[ou]ld 
tend to degenerate if Iran won out which it might unless something 
constructive were done by [the] UK. Eden suggested that Uk sh[ou]ld use 
force [regarding the] Suez Canal issue by sending destroyers with tankers thru 
Suez Canal and insisting on oil being transported freely thru Canal. He seemed 
to believe that UK w[ou]ld get away with Egypt and that it would convince 
[the] N[ear] E[ast] area that UK meant business and w[ou]ld have salutary 
effect on Iran Q He was saying Q that the use of [a] big stick directly in Suez 
w[ou]ld be better than directly in Iran which might bring Soviets in from [the] 
North’*.
American Secretary of State Dean Acheson would not believe that Eden entertained 
such a hawkish opinion, but Ambassador Grifford replied to his chief that Eden had hinted at 
tougher policies in his Empire Day speech on 24 May 1951, communicating Eden’s lines on 
Iran and Egypt: ’giving away just international rights does not win peace. That is appeasement 
at its worst. We have been pushed around a little too much of late. That is bad for us and bad 
for other countries and it is bad for peace. For sometime past I have thought that we should 
call a halt to that process’*.
4. The United States. Eden’s attitude towards the United States can characterized by 
three dimensions: (1) A growing awareness since the mid-1930s that the preservation of British 
influence throughout the world is dependent on Anglo-American co-operation. (2) A growing 
awareness that the United Kingdom is economically strongly dependent on the United States 
after World War Two. (3) A growing awareness that the United States have a much different 
evaluation of the British Empire from Great Britain.
4.1 Anglo-American co-operation. In 1937 Eden (and the Imperial Staff) had 
recognized that Japanese aggression could not be handled by the United Kingdom alone, and 
that American naval support would be needed. Towards the end of that year Eden wished to 
draw the United States into closer co-operation with the United Kingdom in order to deal with 
Mussolini and Hitler, and welcomed a secret initiative by Roosevelt on the matter41. Eden,
* Foreign Relations of the United States 1951. Gifford to Secretary of State, 11 May 1951.
•  ibid.. Grifford to Washington, 25 May 1951.
41 Eventually, Chamberlain rejected Roosevelt’s proposal without consulting Eden; the true cause 
of Eden’s resignation in March 1938.
however, warned against the idea that United States would be willing to cooperate because the 
countries were so much alike: ’I think it is a mistake to attempt to base those relations mainly 
upon sentiment. Q I think it is also a mistake to try to base them on common origin, or 
common percentage, or even common language, because there will be occasions when we 
differ one from the other. But I think it is desirable to base them on their true foundation, 
which is a common interest in the maintenance of world peace and in preventing a repetition 
of these catastrophic conflicts every twenty years*62. It was obvious that after the Second 
World War, die United States had become the leading nation0 . Nevertheless, Eden was 
convinced that Britain was still a leading nation, thanks to its Empire. Unfortunately, exactly 
the Empire would be the cause of much misunderstanding.
4.2 Economic dependency. Towards the end of the war Eden realized that the United 
Kingdom would be economically dependent on the United States for a while. He accepted the 
necessity of American economic assistance, but remarked that this could reduce British 
prestige, as die United States would now take most credit for winning the war64. The solution 
to escape from complete dependency was, again, the Empire. Discussing Marshall aid in the 
House of Commons, Eden remarked that ’[w]e cannot become the permanent pensioners of 
the United States. We have a role of our own to play as die heart and centre of a great 
Empire’65. Preferential trading with Commonwealth nations and die Empire would furnish 
hard currency and guarantee the reconstruction of the British manufacturing industry. The 
Empire thus forms the pivot to Eden’s thinking after the Second World War: firsdy, is a major 
source of prestige which guarantees British Great Nation status; secondly, it is a crucial means 
of economic recovery. Unfortunately for Eden, the Empire was the source of much 
apprehension.
4.3 The place of the Commonwealth and Empire. During the war Eden grew more and 
more aware that the United States held a much different opinion on the Empire from the 
British. In general, Eden complained that the Americans did not understand, and did not take 
the trouble to understand, what, in British eyes, characterized the relationships between the
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nations of the Commonwealth. More in particular, Eden became weary that the Americans 
might develop an interest in one exclusively British sphere of influence, the Middle East.
Towards the end of 1942, Eden and Churchill did not understand why the Americans 
were complaining about the British (and Dutch) colonial Empires, while they had guaranteed 
the integrity of the French territories, ’which is more than we have done’. A report by 
Colonial Secretary Stanley, approved by Eden, suggested that much criticism was the result 
of ’complete ignorance regarding conditions in British colonial territories’46. In a 
memorandum on the American attitude towards colonialism, Eden judged that the difference 
in opinion was fundamental, and could not be changed by, for example, Indian independence; 
while the United Kingdom considered the Commonwealth as an international organization 
within which complete self-government was taken for granted, the United States considered 
it a technique of oppression. In Eden’s view, the Americans themselves disliked colonial rule 
for historical reasons, and had come to rely on different methods: ’as a great power [they] 
were in a position to press for such economic or political advantages as Q desired in a given 
area without assuming any responsibility for its administration’47.
During and after the war, Eden therefore tried to persuade the American Government, 
and the American public, that the Empire was something else than harsh colonial rule, ’a 
family of free nations: free to stay, free to go’, and that the world could learn from this 
example of peaceful coexistence68.
As to the British position in the Middle East during the Second World War, Eden felt 
that the Americans were trying to improve their position in the Middle East by capitalizing on 
their criticism of British imperialism: according to Eden, the Americans tried to increase their 
influence in Iran and Saudi Arabia at the expense of the UK. Moreover, he realized that after 
the war Great Britain would depend on die United States for the development of British oil 
resources in die Middle East69. This fear would return in the early 1950s when the Americans 
tried to force the British to reach an agreement with the Egyptian government on the Canal 
issue. Evelyn Shuckburgh, Eden’s private secretary between 1951 and 1954, noted that ’A .E.’s
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conviction is that all the Americans want to do is to replace the French and run Indo-China 
themselves. "They want to replace us in Egypt too. They want to run the world"’10.
8.4 The operational code and Anthony Eden’s true intentions
I have explained that I have incorporated two checks on the intentions that Eden might 
have had in making the utterances he made. Firstly, I tried to control for role variables by 
making a division in different periods during which Eden played different roles in the British 
political system. Secondly, I tried to get a better grasp of die actual meaning of Eden’s 
statements by making use of both public and private utterances, thus hoping to account for the 
possibility that he would be tailoring his choice of words to his audience.
8.4.1 Accounting for role variables.
Only on one issue, Eden’s attitude towards collective security, can it be said that Eden 
displayed clearly different opinions in different roles. It seems that his enthusiasm for a system 
of collective security, in which all members of die international community react, whenever 
one country commits an act that could be called a severe breach of international law, is clearly 
linked to his role as a Minister for League of Nations Affairs. Eden made his name as Great 
Britain’s representative at the League of Nations disarmament conference in the early 1930s, 
and became even more famous when appointed Minister of League of Nations Affairs. In this 
capacity he emphasizes in his speeches die obsolescence of the system of balance of power and 
the dangers of secret diplomacy, the classic themes of champions of collective security, 
because the. principle of balance of power could lead to both miscalculation and to 
misunderstanding and thus to war, as had happened in 1914. Eden considered the League’s 
decision, at his personal initiative, to install an international police force that would keep an 
eye on the plebiscite in die Saar-area in 1935, as an example of successful collective security 
through the League. Similarly, he insisted on sanctions through the League against Italy after 
the latter had invaded Abyssinia, and was the only Cabinet member in favour of an arms 
embargo.
Despite his enthusiasm for collective security, he gave priority to the interests of the 
United Kingdom: Eden was opposed to sanctions against Japan, because of its attack on 
Manchuria in 1934, because, given die absence of the United States and Soviet Union from 
die League of Nations, Great Britain could not deal with Japanese aggression on her own:
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’Britain and France were not capable of performing the role of an international police 
force’71. Eden thus was not willing to have British foreign policy determined by decisions 
made at the League in Geneva72. I have argued above that Eden’s willingness to impose 
collective security matters on Italy should be understood in terms of his belief system which 
stresses the crucial role of the Middle East and the observance of standards of international 
conduct.
However, after having become Foreign Secretary in December 1935, Eden no longer 
talks of collective security. Indeed, shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War he 
would claim that neither collective security nor balance of power politics are reasonable 
guidelines of foreign policy making.
What must be concluded from this change of belief which seems related to a change 
of political role? Given the fact that Britain’s vital interests remain dominant, the change is not 
disturbing for an analysis that makes use of an individual’s belief system. It points to the 
possibility, nevertheless, that Eden’s assessment of international organizations is not as positive 
as his speeches seem to suggest: he probably conceives of international organizations as 
platforms where the world’s major powers can work together on the basis of the recognition 
of their mutual security interests. That is how he expected the United Nations would develop: 
into a machinery that would prolong the war-time alliance between the Soviet Union, the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Eden considered the United Nations a failure, be it 
possibly temporary, when the Soviet Union used it right to veto so often. International 
cooperation is therefore first of all a product of reasonable nation-states; international 
organizations are vehicles for their interactions but no independent source of cooperation.
No other differences in beliefs occur that can be accounted for by a variation of Eden’s 
political roles. One might have expected a change of Eden’s opinions on foreign policy, once 
he returned to the opposition in 1945. But, consistent with his belief that it was a ’duty to keep 
foreign affairs out of political controversy’, he stuck to his master belief.
8.4.2 Public versus private utterances
No real contradictions between public and private statements appear in the sources that 
1 have consulted. Two troublesome considerations can be made, however: first, a much more 
precise description of what Eden considers Great Britain’s vital interests becomes much more
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evident in private than in public utterances, especially when documents from the Foreign 
Office are considered. It is obvious that he would not in public speak in flavour of handing 
over the Baltic states to the Soviet Union simply because it was much more in the long term 
interest of die United Kingdom to try and reach an understanding with the Soviet Union about 
general post-war arrangements. Second, Eden appears much more hawkish towards Egypt and 
Iran in 1945-1946 in private than in public. Even though he adjusted his attitude towards Egypt 
on the consideration that the Suez Canal base was no longer of strategic importance and that 
Great Britain could not afford to reoccupy Egypt, his exact opinion as to the use of force in 
international affairs remains unclear.
Insofar as no real contradictions have surfaced, we can for the time being assume that 
the cognitive belief system of Eden, as looked for with the help of the operational code, is 
reasonably accurate.
8.5 Implications for the analysis of the Suez crisis
The identification of Anthony Eden’s cognitive belief system should enable us to 
formulate some expectations about Eden’s handling of the Suez crisis. The operational code 
construct does not pretend to be able to give exact predictions as to a politician’s behaviour; 
rather, it sets boundaries on die range of possible interpretations of the nature of a crisis and 
of incoming information, the number of options available, and their respective evaluation13. 
The central hypothesis of an operational code analysis suggests that in times of political crises 
a politician will rely on his most fundamental beliefs, his master belief.
This implies, first of all, that, in the case of Sir Anthony Eden, the adherence to 
accepted standards of international conduct, taking account of nations’ legitimate national 
interests will be the most important consideration. It implies that Eden will not be influenced 
by the nature of the political regime of his opponent, but rather by the latter’s observance of 
certain agreements. It might thus provide a clue as to why the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company, rather than the Czech arms deal, or the sacking of Glubb Pasha by King Hussein, 
sparked off the crisis: possibly Eden considered this the final proof that Nasser did not respect 
international agreements. Similarly, it might give us a clue as to when the British Government
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decided to no longer consult the American Government on their policies on Suez. This decision 
refused to take SCUA seriously, in spite of his pledges.
Secondly, this respect for international norms is founded in a respect for mutual 
legitimate security interests. According to Eden, the Middle East was pivotal to the 
communication between the United Kingdom and the Empire. The Empire itself was crucial 
in determining British prestige in the world and in earning hard currencies that could help 
recovering the British economy. At the same time, Eden recognized that the United States 
played first fiddle and that the United Kingdom needed the United States in retaining its 
influence in the world. This suggests that the act of nationalization of the Suez Canal Company 
will be linked to its function as a line of communication of Commonwealth and Empire. 
Moreover, Eden will recognize the need to co-operate with the United States until the moment 
that he feels that the United States are not properly assessing the nature of the British interest 
involved, or that the United States is evaluating the situation in terms of English imperialism. 
Actually, during the Suez crisis the moment at which communication between the UK and the 
USA was severed, coincided with a tough speech by Dulles in which he accused the British 
and French governments of old fashioned imperialism.
Thirdly, Eden’s view of international organizations stresses the role they can play as 
long as the main powers of the international system co-operate on the basis of the recognition 
of their mutual legitimate security interests, and are prepared to use international organizations 
on the basis of some consensus of international stability. By 1949 Eden has reached the 
conclusion that, for the time being, the United Nations have made useless by Soviet vetoes. 
This suggests that in times of crisis Eden will be reluctant to take recourse to the United 
Nations.
The construction of Sir Anthony Eden’s operational code thus provides a set of lenses 
that will affect perception and appreciation of a situation in foreign affairs. It should now be 
ascertained to what extent it contributes to understanding British foreign policy making during 
the Suez crisis.
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Chapter 9: Interlude: Suez as a case study in crisis decision makin£
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9.1 Introduction
British decision making during the Suez crisis should be understood in terms of the 
perceptions and expectations of foreign policy makers. Chapter 7 has demonstrated how the 
general orientation of British foreign policy makers has been shaped by the Anglo-American 
security regime between 1951 and 1955. Chapter 8 has shown that Anthony Eden’s cognitive 
belief system is characterized by various elements that do not surface in the so-called attitudinal 
prism of British foreign policy makers. Both die attitudinal prism and Eden’s operational code 
have generated several expectations as to how British foreign policy makers, and Eden in 
particular, would approach the Suez crisis. This brings up the notion of an international crisis 
situation.
Explanations that rely on the role of cognitive beliefs partly depend on the assumption 
that in crisis situations decision making will take place on a higher level than usual, thus 
reducing the potential impact of bureaucratic politics. Moreover, the operational code construct 
suggests that in situations of crisis, individuals will rely on their most fundamental beliefs, that 
is, especially their master beliefs, in order to cope with the emotional stress that is generated. 
Furthermore, the likelihood that small group factors, such as groupthink, may come into play, 
is related to the presence of high stress that is generated by external threats. It is therefore 
important to discuss the relationship between international crisis and the occurrence of high 
stress and, subsequendy, to determine the exact period of the Suez crisis that will be relevant 
to an analysis of individual cognitive beliefs and small group processes. Section 9.2 will thus 
deal with the interconnection between international crisis and high stress. Next, section 9.3 will 
confine the exact period of die Suez crisis for this study. Finally, section 9.4 offers a 
description of the research strategy that is to be followed in an analysis of the British decision 
making process during the Suez crisis that focuses on individual cognitive beliefs and small 
group processes.
9.2 International crisis and high stress
9.2.1 The concept of international crisis
The use of the notion of international crisis has given rise to several conceptions of the 
phenomenon. First of all, a distinction can be made between an objectivistic and a 
subjectivistic approach: the former approach considers an international crisis to be a type of
situation that can be defined by the analyst from the outside. It thus refers to those 
international situations that can be argued to be a disruption of (pan of) the international 
system or a sudden change in one or more systemic variables. The latter approach thinks of 
international crisis as a situation which is perceived as such by decision makers themselves. 
It thus relates to real-world experiences of politicians in various countries1.
This study can be considered an objectivistic study of international crisis, to the extent 
that it tries to account for the behaviour of nation-states in a period which could be 
characterized as a disruption of the international system because of its change from a 
multipolar into a bipolar world. The period that is usually called the Suez crisis, is an 
important element of that period of change. Nevertheless, this study is also using the 
subjectivistic approach to international crises, because British decision making during the Suez 
crisis, and the role of individual and small group factors, is related to the perceptions of 
individual decision makers, and their impression of the occurrence of a crisis situations. It is 
to a subjectivistic definition of international crisis that we now turn.
Two elements are part of subjectivistic definitions of international crisis. The first 
element is the perception of a threat to one’s country’s important values2. Although various 
definitions are used, most authors agree that certain core values are perceived to be threatened, 
such as territorial integrity, economic survival, or a nation’s standing in the world3. The 
second element is the perception of a certain restriction in time that is available to reach a 
decision4. This element of time is difficult to confine in a clear manner. Sometimes, an
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1 See for the distinction between objectivistic and subjectivistic notions of international crises (or 
systemic and decision making notions, as they are respectively called as well), Charles F. Hermann, 
’International Crisis as a Situational Variable’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Relations and 
Foreign Policy. The Free Press, New York, 1969, pp. 411-416; Jonathan Roberts, Decision-Making 
during International Crises, pp. 14-15, 36-37.
2 Hermann has been the first to systematically theorize about the concept of international crisis. He 
originally spoke of a threat to ’high priority goals’ and of ’restricted amount of time available’, 
'International Crisis as a Situational Variable’, p. 414. Later, he would speak of ’high treat to im portant 
values’, Charles F. Hermann and Robert E. Mason, 'Identifying Behavioral Attributes of Events That 
Trigger International Crises’, in Ole R. Holsti, a.o. (eds.), Change in the International System. 
Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1980, p. 193. Brecher and Wilkenfeld prefer the term ’basic values’, 
Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 'Crises in World Politics’, World Politics. (34), 3, 1982, 
p. 382.
1 Cf. Roberts, rf«™» International Crises, pp. 51-56.
4 Hermann and Mason talk of a ’relatively short period of time (a few days at the most) for a 
decision before the situation evolves unfavorably’, Hermann and Mason ’Identifying Behavioral 
Attributes’, p. 193; Brecher and Wilkenfeld prefer the term ’finite time’, Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 
’Crises in World Politics’, p. 382; Cable emphasizes ’a sense of urgency’, James Cable 'The 
Identification of Crisis’, International Relations , (8), 2, 1984, p. 120.
external factor leaves no doubt as to a deadline to reach a decision, for instance, when an 
ultimatum has been issued. Usually, however, a deadline seems absent: indeed, by intuition 
at least, international crises often seem to last months rather than hours or days. Brecher and 
Wilkenfeld therefore argue that ’finite time’ would be a better definition5.
It should however be recognized that time restrictions in international crises are not 
always determined by the threatening situation: rather, time constraints are often self- 
imposed6, not only because decision makers feel they should reply within a brief space of 
time, but also because the very feeling of insecurity about the duration of the crisis contributes 
to the feeling that only a swift reply would be suitable. A definition of international crisis 
should therefore refer to perceived time constraints.
A third element of existing definitions of international crisis, perceived surprise7, is 
much disputed. Surprise may not be a necessary part of a definition of crisis at all*. In 
principle, however, it could be argued that an actor that is caught by surprise will be relatively 
unprepared. Such a situation might then affect the quality of the decision making process, 
resulting, for instance, in a frantic search for alternative courses of action.
Surprise may thus add to a policymaker’s perception of time constraints, but it implies 
that perception of time is the more important variable. Surprise may affect the start of a crisis, 
as well as the challenged actor’s initial handling of the situation, but it is not a necessary 
element of a definition of crisis9. Brecher has suggested that surprise be replaced with decision 
makers’ expectation that die involvement of military hostilities will be likely10.
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5 Brecher and Wilkenfeld, ’Crises in World Politics’, p. 382.
* During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the limited amount of time available may have seemed 
imposed on the Executive Committee by the fact that with a limited number of days these discovered 
missiles would become operational. But, as a matter of bet, this time perspective was self-imposed, 
because operational missiles were a threat only because of American decisionmakers’ idea that these 
medium range missiles were a threat to U.S. national security.
7 Surprise was part of Hermann’s original definition, ’International Crisis as a Situational Variable', 
p. 414.
1 Cf. Roberts, naciwna-Malrin« during International Crises, p. 75.
9 Hermann and Mason recognized this and left surprise out of Hermann’s original definition of 
international crisis.
10 Michael Brecher, Decision in Crisis: Israel. 1967 and 1973. University of California Press, 
Berkeley CA, 1980, p. 6. A similar solution is suggested by Lebow, who stresses policymakers’ 
perception that any actions on their part to counter the threat (apart from capitulation) will raise the 
prospect of war; Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 14-15.
If one adopts Brecher’s definition, it becomes possible to mark out the crisis period. 
The start of an international crisis is characterized by a sharp increase of a policy maker’s 
perception that, first, basic values are under threat, second, relatively little time is available 
to take decisions, and, third, military hostilities are highly probable. This definition makes it 
possible to clearly separate the start of the crisis period from the pre-crisis period. The latter 
is characterized by a specific event which triggers an increase in threat perception, but not in 
perceptions of restricted time or probable hostilities11. The end of a crisis is marked by a drop 
in the perceptions of all three elements.
9.2.2 The consequences of crisis for decision making
The occurrence of a crisis situation is bound to provoke emotional stress among 
decisionmakers. Threat perception is the necessary link between the crisis-triggering event and 
the arousal of stress, because the event incites the anticipation of harm. It is important to 
realize that threat perception entails both an emotional and a cognitive element. On the one 
hand, the feeling that one is in danger, the gut feeling, is inherent to it; on the other hand, 
threat perception is also a cognitive phenomenon, because it presumes that decisionmakers 
have learned to recognize what constitutes a threat in international politics12.
Basically, through the arousal of emotional stress a crisis situation has its bearing on, 
first, the structure of decision making and, second, the decision making process.
(1) Structure of decision making: the decision making process is likely to be
centralized. Key decisionmakers will be involved, very often in ad hoc groups. By
consequence, information will be processed at a higher level, resulting in a reduced likelihood 
that standard operation procedures will be adopted. The installation of small decision making 
units will reduce the impact of parochial interests, simply because less persons will be
involved. From this point of view, a higher quality of decision making can be expected13.
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11 Brecher, Decisions in Crisis, pp. 23-25. The end of the crisis-period is characterized by a sharp 
decline in the intensity of all three crisis elements. If the post-crisis period is characterized by the 
outbreak of war, it should be seen as a decline in the image of greater military capability vis-a-vis the 
enemy. This would make it difficult to define the start of the post crisis penod of Suez, when the United 
Kingdom’s principal enemy was United States diplomacy rather than the Egyptian army.
12 Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Criwu. The University of Wisconsin Press, 
1979, pp. 6-9, 80-81. Jervis shows how beliefs and motives direct policymakers’ threat perceptions, 
Robert Jervis, ’Perceiving and coping with threat’, in Robert Jervis a.o., Psychology and Deterrence. 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1985, pp. 18-27.
11 Ole R. Holsti and Alexander L. George, ’The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign 
Policy Makers’, in Cornelius P. Cotter, Political Science Annual. An International Review. Volume 6, 
Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1975, pp. 293-303.
(2) Decision making process: the reduced impact of organizational processes is 
compensated for, however, by die potentially increased influence of individual and small group 
variables. Experimental evidence shows that, although medium levels of emotional stress may 
actually be beneficial to an individual’s cognitive performance, high levels of stress tend to 
reduce the ability of both individuals and groups to process information accurately. Small 
decision making units can fall prey to groupthink. This may eventually result in defective 
decision-making14, leading to an emphasis on short-term considerations, the reliance on easy 
decision rules and ready historical analogies, as well as an tendency to stick with goals that 
were formulated at the outset of die crisis13.
In sum, a crisis can be defined as a situation that is characterized by a sharp increase 
in the perception (1) of a threat to basic values, (2) that relatively little time is available to take 
decisions, and (3) that military hostilities are probable. This increase arouses emotional stress, 
the level of which may even be aggravated if the crisis is provoked by an event that comes as 
a surprise. Emotional stress, in turn, affects the quality and outcome of the decision making 
process.
9.3 How to identify the Suez crisis
The start of the Suez crisis can be traced the evening of 26 July 19S6, when President 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in response to the Anglo-American decision to 
withdraw an offer to lend Egypt money to construct the Aswan high dam. It is sometimes 
suggested that the crisis found its origins in the Glubb affair of early 1956, when King Hussein 
of Jordan dismissed the British Commander of die Arab Legion, Sir John Glubb, allegedly at 
the instigation of Nasser. Some accounts suggest that die British Cabinet decided to stop to 
seek cooperation with the Egyptian leader. Moreover, an infuriated Eden, who had lost his 
temper in Parliament over the Glubb affair, is said to have decided to destroy Nasser16.
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14 Some examples of defective decision making include: discussion of only a small range of 
alternative courses of action; no thorough survey of objectives and values implicated by the choice of 
a course of action; lack of careful weighing of costs and benefits of its alternative; absence of a 
permanent search for information about all options; refusal to take new information seriously; no full 
review of all aspects of alternatives before taking a final decision; failure to make contingency plans. 
A full account of the quality of decision making can be found in Janis and Mann, Decision Making, pp. 
10-14.
15 Ole R. Holsti, Crisis. Escalation. War. McGill Queens U niversity Press, Montreal, and London, 
1972, pp. 14-23; Holsti and George, The Effects of Stress’, pp. 275-284.
“  Nutting. No End of a Lesson. The Story of Suez. Constable, 1967, pp. 17, 32-37.
However, the Glubb affair cannot be considered the start of the Suez crisis, because 
it contains only one aspect of the chosen crisis definition, that is, an increase in threat 
perception. No increase in the perception of time constraints or the likelihood of military 
hostilities can be observed: it is true that the Cabinet decided to change its Egyptian policies, 
but this was not conceived in terms of an immediate response. Rather, the British Government 
decided to intensify Anglo-American coordination of Middle East policy, based on the 
consensus that a tougher line towards Nasser would be likely at some stage. The withdrawal 
of the Aswan loan in July 1956 would be the main example of this tougher attitude. It is thus 
more appropriate to consider the Glubb affair as the start of the pre-crisis period17.
The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company counts as the start of the crisis period, 
because all three elements of definition seems present. Nasser’s move was perceived a serious 
threat to British interests and assets in the Middle East. Moreover, the British Cabinet 
perceived a limited amount of time available for a response, because a ’failure to hold the Suez 
Canal would lead inevitably to the loss one by one of all our interests and assets in the Middle 
East’. Third, it was recognized that the Suez Canal might be held only by the threat with, and 
even use of, force". The sense of crisis may have been aggravated by the considerable 
surprise of British policymakers at Nasser’s move. Given the purpose of this study to solve 
the ’puzzle of Suez’, the crisis entered its post-crisis phase with the Cabinet’s decision of 6 
November to accept the United Nations resolution that called for a cease-fire19. It ended with 
the Cabinet’s agreement on 3 December to withdraw British troops in order to obtain American 
financial assistance20. The Suez crisis is thus defined as the period between 26 July and 6 
November 1956.
This confinement is of considerable methodological importance, because a crisis period 
is expected to be characterized by a sharp increase in the level of emotional stress, which may 
in turn influence the quality and outcome of the decision making process. On the empirical
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17 Appendix 2 offers a detailed analysis of the question whether the Glubb affair constituted the start 
of the Suez crisis.
“ CAB 128/30, CM(56)54, 27 July 1956.
19 It could be argued that after the cease-fire a crisis of different nature had to be faced, that is, the 
defence of gt«rling in face of American opposition to British and French reluctance to withdraw from
the area they had occupied on 5-6 November 1956, and the guarantee of oil supply after the subsequent 
closure of the Suez Canal.
» Kyle, Suez, pp. 510-514.
level, however, it is extremely complicated to tell symptoms of perceptions of crisis from 
symptoms of emotional stress.
9.4 The interrelationship between crisis, stress and decision making
In practice, it is very difficult to separate symptoms of crisis and stress. The literature 
on cognitive psychology shows that time pressure does indeed generate emotional stress, but 
it is equally true that aroused stress itself causes a sense of time constraints21. It may thus 
happen that the marking out of a crisis situation, by looking for perceptions of time pressure, 
involves the use of indicators are themselves a product rather than a generator of stress. 
Possibly, this problem may be pragmatically solved if one wants to confine a crisis period. It 
returns in a more dangerous fashion, once one starts looking for a relationship between an 
increase in levels of emotional stress and the decision making process. Very often, changes in 
die decision making process, or judgments about its quality are presented as evidence of high 
levels of stress. Theoretically, however, high stress is supposed to affect the decision making 
process22.
Ideally, stress generated by perceptions of crisis should be measured independently 
from the consequences it may have on the decision making process. Two solutions to this 
problem have been suggested. One solution would be to try to measure to what extent policy 
makers suffer from high stress. Next, these data should be confronted with, on the one hand, 
data on perceptions of threat and time pressure, and, on the other hand, symptoms of defective 
decision making. This solution has been proposed by Margaret Hermann23, who developed 
several verbal and non-verbal indicators of the presence of aroused stress among 
decisionmakers: she suggests to look for evidence of flustered speech, increased speech tempo, 
body tension, irritability, signs of distress on the individual’s face, hyper-vigilance3*, and 
changes in die quality of the individual’s voice. Lots of problems are involved, however, in
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21 Holsti, Crisis. Escalation. War, pp. 14-15; Holsti and George, ’The Effects of Stress', p. 280.
22 This problem is worrying Shlaim in his application of the Brecher-model to the 1948-1949 Berlin 
Blockade crisis: he warns against the danger of falling into the trap of using the presence of indications 
of defective decisionmaking as proof of the presence of high stress. However, a resolution for the 
problem of collinearity of stress and time constraints, cannot be easily offered, Shlaim, The United 
States and the Berlin Blockade. 1948-1949. pp. 402-405.
s  Margaret C. Hermann, ’Indicators of Stress in Policymakers During Foreign Policy Crises’, 
Political Psychology. (1), 1, 1979, pp. 29-34.
24 The original term is ’vigilance’ instead of hyper-vigilance, but the indicators (increased eye- 
contact and postural rigidity) refer to the category which Janis and Mann have coined hyper-vigilance.
the use of verbal and nonverbal indicators25, the most important one being the fact that most 
data on the indicators mentioned are derived from public statements of foreign policymakers. 
During international crises these are often held when decisionmakers have already made up 
their minds about the nature of the threat, and often have already taken a decision. Very 
crucial elements of an analysis of decision making are thus unlikely to be captured. It becomes 
thus difficult to relate indicators of high stress to the decision making process itself.
A second remedy would be to measure to existence of a crisis situation in an indirect 
manner. One example is Holsti’s study of the outbreak of the First World War. Holsti suggests 
to use, on the one hand, the level and intensity of communications between actors in a crisis 
and, on the other hand, the actors* perception of international hostility26. He found that in a 
situation of increasing stress, actors tended to perceive their range of alternatives to be 
shrinking and those of their opponents to be expanding. They thus perceived themselves to be 
reacting to their opponent’s behaviour as if under conditions of necessity, while they perceived 
their opponent to have alternative courses of action which might avoid further escalation27. 
Holsti’s analysis suggests that changes in intensity of communications can serve as an indirect 
indicator of levels of crisis and stress, which can then be related to the decision making 
process. It may thus be possible to separate the measurement of stress from the measurement 
of its consequences.
As a matter of fact, the intensity of communications between actors during the Suez 
crisis has been a subject of study. Edward Azar conducted a quantitative study of hostile 
signals between Egypt and the United Kingdom28. Employing data from the so-called Conflict 
and Peace Data Bank, he coded 169 signals about Egypt that were communicated by the United 
Kingdom between July 26, 1956 and January 11, 195729, making use of a 13-points scale 
with categories ranging from very friendly to very hostile. In terms of Holsti’s suggestion, 
these utterances of hostility could serve as evidence of variations in levels of stress. 
Unfortunately, if one compares the level of hostility with evidence from primary sources about
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25 Cohen even claims that these indications cannot be taken to be sufficient evidence of high stress, 
Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis, p. 20.
26 Holsti, Crists. Escalation. War, pp. 27-49.
27 This is called the Fundamental Attribution Error; Holsti, ibid.. pp. 143-168.
* Edward E. Azar, ’Conflict Escalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez, 
1956’, Journal of Conflict Resolution. (16), 2, 1972, pp. 183-201.
29 The day when all occupying forces had withdrawn or were about to withdraw from Egypt. This 
study deals with the Suez crisis until the day of the cease-fire, 6 November 19S6.
what seem to have been crucial decision moments, then it must be noted that these hardly 
coincide with an increase in hostility: for instance, no hostile signals were sent from Britain 
to Egypt between 15 and 25 August: at first sight, this seems relatively easy to explain 
because, in that period, a diplomatic solution was sought at the first London Conference. 
However, primary sources show that the British Cabinet was facing a pressing dilemma 
towards 23 and 24 August, insecure whether it would be justified to go to war after a possibly 
unsatisfactory outcome of the Conference, and decided to temporarily play down its hostile 
attitude towards Egypt for the sake of domestic and international public opinion.
A second, even more awkward, puzzle is presented by the period between 14 and 23 
October: no hostility signals are coded for this period, although in those days, with the visit 
of General Maurice Challe to Eden at Chequers and meetings of the inner circle of the British 
Cabinet, the foundations were laid for Israeli involvement in an Anglo-French policing 
operation30. Indirect indicators of crisis and stress may therefore turn out to be less an 
indicator of die arousal of stress among decision makers than the, even deliberate, product of 
foreign policy choices.
How then can it be demonstrated that British decision makers suffered from high 
emotional stress during the Suez crisis? Janis and Mann advance the thesis that so-called 
decisional conflicts are an important source of stress. These decisions contain the high risk of 
suffering serious losses, no matter which course of action is selected, as perceived by the 
decisionmaker31. The adoption of the concept of decisional conflict should enable us to 
identify the most important decisions that were taken during the Suez crisis. These decisions 
will be defined as those situations that produced the perception of a serious dilemma, that is, 
a choice between alternatives each of which would entail important losses.
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30 Cf. Azar, ’Conflict Ecalation and Conflict Reduction in an International Crisis: Suez, 1956’, p. 
191, table 3, and p. 192, figure 1.
31 Janis and Mann, TWirinn Making, pp. 45-52. Janis and Mann call these decisional conflicts ’hot 
cognitions’; decisionmakers show hesitation, vacillation, feelings of uncertainty and signs of acute 
emotional stress, as well as feelings of apprebensiveness, a desire to escape from the dilemma, and self­
blame for having manoeuvred oneself into such a situation, ibid.. pp. 46-47. These ’hot cognitions' 
differ from ’cold cognitions’ in that they do not involve routine decision making.
9.S Decisional conflicts in the United Kingdom during Suez
I suggest to subdivide the decision making process in the United Kingdom during the 
Suez crisis into six decisional conflicts. Because of its nature, each decisional conflict is 
assumed to arouse emotional stress with British policymakers. Individual and group variables 
are thus expected to have had an important influence on the decision making process.
Decision 1 (26 July-2 August). British policymakers were faced with the dilemma of 
how to respond vigorously to the Egyptian challenge of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company 
without alienating the United States and endangering Britain’s long term interests in the Middle 
East. An immediate military attack was considered, either with airborne troops or with 
bombardments; another important plan involved an invasion of Egypt by British troops in 
eastern Libya. On 2 August it was agreed to call for a Conference of the original signatories 
of the 1888 Constantinople Conference that had established the international character of the 
Suez Canal Company.
Decision 2 (2 August-22 August, 2 A.M.). The dilemma facing British policymakers 
was to determine what would be a satisfactory outcome of the London Conference. Could they 
accept an outcome that would not declare them outright winners? In the early morning of 22 
August, at the request of Eden, Dulles, and Lloyd, the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert 
Menzies, accepted to head a delegation to Egypt.
Decision 3 (2 August, 2 A .M .-ll September). British policymakers had to respond to 
the possible failure of Menzies’s mission. Should they refer the matter to United Nations, 
despite American reluctance to such a move; or should they agree to Dulles’s proposal for a 
Users’ Conference? On 11 September the British Cabinet accepted the S.C.U.A. proposal; that 
same day the Suez Canal Company recalled its pilots from Egypt.
Decision 4 (19 September-23 September). British policymakers had to find a response 
to a possibly unsatisfactory outcome of the S.C.U.A. Conference. On 23 September the British 
Government decided to refer their case to the Security Council of the United Nations, despite 
American opposition.
Decision 5 (23 September-25 October). British policymakers were facing three 
dangerous developments. First, a possibly unsatisfactory outcome of negotiations between 
France, Egypt and the United Kingdom at the United Nations; second, the Winter Plan 
presented by the Chiefs of Staff which called off any military operation before Spring 1957 
and thus weakened British leverage on Egypt; third, the likelihood that the United States would 
not be prepared to use S.C.U.A. as a tool of putting Nasser under pressure. On 24 October
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the British Cabinet accepted to intervene in the event of an Israeli attack on Egypt that 
threatened the flow of traffic in the Suez Canal.
Decision 6 (25 October-4 November). British decision makers had to face mounting 
pressure of international public opinion calling for a cease-fire, especially at the General 
Assembley of the United Nations, including the United States. Moreover, Israel (temporarily) 
complied with the British-French ultimatum to stay away from the Suez Canal, thus depriving 
the United Kingdom and France of their pretext to occupy the Canal Zone. To stop the 
operations would imply die abandonment of one of its principal goals, the toppling of Nasser. 
On 4 November, the Cabinet decided to go on with the operations, and, as a matter of fact, 
to drop airborne troops one day earlier than planned.
The actual analysis of the decision making process in chapters 10-17 will follow this 
subdivision of the crisis period into 6 decisional conflicts. It will be a practical tool for both 
the assessment the role of the various independent and constraining variables, and the 
observation of changes in the structure of decision making and quality of the decision making 
process.
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PART IV: BRITISH DECISION MAKING DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Introduction to Part IV
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Part IV will assess the role of two independent variables, individual cognitive beliefs 
and groupthink, and two constraining variables, the organizational context and considerations 
of domestic politics, on the decision making process in the United Kingdom during the Suez 
crisis. This will take three steps. First, chapters 10-15 present six decisional conflicts during 
the crisis. Their aim is to reconstruct the structure of the decision making process, identifying, 
where possible, formal and informal meetings as well as their participants. Second, they mark 
out the possible operation of each variable. Their third purpose is to make the reader familiar 
with the historical development of the Suez crisis.
The next step is an assessment in chapter 16 of the relative weight of each variable on 
the outcome of each decisional conflict. Moreover, given the considerable influence of 
groupthink, attention is paid to the presence of antecedent conditions of groupthink. A final 
step is made in chapter 17, when the question will be answered whether cognitive beliefs 
contribute to solving the puzzle of Suez.
Analyses of crisis decision making suggest that, once a crisis starts, decision making 
shifts to a higher level. Often, ad hoc bodies are formed to handle the new, threatening 
situation. As a matter of fact, after Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, the British 
Cabinet appointed a special emergency committee in order to deal with this crisis. This 
committee became subsequently known as the Egypt Committee1. It is tempting to consider 
this group as the most important decision making unit2, and, because of its small size and 
relative insulation from the Government, a most likely candidate for groupthink. The 
reconstruction of the decision making process in chapters 10 through 15, however, makes it 
clear that the unit of decision making differs at each decisional conflict. At least three different
1 The Egypt Committee was the second of its kind since World War Two: in 1951 Prime Minister 
Attlee had set up a similar emergency committee in order to deal with the Abadan crisis, Colin 
Seymour-Ure, ’British 'War Cabinets* in Limited Wars: Korea, Suez, and the Falklands’, Public 
Administration. (62), 1984, pp. 185-186.
2 R.A. Butler, Lord Privy Seal at the time of Suez, suggested afterwards that the appointment of 
the Egypt Committee had been used by Eden to reduce the importance of the Cabinet. According to 
Butler, the Egypt Committee was sot set up by the Cabinet; ’it was the Prime Minister who set up a 
Cabinet committee Q; the Cabinet would probably not have agreed to set up such a committee. The 
Prime Minister of die day thought these matters in the Suez were best handled by a Suez committee of 
the Cabinet, and that was a representative body Q which met regularly to discuss what is called the Suez 
crisis. The Cabinet came very little into the Suez crisis until towards the end’; ’Reflection on Cabinet 
Government’, Lord Butler interviewed by Norman Hunt (Reprinted from The Listener. 16 September 
1965, pp. 407-411), in Valentine Herman and James E. Alt (eds.), Cabinet Studies: A Reader. 
Macmilliui, London, 1975, p. 202.
units of decision making should therefore be distinguished: first, the full Cabinet, second, the 
Egypt Committee, and third, an inner group of senior ministers who regularly hold informal 
meetings.
Finally, sometimes reference will be made to the so-called Defence (Transition) 
Committee, that was re-activated on 28 July 1956. It consisted of all Permanent Under 
Secretaries within the Government and was chaired by the Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir 
Norman Brook3. This committee dealt with the organization of various non-military aspects 
of the decisions that were taken by the Egypt Committee, such as the civil administration of 
Egyptian territory that might have to be occupied in the event of military action.
Chapters 10-15, each dealing with one decisional conflict, will present an overview of 
the structure of day-to-day decision making during the crisis. Much effort has been put into 
the reconstruction of the chronology of informal meetings of senior ministers. This 
reconstruction is based on the close reading of the archives at die Public Record Office, and 
of memoirs and diaries of participants of the Suez crisis. To that end, the personal diary of 
engagements of Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd4 and William Clark’s ’Whitehall diary’5, 
have been especially valuable sources of information. Although such a reconstruction can only 
be partial, it should nevertheless be attempted if the weight of an inner group of ministers is 
to be appreciated.
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1 William Clark, ’Whitehall Diary’, entry 1 August 1956, p. 104, William Clark Papers, Bodleian 
Library, Oxford.
4 FO 800/713-717, Public Record Office, Kew.
5 See footnote 3.
Chapter 10: Decision 1: diplomacy instead of immediate attack
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10.1 Introduction
In the morning of 30 July 1956 the Egypt Committee decided to hold a diplomatic 
conference as a response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company four days 
earlier. On 1 August this decision was confirmed by die Cabinet. It was also agreed to invite 
those states that had signed the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which had established the 
Suez Canal as an international waterway. The Egypt Committee’s choice in favour of 
diplomatic response raises the question why a conference was preferred to a military 
confrontation. This chapter will formulate an answer to that question in three steps. First, the 
structure of decision making will be reconstructed in order to assess to what extent various 
decision making units have played a role (section 10.2). Next, the terms are examined in which 
British policymakers originally formulated the problem, and how this influenced their 
assessment of various courses of action (section 10.3). Third, it will be shown to what the four 
independent and constraining variables can be said to have played a role in the decision to hold 
a diplomatic conference (section 10.4).
10.2 The structure of decision making
A first Step towards understanding die decision to prefer diplomacy over military 
action, it is important to reconstruct the decision making process. The relevant decision period 
stretches from the evening of 26 July, which was the moment the British Government learned 
of Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, until the Cabinet meeting of 1 August 
at 7.20 P.M.. The following chart gives a picture of the structure of the decision making 
process.
C hart 10.1: Décision making structure of décision 1
26 July 10.30 PM-4AM Informai meeting (Eden, Salisbury, Home, Lloyd,
Kilmuir, Caccia, Chauvel, Piquot, Foster, 
Mountbatten, Templer).
27 July before 11 AM Eden telephones Macmillan
11 AM House of Commons statement
11.10 AM Cabinet (Cab)
5 PM Defence (Transition) Committee (DTC)
6.30 PM Eden and Lloyd meet Commonwealth ministers
7 PM Egypt Committee (EC)
28 July 10.30 AM-lunch EC
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30 July 10.30 AM EC
lunch lunch Eden, Lloyd, Macmillan, Pineau, Murphy
17.45 PM EC
dinner dinner Murphy, Macmillan, Foster, Lord Alexander
31 July 9.45 AM Meeting Eden, Watkinson, Head, Brook, CIGS, QMG
’morning’ Lloyd meets the 1922 Committee of Backbenchers of 
Conservative Party
’lunch’ lunch with Eden, Murphy, Lloyd, Salisbury, 
Macmillan, ’and three Americans’
3.30 PM EC
5.30 PM DTC
10.00 PM EC
1 Aug ’morning’ Home meets Commonwealth ministers
12 noon EC
’afternoon’ Macmillan, Dulles, Murphy, Aldrich
7.20 PM Cabinet
A first glance at chart 1 allows for four observations: first, the full Cabinet is only 
sparsely involved. It convenes at the beginning (27 July) and at the end (1 August), but does 
not meet in between. Moreover, its very first meeting is preceded by an informal meeting at 
10, Downing Street, which lasted more than 5 hours. Second, decision making seems 
dominated by meetings of the Egypt Committee. Third, although in this record of meetings the 
formal tripartite conversations between the representatives of France, Great Britain, and the 
United States are not shown, it appears that, starting from 30 July, they are parallelled by 
meetings between American and British officials alone1, thus giving testimony of the 
uneasiness that both Americans and British felt about co-operation with the French2, and 
possibly of the traditional British view of privileged co-operation with the Americans. Fourth, 
Eden’s phonecall to Macmillan in the morning of 27 July shows Macmillan’s weight within 
the Government. During the phonecall Eden and Macmillan discussed the phrasing of the short
1 The first tripartite meeting, with Lloyd, Pineau, and Murphy present, was early on Sunday 29 July 
1956, while Eden was nuking a speech in Wiltshire; Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 56; talks were 
resumed in the morning of 30 July. An informal lunch followed the 10.30 EC meeting. Next morning’s 
tripartite nw»iing was followed by a lunch at which Eden, Murphy, Salisbury, Macmillan, Lloyd ’and 
three Americans’ were present; Murphy- Diplomat among Warriors, p. 381.
2 British reluctance to cooperation with France is briefly analyzed by Adamthwaite; Anthony 
Adamthwaite, ’La France pendant la crise de Suez vue par la Grande-Bretagne’, Relations 
Internationales, no. 58, Summer 1989, pp. 187-194, esp. 189-193.
statement that Eden would pronounce at the House of Commons that morning at 113. Even 
allowing for Butler’s illness at the time, it seems strange that Eden did not consult him, and 
that he did not include Butler among the original members of the Egypt Committee4. More 
evidence of Macmillan’s influence comes from his presence, and Butler’s absence5, at 
informal meetings with Pineau, Murphy and Dulles. But, much more importantly, Macmillan 
was consulted by Eden about the contents of the letter that would be sent to President 
Eisenhower, following the Cabinet meeting of 27 July6. These four considerations should be 
taken into account in an analysis of the decision making process around decision 1.
10.3 The definition of the problem
The original definition of the problem is of crucial importance: it constrains discussion 
and decisions in subsequent meetings. In the case of Suez, it should be determined what 
meeting has set the boundaries of the problem: the informal meeting on 26 July, the first 
Cabinet meeting next morning, or the first meeting of the Egypt Committee. The records, 
however, do not allow a definite answer.
No full account exists of die first informal meeting after the news of the nationalization 
broke through. Eden is said to have declared Nasser’s behaviour an act of aggression to which 
he wished to respond forcefully and immediately. The Chiefs of Staffs present (Mountbatten 
[Navy], Dickson [RAF], Templer [Imperial Staff]) reckoned that the United Kingdom’s 
military forces were not prepared for this type of crisis7. Indeed, in the Commons next 
morning Eden made a very cautious statement, talking about rights and interests affected, and 
about consultations between Governments concerned, avoiding the question of force*. At the
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3 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm. 1956-1959. Macmillan, London, etc., 1971, p. 101, diary 
entry 27 July 1956. The first version of tbe statement had been formulated the night before by the 
Cabinet members present at the dinner in the honour of tbe King of Iraq.
4 Thomas claims that this was considered as a victory of Macmillan who was competing with Butler 
for being second-in-command, The Suez Affair, pp. 49-50.
5 Despite his recovery on 30 July.
* Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 101.
7 Leonard Mosley, Dulles, quoted by James, Anthony Eden, p. 454; cf. Kyle, Suez, pp. 136-137. 
Kyle suggests that Eden dominated this meeting, quoting Clark; Clark’s original diary, however, does 
not allow for that conclusion; cf. footnote 8.
1 James quotes William Clark as having confirmed the ’complete accuracy of [Mosley’s] quotation’, 
Anthony Eden, p. 454, footnote *; Clark’s original diary, however, reads: ’Then I went down to No.
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first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 27 July at 9.15 A.M. Mountbatten reported that 
’Ministers had already given consideration to the attitude the U.K. should adopt in the situation 
and had decided that until the views of other interested powers had been obtained no action 
should be taken which could be construed as threatening Egypt’9. British decision makers thus 
did not want to strike immediately, even if such a coup de main were possible given the doubts 
Mountbatten, Boyle, and Tempier had presumably pronounced.
The Cabinet’s meeting of 27 July was affected by the way its chairman, Eden, handled 
the discussion. Eden opened the meeting by giving an account of his meeting with the French 
and American representatives the night before: ’he had told them that Her Majesty’s 
Government would take a most serious view of this situation and that any failure on the part 
of the Western Powers to take the necessary steps to regain control over the Canal would have 
disastrous consequences for the economic life of the Western Powers and for their standing and 
influence in die Middle East’10. He thus presented the Cabinet with some sort of fait 
accompli: by ’informing’ France and the United States of ’Her Majesty’s Government’s’ view 
of the situation, he attached importance to the crisis and imposed a sense of urgency on 
Cabinet members. It should be emphasized, however, that he did not suggest the military 
option; the minutes read: ’The Cabinet should now consider what courses of action were open 
to us to safeguard our interests’.
What followed was a discussion of data on die economic importance of the Canal and 
of legal aspects of the problem; not until then did one discuss the factors related to the military 
option. Experts gave their view on each of these sides of the problem: Minister of Fuel and 
Power Jones (not a Cabinet member) had been invited to spell out some of the consequences 
of Egypt’s move; the legal advisors of the Foreign Office had prepared a memo on 
considerations of international law; finally, and the Chiefs of Staff had been invited to discuss 
the military option.
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10 about 10.30 (PM) and met the King of Iraq just leaving (-). From then till 4 AM it was frantic. (-) 
It was badly organized, said Guy, with French and Americans listening while we discussed how and 
whether to take military action. All that emerged was a dullest statement for use in the House at 11 this 
morning’, Clark ’Whitehall Diary’, Bodleian Library, Oxford, p. 101, entry 26/27 July 1956. It seems 
thus more likely that Clark was not present at all and received his information from Guy Millard, Eden’s 
Private Secretary.
* COS(56)73, DEFE 4/89, 27 July 1956.
10 Quotes from the 27 July Cabinet meeting can be found in CAB 128/30, CM(56)54.
Eden intervened only afterwards by saying that ’against this background the Cabinet 
must decide what our policy must be’. He led the Cabinet into formulating its objective: the 
Canal should be placed under international control; next, he invited the Cabinet to face the 
fundamental question ’whether they were prepared in the last resort to pursue their objective 
by the threat or even the use of force, and whether they were ready, in default of assistance 
from the United States and France, to take military action alone*. The Cabinet agreed to this, 
taking into consideration that ’failure to hold the Suez Canal would lead inevitably to the loss 
one by one of all our interests and assets in the Middle East and, even if we had to act alone, 
we could not stop short of using force to protect our position if all other means of protecting 
it proved unavailing...’.
These considerations reveal three important matters: first, British prestige in the area 
was perceived to be at stake rather than British lines of supply. Nationalization was thus 
considered a threat to long-term British interests in the Middle East. Second, Cabinet members 
sensed that die amount of time to respond was limited: failure to react to this slap in the face, 
would have a disastrous effect on British standing elsewhere. Third, the agreement in principle 
to the use of force, even without assistance from the United States and France, reveals the 
prevailing assumption that, in that event, no opposition from the United States was expected, 
but, at least, tacit support. Given the presence of threat perception, perceived time constraints, 
and the possibility of hostilities, the nationalization crisis thus fits the criteria of international 
crisis. It could be added that a sense of surprise must have added to the feeling that a major 
crisis had started: it seems almost certain that after the decision to withdraw die offer of a loan 
for die construction of die Aswan high dam, no one in the American11 nor the British12 
Governments anticipated Egyptian retaliation in the form of the nationalization the Suez Canal 
Company11. An intelligence brief from the State Department on ’the political significance of
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11 Cf. Dougherty, ’The Aswan Dam io Perspective’, p. 38.
12 In their memoirs, Butler and Kilmuir explicitly deny such anticipation. Butler, The Art of the 
Possible, p. 186; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 267.
13 Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal Company in response to the withdrawal of the Anglo- 
American offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam, in cooperation with the World 
Bank. At the time, December 1955, the offer was seen as a means of keeping Egypt out of the Soviet 
Union’s orbit. Doubts about their policy were evident during the Anglo-American talks in Washington 
late January and early February 1956: Egypt’s apparent success in obtaining arms (from the East) and 
aid (from the West) had created problems with the other members of the Baghdad Pact. Eden and Lloyd 
stressed that their vital oil interests depended on the regimes in the area, that these were undermined 
by Egypt’s policies. American protectionist lobbies were pressing die Senate not to agree to the Aswan 
loan, Dulles was getting impatient with Nasser’s foreign policies towards Syria and Communist China.
(continued...)
the High Aswan Dam in Egypt*, sent to the British Foreign Office on the day Dulles told 
Egyptian Ambassador Hussein that the offer was off, did not mention any such move14.
The records of the official Cabinet Suez Canal Committee of the period preceding the 
nationalization do not show that such an act was expected, although at a very early stage, in 
April 1955, when Egypt was looking for possible creditors for the Aswan project, it was noted 
that ’rumours have been prevalent in Cairo that die Government might try to lay their hands 
on the resources on the reserves of the Company to help them to finance the building of the 
High Aswan Dam’. And still earlier, Eden had been warned that after the imminent British 
withdrawal from the Suez Base in 1954, the Suez Canal would be Egypt’s next objective1*.
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10.4 Indicators of independent variables
In the morning of 30 July the Chiefs of Staff told the members of the Egypt Committee that 
immediate military action would be risky because it could not be guaranteed that the troops 
who had to quickly occupy the Canal Zone would hold out until the arrival of reinforcements. 
At that same meeting the committee agreed to organize a conference of those maritime nations 
that had an important interest in the canal. To what extent can one say that the first decision, 
not to take immediate military action, but to arrange a diplomatic conference first, was affected 
by the four independent and constraining variables that have been distinguished?
I3(...continued)
In early May 1956 Dulles and Lloyd had privately agreed that the loan offer should ’wither on the line’. 
However, on 18 July 1956, following Egypt’s recognition of Communist China, and in the context of 
Congressional opposition, the USA decided to formally withdraw the loan offer, which was 
communicated to Egyptian Ambassador Hussein the next day; Aronson, From Sideshow to Center Stage, 
pp. 154-182. This move was regretted by the British Government, that had agreed to withdrawing the 
offer some 5 days earlier, but had not expected such an abrupt announcement; Shuckburgh mentions in 
his diary that this decision had been taken within Whitehall around 20 June; Descent to Suez, p. 356, 
entry 20 June 1956.
14 Actually, it was estimated that Egypt would remain neutral despite a Russian offer to construct 
the Dam; ’State Department Intelligence Brief No. 1969. "The Political Significance of the High Aswan 
Dam in Egypt*’, 19 July 1956, FO 371/118853, Public Record Office. Kew.
13 CAB 134/803, quote from CSC(55)3, 21 April 1955. In a meeting with Lord Hankey, member 
of the board of the Suez f^nal Company, Hankey expressed his view ’that tbe Egyptian Government 
would sooner or later want to take over the Suez Canal. For that reason, [Hankey] deprecated the total 
withdrawal of British forces from the Canal Zone [-]. I [Eden]: explained to him the insuperable reasons 
to any such plan Q He repeated his fear that when British troops had left the zone, die Suez Canal would 
be the next Egyptian objective’, Record of a conversation between Eden and Hankey, FO 800/775, 
Eg/54/37, 23 March 1954.
1. The operational code and directive leadership. Eden’s cognitive belief system 
provides an important clue to understanding why the Cabinet decided to respond vigorously 
and immediately to Egypt’s act of nationalization instead of adopting a more conciliatory policy 
first. After all, the Cabinet had recognized that from a narrow international legal point of view 
’this amounted to no more than a decision to buy out the shareholders’. Why did British 
policymakers define the problem as an Egyptian threat to British interests throughout the 
Middle East? The minutes reflect considerations that can best be understood in terms of Eden’s 
operational code: Egypt’s recent behaviour gave no confidence that they would recognize their 
international obligations in respecting and running die Canal as an important international 
facility16. This suggests that Nasser had passed an important threshold within Eden’s belief 
system: he could no longer be considered someone who respects the rules of international 
conduct based on the mutual recognition of respective national interests. In his memoirs, Eden 
writes that in the many messages he despatched that day he wrote that ’a man with Colonel 
Nasser’s record could not be allowed "to have his thumb on our windpipe”’(emphasis 
mine)17. This is consistent with Eden’s operational code11.
This interpretation is reinforced by Eden’s directive leadership at the beginning of the 
Cabinet meeting of 27 July, when the definition of the problem was narrowed down. However, 
it would be wrong to conclude that he imposed his will on the Cabinet completely: after the 
initial presentation of the problem, he allowed for a relatively free discussion of the courses 
that were open to the Cabinet, after having asked for the opinions of three experts on 
economic, legal and military aspects of the problem19. As a matter of fact, three alternative 
courses of action were discussed: (1) to refer the matter to the United Nations’ Security 
Council, (2) to take economic measures only against Egypt, (3) to put economic pressure on 
Egypt and at the same time threaten with the use of force. This means that at least one option 
was not even considered, that is, to do nothing, or just to issue a strong diplomatic protest. 
As noted above, Eden had made this impossible by opening the meeting with his statement that
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w Cab 128/30, CM(65)54, 27 July 1956.
17 Eden, Full Cirelc. pp. 425-426.
'* James comes close to this interpretation when he observes that ’Q in Eden’s eyes, what Nasser 
had done was a callous betrayal of his solemn pledges and agreements, which was despicable in itself, 
and he was clearly a man without integrity or reason’, Anthony Eden, p. 457.
19 Minister Jones of Fuel and Power on the economic importance of the Canal, a memorandum on 
the legal aspects of the matter, and an overview by the Chiefs of Staff of the military resources that 
would be required to quickly occupy the Canal.
failure to take the necessary steps to regain control of the Canal would ruin the Western 
powers’ standing and prestige in the Middle East.
The first option considered, reference to the Security Council, was rejected by Eden 
during that first meeting. He thought it would risk a Soviet veto. This view is fully consistent 
with his operational code. Eden had grown extremely distrustful of the United Nations since 
1948 (a turning point in his attitude towards the Soviet Union) and thought it had become 
wholly ineffective because of the recurring Soviet veto.
Later, at the afternoon Egypt Committee meeting of 30 July, Lord Home 
(Commonwealth Secretary) suggested taking the matter to the Security Council and trying to 
get Egypt charged with aggression, because it would, first, give more time to prepare other 
measures, and, second, prevent Great Britain from being labelled as aggressor20. This option 
was rejected for two reasons: for one thing, it was not considered in the British interest, but, 
in addition, a vote at the United Nations would put the Arab countries in a most difficult 
position as they would have to side with Egypt while they might secretly support the strong 
action being taken against Egypt. The records do not show who formulated these 
considerations (they are presented as ’Cabinet discussion’), but it seems that the operational 
code is not the only factor that can account for the attitude adopted towards the United 
Nations: narrow calculations of national interest and strategy seem to have been equally 
important.
It is thus difficult to indicate Eden’s impact on decision making with precision. 
Nevertheless, it has been significant for the definition of the problem and for the consequent 
formulation of Great Britain objectives in this crisis: Mountbatten suggests that Eden was much 
more straightforward about the stakes than the official records reveal: apart from the 
restoration of international control of the Canal, Eden’s ’object was to get rid of Colonel 
Nasser personally and his regime which he regarded as the principal enemies’21. There can 
be no doubt that the decision to establish a link between Great Britain’s response and the 
downfall of the Egyptian Government, which the Egypt Committee explicitly formulated as its
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x Most interestingly, Home suggested that a UN intervention force be formed in order to deal with 
this international problem.
21 ADM 205/117, 27 July 1956. It must be said that these are Mountbatten’s words, and that they 
do not occur as such in the records of the EC’s meeting of 27 July. If this counts as sufficient evidence 
of Eden’s first reaction to Nasser’s act of-nationalization, then it seems to fit what Irving Janis labelled 
emotive decision rules: these serve to cope with emotional stress when a decisionmaker feels confronted 
with a threat to his self-esteem. Janis argues that two types of decision rules may enter the process: one 
’the audacity rule’, which opens the possibility of taking a risky course of action, secondly, the 
’retaliation rule’, in order to deal with anger; Janis, Crucial decisions, pp. 16-18, 191-198.
immediate objective22, was the origin of the principal dilemma which die British Government 
would be facing during the entire crisis: it would be very difficult to get rid of Nasser if one 
preferred not to say so explicitly, and to rather use the veil of international control of the 
Canal as a pretext for intervention: control of the Canal could be only obtained with support 
from die United States and public opinion. Neither of these,however, would support military 
action explicitly aimed at toppling Nasser. Therefore, the principal cognitive failure made by 
the British Government was the assumption that taking strong action regarding die Canal would 
automatically cause Nasser’s downfall23. This assumption was indispensable, however, if a 
formal acknowledgement that the toppling of Nasser was the real objective, was ruled out.
It is curious, however, that the objective of Nasser’s downfall was not mentioned 
during the Cabinet discussions on the day after the nationalization, but reoccurred at the Egypt 
Committee of 30 July, when it was concluded that ’while our ultimate purpose was to place 
the Canal under international control, our immediate objective was to bring about the downfall 
of the present Egyptian Government’34. It seems more likely25 that Mountbatten’s account 
of Eden’s objectives refers to the informal meeting in the evening of 26 July at which he had 
been present36. If this picture is correct, it puts a heavy burden on Eden who led the Cabinet 
into accepting the use of force in principle without full discussion over the question whether 
its objective should include the downfall of Nasser. Of course, the genesis of the Egypt 
Committee might point to Eden’s preference to withhold certain objectives from the Cabinet. 
The installation of such an ad hoc body was rather unusual. Butler afterwards declared that it
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2 CAB 128/1216, EC(56)3, 30 July 1956.
23 The records of the third EC meeting on 30 July 1956 reveals the perception of this dilemma very 
clearly: ’This [downfall Nasser] might perhaps be achieved by less elaborate operations than those 
required to secure physical possession of the Canal itself [e.g., air raids on Alexandria and Cairo]. On 
the other hand, it was argued that our case before world opinion was based on the need to secure 
international control over the Canal’, EC(56)3, 30 July 1956.
34 ibid..
25 This conclusion is based on two considerations: (1) as a rule, the Chiefs of Staff would be seen 
into the Cabinet Room when military planning was the subject of discussion, (2) on 27 July the Cabinet 
discussed military requirements for the occupation and running of die Canal in the light of Egyptian 
military strength rather than an attempt to topple Nasser. Therefore, Mountbatten has not been present 
at the beginning of the Cabinet meeting, when the definition of the problem and the objectives were 
discussed.
* Chauvel, the French Chargé d’affaires, who had been present, reports in his memoirs that night 
’all die members of the British Government want decisive action, but don’t see clearly how to take it’. 
Vaisae notes that Chauvel says nothing of the sort in his official account in his telegram to the Ouai 
d’Orsav: Maurice Vaisse, ’France and the Suez Crisis’, in Louis and Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. The 
Crisis and its Consequences, p. 139, footnote 50.
was Eden’s personal wish to have a small committee of trusted collaborators27 around him 
in order to avoid opposition from the full Cabinet2*.
If one accepts Mountbatten’s account as a correct record of the informal meeting of 
26 July, then Eden can be said to have directed the Cabinet towards the use of force without 
clear objective for such action, leaving the formulation of military and political objectives to 
the Egypt Committee, originally intended as a very small group indeed. However, if one 
accepts Mountbatten’s account as a reflection of the Cabinet’s first meeting during the crisis, 
as he claims himself, then it must be concluded that the Cabinet unanimously accepted the 
toppling of Nasser as die immediate objective of the whole enterprise. Even if criticism against 
such objective did emerge (the records cannot tell us), it must have been rather clear, given 
Eden’s personal statements of goals (as recorded by Mountbatten), that in deciding in favour 
of an extremely small decision making body to deal with the situation, all Cabinet members 
knew perfectly well into which direction such planning would go.
2. Groupthink. One is struck by the extent of unanimity that arises from the records 
of the meetings related to decision 1. Discussions neither at the Cabinet nor at the Egypt 
Committee show much dissension on the aims that were formulated or the methods that should 
be employed, including the possible use of force. Even later critics, such as Monckton and 
Butler29, raised no objection. Moreover, every policy maker appeared to agree to the essential 
consideration that failure to hold the Canal would inevitably lead to the loss of all British 
interests in the Middle East.
Both Cabinet and Egypt Committee formulated some interesting assumptions about the 
Egyptian attitude: first, Egypt was considered incapable of running the Canal by itself; second, 
it was ’evident that Egypt would not yield to economic pressure alone’. It was thus essential 
to concert diplomatic pressure on Egypt with France and the United States30. Neither the
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27 The original members included Eden, Lloyd, Macmillan, Salisbury, Monckton, and Home.
a  Butler, ’Reflections on Cabinet Government’, p. 202; One reason not to give full credit to Butler’s 
story is the fact that he was ill during the first days of the crisis. He was not present at either the first 
Cabinet or at the first and second meeting of the Egypt Committee. His account of Eden’s personal 
interests in the EC must therefore have been based on hearsay. Butler’s account should be handled with 
care; in his memoirs he dates his entry into the EC to 2 August 1956. The records show, however, that 
Butler was present at the EC meetings from 30 July. Butler may simply have been mistaken, but it 
appears that he agreed to the EC’s decision of 30 July that the toppling of Nasser was the first objective 
of the British Government.
v It is only fur to Butler to stress that he was absent until 30 July.
30 CM(56)54, CAB 128/30, 27 July 1956.
Cabinet nor the Egypt Committee felt like verifying whether Egypt might be brought on her 
knees by economic pressure alone, and whether die Egyptians would be capable of running the 
Canal without help from die Company’s pilots. Failure to examine the latter question especially 
would prove a fundamental mistake later in September when the British and French 
Government thought they could bring matters to a head by having the Company recall its 
pilots51.
When eventually the Egypt Committee accepted the idea of a users’ conference in the 
morning of 30 July 1956, after it had become clear that no immediate military action would 
be possible, die Committee engaged in some dangerous wishful thinking: the users’ conference 
was to re-establish international control of the Suez Canal. ’If Colonel Nasser failed to accept 
it, military operations could then proceed’*2. No-one thought of the possibility that the 
outcome of the Conference might be ambiguous, instead of a clear acceptance or rejection of 
Western demands by Nasser. This development would once again catch British decisionmakers 
by surprise, the second time in a fortnight.
Dissension focused on possible recourse to the United Nations. On 30 July Home 
argued that Egypt should be condemned as an aggressor before die Security Council in order 
to anticipate Egypt or the Soviet Union trying die same tactic against the United Kingdom. The 
other EC members considered such a move detrimental to British interests and feared it would 
bring Arab countries into a most difficult position because a resolution would force them to 
take a public stand. At the full Cabinet on 1 August the issue of the United Nations was 
brought up again. Lloyd stressed that the United States in particular had been against recourse 
to die United Nations, because the Americans feared that discussion at the UNO about the Suez 
Canal might have implications for the status of the Panama Canal which they regarded as 
American property rath«' than an international entity, such as the Suez Canal Company. Rather 
than a UN-sponsored conference, they preferred a Conference of signatories to the original 
1888 Convention of Constantinople, which had established the Suez Canal as an international 
waterway.
This raises the question of the importance of a ’third level of decision making’ which 
comprised neither the Cabinet nor the Egypt Committee, but the level of a small group of 
individual Ministers. Only a restricted number of British policymakers met with the American 
envoy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Murphy and, after his arrival on 1 August, Dulles:
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11 See Chapter 17.
11 EC(56)3, CAB 128/1216, 30 July 1956.
Eden, Lloyd, Salisbury, and Macmillan33. This meant, first of all, that British perceptions of 
the American attitude towards the dispute was based on the interpretation of a small number 
of individuals; second, that both the Egypt Committee and the Cabinet were dependent on 
these four individuals in making an assessment of the American position.
In a meeting at the Foreign Office on 27 July the American Charge d’Affaires 
Foster34 had made it clear to Lloyd and the French Ambassador Chauvel that American 
understanding of the British and French position did not mean giving them carte blanche to 
engage in military adventures35. Even more alarming was the next day’s message from Roger 
Makins, British Ambassador in Washington, that the Americans did not want to be entangled 
into that conflict. He suggested therefore to leave a big impression with Murphy that France 
and Great Britain took the matter very seriously36. It must therefore have been deliberate 
policy of Eden, Lloyd and Macmillan to ’mislead’ Murphy as to the immediate use of military 
action37.
In an attempt to coordinate French and British policies, Lloyd told Pineau on 29 July, 
IS minutes before they were to meet with Murphy for the first time, that the United States was 
very reluctant to talk about military force. It would therefore be better to discuss restoring 
international control of the Canal ’to fill the gap until we were prepared militarily’3*. During 
their meeting with Murphy, Lloyd talked of the threat to Great Britain’s vital interests, and 
Pineau stressed Nasser’s influence on North African politics, comparing him with Hitler. 
Murphy answered that attention would have to paid to world opinion, adding that American 
public opinion was ’not yet prepared’39. The French were clearly afraid that Murphy had
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33 One should distinguish between, firstly, the formal tripartite talks between Lloyd, Pineau, and 
Murphy (and later Dulles), secondly, formal bilateral talks between Great Britain and the United States 
and between Great Britain and France (The United States and the French did not meet bilaterally), and 
thirdly, the informal lunches and dinners between American and British policymakers. The latter 
included Eden, Macmillan, and Salisbury as participants.
34 Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich had coincidentally left for Washington on 26 July 1956; Winthrop 
Aldrich, ’The Suez Crisis. A Footnote to History’, Foreign Affairs. April 1967, pp. 541-542.
35 PREM 11/1098.
36 PREM 11/1098.
37 Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, pp. 39-40.
* PREM, 11/1098.
39 PREM 11/1098; Murphy claims that he ’asked a few questions and mostly Q just listened’; Robert 
Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors. Doubleday and Company, Garden City, 1964, p. 379; apparently
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come to London only to delay the adoption of drastic measures. The French Ambassador told 
Lloyd on 29 July that bis Government was afraid that the Americans would take the same 
position as they had over the Abadan-crisis40.
On 30 July Eden, Salisbury, Lloyd and Macmillan had lunch with Murphy. That 
evening Murphy dined with Macmillan, Foster, and Lord Alexander at 11, Downing Street. 
On both occasions British ministers tried to convince Murphy that Great Britain meant 
business. Macmillan made his famous remark that Britain could not become a second 
Netherlands41. Murphy’s account of these conversations to Eisenhower prompted the 
American President to send Secretary of State Dulles to London42. By that time, however, 
Lloyd and Eden had already concluded in a private discussion about the talks with Murphy, 
that in case the United States would not join in with military action, ’we should rely upon them 
to "watch the bear"’ and to make sure that the United States ’should use all their influence to 
keep the Israelis out of it’. Lloyd and Eden took account of another message from Makins who 
had reported that Dulles had sent for him, and had told him that he saw no basis for U.S. 
military force, partly because it would need the approval of Congress, which was by no means 
a certainty43. Again, British policymakers assumed that an American refusal to actively 
participate in military action, still implied tacit approval of, and support for, such a policy.
When Dulles arrived on 1 August, he carried a letter from Eisenhower, in which the 
President stressed the exploration of diplomatic solutions. In his letter to Eden of 28 July, he 
had already suggested a conference of those maritime nations that were affected most by 
Nasser’s move44. Dulles had recognized that Eisenhower’s phrasing was rather ambiguous 
and handed over another letter of his own, explaining that Eisenhower’s text ’refers not to the 
going through the motions of having an intermediate conference, but to the use of intermediate
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he did more than that and may have given hope to Lloyd and Pineau by saying that American public 
opinion was not yet ready (my emphasis).
40 PREM 11/1098. That is, delaying tactics in order to prevent military action, by suggesting that 
a diplomatic solution is possible, eventually leading to an agreement (as to Abadan regarding exploiting
oil resources) that benefitted the Americans but weakened the British sphere of influence.
41 Murphy, Diplomat among Warriors, p. 380; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 105.
c  Murphy, ibid.. p. 381.
43 PREM 11/1098, Makins to Foreign Office, 30 July 1956. Makins wanted that ’Mr. Dulles’s 
attitude confirm s the pessimistic im pression Q. In prevailing conditions, we can look for little help from 
Washington’.
44 James, Anthony Eden, p. 463.
steps as a genuine and sincere effort to settle the problem and avoid the use of force’43. On 
1 August Harold Caccia reported to Eden a meeting between him and Dulles at the Foreign 
Office that morning. Caccia told of Dulles’s words that the aims of the United States and the 
United Kingdom were the same, but that ’if the attempt were to be made by force alone, he 
saw great difficulties’46. The one word alone may have left enough room for Eden not to take 
Dulles's correction of Eisenhower’s letter too seriously, and to conclude: ’The President did 
not rule out the use of force’47. Lloyd’s conversation with Dulles and Murphy at noon that 
day left the Foreign Secretary with the same impression even though he truthfully reported that 
Dulles suspected the British Government was not taking diplomatic steps seriously48. In 
general, Lloyd displayed a rather bellicose attitude in these early days. He privately told 
Pineau on 31 July that it would be wise for France and Great Britain to go forward together: 
’the Americans often followed where others took action. It was important not to get held up 
in discussions longer than suited us militarily’49.
Concluding remarks on the importance of the small group variable. Two main 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the possible influence of small group factors. Firstly, both 
Cabinet and Egypt Committee acted rather unanimously in their assessment of the problem, 
the objectives to be pursued and the means to be employed. The consequence was that many 
assumptions on which their decision making was based were not discussed. Secondly, contacts 
with the United States and France were maintained by a small group of four policymakers, two 
of which, Macmillan (Chancellor of the Exchequer) and Salisbury (Lord President of the 
Council) did not formally belong to the foreign policy making system. This is be a clear 
indicator of the presence of a coherent smaller inner circle.
In their dealing with the Americans it can safely be concluded that Eden, Macmillan, 
Lloyd, and Salisbury acted on the assumption that it would be possible to cajole the United 
States into a policy that would best benefit the United Kingdom. In doing so, they applied a 
technique that had been practiced regarding the concluding of the Suez Canal treaty, the
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47 Eden, Full Circle, p. 436.
41 PREM 11/1098, 1 August 1956, conversation between Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Dulles.
* PREM 11/1098, 31 July 1956. That morning Uoyd had been very tough at a meeting with 
Conservative backbenchers: ’Apparently he almost declared war and got a great hand for doing so’; 
Claike, ’Whitehall Diary’, entry 31 July 1956, p. 103.
Persian oil crisis, and, most recendy, after Nasser’s Czech arms deal and the Glubb affair30. 
This approach had two important consequences. First, British policy makers did not conceive 
of the possibility that American reluctance to support military action might actually signal their 
opposition to it31. Lloyd and Eden thought the Americans would rather not join in military 
action, but would no doubt cover British and French manoeuvers. Second, by consequence, 
British policymakers went to great lengths to make sure that their interpretation of messages 
from Dulles and Eisenhower fitted their own assumptions regarding the American attitude.
Did this added level of four policymakers impede decision making at the level of the 
Cabinet or Egypt Committee? In the Egypt Committee Eden was fair about the conversations 
with Murphy. He told the Committee that Murphy had come only to hear what the trouble was 
all about. Eden told them that he had said to Murphy that he hoped that the Americans would 
keep a watchful eye on the Soviet Union and would restrain Israel32. It is much more doubtful 
whether Selwyn Lloyd was correct in telling die Cabinet on 1 August, when the Government 
was to accept the proposal for the London Conference, that the United States and the United 
Kingdom were thinking along the same lines: both wanted to make Nasser ’disgorge’33 what 
he had swallowed, Lloyd said34. According to Clark, ’Selwyn reported that Dulles would give 
full support to our tough attitude if we only agreed that Russia should be invited to the 
conference’55. Lloyd added, however, that Dulles had made it clear that the Americans would 
’strongly deprecate "any premature use of force"’36. Obviously then, no member of the
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31 This was, of course, grounded in Eden’s and Lloyd’s conviction that by cancelling the Aswan 
loan, the Americans had accepted the British idea that Nasser should no longer be appeased. This is 
confirmed in Lloyd’s remark to French Ambassador Chauvel on 26 July 1956, a few hours before 
Nasser would nationalize the Canal Company: ’the Americans had made up their minds that it was time 
to deal firmly with Nasser, but had not given further consideration to methods Q The prospect was that 
relations with Nasser would wither away’, FO 800/738.
52 EC(56)4, CAB 128/1216, 30 July 1956.
° The term was first used by Dulles when he met Eden on 1 August 1956. During the crisis British 
decision makers often referred to this expression in order to prove that Dulles and they wanted the same 
thing.
34 CM(56)56, CAB 128/30, 1 August 1956.
33 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 1 August 1956, p. 104.
36 CAB 128/30, CM(56)56, 1 August 1956. Cf. Richard Lamb, The Failure of the Eden
Government. Sidgwick and Jackson, London, 1987, p. 202.
Cabinet wondered whether the United States’ attitude implied complete opposition to the use 
of force.
It is difficult to distinguish all symptoms of groupthink, either at the level of the 
Cabinet, or Egypt Committee, or the small group that was in contact with Murphy and Dulles. 
One could say that the Cabinet’s decision on 27 July to be prepared to go it alone eventually, 
testifies to an illusion of invulnerability. Possibly one could consider the decision not to go 
to the United Nations to be of that category as well. Neff reports that on that same day Cabinet 
members felt as if they had taken a weighty decision, one of great righteousness. 
Unfortunately, no primary or secondary source is given37. If correct, this would indicate a 
belief in the inherent morality of the group. To a certain extent, the original exclusion of 
Butler from the Egypt Committee, and from the group of four that spoke to the Americans, 
might qualify as a self-appointed mindguard. The evidence is rather poor, however. 
Moreover, efforts to rationalize collectively (e.g., about the American attitude) are not linked 
to this decisional conflict in particular, but seem the recurrence of habitual tactics the British 
had adopted towards the United States. They thus testify of the influence of what has been 
called the attitudinal prism British foreign policymakers had developed towards the United 
States.
3. The organizational context. The main reason why the British Government was 
unable to send a military force forthwith was the unpreparedness of the British Armed Forces 
for the contingency of a limited war such as an operation against Egypt was likely to be. Great 
Britain was well enough equipped to fight a major war in Europe, including a nuclear conflict, 
as well as a guerilla-war, as on Cyprus and Malaya. This constraint obviously conditioned 
British decision making to a large extent. As shown above, Mountbatten told the Chiefs of 
Staff that in the night of 26 July Ministers had already decided not to take any action ’which 
could be construed as threatening Egypt’ until the views of other interested powers had been 
obtained. What is not clear is whether the state of unreadiness induced the Ministers to embark 
on consultations first, or whether they had deemed consultations the proper move anyway. In 
any case, the Cabinet of 27 July must have been under no illusion regarding the immediate use
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of force: the Chiefs of Staff pointed out that military supplies would take weeks to arrive by 
sea. Preparations would thus take several weeks5*.
The military plans, presented to die Cabinet by the Chiefs of Staff on 1 August under 
the title 'Action against Egypt’, stressed die unreadiness of notably the paratroopers who 
lacked adequate parachute training, because they had been fighting against Cypriot guerillas 
since the Summer of 1955**. Any swift airborne occupation of (part of) the Canal therefore 
seemed unlikely*0. Much more important, however, was the military’s belief that airborne 
troops should be reinforced within a reasonable time. Even though it might be possible, with 
French support, to move an armoured division to the Canal area, it would take too long to 
have them relieved by the main task force, which would have to sail from Malta, which was 
the closest harbour for landingcraft. It has been said that this cautious approach was caused 
by die trauma left by the battle of Arnhem in 1944, «lien ground troops had been too slow to 
relieve the airborne troops. The Chiefs of Staff allegedly reminded Eden of Arnhem61.
It thus seems clear that the decision making process was strongly affected by the 
conditions of military preparations. It could be said that on the one hand British military forces 
were caught by surprise by the nature of task assigned to them, being prepared only for 
nuclear or guerilla warfare, so that they would have to engage in traditional, meticulous, 
planning, as for the Normandy invasion in 1944. In that effort they relied on standard 
operation procedures. This is recognized by Eden, who recalls ’constantly urging* on the 
military that planning against Egyptians was not as difficult as planning against Germans62.
This interpretation may be correct, but should be qualified. For one thing, contingency 
planning did include operations against Egypt. Since 23 April 19S6 British and American Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had been engaged in preparing contingencies to act against aggression in a war 
between Israel and Arab countries. On 13 April 19S6, in preparing themselves for these talks, 
the British Chiefs of Staff had come up with four situations that might arise. One possibility
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Macmillan diary entry 30 and 31 July 1956, quoted by Alistair Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. Volume
1 of the Official Biography. Macmillan, London, 1988, p. 398.
*  Lamb, The failure of the Eden Government, pp. 134 fif.
*  AIR 8/1948, JS(56)135 (final), 1 August 1956.
"  Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government pp. 198-199; Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 51: 
Thomas speaks of a military taboo that existed since Arnhem 1944.
® Eden, Full Circle, p. 430.
was an attack of Israel on Egypt, another was an Egyptian attack on Israel; a third, a situation 
in which the aggressor would not be evident, and fourth, a limited military action to safeguard 
nationals and vital interests, notably the Canal base. Apart from plans to install a maritime 
blockade, combined with air operations and possibly land operations, a worst case scenario was 
developed that was aimed at keeping open the Suez Canal by dropping paratroopers, followed 
by a swift build-up of air transported forces in order to secure the airfield, to occupy Suez, 
and to seize bridges and ferries across the Canal. Port Said was a deep water port that could 
be used for the arrival of reinforcements13.
Interestingly, Mountbatten asked for guidance on political objectives, because British 
involvement in an Arab-Israeli conflict could have consequences for British relations with the 
Arab world. He thought it wise, however, to have these joint planning sessions on the 
assumption that the protection of oil interests would be the ultimate purpose of the planning64. 
The Chiefs’ report of the joint planning talks with the Americans in Washington between 25 
April and 3 May clearly shows that one thought the seizure of the Canal Zone by employing 
paratroopers and launching a naval assault was thought to be possible. The main objectives of 
such operations should be Port Said, Suez, and the area of the Suez Canal base, where the 
British, under the Egyptian-British 1954 Treaty, still kept stored supplies for 80,000 soldiers. 
British and Americans did not differ in their assessment of plans and requirements, only 
regarding the command structure of such an operation63.
These data suggest that contingency planning for other wars than those on a world 
wide or local scale did take place. Even the employment of paratroopers for an action against 
the Suez Canal had been contemplated66. The Chiefs of Staff expressed their preference for 
a maritime blockade, possibly combined with air operations. This preference was based on the 
objective of minimizing the alienation of Arab allies, who might think that seizure of the Canal 
would amount to British support of Israel67. No reference is made to the unpreparedness of
225
® JP(56)70 (Final) 13 April 1956, DEFE 6/35
44 COS<56)44, DEFE 4/86, 25 April 1956.
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** Nevertheless, the Chiefs of Staff, in their first meeting on 27 July 1956 at 9.15 A.M., concluded
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1956. Technically, this is true: Anglo-American planning dealt with an Arab-Israeli conflict, not with
a limited war against Egypt.
* DEFE 6/35, JP(56)70 (final), 13 April 1956.
paratroopers, nor to problems regarding the amount of time that would be needed to relieve 
the airborne troops**.
It should nevertheless be concluded that British policymakers were constrained by the 
range of options presented by the Chiefs of Staff.
10.5 Conclusions
An explanation of the British decision to accept a diplomatic conference instead of 
immediate military action must take account of die following: although die proposition for a 
conference of the principal users of die Suez Canal was adopted by die Cabinet on the evening 
of 1 August, the discussion preceding this decision was not about the principle of such a 
diplomatic move, but about the participants of this conference. The decision to hold a users’ 
conference had effectively already been taken by the Egypt Committee in the morning of 30 
July. This decision, however, was the outcome of deliberations of a small group of Ministers 
(Eden, Lloyd, Salisbury, Home, and Kilmuir) not to take drastic action before the view of 
other interested powers (presumably the United States and France) had been known.
Two elements seemed to have principally affected die British decision: first, the 
consideration that at least American tacit consent was needed before starting any military 
action. This meant that the opinion of the main American foreign policy makers (Murphy, 
Dulles, and Eisenhower) had to be convinced of the seriousness of the situation. Second, the 
presumed unpreparedness of British military forces. Eventually, this meant that a conference 
became indispensable in order to keep up the pressure while military plans were being worked 
out. Military unreadiness actually caused a domestic problem for the Government, because 
public opinion in Great Britain might accuse die Government of inactivity. This explains the 
hurry with which troops were sent to Tobruk in Cyrenaica on 31 July and why 20,000 
reservists had been urgendy recalled forthwith on 28 July*.
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even made while risking that Egypt or the Soviet Union might address this question to the Security
Council; EC(56)2, 28 July 1956; EC(56)6, 31 July 1956, ADM 116/6097.
Thus, it appears that the organizational context has been relevant in setting the time 
frame within which British decision makers had to operate. The group factor seems to have 
been most relevant in that the crucial meeting of 26 July was attended by only a small group 
of ministers and that contact with the representatives of the United States and France was 
entrusted to almost the same small group10. Moreover, apart from the issue of going to the 
United Nations, both the Cabinet and the Egypt Committee were unanimous in their analysis 
of the stakes, objectives, and options available. Their unanimity prevented them from 
questioning several important assumptions that they employed in their deliberations. 
Nevertheless, only a few symptoms of groupthink could be found. It was shown, moreover, 
that part of the decision making process, at least during the important first full Cabinet meeting 
on 27 July, should be explained by the way the group’s leader, that is, the Prime Minister, 
dealt with the situation. In that sense, directive leadership has been of some relevance. 
Furthermore, it was argued that Eden’s operational code partly explains the sense of crisis 
that occurred after Nasser’s move (contrary to earlier Egyptian acts against British interests) 
as well as the attitude that was adopted towards the possibility of referring the dispute to the 
Security Council.
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Chapter 11: Decision 2: the Menzies mission
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10.1 The dilemma
The Cabinet had thus accepted that a conference would be held in London, expecting 
that the outcome would amount to either Nasser ’disgorging’ the Canal or obtaining permission 
to restore the international character of the Canal by force. Evidently, it did not anticipate a 
more ambiguous outcome of the London conference, which was to open on 16 August. 
Eighteen of die 22 countries present1 supported a proposal which reflected Dulles’s strong 
opening speech at the Conference in which he asked for international control of the Canal2. 
Towards the end of the Conference it became dear that Dulles did not want to travel to Egypt 
to present the so-called Eighteen-Powers Proposals to Nasser. Great Britain and France had 
thought this die best way to, first, reinforce the commitment of the United States to their case 
and, second, confront Nasser with something which looked like an ultimatum. Towards the 
end of die Conference, therefore, British policymakers suddenly became aware of the 
possibility that, unless a strong delegation was sent, Nasser might procrastinate for a little 
while, making it impossible to Great Britain and France to take stronger action. The solution 
to this dilemma, temporary, as it would proof, was found in the early morning of 22 August, 
when the Australian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, agreed to head the delegation to 
Cairo.
British policymakers’ growing apprehension that the London Conference would have
an unfortunate ending is best expressed in Lord Salisbury’s letter to Eden on 9 August.
Salisbury suggested that the Conference might have many different endings than acceptance
or refusal by Nasser of proposals regarding the internationalization of the Canal:
’There are an infinite number of gradations in between. For instance, the 
conference may break up without agreement. Or Colonel Nasser may not 
entirely turn down some proposal that is put to him, but may make suggestions 
that go some way to meet us, but not nearly enough 0 for it would be claimed
1 Present at die Conference were the Parties to the Convention of 1888: France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, Soviet Union; and other nations that had a strong interest 
in traffic through the Canal: Australia, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Western Germany, Greece, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Sweden and the United States. Egypt 
had been invited, but had refused the invitation. All states, except for India, the Soviet Union, Ceylon 
and Indonesia, did agree to the proposal based on Dulles’s speech.
2 This idea was not really liked by Eisenhower. He preferred India’s Foreign Secretary Krishna 
Menon’s proposal, which envisaged the installation of an advisory council to the Egyptian Government 
rather than create a formally international body to run the Canal. Of course, Dulles could not change 
his opening speech, and convinced Eisenhower that Meoon’s proposal clearly was a concession to 
Nasser that Great Britain and France would never accept; James, Anthony Eden, pp. 501-502.
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by Colonel Nasser as a success, and we cannot afford that he should have a 
success Q.’ [Contingency planning was thus] ’the more necessary as we shall 
we have, if we are to proceed to force, to try to carry the bulk of our own 
public opinion with us, and at present I doubt whether we have more than half 
the country behind us; and the official Labour Party are steadily sliding away.
This may well entail further intensive propaganda during the next few days as 
to the issues involved and the danger of weakness []. Finally, there is the 
position with regard to Parliament’Q If we are likely to have unhappily to 
proceed to extremes [i.e., use of force], a debate in Parliament is going to put 
us in an almost impossible position* [] This is, as I see it, an entirely new 
position, at any rate so far as recent times are concerned,’ [in which] ’we 
should certainly not want to disclose our intentions or our plans’3.
Salisbury’s letter illustrates two increasingly pressing developments confronting British 
policymakers: first, the decrease in public support for a tough policy towards Egypt, and, 
secondly, the possibility of an equivocal outcome of the Conference. This dilemma would 
eventually lead a small group of Ministers to conclude that some provocative action by Nasser 
would be needed, if force were to be justified. This conclusion was furthered by a third factor 
which after 10 August constrained the decision making process: on that day the Chiefs of Staff 
suggested that the invasion should not be located at Port Said, but rather at Alexandria, thus 
making it seem much less a response to the nationalization of the Canal company, and taking 
the risk of a larger number of civilian casualties. This plan of attack was therefore less easily 
justifiable under international law, and added to the sense of facing a dilemma.
11.2 The structure of decision making
Chart 2 presents the structure of the decision making process relating to decision 2. 
It should be recalled that the London conference opened on 16 August and ended on 23 
August. Menzies accepts his assignment on 22 August at 2 A.M..
Chart 11.2: decision making structure of decision 2
02 Aug 10 AM Cabinet
? Eden meets Gaitskell
6 PM Egypt Committee (EC)
3 PREM 11/1099, Salisbury to Eden, 9 August 1956.
03 Aug 10 AM Defence (Transition) Committee
11 AM Cabinet
noon EC
x Exchange of letters between Eden and Gaitskeli
05 Aug Macmillan dines with Churchill
06 Aug Churchill meets Eden at Chequers
07 Aug noon D(T)C
3 PM Ministerial meeting
3.15 PM EC
09 Aug 11.15 AM EC
10.00 PM EC
10 Aug 10.30 AM EC
03.30 PM D(T)C
11 Aug ? Staff Conference: Chiefs of Staff;
Anthony Head, Eden, Monckton
14 Aug 10.00 AM D(T)C
10.45 AM Lloyd/Eden/Salisbury meet Labour delegation
05.15 PM EC
16 Aug 11.45 AM EC
17 Aug 10.00 AM D(T)C
11.00 AM EC
19 Aug ?? Macmillan and Salisbury meet Aldrich
at Hatfield
20 Aug 11.30 AM EC
21 Aug 10.00 AM D(T)C
11.15 AM Ministerial meeting
noon Cabinet
22 Aug 02.30 AM Eden, Dulles, and Lloyd meet Menzies
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A glance at chart 11.2 allows three conclusions to be made regarding the structure of 
decision making: first, decision making is dominated by the Egypt Committee; second, two 
informal meetings senior ministers take place, one of which at a rather crucial moment: shortly 
before the important Cabinet meeting of 21 August, at which the official British attitude
towards the development of the London conference had to be determined; third, further 
evidence exists of a restricted number of ministers, Eden, Macmillan, Salisbury and Lloyd, 
who meet informally with representatives of the United States (Aldrich, Dulles) during the 
conference. Furthermore, some these ministers (Eden, Lloyd, Salisbury) keep in touch with 
the opposition. It thus seems that both Cabinet and Egypt Committee depended on a restricted 
number of ministers for their information on the attitude of both the United States Government 
and the Labour Party.
11.3 Constraints on decision making before the conference’s start
As the day of the Conference’s start approached, three factors made British decision 
makers realize that military action might not yet be possible in the event of Egypt’s rejection 
of the conference’s outcome: domestic opposition to the use of force was growing, Nasser 
might not give equivocally accept or reject the conference’s outcome, and the military came 
with a change of plan.
1. Domestic public opinion. In the Commons debate of 2 August, the Labour Party 
had vigorously denounced Nasser’s act of nationalization. Indeed, some commentators on Suez 
note that Labour leader Gaitskell made a more aggressive speech than Eden4. Gaitskell met 
Eden that same day, in order to find out about the Government’s intentions regarding the use 
of force. Next day he wrote a letter to Eden in which he emphasized that the majority of his 
Party would not agree to force unless it was in line with the United Nations Charter. Eden’s 
reply did not entail specific assurances about the use of force, upon which Gaitskell instantly 
sent another letter to Eden, repeating his party’s reservations9. Further erosion of whatever 
Labour support of a tough line occurred when Eden, Salisbury, and Lloyd met with a Labour 
delegation, headed by Gaitskell, on 14 August. Gaitskell again stressed Labour’s opposition 
to the use of force. This was reported by Eden at the Cabinet meeting which opened 
immediately after this meeting, but Eden significantly added that the Labour party delegates 
’recognized that if any new incidents occurred, such as the interference with ships using the 
Canal, a new situation would arise in which force might be justified*.
British policymakers also had to take account of international public opinion. On 7 
August the Egypt Committee, discussing Lloyd’s draft instructions to the British Ambassador
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* James, ibid.. pp. 492-493.
* CM(56)59, 14 August 1956, PREM 11/1099.
to France, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, discussed the possibility of both Nasser’s downfall and the 
occupation of entire Egypt as a possible outcome of strong action. Nevertheless, it was 
considered most important, ’from the point of public opinion, especially in the United States 
and in Asia, that the purpose of our action should appear to be confined to establishing the 
security of the international waterway across die isthmus of Suez, and not as being complicated 
by political designs against the Egyptian regime. It follows that the leakage of a document 
appearing to define our objective in wider terms could be disastrous’. Therefore, and in order 
not to alienate pro-Western Arab states, Israel should be restrained7, and France should 
moderate her attitude towards the Algerian situation, which had made her unpopular with Arab 
states*.
The Egypt Committee was very anxious not to appear too bellicose, while a diplomatic 
conference was at hand. Any significant military measures were therefore to be played down, 
much to the annoyance of the French who, because of domestic concerns opposite to those of 
the British Government, wanted to give as much publicity as possible to any sign of vigour9.
It does not come as a surprise therefore that the first two weeks of August witnessed 
an increased effort to impress domestic and international public opinion with die brutality of 
Nasser’s act and of the strength of die Anglo-French case under international law. On 8 August 
Eden went on television to make a speech in which he compared Nasser with dictators from 
the Thirties. This broadcast was meant to be heard in the United States as well10. On 13 
August the Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies, arriving for the London Conference, 
also broadcast, at Eden’s request, a condemnation of Nasser’s action under international law; 
he was followed next day by Lloyd who did the same11.
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* EC(56)10, PREM 11/1099, 7 August 1956.
* An example from this period comes from the planned visit of British military commanders to Paris 
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Lloyd’s instructions to Jebb read: ’Q it is no less important that we should both carry international public 
opinion with us, particularly before and during the Conference’, Telegram Foreign Office to Paris, No. 
1329, PREM 11/1099, 8 August 1956.
10 Ambassador Makins reported that the speech was received well, and that one understood the 
necessity of military precautions, although that would not imply American support for employing force; 
Makins to Foreign Office, Telegram 1691, PREM 11/1099 (therefore seen by Eden), 10 August 1956.
11 Menzies, Afternoon Light, pp. 150-151; Lloyd, Suez 1956. p. 112.
2. Apprehension of the conference’s results. Lord Salisbury’s doubts about the outcome 
of the Conference were a response to discussions in the Egypt Committee meeting in the 
evening of 9 August, at which only Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, Lloyd, Home, Thomeycroft, 
and Brook had been present. The group had been discussing the dilemma that, while wanting 
to appear willing to accept a diplomatic solution, the government would have to set the military 
machine in motion while the conference was still going on. Furthermore, it was recognized 
that Parliament’s approval might be in doubt and a division of the House might reveal only a 
small majority for the Government. For the first time, this group of senior Ministers came up 
with the idea that what was needed, was a provocative act by Egypt. The Committee asked 
Selwyn Lloyd to produce a paper on the international legal aspects of the use of force12. This 
memorandum would be ready by 18 August.
This solution was the central thought of Eden’s later reply to Salisbury’s letter. Eden 
stated that the Conference should produce some form of international control of the Canal. In 
case Nasser rejected this arrangement, the other nations should refuse to pay their shipping 
dues. If Nasser would not then allow them to pass through the Canal, ’an incident would have 
been provoked by him which would justify our using force’13. The full Cabinet adopted this 
line of reasoning at the Cabinet meeting of 14 August too, specifying that the United States 
should cooperate by withholding shipping dues. The causal chain at the end of which Nasser 
would be willing to provoke an incident was never questioned14. Later that afternoon Norman 
Brook submitted a provisional timetable to the Egypt Committee, which met after the full 
Cabinet. It suggested that Nasser would respond to a note, asking him to accept the majority 
recommendation of the Conference, within four days. Egypt’s counter-proposals could then 
be rejected one week later, and after two days (7 September was the provided date), ships 
could sail15.
3. Military planning. British decision making was also affected by changes in the 
original military plan, due to objections from British Task Force Commanders. They reckoned 
Port Said a place far from ideal for a rapid build-up of forces16, and thought Alexandria much 
more suitable. The new plan, presented on 10 August, proposed a landing of 80,000 troops
12 EC(56)13, PREM 11/1099, 9 August 1956.
13 PREM 11/1099, Eden to Salisbury.
14 CM(56)59, PREM 11/1099, 14 August 1956.
15 James, Anthony Eden, pp. 499-500.
11 Port Said was at the end of a narrow causeway, and 50 miles away from the nearest jet airfield.
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at Alexandria, which would advance on Cairo. This threat alone, it was assumed, would 
provoke the fall of the Egyptian Government and, with a new Government installed, British 
and French troops could march to the Canal Zone17. Despite Eden’s initial objections to the 
plan, because of its military risks1',  the Egypt Committee endorsed the new plan. Because 
of its clear objective to topple Nasser, it would be much harder to defend this operation in 
front of national and international public opinion. This consideration added considerably to the 
feeling that American support at the Conference was needed. This is why Eden suggested on
14 August, when he told the full Cabinet that military planning had been completed, that ’there 
would be Q a difficult question of timing*. Indeed, he recognized that American support of 
economic sanctions against Egypt, including the withholding of shipping dues, would be 
necessary19. After the Cabinet, later that afternoon, when a timetable was presented to the 
Egypt Committee, he suggested that a final decision to launch any attack should be delayed. 
Clearly, the new military plans demanded an unequivocal outcome of the Conference, 
including firm American support.
British decisionmakers, both informally (correspondence Eden-Salisbury), and in the 
Egypt Committee, thus initially entertained rather simple visions of what the Conference would 
be like. Once they realized that things might not work that smoothly, and that the new miliary 
plan had some serious consequences, they reasoned that Egyptian provocation was needed. 
This induced them to think that simply withholding shipping dues would provoke Nasser into 
further action.
These considerations set the tone for (he British approach to the London Conference 
that opened on 16 August. Some preliminary conclusions could be made about the decision 
making process.
(1) The Cabinet was not informed of the details of military planning. However, when 
before the Cabinet meeting of 14 August it had become clear that decisions about the use of
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17 For a discussion of these plan, Kyle, ’Britain and the Crisis, 1955-1956’, in Louis and Owen 
(eds.), Suez 1956. The Crisis and its Consequences, pp. 115-116. Cf. EC(56)15, 10 August 1956, 
PREM 11/1099.
11 André Beaufre, The Suez Expedition, pp. 28-29. Beaufre arrived in London on 10 August, and 
heard of the change of plans and of Eden’s opposition from General Stockwell.
"  CM(56)59, 14 August 1956, PREM 11/1099.
force might have to be taken at some nearby stage20, few Cabinet members seemed worried 
about the small circle to whom decision making had been entrusted. Only Duncan Sandys 
would write to Eden complaining about die lack of information21.
(2) The role of an even smaller group of Ministers within the Egypt Committee 
becomes increasingly important. First, important considerations were made at a meeting at 
which a small group of Ministers, most of whom had met informally during the period of 
decision 1, were present. Second, a kind of circuit of letters emerges between Salisbury and 
Eden. Similarly, Macmillan writes memos to Eden before putting things, such as Israeli 
involvement, to the full Egypt Committee. Third, Salisbury and Lloyd are present at Eden’s 
meeting with Gaitskell and other Labour M.P.’s at 14 August. The Cabinet therefore appears 
as a body which authorizes Committee decisions rather than a place of genuine discussion22. 
These patterns were to be reinforced during die days of the Conference.
11.4 The London Conference
Between the opening of the Conference on 16 August and the moment that Menzies 
accepted the chairmanship of the delegation that would go to Cairo, the situation was becoming 
difficult for those British policymakers that had thought that the Conference would produce 
either Nasser’s retreat or military action. First, Lloyd’s paper on the legitimate use of force 
under international law, which had been ready on 18 August and was discussed at the Egypt 
Committee two days later, made it clear that armed intervention was justifiable only if four 
situations would occur23: interference with a British warship, an action which endangered the 
lives of British subjects, the refusal to let a ship pass because of a refusal to pay her dues, or 
seizure of the Suez Base24. Second, it was realized that at some stage it would become very
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x ’Just before the Cabinet I saw Walter Monckton who is also depressed by the prospect of military 
operations] and feels that the senior civil servants are against it, but he realized that to row back now 
would be fatal for the Government’, Clark, ’Whitehall Diary’, entry 14 August 19S6, p. 113.
21 James, Anthony Eden, p. 499.
22 Although it would be incorrect to say that Eden, or other Egypt Committee members, misled the 
Cabinet. He, certainly, did not hesitate to use emotive persuasion. For instance, at the Cabinet meeting 
of 14 August Menzies held, at Eden’s request, a vigorous speech in which be portrayed Nasser as a 
familiar military dictator; CM(56)59, 14 August 1956, PREM 11/1099.
23 PREM 11/1099, memorandum by the Foreign Secretary, 18 August 1956.
24 When Great Britain left the Suez Canal Zone in June 1956, it remained entitled to leave supplies 
that could be used, whenever a situation would occur in which troops could legally reenter the area, as 
provided by the 1954 Canal Treaty.
difficult to employ military force, because of the international support that Nasser would have 
mounted during and after die Conference. The Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brook, 
suggested to Eden that after 15 September his support would outweigh support for military 
action. Third, at home those voices gained strength which urged that reference of the dispute 
to the United Nations should precede military action. However, the United States did not show 
much enthusiasm for such a move; moreover, military preparations would be ready soon (30 
August), so that a final decision could be taken by 27 August29.
Decision making can therefore be characterized as almost panic-like, at least among 
three or four important politicians, Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, and Lloyd. They seem to have 
virtually prepared the meetings of the Egypt Committee and die Cabin« during this period. 
Their approach seems to have been influenced by their contacts with Dulles who had come to 
the London Conference.
One day before the start of the conference Eden had already defined die stakes: ’PM 
said at one point this morning people still talk about the danger of our alienating India, or 
worrying Africa, but the fact is that if we lose out in the Middle East we shall be immediately 
destroyed’*. Three days later, Macmillan, in a similar analysis, contemplating ’the end of 
British influence and strength for ever’, wondered *[o]n what principle can we base a "casus 
belli”? How do we get from the Conference leg to the use of force?’. That evening he dined 
with Dulles, and once more tried to convince Dulles that ’0  in the last resort, we must use 
force and defy opinion, here and overseas. [Dulles] really agreed with our position. But he 
hopes (and he may be right) that Nasser will have to yield in due course. This again lights up 
the frightful problem of how to keep a military expedition 0  "all dressed up and nowhere to 
go"’*7.
Next day Macmillan and Salisbury met U.S. Ambassador Aldrich at Hatfield. They 
wanted to know the American attitude towards referring the dispute to the United Nations. 
Aldrich said that Dulles was strongly opposed to this course. Looking for an explanation, 
Macmillan reasoned that the American position was not due to doubts Dulles might have about 
the legal strength of a complaint against Nasser, but rather to die American fear that the 
Panama Canal would be drawn into a U.N.-discussion of international control of waterways2*.
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26 Clark, ’Whitehall Diary’, entry 15 August 1956, p. 113.
27 Diary entry 18 August 1956, quoted in Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 408.
* Macmillan Riding the Storm, p. 118.
Macmillan noted in his diary that both he and Salisbury found Dulles ’rather "sticky”’, and 
that he could not ’help feeling that he really wants us "to go it alone”, and has been trying to 
help us by creating the right atmosphere’29.
At the same time, pressure was put on participants at the Conference in lunches with 
Eden and apparently handpicked Cabinet members on 16, 17, 21, and 22 August. On IS 
August Eden’s private Secretary, Philip de Zalueta, sent a list of lunch guests30. Included 
were Salisbury, Kilmuir, Lennox Boyd, Monckton, Home, Macmillan, and Thomeycroft, all 
hard-liners, except for Monckton, who at this stage had not yet expressed his doubts. Butler, 
at that stage the Cabinet member least in favour of military action, was conveniently on 
holiday between IS and 21 August.
The pressure on the Americans, however, was of no avail. Dulles was not prepared 
to lead the delegation to Nasser, despite his strong speech at the opening of the Conference. 
Things looked even worse when Eden told the Egypt Committee on 20 August that Dulles had 
said to him that the United States could neither increase her economic pressure on Egypt nor 
block the payment of transit dues by American ships ’since this would lead to difficulties with 
the U.S. Treasury over the control of Egyptian Government holdings in the United States’31. 
The withholding of transit dues had been seen as a way of provoking Nasser into retaliation. 
Yet, American support of this measure was obviously indispensable.
This may then explain the meeting of a small group of senior ministers just before the 
mid-day Cabinet on 21 August. The crisis-like proportions of the situation are evident from 
Macmillan’s diary notes of that day: Macmillan clearly opposed the possibility that a 
committee, which would be sent to Nasser, would engage in negotiations. It should only give 
’explanations and elucidations’. Negotiating would be ’very alarming. It’s too much like 
Canossa’32. The informal meeting therefore clearly faced an equivocal outcome of the 
situation; once again, provocative action against Egypt was seriously considered33.
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30 De Zalueta to Monckton, 15 August 1956, Monckton papers, 6(139-141), Bodleian Library, 
Oxford.
31 EC(56)18, Confidential Annex, 20 August 1956, PREM 11/1099.
32 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 108, diary entry, 21 August 1956.
33 The only record which gives a bit of insight into what happened can be found in the files of 
Anthony Head. C.E. Key reported to Head that ’Sir Norman Brook spoke to Sir Richard Powell this 
morning and said that a small group of Ministers thought that it might be a good thing to take some 
provocative action against Egypt and suggested that we might start moving munitions out of the [Suez 
Canal] Base in a rather big way’. C.E. Key to Head, DUS(A)/BM/425,21 August 1956, WO 32/16709.
The dilemma was resolved with the decision to ask Menzies to head the delegation to 
Nasser, but not to give him the authority to negotiate with the Egyptian Government. This was 
coordinated with Dulles. Dulles, Eden, and Lloyd rang Menzies at 2 A.M. and asked him to 
come over to the American Embassy. There they asked him to become chairman of the 
delegation34. Menzies reluctantly agreed, and 22 August was used to put pressure on other 
countries* delegations to accept the proposal that had been worked out by Eden, Dulles, and 
Lloyd. Eventually, 18 out of 22 nations would adopt their proposals.
11.5 Independent variables
Given the structure of the decision making process groupthink is likely to have played 
a role in the period regarding decision 2 (2 August to 22 August, 2 A.M.). Notably the Egypt 
Committee meeting of 9 August with only a small group of Ministers and the informal meeting 
45 minutes before the Cabinet meeting on 21 August suggest that decision making was getting 
more concentrated in the hands of a group even smaller than the regular Egypt Committee.
Can any symptoms of groupthink be discerned ? (1) Self-censorship of personal 
doubts. On 9 August Salisbury wrote a letter to Eden about the possibility of an equivocal 
outcome of the Conference. In his reply Eden suggested that the withholding of shipping dues 
as the solution if Nasser refused international control of die Canal. The problem that Salisbury 
brought up is therefore ignored until it resurfaces when during the Conference it becomes clear 
that Dulles does not want to head a delegation. Rather than discussing the matter in the Egypt 
Committee, Salisbury preferred discussing this matter privately with Eden, and seemed 
temporarily relieved after Eden’s reply. Had the matter been discussed right away, a new, 
surprising situation around 20 August might have been avoided.
(2) Illusion of unanimity. (1) On 2 August when the Chiefs of Staff presented their first 
military plan to the Egypt Committee, the members of the Committee had a tough discussion 
on die importance of going to the United Nations. That night Salisbury wrote a reassuring 
letter to Eden, comforting him that unity was not lost: ’My dear Anthony, I felt today that we 
were very unhelpful with our ifs and ands over the United Nations etc. But, tiresome though 
all these things are -& short though the time is in which decisions have to be made - I really 
think we made some progress Q’M. (2) When during the London Conference delegates of
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this letter that Salisbury himself was at that moment troubled by moral and legal concerns, given the 
next passage in Salisbury’s letter in which be seems to agree with a scheme to ’abuse’ the United
(continued...)
important nations were lunching with Eden, only hard-line British Ministers (or people not yet
known to be dissenting, such as Monckton) were asked to join in. Most important absentee was
Butler, who happened to be on holiday.
(3) Illusion of invulnerability. Some members of the inner circle around Eden were
clearly irritated by criticism. When Eden, Salisbury, and Lloyd met with a Labour delegation
on 14 August, Salisbury had an outburst, according to Eden’s diary: ’Gaitskell gave us a
donnish lecture about the situation of inordinate length but of unremarkable quality. We
listened with all the attention we cd command but suddenly Bobbety [Salisbury] cd take no
more & burst out with indignation that he and the Prime Minister, having spent all their lives
in foreign policy, cd not see the purpose of this lecture Q’36.
The small group of Salisbury, Macmillan, Lloyd, and Eden was also responsible for
interpreting the American attitude to the Cabinet in this period, as they met with Dulles and
Aldrich. While it was therefore an inner circle which actually formed opinion on the United
States position, it was primarily Eden who communicated this to the Egypt Committee and
Cabinet. Here is where individual factors come into play. The most important development,
from the point of the decision making process, is the fact that at the Cabinet meeting on 21
August Eden discussed the American attitude only because he was asked to do so. In his
discussion Eden only referred to the American attitude towards economic measures
(withholding shipping dues, etc.) and not to the question of military action37. He had been
much more straightforward in the Egypt Committee the day before. It is worth quoting his
perception of the United States’ position at some length:
’It had been pointed out to him [Dulles] that the Government of the United 
Kingdom could not accept a long delay in any settlement, since once the 
military preparations had been completed, the forces involved could not be 
maintained in a state of readiness for an indefinite time. Mr. Dulles had 
recognised the value of these military preparations in evincing the 
determination of the United Kingdom to reach a satisfactory settlement, but he 
was not in favour of provoking Colonel Nasser into taking further action 
which would justify the use of military force. He had indicated that if the 
United Kingdom and France became involved in war, United States forces 
would not be able to join in military operations, since the United States 
Government could not justify going to war over oil in the Middle East Q’.
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Nations rather than go there with honest intentions: ’[] Bob Dixon, whom some of us had a word with 
since I saw you, has an idea about a form of reference to the UN which may turn out to have 
advantages over anything we have thought of yet’.
34 Eden’s diary, » try  14 August 1956, quoted by James, Anthony Eden, pp. 492-493.
37 CM(56)60, 21 August 1956.
Nevertheless, Dulles had told Eden that he had warned the Soviet Union’s Foreign Secretary 
Shepilov that the United States would provide material support to Britain and France in case 
of hostilities3*. This suggests that Eden had come close to Macmillan’s (and possibly 
Salisbury’s) opinion that Dulles had implicitly conveyed the message that they wanted the 
United Kingdom and France to go it alone, but that indirect support would be forthcoming.
The organizational context. Finally, it seems evident that part of the decision making 
process had been affected by the military’s change of plans. The Forces* Commanders who 
would have to do the actual fighting had rejected the original idea of landing at Port Said had 
been rejected, because they found it too risky. The alternative that the Chiefs of Staff formally 
presented on 10 August brought further complications, because landing at Alexandria and 
marching in the direction of Cairo was much harder to defend to domestic and international 
public opinion. This clearly was an additional factor that caused the inner circle of Ministers 
to think that somehow provocative action by Egypt would be needed in order to justify the use 
of force against Egypt. For the time being, however, the Menzies mission gave them some 
breathing space.
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Chapter 12: Decision 3: S.C.U.A. and the withdrawal of the pilots
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12.1 The dilemma
The London Conference thus sent Menzies with the Eighteen Powers’ Proposal to 
Cairo. The British Government had assumed that Nasser would either accept 
internationalization of the Canal, or flatly reject the proposals, because the Menzies mission 
had not been given authority to engage in further negotiations. Dulles, meanwhile, who had 
hoped that his diplomatic efforts would cause such a long delay that the feeling of crisis would 
have faded, and force could thus be avoided, thought that France and the United Kingdom 
were not inclined to accept further delay. Menzies first met with Nasser on 3 September, and 
his mission’s proposals were formally rejected by Nasser on 9 September. Dulles, knowing 
that a crisis might be precipitated if Menzies had to leave Cairo without Nasser having 
accepted the Conference’s ideas, came up with the idea of an Association of Users of the Suez 
Canal (later to be baptized S.C.U.A.) to which shipping dues should be paid, a fair share of 
which would be handed over to Egypt.
France and Great Britain were not certain of Dulles’s intentions: was this a proposal 
to de facto internationalize the administration of the Canal, and thus a slap in the face of 
Nasser, or just another stalling technique? Eventually the British Cabinet would adopt the 
S.C.U.A.-proposal on 11 September and agreed that another Conference should be held in 
London in order found this association. But, directly related to this decision, the Egypt 
Committee had taken another important decision on September 7, that is, to ask the Suez Canal 
Company to withdraw its pilots from the Canal, expecting that traffic in the Canal would then 
come to a standstill.
Both decisions should be analyzed in the context of uncertainty, first, about the 
outcome of Menzies mission to Nasser, and, second, about the American position. 1 contend 
that the decision to withdraw the pilots was a deliberate attempt to bring matters to a head, and 
provoke military action, despite the adherence to another diplomatic effort.
12.2 The structure of decision making
Chart 12.1 offers an overview of the decisionmaking process between 2 August, 2.30 
A.M., and 11 September1.
1 It should be realized that Dulles’s proposals regarding a Users’ Association were discussed in 
bilateral exchanges between Washington and the United Kingdom (excluding the French), and within 
certain Whitehall circles, but never in public until its formal announcement by Eden in the House of 
Commons on 12 September.
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Chart 12.1: decision making structure of decision 4
22 Aug
23 Aug
11.00 A.M.
11.30 A.M.
morning
11.00 A.M.
11.30 A.M.
12.15 P.M.
03.00 P.M.
24 Aug 10.00 A.M. 
noon 
??
??
26 Aug ??
27 Aug 06.00 P.M.
28 Aug 10.00 A.M.
11.00 A.M. 
03.30 P.M.
29 Aug 03.30 P.M. 
evening
4 Sep 01.00 P.M.
06.00 P.M.
5 Sep afternoon
6 Sep 11.00 A.M.
7 Sep morning 
10.00 A.M. 
’later’
02.45 P.M. 
06.15 P.M.
Tripartite consultations: Dulles, Lloyd, Pineau 
Egypt Committee (EC)
London Conference ends 
Tripartite consultations 
EC
Cabinet
Informal meeting of Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, Butler, 
Head, Heath
D(T)C
EC
Eden and Lloyd (together with Beeley from the Foreign 
Office) meet Dulles 
Macmillan meets Dulles
Macmillan meets Monckton
EC
D(T)C 
Cabinet 
EC (suddenly)
Eden and Lloyd meet at 10, Downing St.
Eden telephones Macmillan
Lloyd lunches with Macmillan 
EC
Kirkpatrick and Eden respond to critical letter of Eisenhower 
Cabinet
Eden and Monckton meet Chiefs of Staff 
D(T)C
Keithley meets Eden 
EC
Eden and Lloyd meet at 10, Downing St.
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10 Sep 12.30 P.M. Lloyd meets Macmillan
01.15 P.M. Lloyd and Eden lunch
03.00 P.M. EC
06.15 P.M. Lloyd and Eden meet Mollet and Pineau at 10, Downing St.
08.15 P.M. Dinner at 10, Downing St. Eden, Lloyd, Mollet, Pineau, and
Menzies
11 Sep 10.00 A.M. D{T)C
03.00 P.M. Cabinet
The records allow for three preliminary conclusions: (1) the decision to ask the Suez 
Canal Company to recall its pilots from Egypt was taken by the Egypt Committee without 
consulting the Cabinet; (2) the decision to accept Dulles’s proposal of a users’ association was 
made after bilateral, instead of trilateral, diplomatic exchanges between the United States and 
Great Britain, without France, in which neither the Egypt Committee, nor die Cabinet were 
involved; (3) the number of informal meetings started increasing, especially during the last 
week of August. All this suggests that by then the Egypt Committee may not have been the 
central unit of decision making, but rather an inner circle of senior ministers. The latter 
suggests a higher probability that individual and group variables come into play. In order to 
systematically analyze their influence it is useful to make a distinction between the periods 
before and after Dulles presented his idea of a users’ association.
12.3 How to respond to the outcome of the Menzies mission
12.3.1 Group variable
As shown earlier, the period preceding the creation of the Menzies Mission was 
increasingly characterized by decision-making by a small group of ministers intent on 
provoking Egypt into action that would justify the use of force. Now, the prospect of using 
force was beginning to cause some uneasiness among members of both the Egypt Committee 
and the Cabinet. On 22 August Butler returned from holiday and must have understood that 
military intervention had come much closer during his absence2. He did not raise any
1 At the EC mwiing of 22 August force must have seemed an accepted option, as it was decided 
to postpone- photographic reconnaissance flights 'at this crucial stage of the international conference’, 
and consequently, to accept a delay of military operations by 3 to 4 days; EC(56)19, 22 August 1956, 
PREM 11/1104.
objections at that time, but aired bis doubts to Lord Home3. Other Cabinet members had the 
same impression as Butler: Duncan Sandys, Minister of Housing and Local Government, 
complained to Eden about die lack of information to the Cabinet about the use of force4. At 
the same time, the Minister of Defence, Sir Walter Monckton, started doubting the wisdom 
of the use of force at this moment, and spoke up during the Egypt Committee’s meeting of 24 
August. The full Cabinet meeting of 28 August was therefore clearly meant to obtain a new 
mandate. The decision making process in this period shows the occurrence of several 
symptoms of groupthink.
1. Illusion of unanimity. Aware of Buder’s anxiety3, Lord Home wrote to Eden on
22 August*. His letter clearly shows that until that moment Butier must have been outside the 
inner circle of decisionmakers, and must have had little contact with Eden. Second, the letter 
testifies of the conviction among members of the inner circle that dissenters were just having 
difficulties with the timing of force, but still fully supported the original analysis and decisions. 
Next day (23 August) Buder was invited to an informal meeting after the full Cabinet. Those 
present, besides Buder, included Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, Edward Heath (Chief Whip), 
and Anthony Head (Secretary of State for War). The small group discussed the possibility of 
provoking Egypt by taking away equipment from the Suez Base, the role of the United Nations
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4 James, Anthony Eden, p. 499.
1 Cf. Clark’s remark that ’[i]n particular Rab [Butler] is discouraged by the whole outlook and has 
come back from holiday a very damping influence’, Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 23 August 1956, 
p. 118.
* It is worth quoting his letter in full length: ’My dear Anthony, I sense that Rab is very unhappy.
I know your time is full but if you could see him alone it would be well worth while. He is not against 
the use of force, but be fears that we have got ourselves into a position where we shall press the button 
before we have a moral basis for action which will carry conviction in this country, the free world and 
die Conservative party. He feels that there should be more flexibility so as to allow time for the fullest 
diplomatic action the extent of which cannot be foreseen. I have told him that the pressing of the button 
is entirely within our control and that an intensive study is being made of the ’casus belli’ and the 
justification for armed intervention. I think his anxiety derives very largely from the f»ct that he was 
away for a fortnight and feels that possibly irrevocable decisions have been taken before the full 
implications of the use of force have been weighed. I may be wrong about this diagnosis but I am 
certainly right about his state of mind and I think if you can see him you can put everything into 
perspective and he will feel he has had a chance to tell you what he feels. I am sony to add this to your 
preoccupation but I thought you should know. Yours, Alec. Rab, of course, does not know I am telling 
you of this.’; Lord Home to Eden, 22 August 1956, PREM 11/1100, quoted by Lamb (1987), p. 206.
(resort to which was ruled out by Dulles’s preoccupation with the Panama Canal) and the right 
moment to recall the House of Commons after any decision to send in the troops7.
An even clearer example of the same phenomenon occurred after Monckton’s sudden 
outburst of opposition against the use of force at the Egypt Committee at 24 August. Lamb 
suggests that this was caused by Eden’s statement at the Cabinet meeting on the day before that 
the use of force would be justifiable under the Charter of the United Nations'. In any case, 
immediately after the meeting at least three participants wrote reassuring letters to Eden. One 
of them, Secretary to the Cabinet Sir Norman Brook, told him not to worry too much about 
Monckton’s behaviour:
’I don’t think that W[alter] M[onckton]’s statement, at the Friday meeting, 
need be taken too seriously. I think he [unreadable], that it was ill judged and 
ill timed. He was provoked into it by H[arold] M[acmillan]’s speaking as 
though we were deciding there and then on the date of the operation. Q As I 
see it, the position is this. All the members of the Cabinet, without exception, 
are solidly in agreement with you that we cannot afford to let Nasser get away 
with this Q. The Cabinet are therefore agreed that we must stop this at all cost 
and that, in the last resort, if all other methods fail, we must be ready to use 
force’9.
Two others, Salisbury and Home, were clearly worried Cabinet that support for a tough line 
was weakening. Home saw ’a definite wavering in the attitude of some of our colleagues 
towards the use of force’. Both he, Salisbury, and Brook pointed out to Eden that some 
Cabinet members, notably Butler, Monckton, MacLeod, Selkirk, and Amory, were anxious 
not to use force before all diplomatic means had been exhausted: ’[t]he anxieties of some, Rab 
for instance, might be removed if we didn’t have to go on thinking in terms of button pushing 
and dates and had plenty of time for diplomatic manoeuvre’. All three warned Eden not to rush 
things and to avoid creating too large a distance between the full Cabinet and the Egypt 
Committee. These remarks suggests that the individual factor, that is, the way Eden handled 
the decision making process, might have been of importance (see 12.3.2)10.
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2. Self-censorship of personal doubts. Although Butler discussed his doubts with 
Monckton and Home, he never raised them openly or explicitly until the full Cabinet meeting 
on 28 August when he said that more time was needed before military action could take place. 
That means that Butler had accepted the idea of provoking Egypt into a incident that might 
justify the start of hostilities, such as at die informal meeting of 23 August. Home later 
recalled that ’Rab was constantly asking us all what we thought. In the end he always 
supported the Prime Minister’s decisions with the rest of the Cabinet’11.
3. Direct pressure on dissenting group members. After Monckton’s outburst at the 
Egypt Committee meeting of 24 August, Macmillan made an attempt to get him back in line. 
Eden’s press secretary, William Clark, talked with Monckton on Monday 27 August: ’He 
[Monckton] told me [Clark] that he had spent die day with Macmillan on Sunday being 
toughened up. What PM [Eden] and HM [Macmillan] seem to want is agreement to go in if 
Nasser refuses to accept internationalization. WM [Monckton] refused’13. Macmillan’s 
pressure was of no avail, as Monckton would repeat his objections at the Cabinet on 28 
August. Yet he too would finally agree to the Cabinet’s decision that day that *[a]s soon we 
were satisfied that a just setdement could not be secured through the machinery of the United 
Nations, we should ourselves take other steps to secure it’13. Not even Monckton therefore 
would go so far as rejecting force outright, and, presumably, resigning from the government.
12.3.2 Individual variable: directive leadership
Much of the internal dissent of Buder and Monckton seems related to the way Eden, 
and to a certain extent, Macmillan dominated the decision making process. Indeed, both Home 
and Brook would advise Eden to play die game slowly.
William Clark, who had lunch with several key participants on a regular basis 
throughout die crisis, noticed a hurried decision making style on 23 August. After a lunch with 
Lord Home he records: ’he [Home] regrets Q the hurry with which the PM pushed that vital 
decision [to use force] through [the] Cabinet without time for a proper decision’14. A few 
days later he had a conversation with Walter Monckton, who made it clear to him ’that PM
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11 Home in a letter to Richard Lamb, quoted by Lamb, Failure of the Eden Government, p. 206.
12 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 27 August 1956, p. 121.
13 CM(56)62, 28 August 1956.
14 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 23 August 1956, p. 118.
is pressing Cabinet to decide for force. WM said that at last Friday’s Cabinet15 he had to 
speak up when PM and Chancellor were trying to rush things through Q’16.
Brook and Home warned Eden not to push the full Cabinet too hard. Brook wrote that 
’[a)ll this leads me to the view that it would be a mistake to put the Cabinet at the final fence 
too soon’; Home suggested Eden to use the planned Cabinet on 28 August to ’get their [the 
doubters’] feelings off their chest so that you should know where you are. [] You will know 
how to handle all this, but I am sure you should encourage those who have not been on the 
Egypt Committee to be frank and outspoken’17. All this suggests that Eden (and Macmillan) 
were in a hurry to have permission to move into Egypt without much delay. Moreover, it 
testifies to the relative isolation of Eden (and his inner circle) from the rest of the Cabinet. 
What considerations had caused all this hurry and protests ?
12.3.3 Perceptions of dilemma’s
The most pressing dilemma between 22 and 28 August was the need to respond to 
Nasser’s expected refusal of the 18 Powers Proposals. In a note, given to Eden just before the 
Egypt Committee meeting of 24 August, Salisbury sketches the dilemma that on the one hand 
diplomatic moves would be advisable, given international and national public opinion, but that 
on the other hand further diplomacy ’would weaken our power to resort to force’ and entailed 
the danger that Nasser could ’get away with it’1'.  One way to sooth public opinion would be 
to refer the matter to the United Nations. Indeed on 23 August, the Egypt Committee had 
recognized that recourse to the Security Council seemed unavoidable, but that it would 
compromise military planning. The Committee ’invited the Foreign Secretary to consider how 
the machinery of the United Nations could best be used to present the case of the United 
Kingdom for any military action against Egypt’19. Yet neither these considerations nor this 
invitation were mentioned to the Cabinet meeting that started 45 minutes after this Egypt
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17 Brook to Eden, 25 August 1956; Home to Eden, 24 August 1956, PREM 11/1152.
11 Salisbury to Eden, 24 August 1956, PREM 11/1100.
19 EC(56)20, Confidential Annex, 23 August 1956, PREM 11/1100.
Committee meeting30. The informal meeting immediately after the Cabinet at 3 P.M.
discussed the best date to recall Parliament so as to avoid too much opposition21.
Obviously then, Lloyd’s assignment to see how the use of force could best be
reconciled with reference to the U.N. was an illusory attempt to satisfy both public opinion
and the need to quickly proceed after the Menzies mission. Lloyd immediately asked Sir
Pierson Dixon, British Ambassador to the United Nations, who happened to be in London,
what to do. Dixon suggested simply informing the Security Council of the dispute. If this was
not to be done, other nations would try ’to prolong the period of negotiation and possibly also
to extract some commitment from us in regard to not using methods of force’. The best thing
would be to let the meeting of the Security Council end without it voting on any resolution,
an unusual, but not illegal move22. On 26 August, after having read Dixon’s suggestion, Eden
wrote to Lloyd and Salisbury that he thought the Security Council far too dangerous a place,
and wondered whether referring the matter to NATO or the Western European Union would
not be a solution. In their responses Lloyd and Salisbury wrote that sooner or later they would
have to go to the United Nations anyway23.
The acute dilemma of having to anticipate Nasser’s rejection of the 18 Powers
Proposals provoked the reoccurrence of the fundamental dilemma Great Britain was perceived
to be facing at this moment by most policymakers. Macmillan recorded in his diary
’The truth is that we are caught in a terrible dilemma. If we take strong action 
against Egypt, and as a result the Canal is closed, the pipelines to the Levant 
are cut, the Persian Gulf revolts and oil production is stopped-then U.K. and 
Western Europe have "had it"’ Q; if we suffer a diplomatic defeat, if Nasser 
"gets away with it”, Nuri [Prime Minister of British d i m  state Iraq] falls, and 
the Middle East countries, in a ferment, "nationalise oil" 0 we have equally 
"had it”. What then are we to do ? It seems clear that we should take the only 
chance we have - to take strong action, and hope that thereby our friends in 
Middle East will stand, our enemies fall, and the oil will be saved, but it is a 
tremendous decision’34.
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’if the Government had obtained a vote in the House, as suggested above, they could refuse to allow  
further discussion during this period on grounds of military security*.
22 Pierson Dixon to Selwyn Lloyd, 23 August 1056, seen by Eden on 25 August, PREM 11/1100.
s  Eden to Lloyd, 26 August 1956, PREM 11/1100.
24 Macmillan diary entry 25 August 1956, quoted in Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. pp. 410-411. 
Macmillan had expressed this perception of a choice between two negative alternatives also to Dulles, 
before the latter left London on 24 August. Macmillan told him that ’we had no alternative, if we could
(continued...)
The Cabinet meeting of 28 August therefore had to deal with internal opposition, with 
international and national public opinion against the background of having to take a decision 
that dealt with the expected failure of the Menzies mission. The discussion seems to have been 
dominated by several hardliners Macmillan, Home, Salisbury, and Kilmuir, against whom 
Monckton and, to a lesser extent, Butler, spoke up.
Monckton’s objections were not as strong as those he had raised at the Egypt 
Committee four days earlier. Now, he agreed that ’if all other methods proved unavailing, 
force would have to be used. On the other hand the Cabinet should weigh the disadvantages 
of using force’25. My interpretation is that this Cabinet meeting was well-prepared, not to say 
stage-managed, by a small group of Ministers in order to sway the Cabinet so as to reduce the 
possible harm of an intervention by Monckton. First of all, Eden opens with a concession by 
accepting referring the matter to the United Nations, thus relieving those Cabinet members, 
such as Duncan Sandys, who were afraid that the button would have to be pushed any minute. 
Only then an important memorandum is distributed, instead of handing it out before the 
meeting, followed by a speech by Macmillan illustrating the high stakes, backed up by Lennox 
Boyd, another hardliner26. After Monckton’s objections Salisbury draws a parallel with Hitler 
and Mussolini. This theme is seldom explicitly mentioned in the minutes of either the Cabinet 
or Egypt Committee, yet I take it that there was a deliberate attempt to persuade the full 
Cabinet to continue supporting the original line of policy. Kilmuir’s exposition on the 
lawfulness of military action must fall into the same category. I think it is therefore a bit 
exaggerated to call this Cabinet meeting a ’full review of the situation’27. The inner circle had
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not get our way by diplomatic pressure, but to resort to force’; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, diary 
entry 24 August 1956, p. 108.
25 Ibid.. T imh therefore calls him ’only a wishy-washy opponent of war’ in the full Cabinet, Failure
of the Eden Government, p. 208.
36 T winnT Boyd had written to Eden, after Monckton’s outburst on 24 August, ’I was horrified by 
the doubts expressed by the Minister of Defence. All these difficulties stood out miles when we first 
«unhaAftH on our policy Q’. If Nasser ’wins or even appears to win, we might as well as a Government 
(and indeed as a country) go out of business’, Lennox Boyd to Eden, 24 August 1956, PREM 11/1102, 
quoted in Lamb, Failure of the Eden Government, p. 207.
27 James, Anthony Eden, p. 411.
thus preserved unity and expected to carry public opinion by referring the matter to the United 
Nations2*.
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12.4 Dulles comes u p  with the users* association
So far, two assumptions had guided British decision making: first, a quick and clear 
rejection or acceptance by Nasser of the Menzies mission, and, secondly, American support 
for going to die United Nations. No sooner had the Cabinet agreed to go to the United 
Nations, than both assumptions were proven to be false, thus creating another problematic 
situation. First of all, Nasser had taken his time in receiving Menzies and discussing and 
answering the proposals his mission had brought to Egypt. This delay much angered Eden. He 
called Macmillan on 29 August, after the news had broken that Nasser had finally agreed to
* The minutes give a fair picture of how the hardliners structured the decision making process: 
Eden, apparently convinced by Salisbury and Lloyd, opened the meeting by stating that it would now 
be better to refer the matter to the United Nations in order to carry public opinion both at home and in 
the United States and because ’a Russian veto Q would demonstrate clearly the obstructive nature of 
Communist tactics*. Next a paper was handed out which explained (1) that the costs of a military 
operation could be borne if a large crisis were avoided and (2) that Britain’s national economy depended 
largely on Middle East oil (this memorandum had been distributed to the Egypt Committee on 27 
August; EC(56)22, 27 August 1956, EC Paper EC(56)35). Macmillan presented the paper by arguing 
that Nasser's ambitions threatened those supplies both directly (through the Canal) and indirectly (by 
his increased influence in the Middle East). In the discussion that followed, Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial 
Secretary, added that the Governors had communicated that if 'this contest between Colonel Nasser and 
the Western powers* were won by Nasser, then British influence in Aden, Somaliland, and Kenya would 
vanish. The same would be true for British influence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf area. The conclusion 
therefore was that the entire position in the Middle East was in danger of being undermined and the 
stability of the national economy threatened.
Then Monckton spelled out the disadvantages of the use of force. They included (1) the 
opposition of British and Commonwealth public opinion to military action, (2) the division such action 
would cause within the United Kingdom, (3) sabotage that might be expected from Arab countries, such 
as the cutting of pipelines, and (4) the problem, so far hardly thought of, that once British forces would 
move into Egypt, they would have to stay there. Monckton therefore preferred a diplomatic settlement.
After he had spoken, Salisbury drew a parallel with the 1930s: ’experience with Italy, and later 
with Germany, had surely shown that if the encroachments of a dictator were not checked at the outset, 
when comparatively little strength was needed to check them, the ultimate reckoning involved a far 
greater convulsion and a much greater sacrifice’. Next, Kilmuir, referring to an article in The Times 
by Goodhart, a Professor of International Law, tried to prove that Great Britain and France had a very 
strong case both morally and under international law.
Then, Butler spoke of the importance of having the support of domestic public opinion, and 
suggested that, first, all other diplomatic means should have been tried. Eden answered that France was 
’afraid of hesitancy on our part’, and that Nasser would be looking for signs of weakness. Too much 
lingering would therefore endanger military operations: 'a stage would soon be reached [] at which it 
would become difficult to preserve any large measures of flexibility in the military plan*. The final 
conclusion reached was that ’as soon as we were satisfied that a just settlement could not be secured 
through the machinery of the UN, we should ourselves take other steps to secure it’; all evidence and 
quotes come from CM(56)62, 28 August 1956.
see Menzies on 3 September, and said: ’these delays are really intolerable’29. Intolerable they 
were: for the British military timetable, that is. Nasser’s eventual rejection of the proposals 
would not come until 9 September. By that date, events had been overtaken by a surprising 
American reaction to Lloyd’s invitation to Dulles on 28 August to coordinate an approach to 
the United Nations30. On 4 September Dulles communicated through the British Ambassador 
in Washington, Roger Makins, his idea of a users’ association. British policymakers were 
puzzled by this new American move31.
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12.4.1 Individual factors: directive leadership
As the decision to refer the matter to the United Nations was meant to remain a secret 
until the Menzies Mission had completed its task, and because the negotiations between the 
American Government and the United Kingdom on a users’ association were conducted 
through diplomatic exchanges, decision making during the first week of September shifted to 
the highest level, as Eden wished to be closely involved with Lloyd’s handling of foreign 
policy. The dynamics of Anglo-American relations in this period, and therefore the acceptance 
of the principle of a users’ association carries the personal mark of Anthony Eden.
Eden was worried by Eisenhower’s letter of 3 September which Clark judged ’most 
devastating’ at the time: ’it is this which has brought the PM racing back almost in despair’32. 
Eisenhower’s telegram was a clear argument against the use of force, because ’American
v Macmillan diary entry 29 August 1956, quoted in Horne, Macmillan 1894-1956. p. 411.
30 Lloyd stressed that ’as you know, it is our intention to proceed with our plans unless Nasser can 
be seen clearly and decisively to have given in’, Lloyd to Dulles, Telegram 3931, 28 August 1956. 
Significantly, the British preferred to deal with the Americans first, and to involve the French only later; 
Lloyd to Jebb, Telegram 1501, 28 August 1956, PREM 11/1100.
31 Before Dulles’s move, some members of the inner group had already started doubting the 
American attitude. Macmillan, who had been confident of American support for going to the U.N., 
wrote to Eden on 27 August that the United States Government did not block private Egyptian accounts 
or 'fresh accruals to the Egyptian Government Q. This does not seem to be a very logical course’. Two 
days later, Makins reported a conversation with Dulles in which Dulles had 'agreed that the general 
concept of excluding military action until recourse had been had to the UN was a sound one’. Makins, 
however, described Dulles as 'legalistic and completely non-committal'. Some attempts were made to 
negotiate a trilateral policy towards the United Nations: Embassy officials discussed coordination with 
Dulles’s officials. Topics included to contingency of a Soviet veto, and the possibility of invoking the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Foreign Office replied that ‘we have no intention of using this 
procedure and hope to be able to block any move by the opposition to invoke it’; Makins to Foreign 
Office, Telegram 1761, 29 August 1956, PREM 11/1100; Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, 
Telegram 1788, 1 September 1956; Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, Telegram 4018, 4 
September 1956, PREM 11/1100. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 108, diary entry 24 August 1956.
32 Clark, 'Whitehall diary’, entry 5 September 1956, p. 125.
public opinion flatly rejects the thought of using force, particularly when it does not seem that 
every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital interests has been exhausted without 
result’. Worse, Eisenhower thought that going to the U.N. at this very moment would be 
wrong, and preferred proceeding with die Menzies mission, even if it ’may M l to give the 
setback to Nasser that he so much deserves’33.
Eden was clearly disappointed by Eisenhower’s opposition to the use of force34.
The very day Eisenhower’s letter was the hot news in Whitehall, the American 
President dealt another blow to British optimism by declaring to the American press that ’we 
are committed to a peaceful settlement of this dispute, nothing else’. This was considered to 
take out any pressure Menzies’s mission could have on Nasser33. Interestingly, Macmillan 
tried to interpret Eisenhower’s declaration as fitting with British objectives: ’Q read carefully, 
the last phrase could be interpreted to refer only to present undertakings’36.
Eden must therefore have welcomed Dulles’s idea of a users’ association as a possible 
way of extracting a commitment of the United States to a hard line towards Nasser, which 
Eisenhower’s letter seemed to have excluded. His message to Makins in Washington makes 
it clear that by endorsing a users’ association die United States would be obliged to pay its 
shipping dues no longer to Nasser, but to the new association37. In addition, he still expected 
the Americans to go to the United Nations with the United Kingdom and France.
At the Cabinet meeting on 6 September Eden gave a reasonably correct summary of 
Eisenhower’s letter by explaining that the United States Government was worried that Britain 
and France were to use force before all other means had been tried. However, he did not tell 
his Ministers that Eisenhower doubted whether force should be used at all. Significantly, Eden 
preferred to rely on Dulles’s message on die users’ association and told the Cabinet that
252
70 Eisenhower’s letter is printed in Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, pp. 118-120.
34 Eden’s scribbled some remarks on Eisenhower’s message, which testified to his disillusion. Above 
the telegram, he wrote ’US was in favour of our continuing moves’. Next to the passage, in which 
Eisenhower suggests that if united diplomacy were conducted the chances would be greater that Nasser 
would give way without the need for any resort to force, Eden wrote: ’Foster [Dulles] advocated going 
on. AE\ When Eisenhower used the economic burden of prolonged military operations as another 
argument against the use of force, Eden underlined the word ’prolonged ’. Was he thinking that 
Eisenhower might accept a military intervention, if only it were swift? Eisenhower to Eden, 3 September 
1956, PREM 11/1100.
M Cf. Menzies’s disappointment with Eisenhower’s press conference. Afternoon Light, p. 165.
*  Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 117.
37 Eden to Washington Embassy, Telegram 4032, 5 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
Dulles’s letter showed ’that our continued firmness was having the effect of encouraging the 
United States Government to consider further means of bringing pressure to bear on Egypt’3*. 
The Cabinet discussed and agreed to the draft response to Eisenhower, drawn up by the 
Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick. This letter was ’really a very 
noble bit of prose saying we should rather die fighting than live with a thumb on our jugular 
vein. This is also supported by long analogies with the Rhineland, 1936, episode which is 
clearly in the forefront of the PM’s mind’39.
While the French reluctantly agreed to go to the United Nations, and a draft resolution 
was already circulating between Washington, London, and Paris40, Dulles had changed his 
mind and suggested that it would be unwise to go to the United Nations now, and preferred 
to exhaust the possibilities of the 1888 Constantinople Convention first, implying that one 
should first try the users’ association. This left the British completely in the dark as to his real 
intentions. Dulles had said that a resolution in the Security Council would make the parties 
engage in new negotiations. Egypt would ’prolong it and finally break it off and then we would 
be precisely where we are today’. Eden marked this passage with his pencil, and must have 
been uncertain as to Dulles’s intentions: did he want a tough policy on Nasser, or was this just 
another stalling technique?41. That day Dixon, British Ambassador to the United Nations, 
warned Eden not to go to the United Nations without the Americans, as they might then ’even 
feel obliged to support another country’s resolution ’not to use force without further recourse 
to the Council’42.
Lloyd responded, with Eden consenting, that ’Mr. Dulles’s response is most 
disappointing. We seem to be further apart than at any time since July 26’. 0 Any further 
dawdling along will be fatal’43. Clearly, Eden and Lloyd must have been in despair about the 
Americans’ attitude. In this context of different wordings and proposals by Eisenhower and 
Dulles, and of Dulles, apparently ambiguous, it does not seem odd that the Egypt Committee
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* CM(56)63, 6 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
39 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 5 September 1956, p. 125.
40 Printed in Eden, Full Circle, pp. 460-461.
41 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegram 1823,7 September 1956; Washington Embassy 
to Foreign Office, Telegram 1829, 8 September 1956.
42 Dixon recommended simply writing a letter to the Council’s chairman. Dixon to Foreign Office, 
Telegram 650, 8 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
43 Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, Telegram 4102, 8 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
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decided that the Company’s pilots should be pulled out of the Canal in order to create chaos,
and possibly, a pretext for military intervention44.
Later that day, 8 September, Roger Makins sent Eisenhower’s reply to Eden’s letter
of 6 September. Eisenhower told Eden that he was ’making Nasser a much more important
figure than he is*. Force was to be avoided because it would make Nasser an Arab hero. But,
ambiguously, Eisenhower wrote that there was no public support as vet (emphasis mine) for
military intervention. In short, Eisenhower recommended a slow approach through the users’
association45. However, Eisenhower’s restraint letter was delivered together with Makins’s
account of his conversation with Dulles, when the Secretary of State handed over Eisenhower’s
message. Dulles’s words went clearly further than Eisenhower’s:
’you must not think that the United States Administration were not as deeply 
concerned as Her Majesty’s Government Q, but they saw no end to the 
consequences of military intervention. It would be possible to occupy several 
key points, but in the President’s view there were not enough troops and 
resources to put out all the fires that would be started’. Nevertheless, ’the 
President did not exclude the use of force in the last resort [margin marked by 
Eden], Between us we could get Nasser down and the United States 
Administration were quite determined that this should happen. If Nasser 
obstructed the Canal and used force, they would use it too. But they did not 
believe that the methods and the tempo which we were advocating were the 
right ones []. Mr. Dulles said he regards his proposal [users’ association] as 
a temporary one which might perhaps last for a year’ [double line in the 
margin by Eden].46 *He [Dulles] believes that there were acceptable courses 
between occupation of the Canal and yielding to Nasser, and he was trying to 
work one out. Q On parting he said he realised our need to collaborate with 
die French. Nevertheless, this was a complication for the administration. It 
was much easier for them to work these problems out with us. They distrusted 
French security in general, not only from the technical standpoint’47.
Now this must have been a puzzling situation. Eisenhower rejects force; Dulles accepts it 
under specific circumstances, e.g., in response to Egypt’s obstruction of the Canal, or, in the 
last resort; moreover, Dulles seemed to exclude the occupation of certain key points only on 
practical military grounds, not on political; more importantly, Dulles suggests that the 
Americans agreed to the immediate British objective, that is, Nasser’s downfall; and, last but 
not least, Dulles refers to Anglo-American cooperation. Undoubtedly, die latter was an attempt
44 EC(56)25, 7 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
45 Eisenhower’s letter is printed in Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, pp. 123-125.
44 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegram 1839, 8 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
47 Washington Embassy to Foreign office, Telegram 1840, 8 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
by Dulles to separate the British from the much more aggressive French, but it is much more 
likely, given the prevailing British perception of the nature of Anglo-American relations (see 
chapters 3 and 7), that British policymakers would interpret this as the United States asking 
the United Kingdom to lead the dance.
Under this dilemma, the solution to recall the Company’s pilots, while simultaneously 
abandoning the idea to go to die United Nations forthwith, and adopting the idea of a users’ 
association, must have seemed ideal. By appearing to comply with the United States’ 
preference for diplomatic means, the Americans would become more closely involved through 
the paying of shipping dues to the association, and American consent to stronger measures 
might still be won if the shipping in the Canal would break down due to the absence of 
competent pilots41. Moreover, it would satisfy the French who were becoming impatient over 
all these hesitations. Thus, the withdrawal of the pilots was finally announced on 11 
September49. A fortnight later it would appear that Nasser could perfectly manage the traffic 
in the Canal.
It should therefore be concluded that Eden, and, to a lesser extent, Lloyd were at the 
centre of British communications with the United States regarding the United Nations and the 
users’ association. Although the specific characteristics of Eden’s operational code do not add 
to an understanding of the decision making process, it seems that Eden, and Lloyd, for that 
matter, perceived the American attitude according to the so-called attitudinal prism: they 
assumed that Great Britain and the United States had the same objectives in the Middle East. 
Traditionally, the United States always had to be cajoled into supporting British policies in the 
area: withdrawing the pilots and the users’ association seemed two perfect methods to bring 
the Americans over to the British side.
255
m The idea of withdrawing the pilots had been entertained by the Egypt Committee for a long time, 
but did not become part of the agenda until the first week of September as one of the alternative policies 
by which the Egyptian Government might be provoked into an armed conflict: on 5 September Harold 
Watldnson, Minister of Transport, had explained to Monckton and Lloyd what was likely to happen, 
if the Suez Canal Company were asked to withdraw the pilots. It would eventually lead to abrogation 
of the 1954 treaty with Egypt and the sending of troops to the Canal zone; Watkinson to Monckton, 5 
September 1956; Watkinson to Lloyd 5 September 1956, Monckton Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, 
6(168-170), 6(171).
* The French Foreign Minister, Christian Pineau, was afraid that Dulles would try and stop the 
pilots’ leaving Egypt. He said England and France should ’dig our toes in and say firmly "no*’ to 
Dulles. As a matter of fact, Pineau had already conveyed his opinion that the Americans ’will never 
authorize any action likely to provoke the fall of Nasser, at any rate until after the American elections, 
which could mean that we should never be able to take such action at all’, Jebb to Foreign Office, 
Telegrams 294 and 295, 9 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
However, not only the American attitude created a provocative context in which Eden 
must have felt obliged to act both strongly and in a restrained way at die same time. Two more 
pieces of information added to the pressure. First, the appearance of a memo which made it 
clear that a trade embargo against Egypt would be as damaging to Great Britain as to Egypt. 
Second, when Eden and Monckton met with the Chiefs of Staff in the morning of 7 September 
1956, they presented yet another change of military plans. This brings us to the influence of 
organizational variables.
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12.4.2 The influence of the organiMtinnal cnntert
In their proposal of 7 September, the Chiefs of Staff abandoned the idea of landing at 
Alexandria, and returned to their first choice of Port Said. James points out that the traditional 
explanation of this change of plans is a political one: that politicians found Port Said more 
attractive than Alexandria because it could be better justified in face of public opinion90. The 
curious point is, however, that the members of the Egypt Committee were particularly angry 
with the military for the change of plan, which implied more postponement, and new 
preparations31. The records are of little avail. It appears that Eden was much frustrated by 
the comments of his military staff. The curious thing is that he interpreted their report as an 
urge to move ahead at a time when international and national support was not yet sufficient33. 
It is much more likely that the Chiefs of Staff tried to impress the Egypt Committee with the 
problem of civilian casualties and the need for strengthening moral support for action, while 
at the same conveying the message that military operations might soon be thwarted by bad
* Cf. Fullick and Power, Suez: The Double War, pp. 55-56.
31 James concludes that the thing remains unexplained; Horne suggests that the new plan was 
Mountbatten’s initiative, supported by Hailsham, as he was afraid of a large number of civilian 
casualties; Janies, Anthony Eden, pp. 507-509; Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 413; no source is 
mentioned, however.
32 Monckton circulated the Chiefs’ report to senior Ministers on 6 September. The report first sets
out the consequences of further delay of military operations. Only towards the end do they propose the
new plan, Musketeer Revise. The Chiefs remark that after 6 October weather conditions in the Eastern
Mediterranean would worsen to such an extent that military action might have to be postponed until
Spring 1957. Eden wrote in the margin of his copy: ’Non sense’. Next, the Chiefs point out that action
before 6 October permitted 10 days of further delay, but no more. Moreover, things would be
complicated by the fact that by that time Soviet submarines with Egyptian personnel would arrive in the
Eastern Mediterranean. In the margin Eden wrote: ’they favoured postponement’. Clearly then, Eden
thought that the Chiefs of Staff were pressing for a quick decision. The new plan involved an attack on
Port Said instead of Alexandria. The Chiefs added: ’it is G of the greatest importance that this invasion
of Egypt is launched with our moral case unassailable*. Eden wrote: ’yet be won’t delay to strengthen
it’; PREM 11/1100, EC memo EC(56)43, 6 September 1956.
weather. Thus they might have attempted to persuade the politicians to realize that force might 
not be a real option after all.
More evidence of peculiar military planning comes from a letter of Watkinson, 
Minister of Transport55, to Monckton on 7 September. Watkinson opened by saying that ’I 
am afraid I have some very awkward things to raise at the Egypt Committee this afternoon and 
as most of them concern the Services, particularly the Army, I thought I ought to give you 
some warning as I have not been able to see you. It is against this background that I must say 
that it seems to me that the Army are grossly over-estimating the number of vehicles they 
require’. Watkinson explained that the Army allocated one vehicle to every three men, and 
that, by consequence, too many civilian transport ships had to be requisitioned. This would 
soon lead to economic and political difficulties. People would start wondering why so many 
ships were needed54.
The question thus arises whether (parts of) the Services, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, contributed to further delays of military operation by their method of 
meticulous planning. Certainly, the volte face in the planning of the Chief of Staff seems 
peculiar. The point of civil casualties is a relevant one, but the really relevant question is not 
as much the change of plan itself, but its timing55. Fortunately, it is not essential for this 
study to discuss the intentions of the Chiefs of Staff. It can safely be said that the very 
presentation of Musketeer Revise at that moment structured the political decision making 
process. It implied a further delay of at least two weeks. Exploring the possibilities of a users’ 
association might thus be a welcome method of keeping up the pressure on Egypt and raising 
more international support.
12.5 The decision to adopt S.C.U.A.
On the day that the Chiefs of Staff presented their new ideas, the news came through 
that Nasser had rejected the 18 Powers’ proposals, presented to him by the Menzies Mission; 
this called for a strong response, but military action was not an immediate option, because the
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53 Not a member of the Cabinet, but a regular attendant of the Egypt Committee.
54 Watkinson to Monckton, DEFE 13/12, 7 September 1956.
55 Why did the military come up with Musketeer Revise only on 6 September? It could be suggested 
that for those who did not know about the plans for a users’ association (and the Chiefs did not), it must 
have seemed that military intervention was imminent, because no-one expected Nasser to accept the 
proposals put forward to him by Menzies. It may have been the case that the military did not want to 
fight, at least not at that moment under such circumstances, with the plans at hand. Suggesting 
Miislrrtftgr Revise should then be interpreted as a stalling technique.
military’s new ideas had caused another fortnight’s delay and because the Americans seemed 
opposed to it at this moment. The adoption of the idea of a users* association and the 
withdrawal of the pilots seemed an attractive way out. The consequence, however, was that 
the policymakers faced a new set of dilemmas. First, no full commitment had yet been 
obtained from the Americans that they would turn such a users’ association into an instrument 
of keeping pressure on Egypt. Yet, the failure of the Menzies mission required the 
Government to show that the United States, France, and Great Britain were able to make a 
powerful diplomatic move. Second, die end of die Menzies mission obliged the Government 
to answer questions in Parliament, and it was expected that the Opposition would try to extract 
a promise from the Government not to use force unless recourse to the United Nations had 
been taken, an option to which the United States was strongly opposed.
The aspect which worried British policymakers most was the prospect of Nasser 
’getting away with it’. Between die Egypt Committee’s meeting of 7 September and the 
Cabinet’s adoption of the users’ association on 11 September perceptions of what was at stake 
were narrowed down to the loss of British prestige if Nasser should seem to have successfully 
resisted Western diplomatic pressure. Macmillan pointed the gloomiest picture and, once again, 
sketched a choice between two negative outcomes: ’[w]e shall be ruined either way; but we 
shall be more inevitably and finally ruined if we are humiliated’16. Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, who 
had drafted Eden’s response to Eisenhower’s letter of 3 September, wrote of his 
disappointment at Eisenhower’s reaction to that response, indicating that, according to him, 
Great Britain would be wrecked within a year, or two. He thought Dulles’ users’ association 
scheme impractical, which ’would leave us with no other choice, but the use of force or to 
surrender to Nasser’57.
It was therefore important to try to obtain a commitment from the Americans to pay 
shipping dues to the new organization and to use that money as a leverage to influence Egypt’s 
policies. Moreover, at this instance it was necessary to act unitedly with the Americans. Thus
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57 Kirkpatrick to Makins, Telegram 4144, 10 September 1956, FO 800/740. ’I wish the President 
were right. But I am convinced that he is wrong. Nasser in himself is not an important figure, nor can 
Egypt by beroelf deal us a mortal blow. But if we sit back whilst Nasser consolidates his position and 
gradually acquires control of the oil bearing countries, be can and is, according to our information, 
resolved to wreck us. If the Middle East is denied to us for a year or two our gold reserves will 
disappear. If our gold reserves disappear, the sterling area will disintegrate. If die sterling area 
disintegrates and we have no reserves, we «Hall not be able to maintain a force in Germany or, indeed, 
anywhere else. I doubt whether we shall be able to pay for the bare minimum necessary for our defence. 
And a country which cannot provide for its defence, is finished’.
Lloyd’s flow of telegrams to Washington to attain both objectives, in which Lloyd pointed out 
that if the Government were not able to offer a users’ association to the House of Commons, 
it would not be able to refuse Parliament’s expected request to go to the Security Council. This 
clearly was meant as a way to put pressure on the Americans, as the Cabinet had already 
accepted to go to the United Nations, before Dulles came up with his new idea. Much more 
relevant to understand the British Government’s mood was another of Lloyd’s considerations: 
’This D rejection [of the Menzies mission’s proposals] will be a second blow to Western 
influence in the Middle East unless it is followed at once by a statement of a clear and decisive 
Western policy in the light of it’**.
No decisive American commitment as to the payment of shipping dues was obtained, 
however. The decision of the Egypt Committee to adopt the plan for a users’ association must 
therefore be explained by the British confidence that Americans could be cajoled into accepting 
such strong measures. Macmillan wrote on 8 September: ’It is vital to keep the pressure up 
on our American friends’, and on the 9th: ’the more we can persuade them [the Americans] 
of our determination to risk everything in order to beat Nasser, the more help we shall get 
from them’39. Macmillan’s analysis points to the common orientation of British foreign 
policymakers, the so-called attitudinal prism, which centered around the belief that the United 
States could be persuaded to defend British interests in the Middle East.
When the Cabinet adopted Dulles’s proposal on 11 September, it became immediately 
clear, that a users’ association was only a temporary compromise. Macmillan thought that if 
the users’ association plan failed, Britain could and should resort to force. He was supported 
by Kilmuir and Salisbury who thought force permissible under the U.N.-Charter under such 
circumstances. Monckton argued that the users’ plan could not be more than a prelude to 
negotiation or an appeal to the United Nations, and warned against resorting to force without 
full American support60. Much therefore depended on full American cooperation regarding 
the implementation of the users’ association scheme. Unfortunately, no sooner had the Cabinet 
adopted the proposal, and the House of Commons started assembling in the morning of 12
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* Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, Telegram 4136, 10 September 1956, WO 32/16709.
39 Macmillan diary entries, 8 and 9 September 1956, Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. pp. 413, 415.
® CAB 128/30. Cf. James, Anthony Eden, pp. 511-512. Lamb argues that the Cabinet gave Eden 
’an overwhelming mandate for attack’, if the users’ club failed, but Claik, reading the Cabinet minutes 
on 13 September 1956, wrote in his diary: ’the belated Cab minutes from Tuesday [11 September] 
reveal that there is a severe split in the Cab. Q I can’t say that I know which way [users* club as prelude 
to force or to negotiations] the Cab made up its mind. I doubt if it did’; Lamb, Failure of the Eden 
Government, p. 215; Clark, ’Whitehall diaiy’, entry 13 September 1956, p. 129.
September, than the news from Washington seemed to convey only a qualified American 
commitment. This was to be the first element eventually adding up to the British Government 
growing increasingly annoyed with the American attitude and eventually deciding to go it 
alone.
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13.1 The dilemma
The month of September 1956 was characterized by an increased British effort to 
persuade the United States to consider the users’ club, which was to become known as Suez 
Canal Users’ Association (S.C.U.A.), as a tool of influence to use against Egypt’s Middle 
Eastern policy. The Americans were very reluctant to agree with this view and remained 
hesitant to pay their shipping dues to this newly established authority. At the same time it 
became clear that the withdrawal of the pilots had been of no avail and that Egypt was 
perfectly capable of managing the Canal. In this context the British Cabinet decided to refer 
the matter to the Security Council, despite Dulles’s warning not to do so, and thus added to 
the growing apprehension and misunderstandings between Washington and London.
13.2 The structure of decision
Chart 4 gives an outline of most relevant meetings leading to the decision to go to the United 
Nations, that could be traced.
Chart 13.1: decision making structure of decision 4
11 Sep After Cabinet Informal meeting of Salisbury, Kilmuir, Butler, and Macmillan.
12 Sep 10.45 A.M. Egypt Committee
afterwards House of Commons debate
13 sep 2.30 P.M. House of Commons: vote of confidence
6.00 P.M. Informal meeting of at least Eden, Macmillan, and Butler, Salisbury,
and Kilmuir
14 Sep 10.00 A.M. D(T)C
11.00 A.M. Cabinet
4.15 P.M. EC
15 Sep ??? Eden phones Macmillan
16 Sep TP. Eden phones Macmillan
17 Sep 5 P.M. 
9 P.M.
EC
Ministerial meeting at 10, Downing Street
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18 Sep 10.00 A.M. 
after dinner
19 Sep morning 
IT!
3.15 A.M. 
after EC
D(T)C
Macmillan and Salisbury meet Dulles and Aldrich at the American 
Embassy
Staff conference, Chiefs of Staff, Monckton, Eden, Kirkpatrick 
Opening S.C.U.A. Conference 
EC
Macmillan meets Eden
20 Sep 777
dinner
21 Sep lunch
2.30 P.M. 
afterwards
Eden meets William Clark to discuss latter’s paper on public opinion 
Eden and Lloyd meet Dulles
Eden and Lloyd
End of S.C.U.A. Conference
Lloyd meets Dulles
23 Sep 77! Dispute referred to die Security Council
The structure of decision making in this period is characterized by three important 
elements. First, the decision to refer the dispute to the Security Council is taken without a 
formal meeting of either the Cabinet or even the Egypt Committee. Only Macmillan seems to 
have been consulted, by telegraph, as he had left for Washington on 21 September in order 
to attend the yearly meeting of the International Monetary Fund. It is therefore probable that 
this decision was taken by Eden and Lloyd and Macmillan1. Second, the central place of 
Macmillan is evident. Eden phones him, he meets with Dulles, and is present at the various 
informal meetings. Third, it appears that British decision makers are seeing the representatives 
of the American Government independently from the French, probably in an attempt to reach 
a bilateral agreement first.
13.3 Explaining the decision
The decision to refer the matter to the Security Council without American consent can 
be explained by considerations of domestic politics and by growing British impatience with the 
attitude of the United States Government. The latter factor appears to have been more relevant 
to the matter. Both factors, however, are intertwined with processes at the individual and 
group level.
1. Domestic politics. In September Parliament would return from recess. A small 
group of British policymakers, such as Eden, Macmillan, Salisbury, and Home, had been
1 Cf. Lloyd’s account: ’Q it became clear to the Prime Minister and myself that we must act. □ The 
Prime Minister sent a message to Macmillan Q explaining our reasoning’, Lloyd, Suez 1956. A Personal 
Account, pp. 148-149.
afraid that Parliament would force the Government to promise that no force would be used 
unless recourse to the United Nations had been taken. They hoped to be able to avoid that by 
offering the users’ association coupled with a strong American commitment. The full Cabinet 
meeting of 11 September, however, had revealed a severe split as to whether the users’ 
association should be seen as a prelude to force, or as a prelude to going to the U.N.. A small 
group, consisting of Butler, Kilmuir, Salisbury, and Macmillan, convened after the Cabinet 
in order to work out the wording of the pledges the Government could make without 
committing the Government to a U.N. approach, while keeping together hawks and doves 
within the Conservative Party2.
The debate in the House of Commons opened on 12 September with the Government’s 
official announcement of the concept of a users* association. Next day the Labour Party and 
the Liberal Party asked the Government to go to the United Nations all the same, while the 
Conservative Party started showing an internal division between those to whom a users’ 
association was too soft an approach and those who showed first doubts as to the principle of 
using force. A small group of Ministers met on the following day. Butler suggested to give the 
pledge not to use force without recourse to the United Nations, but the other Ministers present 
followed Macmillan in his fear that the appearance of climbing down under Socialist pressure 
would be fatal to the Prime Minister’s, and Government’s, reputation3.
After the debate, at which Eden only just managed not to give such a pledge, domestic 
trouble was not quite over yet: on 19 September Chief Whip Edward Heath, had told reported 
to Eden ’a good deal of trouble in the Party’ and that the Tory group that was opposed to force 
even as a last resort, might be large enough to put the Government in a minority position in 
the House4. It is thus not unlikely that the inner group of Ministers felt pressed to give up its 
hesitancy to going to the United Nations. This does not explain, however, why these politicians 
felt that they could make this important step without American consent, or even, in spite of 
American opposition to this plan.
2. Increasing disappointment with the American attitude. News of Dulles’s press 
conference on 13 September had much embarrassed Eden, who had been caught by surprise 
when Gaitskell was able to make use of it during the Commons debate. Macmillan’s remarked 
that the Prime Minster was ’a little rattled’. This sense of apprehension of the American
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2 Evidence of this meeting can be traced in Macmillan’s diary entry for 13 September 19S6, Ridim 
the Storm, p. 125.
3 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, diary entry 13 September 1956, p. 125.
4 Macmillan diary entry 20 September, Home, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 128.
attitude towards the dispute was mounting when the day of the second London Conference was 
coming closer and Dulles still did not seem willing to commit the United States to making use 
of the users’ association as a tool of keeping pressure on Egypt. Indeed on 20 September 
William Clark, Eden’s press secretary, presented a paper on public opinion to Eden ’which 
showed that the public felt that the Government which had intended to be warlike was slowly 
but surely being pacified by Dulles and finally w[oul]d have to go reluctantly to the UN’3. At 
the start of the Conference on 19 September the mood around 10, Downing Street was glum: 
’everyone seemed to feel that somehow the Americans were letting us down []. Dulles’s speech 
at the conference cheered the party up a bit: ’then Selwyn [Lloyd] came in [with news of 
Dulles’s speech]. This seemed to restore morale a bit though the odour of defeat is still pretty 
pervasive’. Next day, Clark saw ’great dangers in the strong anti-Dulles movement which is 
building up’6. The last day of conference, which heralded the foundation of the Suez Canal 
Users’ Association (SCUA), ’was a ghastly day with all the worst expectation turning up. 
Dulles pulled rug after rug from under us and watered down the Canal Association Q till it was 
meaningless7.
3. Groupthink. The course of the decision making process, as presented in chart 13.1 
above, makes it evident that inner circle of Salisbury, Kilmuir, Butler, Eden, and Macmillan 
played a central role in coping with threat posed by Parliament. The one thing that had to be 
avoided was the impression to have given in to the Opposition over the U.N.-issue. At the 
informal meeting on 13 September just before Eden’s wind-up of the debate, Butler had been 
in favour of meeting the Opposition to a certain extent, but the group’s majority thought the 
entailed loss of prestige a worse consequence than a break-up of the domestic consensus about 
the Government’s policy which had existed until then. Some evidence of groupthink can be 
observed in the days after the debate. Two days after the debate Eden phoned to Macmillan 
after having read a letter by Hugh Gaitskell to The Times in which the Opposition Leader 
complained about the Government’s obscure position on the use of force. Eden ’seemed rather 
concerned’, but Macmillan said that he ’felt very relieved that Mr. G[aitskell] should take this
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5 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 18 September 1956, p. 132. Clark had discussed the report with 
Sir Norman Brook: ’I really feared Q that we were building up to a disastrous letdown. He [Brook] was 
glum but emphasized that all was not yet lost, and that force had not yet been abandoned’.
4 Clark, 'Whitehall diary’, entries 19 and 20 September 1956, pp. 132-133.
7 Clark, ibid.. entry 21 September 1956, p. 134. Clark added that lata1 ’Pineau came in and seemed 
almost at the edge of dissolving the Alliance’. Cf. Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 271.
line, as it entirely destroyed the argument that P.M. had "climbed down"’*. This is a clear 
example of a common effort to rationalize, which was to be repeated next day when Eden 
rang Macmillan once more: ’he seemed a little depressed, so I did my best to cheer him up. 
We are in a difficult position Q. But we must have the courage to play the hand through’9. 
Another example is the effort by Macmillan and Salisbury to put pressure on Dulles before the 
start of the users’ conference. Macmillan and Salisbury thought it ’vital that the Americans 
should not think that we are weakening, in spite of the Socialist Opposition and the other 
defeatist elements here’10. Both thus stuck to the common assumption that one can persuade 
the Americans to follow if you give them a firm lead.
3. The individual factor. The individual factor constitutes an important element of the 
decision making process, despite the central role of senior Ministers. First, evidence of the 
growing impatience with the United States mainly comes from a witness at 10, Downing 
Street, William Clark. This suggests a crucial role for Eden, even though he must have stayed 
in close touch with on the one hand Macmillan and Salisbury, who had been talking with 
Dulles, and on the other hand Lloyd, who represented the United Kingdom at the conference. 
Most importantly, during the conference Eden started doubting the wisdom of having accepted 
the idea of a users’ association: ’he [Eden] seems to feel that the Users’ Association has been 
a bit of a mistake though if we can make the clause on payment of dues effective, he said, it 
will be just worthwhile’11.
The decision to go to the United Nations despite American opposition was clearly taken 
without anticipating two weighty consequences. First, it could arouse anger with the 
Americans. Indeed, Dulles became very angry when he heard of the Anglo-French decision 
to refer the matter to the Security Council. Actually, Dulles claimed that Eden had promised 
him not take such a step without coordination with the United States12.
Second, it could stir the doubters within the Egypt Committee and the Cabinet, who 
had considered the users’ association as a prelude to negotiations, and who might consider this
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10 Macmillan, diaiy entry 18 September 1956, Riding the Storm, p. 128.
11 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 20 September 1956, p. 133.
12 This is what Dulles told Paul-Henri Spaak on 5 October; he added that this had created a bad 
psychological climate; Paul-Henri Spaak, Combats Inachevés I. De l'indépendence à l’Alliance. Fayard, 
1969, p. 238.
sudden rush to the United Nations without consulting the full Cabinet might amount to 
manipulation by a small inner group. It is significant that Monckton, who had already 
expressed his worry to Clark that ’PM would use [a] loophole [in the idea of a users’ 
association] to start trouble’13, sent his letter to Eden, in which he announced his coming 
resignation of Minister of Defence, on 24 September, the day after die announcement to refer 
the matter to the U .N .M.
The decision to act independently from the United States was thus furthered by a sense 
of frustration with American unwillingness to consider die users’ association as a tool of 
curbing Nasser. The urge to go to the U.N. itself was prompted by considerations of domestic 
politics. In the view of this latter aspect, the individual factor seems to have been relevant as 
well: first, in judging domestic support, Eden was increasingly interested in getting the 
Conservative Party united behind him rather than in preserving some kind of national unity. 
Indeed, he was worried to appear weak and permissive in face of Labour’s opposition. Eden’s 
reaction to die news of the strength of die Tory group opposed to force, was one of cognitive 
closure: ’P.M. seemed Q quite determined. It was 1938 over again, and he could not be a 
party to it’u . Clearly then, in the days of the users’ conference, the Munich parallel was in 
Eden’s mind. In die same period, he would not agree to Clark’s suggestion of what public 
opinion would regard as an ’unfair’ resort to force, but agreed with the analysis that part of 
the trouble was the impression that Great Britain was meekly responding to Dulles’s delaying 
tactics16. He must therefore have been sensitive to a report by the Tory Party Central Office 
on opinion polls, that reached in the days of die Commons’ debate. The report stressed the 
attitude of Tory voters. Explaining the loss of support among Conservative voters for the 
Government’s policy, the Party Office’s General Director wrote to Eden: ’[t]here is not a lot 
of difference. There is no evidence to show whether the lessening of support is due to a 
weakening of the Conservative attitude or to increased dissatisfaction that a stronger line has 
not been taken’17.
13 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 14 September 1956, p. 130.
14 Draft of a letter from Monckton to Eden, final letter sent on 24 September 1956, Monckton 
Papers, 6(210-211).
13 Macmillan diary entry 20 September 1956, Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 418.
“ Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 20 September 1956, p. 133; that day Clark discussed the paper 
on public opinion he had in on the 18th; ’PM who agreed heartily with it though denouncing the
analysis of what people thought as "unfair"’.
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In conclusion, the decision to refer the dispute to the United Nations was taken by a 
small group of ministers (Eden, Lloyd, and Macmillan) provoked by a growing disappointment 
with the American attitude towards the users’ association. Of the various independent variables 
only a limited amount of evidence of the existence of groupthink can be traced. Considerations 
of domestic politics seem to have favoured the decision to refer the dispute to the United 
Nations.
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14.1 The dilemma
At the beginning of October British policymakers were facing a complicated situation: 
a negotiated settlement seemed possible, but would not reduce Egyptian influence in the Middle 
East; the users’ association might be a means to put pressure on Egypt in the future, but the 
United States were very reluctant to consider it as a policy instrument; some policymakers 
wanted to get rid of Nasser, but their formal objective of international control over the Canal 
made military action unlikely, if a settlement could be negotiated at the United Nations. In die 
first week of October, it thus looked as if the users’ association could not be presented as a 
victory over Egypt, Nasser would appear to ’get away with it’.
On 25 October the British Cabinet decided to agree to an occupation of the Suez Canal 
Zone in case a conflict between Israel and Egypt were to occur. It is puzzling to see that the 
British Government decided to accept the far from remote possibility of war against Egypt 
when at the same time reasonably satisfactory negotiations between Egypt, France and Great 
Britain had been conducted at the United Nations. I will show that this decision should be 
explained by individual and small group variables, as one of its preconditions has been a 
significant change in the perception of the American attitude by British decisionmakers, 
furthered by Eden’s handling of the of the decision making process.
14.2 The structure of decision
A look at chart 14.1, which gives an outline of the decision making process relevant 
to decision 5, makes it clear that the
Chart 14.1: Decision making structure of decision 5
24 Sep 771 Letter Monckton to Eden announcing probable resignation
25 Sep morning Eden meets the Chiefs of Staff
11.00 A.M. Egypt Committee
3.00 P.M. Eden and Lloyd meet
26 Sep 7777 Eden and Lloyd meet
10.30 A.M. Cabinet
27 Sep Monckton drafts resignation letter
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01 Oct m
12.15 A.M.
02.30 P.M.
02 Oct until lunch­
time
03 Oct m
10.45 A.M.
08 Oct 07.00 P.M.
09 Oct 11.00 A.M.
10 Oct rr>
noon
11 Oct m
TH
13 Oct
14 Oct m
16 Oct 11.15 A.M.
12.15 A.M.
04.00 P.M.
17 Oct m
02.30 P.M.
04.00 P.M .1
18 Oct 11.30 A.M.
IV.
19 Oct 11.30 A.M.
TH
02.45 P.M.
21 Oct m
afterwards
22 Oct
Admiral Barjot meets Dickson 
Meeting Eden, Monckton, and Dickson 
Egypt Committee
Eden meets Macmillan
Monckton resigns formally 
Cabinet
Egypt Committee 
Cabinet
Informal meeting with at least Monckton present 
Egypt Committee
Staff conference Monckton, Head, Eden, and Kirkpatrick 
Meeting Eden, Monckton, and Watkinson
Conservative Party Conference at Llandudno
Challe and Gazier meet Eden and Nutting at Chequers
Lloyd meets Nutting
Ministerial meeting with at least Kilmuir, Thomeycroft, Head, 
Monckton, Lloyd, Nutting, and Eden 
Eden and Lloyd take off for Paris
Eden meets several ministers individually 
Eden and Lloyd at #10 
Egypt Committee
Cabinet
Lloyd lunches with Monckton
Lloyd and Eden meet at #10 
Lloyd lunches at Buckingham Palace 
Lloyd at #10
Meeting at Chequers: Butler, Macmillan, Head, Kilmuir, Brook, 
Lloyd, Eden, Powell, and Keightley 
Lloyd leaves for Paris
Secret Anglo-French-Israeli talks at Sèvres near Paris.
1 Lloyd’s diary of engagements reads: Egypt Committee at 3 P.M., Defence Committee at 4 P.M..
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23 Oct morning Lloyd meets Nutting
10.00 A.M. Meeting of Senior Ministers
11.00 A.M. Cabinet
07.30 P.M. Pineau arrives in London
08.30 P.M. Pineau, Lloyd, and Eden (after dinner) at 1, Downing Street (Foreign
Office)
24 Oct 10.00 A.M. Lloyd meets Patrick Dean
11.00 A.M.2 Cabinet
04.00 P.M. Meeting in the Prime Minister’s room
10.30 P.M. Dean and Logan return from Sèvres
11.00 P.M. Meeting of Senior Ministers at #10:
Eden, Butler, Macmillan, Head, Mountbatten
25 Oct 10.00 A.M. Cabinet
05.45 P.M. Meeting at #10
06.15 P.M. Meeting at #10
08.15 P.M. Lloyd (at dinner) called upon by Dean and Logan
the most important development that occurred is the shift of the level of decision making away 
from the Egypt Committee towards the informal level of meetings of senior Ministers. Note 
that the day after General Maurice Challe disclosed the plan to intervene as policemen in case 
of an Israeli-Egyptian war, the Egypt Committee met only once, on 17 October. Moreover, 
those informal meetings precede, or follow on, Cabinet meetings. It is therefore very likely 
that these informal meetings were held in order to reach consensus among the most important 
ministers, before putting the matter before the full Cabinet. In order to better understand the 
circumstances that led to the decision to intervene in case of an Israel i-Egyptian war, it is 
useful to make a distinction between the period before Challe’s arrival on 14 October and the 
period afterwards.
14.3 Conditions favourable to the adoption of the ’Challe-plan’
The conditions that favoured the adoption of the ’Challe-plan’ had been created by a 
fundamental change of British perceptions of the American attitude towards the dispute in 
general, notably because of Dulles’s talk of neo-colonialism on 2 October. This change of 
perception can be noted at both the individual and group-level.
1. The individual factor: operational code and directive leadership. Two important 
developments set the stage for the adoption of the ’Challe-plan’. First, Eden was growing ever
3 CAB 128/30 says 10.00 A.M.
more impatient with American reluctance to use the users’ association as a means of pressure 
against Egypt. Second, at a press conference on 2 October Dulles would accuse France and 
Great Britain of colonialist practices in their handling of the dispute. Although Eden’s formal 
reaction was rather restraint, the way he presented the matter to his fellow Ministers testifies 
to the serious impact Dulles’s speech must have had.
British correspondence with Dulles on S.C.U.A. was conducted by Eden and Lloyd 
and later, when Lloyd left for the United Nations at the beginning of October, by Eden and 
Nutting. Although Eden had been able to report to the Cabinet on 26 September that the 
United States seemed willing to pay their shipping dues to the new Canal Authority3, 
American reluctance became evident two days later and Anglo-American bickering over the 
implementation would continue until Israeli forces invaded the Sinai on 29 October. British 
confusion about the American attitude is evidenced in Lloyd’s remark to Eden, after a talk with 
Dulles and Pineau: ’I have never seen anyone so anxious to denigrate his own child as Dulles 
with S.C.U.A.’4.
Anglo-American differences on the users’ association regarded four issues. (1) 
American reluctance to put pressure on Liberia and Panama to make their ships pay to the 
users’ association. British officials regarded these ships as ’American-controlled’5. (2) 
American hesitancy in considering the payment of shipping dues to SCUA as a tool of bearing 
pressure on Egypt. It had been agreed that part of the shipping dues would be transferred from 
SCUA to Egypt for the financing of development projects, but the British Government was 
very eager to make such money transfers dependent on Egyptian good behaviour. The United 
States never committed themselves to any percentage of shipping dues that might be used for 
such purposes6. (3) The Americans had indicated that they preferred waiting with payments 
to SCUA until agreement would have been reached with the Egyptian Government about the 
18 Powers’ Proposals during the negotiations that were being conducted at the United Nations
271
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London the next day, see ME(OX56)60 [Middle East Official Committee], 27 September 1956.
4 Lloyd (at the United Nations) to Eden, Telegram 847, 13 October 1956, PREM 11/1121.
5 This was borne out by a memorandum by the Official Middle East Committee that was discussed 
by the Egypt Committee; EC document EC(56)55, 29 September 1956, PREM 11/1121. Cf. Eden’s 
letter to Butler, sent from Paris where he was having talks with Mollet and Pineau, Telegram 337, 26 
September 1956, PREM 11/1121.
6 Cf. Eden to Washington Embassy, Telegram 4608, 5 October 1956, PREM 11/1121; minutes 
EC(56)33, 8 October 1956, PREM 11/1121; minutes EC(56)34, 10 October 1956; Dulles to Lloyd, 15 
October 1956, PREM 11/1121.
as a result of the Anglo-French decision to refer the matter to the Security Council7. (4) 
Finally, the United States were very wary of being identified too closely with SCUA. They 
thus wavered over participating in the association’s administrative body*.
By the time Eden was to meet Challe and Gazier, therefore, a feeling of strong 
disappointment with the American attitude towards the users’ association had been built up. 
The optimism of the end of September, had been replaced with the strong conviction that the 
United States would not use SCUA as a tool of pressure against Egypt. Even Nutting wrote 
to Lloyd on 12 October that the Americans were ’deliberately exaggerating the danger of 
Egypt closing the Canal to ships paying their dues to SCUA Q. It is difficult to avoid the 
impression that the Americans are doing their best to put off this issue [shipping dues] as long 
as possible’9. Final proof of this came three days later when Dulles wrote to Lloyd that SCUA 
was not meant to be a means of pressure, but ’of practical working cooperation with the 
Egyptian authorities which would seek to establish de facto international participation in the 
operation of the Canal’10.
The Egypt Committee’s opinion of die American attitude over the users’ association 
thus shifted from moderately positive via ’highly unsatisfactory’ (29 September) to ’defeating 
the whole purpose of the SCUA exercise’ (8 October)11. Although growing dissatisfaction 
with die Americans can be observed at the level of the Egypt Committee, it should be borne 
in mind that die Committee depended for their information on Eden and, to a lesser extent, 
Nutting12, who were communicating with Lloyd in New York and coordinating British 
negotiations with, on the one hand, the Americans on SCUA, and, on die other hand, France, 
die United States and Egypt on a peaceful settlement.
in
7 Lloyd (it New York) to Eden, Telegram 798, 7 October 1956, PREM 11/1121; Lloyd (at New 
York) to Foreign Office, Telegram 816, 10 October 1956, PREM 11/1121.
* On 9 October there had been a meeting of SCUA’s executive group. It appeared that the United 
States wanted to participate in the management of ’administrative funds’ only, and not of shipping dues; 
FO to Washington Embassy, Telegram 1092, 9 October 1956, PREM 11/1121.
* Nutting to Lloyd (at the United Nations, New York), Telegram 1160, 12 October 1956, PREM 
11/1121.
10 Dulles to Lloyd, 15 October 1956, PREM 11/1121.
11 EC(56)55 memo, 29 September 1956; EC(56)33 minutes, 8 October 1956.
11 On 8 October Eden was not present at that day’s EC meeting; he probably was in hospital with
high fever. All in formation regarding SCUA and negotiations at the UN must have come from Nutting
who replaced Lloyd. Nutting was present on 10 October as well.
On 2 October Dulles held a press conference in Washington that would have an 
enormous impact on the decision making process in Great Britain. He told journalists that 
’there is talk about teeth being pulled out of the plan [SCUA], but I know of no teeth in it, so 
far as I am aware’13. Moreover, Dulles compared the Anglo-French attitude with colonialism 
by stating that the United States could not always be expected to identify automatically with 
either so-called colonial powers or independence-seeking nations14. The effect of these words 
was that Eden felt completely let down: apparently he told Nutting: ’Now what have you got 
to say for your American friends...!’13. Clark, meeting Macmillan at 11, Downing Street, 
was summoned to see Eden: ’He was bitter about Dulles’s press conference in which JFD 
seems to have accused us of "colonialism* over Suez- however, we agreed to say nothing 
publicly G’16- Indeed, Eden sent messages to both the British Embassy in Washington and to 
Lloyd at the United Nations reassuring that ’Mr. Dulles knows that not one of us would ever 
want to make difficulties over Anglo-American relations’17.
Much more importantly, however, Eden decided to have Dulles’s speech passed from 
hand to hand round the table at the full Cabinet meeting next day1*, a clear example of 
structuring the decision making process and influencing his colleagues’ opinion on the 
American attitude19. Eden denied Roger Makins’s claim of 4 October that the colonialist 
theme ’is common to so many Americans, [and] welling up inside Foster [Dulles] like lava in 
a dormant volcano’, and was outraged by an article, enclosed by Makins, which suggested that 
Dulles’s policy amounted to no more than simply trying not to wreck American relations with
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IS The Times. 3 October 1956, quoted by Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 101.
14 Cf. Eden, Full Circle, pp. 498-499.
15 Home, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 425; at this place Home quotes from the original manuscript 
of Nutting’s No End of a Lesson, which apparently had been purged at the request of the Cabinet 
Office, cf. Home’s remark on p. 493, note 8.
'* Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 2 October 1956, p. 137.
17 Eden to Washington Embassy; Eden to New York, 3 October 1956, PREM 11/1174. This was 
probably in response to the Embassy’s report that Dulles had said ’how very unhappy he was about the 
Press conference yesterday Q "a really bad blunder” , Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegram 
2052, 3 October 1956, PREM 11/1174.
“  Nutting, allegedly purged paragraph from No End of a Lesson, quoted by Home, Macmillan. 
1894-1956. p. 426.
19 Indeed, Butler thought Dulles’s speech ’preposterous’; The Art of the Possible, p. 191.
Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Portugal. Eden thought the article 
’describes the most dishonest policy I ever read’30.
Clearly, then, Eden was enraged by Dulles’s remarks, despite his restraint official 
reaction. This is clear from the change of tone in his messages to Lloyd, who was present at 
the negotiations at the United Nations in New York. On 6 October Eden wrote to Lloyd: ’I 
think we must never forget that Dulles’s purpose is different from ours. The Canal is in no 
sense vital to the United States and his game is to string us until Polling Day*21. Two days 
later Eden feared that ’our position is being eroded Q. We have been misled so often by 
Dulles’s ideas that we cannot afford to risk another misunderstanding. That is why a 
negotiating committee [Dulles’s latest diplomatic move] would be so dangerous. We should 
lose control of the situation and justifiably be accused by the French of betraying them. Time 
is not on our side in this matter Q’22.
In tom s of his operational code, Eden’s changing attitude towards American policies, 
at least those formulated by Dulles, could be explained by Dulles surpassing a certain 
threshold: at the beginning of October Eden must have felt that Dulles could be relied upon 
no longer. Having suggested so regularly that American aims coincided with British objectives, 
and never having excluded force as a last resort, while having obstructed British policies so 
often, Dulles may have driven Eden to the conclusion that he should no longer have a strong 
confidence in Dulles’s diplomatic moves.
2. Groupthink. The first weeks after die adoption of the idea of a users’ association 
display three instances of phenomena that occur at the group level. First, the initial optimism 
over the American attitude (until Dulles’s devastating press conference) should be explained 
by over-optimism within the inner circle. Re-assurance about the American position came from 
Macmillan who was attending the yearly conference of the International Monetary Fund in 
Washington0 . Both he and Ambassador Makins saw President Eisenhower in private. Makins
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Washington Post, ’Colonialism Headache. Dulles* Suez Remark A Freudian Slip?’, which Eden read 
and commented on 5 October, PREM 11/1174.
21 Eden to Lloyd (at United Nations), Telegram 1063, 6 October 1956, FO 800/741.
22 Eden to Lloyd (at United Nations), Telegram 1978, 8 October 1956, FO 800/741.
23 Macmillan sent his impressions of these conversations to Eden (preserved in the PREM files). 
Some the most important telegrams (Nos. 2000,2001,2002) can be found in the files of Anthony Head, 
Secretary of State for War (WO 32/16709). The most crucial telegrams (Nos. 2003 and 2004), which 
gave an account of Macmillan’s private conversations with Dulles and Eisenhower can be found in the 
files of Eden (PREM) and Lloyd (FO 800/740). This suggests that discussions of the exact nature of 
the American attitude were confined to narrow circle.
recalls that he was ’amazed’ by their conversation: ’Q I was expecting Harold to make a 
statement, say something important on Suez-but in fact he said nothing. I was very much 
surprised. Nor did Ike say anything’24. Macmillan, however, felt confident enough to report 
to Eden that ’I feel sure the President understands our problems about N[asser], but he is, of 
course, in die same position now as we were in May 1955 [election]’25.
In terms of symptoms of groupthink, Macmillan may have fallen prey to self- 
censorship of personal doubts: he did not have the courage to risk a negative reply from 
Eisenhower, and thus did not bring up the issue. The fact that Eisenhower did not either, 
coupled with the fact that Macmillan and Makins were ushered in and out through a sidedoor 
in order to avoid the press, and that the talk lasted some 35 minutes, must have reinforced 
Macmillan’s perception that a difference existed between American public and private 
utterances. Similarly, Macmillan reported on two different meetings with Dulles, one official, 
the other private. About the latter he wrote to Eden that ’some of the things he said were very 
helpful, but might be dangerous to him if they got about in the electioneering atmosphere’26. 
Moreover, Macmillan once more reassured Eden that American objectives coincided with 
British aims: ’the American Government was prepared to do everything it could to bring 
Nasser down’ 27. On his return to London, Macmillan had a long talk with Eden, and 
afterwards, Eden picked up his correspondence with Eisenhower, and sent him a letter in 
which he argued that Nasser was ’now effectively in Russian hands, just as Mussolini was in 
Hitler’s. It would be as ineffective to show weakness to Nasser now in order to placate him 
as it was to show weakness to Mussolini’2*. Dulles’s press conference next day was to change 
the mood considerably.
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25 Macmillan to Eden, Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegram 2004, 25 September 1956, 
FO 800/740.
26 Macmillan to Eden, Washington to Foreign Office, Telegram 2003, 25 September 1956, FO 
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ships*. Clearly then, Macmillan did not even wish to risk hearing a negative American reply.
27 Macmillan to Eden, Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegram 2001,25 September 1956, 
PREM 11/1121.
■ Eden to Eisenhower, 1 October 1956, F0 800/726.
Its impact was felt at the Cabinet’s meeting of 3 October. It was concluded that the 
British position was weakened because of Dulles’s statement29. Similarly, at the Egypt 
Committee’s meeting of 8 October, Nutting expressed die fear that United States might not 
want to be involved in a SCUA scheme that was designed to put pressure on Egypt30. It can 
therefore be concluded that between late September and half October a definite change had 
occurred at least the level of the inner circle, and probably at the level of both the Cabinet and 
the Egypt Committee as well, in the estimation of the American attitude towards the users’ 
association. Dulles’s press conference had the impact of reducing British confidence that they 
could put confidence in forthcoming American support in cutting Nasser down to size.
3. The bureaucratic variable. Just as in the preceding period, the political decision 
making process in the end of September and the beginning of October was conditioned by the 
military’s view of the preferable conditions under which an operation against Egypt could be 
mounted. At the beginning of October the Chiefs of Staff issued the order to draw up a so- 
called Winter-plan31. The aim was to reduce the state of readiness of the forces, which had 
been ready to initiate an invasion from early September. The new plan envisaged the troops 
to be ready to fight at 10 days’ notice.
The change of plan had occurred because the military judged that it would become 
difficult to keep the troops in a state of readiness for a long period of time. Moreover, it was 
thought that meteorological conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean were likely to worsen 
towards the end of October, so that a different type of operation might be required32. On 12 
October Headquarters issued the new Winter-plan’. Four days later, Monckton wrote a 
memorandum for use in the Egypt Committee the following day in which he observed that ’it 
now seems probable that military operations against Egypt will not be required in the
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31 Love traces the decision back to 6 October; Beaufre mentions 2 October; Kennett Love, Suez: 
The Twice-Fought War. New York, 1969, p. 459; General André Beaufre, The Suez Expedition. New 
York, 1969, p. 64.
12 The meteorological argument had occurred several times at the end of September the French had 
used it as an argument to persuade the British to launch the attack as soon as possible. Eden thought 
these considerations were incorrect. Eden reported this from Paris, where he had flown to on 26 
September in order to persuade Mollet, Pineau, and Bourgès-Manoury to try to make SCUA a tool of 
putting pressure on Egypt. The French ’alleged that the weather would preclude it [an attack] later. I 
contested this’; Eden to Buder, Paris Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegram 337, 26 September 1956, 
WO. 32/16709. At the same time, the Chiefs of Staff argued the same, but not because they were eager 
to precipitate a military move.
immediate future, but that there will be further negotiations which may well be protracted’. 
Monckton, therefore suggested that, following a more relaxed state of readiness of the forces 
as suggested in the Winter-plan, it would be advisable to release some ships that had been used 
to carry troops and return diem to the merchant fleet33.
Clearly then, British decisionmakers were confronted with the military’s preference 
to switch to a plan which precluded a quick decision to go in and which might be interpreted 
by the outer world as a sign of weakening of British resolve to ’deal with Egypt’. By the time 
that Gazier and Challe arrived in Great Britain on 14 October, therefore, British 
decisionmakers faced (1) American reluctance to ’put teeth’ into the users’ association, (2) 
uncertainty about the question whether the negotiations at the United Nations could be 
presented as a clear defeat of Nasser, and (3) increasing difficulties in implementing military 
plans, as time elapsed.
14.4 The Challe-plan
Much has been written about the exact moment at which Anglo-French cooperation 
with Israel started. Some claim that Eden and Lloyd were informed of, and did not object to, 
French-Israeli plans as early as 23 September, when Pineau visited London34. Horne suggests 
that Eden told the Cabinet as early as 3 October that Israel might be willing to help out France 
and Great Britain35. This, of course, is not the relevant question, for the Israeli attitude 
towards the crisis had been part of British discussions from early August on36. The really 
important question, therefore, is not when collusion started, but why British decisionmakers, 
Eden in the first place, were prepared to accept a plan that involved Israeli operations, and 
thus accepted the risk of long-term damage to British relations with the Arab world.
277
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34 E.g., Terence Robertson, Crisis. The Inside Storv of the Suez Conspiracy. Hutchinson, London, 
1964, p. 134.
35 Home, Macmillan. 1894-1956. pp. 422-430; Horne does not mention any sources to which this 
date can be traced back.
36 In military planning it had always been taken into consideration that Israel might take advantage 
of an Anglo-French operation and make a move to secure the Straits of Tiran. Macmillan had even 
presented a memorandum to the Egypt Committee in which he urged to take advantage of ’noise’ that 
could be by Israel so that a considerable amount of Egyptian forces would be tied up in the Sinai, 
unable to defend Alexandria or the Canal Zone. Eden, however, had always wanted to keep Israel out 
of the picture, because he did not want Great Britain to be seen lined up with Israel against an Arab 
country; this would do irreparable harm to the basically pro-Arab foreign policy of the United Kingdom.
Contacts between France and Israel had been established as early as 22 June 1956, 
when top officials of the Army and Ministry of Defence of both countries met to discuss the 
coordination of an anti-Nasser policy. In the second half of September an Israeli ’high level’ 
delegation flew to Paris and met with Pineau, Bourgès-Manoury and General Ely in order to 
coordinate a joint French-Israeli operation against Egypt. Bourgès-Manoury had obtained 
Cabinet approval of such a move on 19 September37. On 8 October Bourgès-Manoury asked 
Ely to study the possibility of a French-Israeli intervention. This plan was eventually produced 
by General Maurice Challe who flew to New York to discuss it with Pineau. The French 
Foreign Secretary showed remarkable enthusiasm and, so as to avoid the Ouai d ’Orsai, sent 
Challe to London, accompanied by Acting Foreign Secretary Albert Gazier, to consult 
Eden3*. Eden and Nutting received Challe and Gazier at Chequers on 14 October. Challe 
pointed out his plan of Anglo-French military intervention in case of an Israeli attack on Egypt 
and subsequent threat to the Suez Canal*. Eden said he would have to discuss the matter with 
the Cabinet. The sequence of events has become well-known since40.
On 16 October Lloyd, at Eden’s request, returned from New York in order to 
participate at a meeting of senior ministers. It was decided that Eden and Lloyd should fly to 
Paris that afternoon to have talks with Mollet and Pineau. Next die Egypt Committee approved 
of the Challe-plan in principle, followed by the full Cabinet next morning. On 21 October 
Israel had indicated that it had wanted to discuss the exact terms of agreement with Great 
Britain and France. Lloyd went to Sèvres, near Paris, to meet with representatives of France
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37 Michel Bar-Zohar, Ben Goerion. 1986 (édition originale 1978), pp. 345-350; Bar-Zohar makes 
extensive use of Jacob Tsur, Prélude à Suez. Presses de la Cité, Paris, 1968. Tsur was Israel’s 
Ambassador to France in 1956.
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Pineau, who until then had been most stubborn and inflexible towards the negotiations up to the point 
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that Challe and Gazier had met a rather enthusiastic Eden; FO 800/725, 15 October 1956.
* Maurice Challe, Notre Révolte. Paris, 1968, pp. 26-27; Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 95.
40 Cf. Neff, Warriors at Suez, pp. 337-348; Geoffrey Warner, ’*Collusion" and the Suez Crisis of 
1956’, International Affairs. April 1989, pp. 226-239; Anthony Adamthwaite, ’Suez Revisited’, 
International Affairs. (64), 3,1988, pp. 449-464; Mordechai Bar-On, ’David Ben-Gurion and die Sèvres 
Collusion’, in Louis and Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. The Crisis and its Consequences. Clarendon, Oxford, 
1989 (1991), pp. 145-160.
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and Israel. On 23 October, due to British and Israeli reservations as to these details41, it
looked as if the deal was off; indeed, that day the Cabinet was told that it now looked unlikely
that an Israeli attack on Egypt was imminent42. On 24 October, however, agreement between
the three Governments’ representatives was reached, and next morning the British Cabinet
’agreed in principle, that, in the event of an Israeli attack on Egypt, the 
Government should join with the French Government in calling on the two 
belligerents to stop hostilities and withdraw their forces to a distance of ten 
miles from the Canal; and should warn both belligerents that, if either or both 
of them failed to undertake within twelve hours to comply with these 
requirements, British and French forces would intervene in order to enforce 
compliance’43.
The die was cast.
1. Groupthink. The Egypt Committee met only once (on 17 October) during the crucial 
period between the French officials’ visit and the Cabinet decision of 25 October. The fact that 
during those 12 days the Cabinet convened four times and that at least four informal meetings 
of senior ministers were held, suggests that (1) the Cabinet’s approval of a weighty decision 
was needed, (2) a sense of urgency was felt, and, most importantly, (3) Cabinet meetings were 
structured by informally reached consensus among senior ministers. What can be said about 
these informal gatherings ?
1.1 Informal meetings. The first informal meeting took place on 16 October shortly 
after noon. According to Nutting44, those present, besides himself, were Thoraeycroft, Head, 
Monckton, Kilmuir, Eden, and Lloyd, who had returned from New York at 11.15 that
41 The fundamental problem was that Great Britain insisted that Israel pose a real threat to the Canal, 
so that it would really look that France and Great Britain acted as intervening policemen. Israel was 
reluctant to cooperate as her army would be fighting the Egyptian army alone for 48 to 72 hours before 
France and Britain would join her. It would thus be exposed to the strong Egyptian air force. 
Eventually, the Israeli agreed to drop airborne troops near the Mitla Pass, so as to put a threat to the 
Canal; the French Government agreed to fly two French fighter squadrons to Israel and to have the 
Israeli Mystère IV planes flown by French pilots; cf. Bar-On, ’David Ben-Gurion and the Sèvres 
Collusion’, pp. 153-155.
42 CM(56)72, 23 October 1956.
43 CM(56)74, 25 October 1956.
44 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 97-99; Nutting interviewed by Richard Lamb, The Failure of 
the Eden Government, p. 233.
morning. It is curious that Butler, Salisbury, and Macmillan were absent45. The Challe-plan 
must have been presented frankly to all participants: Lloyd thought ’the idea of our inviting 
Israel to attack Egypt Q a poor one* (emphasis mine)46. Nevertheless, despite his reservations 
he chose not to express his doubts at the meeting. This can clearly be considered an example 
of self-censorship. Those who did protest against die plan were Nutting and, less vigorously, 
Monckton47. According to Lloyd, however, the meeting was no more than a ’general 
discussion of a rather indeterminate nature’. It was decided that Lloyd and Eden should go to 
Paris to discuss the matter further with Mollet and Pineau4*. It is not unlikely that the absence 
of three senior Ministers made it impossible to commit the British Government to the Challe- 
plan.
A second informal meeting took place at Chequers on 21 October, at which Butler, 
Macmillan, Head, Kilmuir, Lloyd, and Eden were present, as well as General Keightley, 
Brook, and Powell. The French Government had indicated that Israeli leaders would be coming 
to Paris; they thought that a British representative would be needed49. At the meeting it was 
decided that Lloyd should go to Paris the next day, travelling incognito. Clearly then, by 21 
October another regular critic, Butler, had accepted the use of force and collusion with Israel.
A third informal meeting was held on 23 October at 10 in the morning, one hour 
before the full Cabinet would meet. Lloyd describes the meeting as ’in effect the Egypt 
Committee’50, so Eden, Butler, Macmillan, Salisbury, and Home, must have been present. 
The Foreign Secretary reported of troubles he had encountered in reaching agreement with the 
French and Israeli. The Cabinet was told no more than that an Israeli attack on Egypt now 
seemed unlikely, but that the French were unwilling to reach a settlement by compromise. No 
decision was taken.
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* see footnote 250.
49 Richard Powell, Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence; Lloyd, Suez 1956. A Personal 
Account, p. 180.
*  Lloyd, ibid.. p. 185.
A fourth informal meeting was held in the evening of 24 October. Patrick Dean, 
instructed that morning by Eden to go to Sèvres accompanied by Donald Logan, reported of 
his negotiations with the French and Israeli to a meeting of senior ministers at 10, Downing 
Street. They included Eden, Butler, Lloyd, Macmillan, Head, and the First Sea Lord, 
Mountbatten. Lloyd remarks that it was decided to ’recommend the contingency plan to the 
full Cabinet’31. The Cabinet minutes of next morning’s meeting indeed suggest that the plan 
was proposed by Eden as a contingency plan. However, as Dean must have reported that Israel 
now agreed to pose a threat to the Canal in exchange for Anglo-French protection against the 
Egyptian air force, the informal meeting must have agreed to present it to the Cabinet in that 
way. This implies that another self-proclaimed critic, Mountbatten, must have decided not to 
speak up against it.
Very little is known about the considerations that were put forward at these informal 
meetings. It seems very probable, however, that the meetings of 21, 23, and 24 October must 
have dealt with the exact terms of the agreement with France and Israel. If not, Eden would 
not have been able to present to the Cabinet of 25 October the plan of confronting Israel and 
Egypt with an ultimatum to withdraw their troops at a distance of 10 miles from the Suez 
Canal. One can only guess the nature of the discussions, but some clues might be found in the 
records of the four Cabinet meetings between 18 and 25 October.
1.2 Cabinet meetings. The full Cabinet met on 18, 23, 24, and 25 October. In order 
to reconstruct to decision making process regarding decision 5 , 1 will first discuss the decision 
structure of each meeting, and, next, which factors may have played a role.
1.2.1 Decision structure. The Cabinet meeting on 18 October followed a curious 
order: first, Lloyd reported that negotiations at the United Nations might eventually lead to a 
satisfactory settlement; then Eden told the Cabinet that Israel might make a military move 
soon against either Jordan or Egypt. Eden said that ’it would be far better from our point of 
view that they should attack Egypt; and he had reason to believe that, if they made a military 
move, it would be made in that direction’. He had even ’therefore thought it right to make it 
known to the Israelis, through the French’ that the United Kingdom would not defend Egypt 
under the 1950 Tripartite Declaration52. Raising the question of what should be done in such
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800/828, 18 October 1956.
a situation, Eden suggested that fighting over the Canal should be avoided53. Significantly, 
’he said he had discussed this with some of his senior colleagues and they had agreed to this 
view. No one in the Cabinet disagreed’54. Clearly then, Eden made a successful attempt at 
carrying die full Cabinet and at avoiding a detailed discussion of the plan’s advantages and 
disadvantages by confronting his ministers with consensus among his senior ministers.
On 23 October Eden structured die discussion with his opening: considering that an 
Israeli attack on Egypt now seemed less probable, he sketched a choice between an early attack 
and prolonged negotiations before the Cabinet: die latter possibility ran die risk of a slowly 
weakening of the British bargaining position because, following die Winter Plan, military 
preparations would have to be relaxed. When, in die discussion that followed, it was conceded 
that the Egyptians were willing to continue negotiations, Selwyn Lloyd spoke up and said that 
the French were unwilling to fully co-operate to reach a diplomatic settlement, and added no 
setdement was likely that would diminish Nasser’s influence throughout the Middle East. It 
therefore seems that Eden and Lloyd prepared the Cabinet to accept the use of force even 
without an Israeli attack on Egypt.
This suggestion came up the very next day, 24 October, when Eden and Lloyd 
reported of Pineau’s visit to London. Eden told the Cabinet that the French Government 
preferred early military action, but saw no sufficient grounds to embark on such an operation 
at die present time. Secondly, he informed them that the troops ’could not be held in readiness 
for many days longer’, and that adoption of the Winter Plan weakened the British bargaining 
position. What followed was an open discussion of die objectives of such an operation, and 
die reaction of die Arab world. Eden explicidy intervened in this debate, by stating ’we should 
never have a better pretext for intervention against him [Nasser] than we had now as a result 
of his seizure of the Suez Canal’. Both the effect on the Arab world and the international 
community would be limited if the operation were ’swift and successful*. The Cabinet then 
considered die possibility to bring the issue to a head by issuing an ultimatum to Nasser to 
comply with the Eighteen Powers Proposals. No final decision would be taken, however, until 
die French Government’s attitude would be fully known.
Next day, on 25 October, Eden and Lloyd determined the decision structure: Eden 
told the Cabinet that an Israeli attack on Egypt had now become very likely, and next
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presented Challe’s proposal to intervene if either party were to refuse to withdraw at 10 miles 
from the Canal. He even anticipated the risk of being accused of collusion, but thought this 
inevitable because Israel was likely to take advantage of any future Anglo-French intervention. 
Next Lloyd spoke up, supporting Eden’s analysis, adding that Egypt had stepped up its 
attempts at undermining British influence in the Middle East. Only then did the Cabinet discuss 
the situation, and even in that discussion Eden seems to have played a dominating role in 
claiming that ’our action would be defensible in international law’ and that military action now 
would be more effective than at some later moment. In die discussion it was put forward that 
Anglo-American relations might suffer lasting damage, that it must look rather odd to ask 
Israel to remain at 10 miles from the Canal and thus allow her to occupy Egyptian territory, 
and France and the United Kingdom did not have any ’specific authority of the United Nations’ 
separating the fighting parties. Nevertheless, the Challe-plan was adopted35.
Clearly then, discussions were dominated by Eden and a loyal Lloyd. Two meetings 
probably did not even involve a full discussion, but should rather be characterized as 
gatherings at which information about recent developments was given. At the meeting of 18 
October this must have led to the acceptance of the Challe plan in principle, without a formal 
decision being recorded. It would be wrong, however, to suggest that these dynamics pertain 
to the conclusion that Eden imposed ’his war’ on the Cabinet. For one thing, the decision of
18 October was the result of consensus previously reached among senior Ministers. Eden used 
that argument to carry the whole Cabinet. Moreover, all three remaining Cabinet meetings 
were coordinated by parallel informal meetings of senior Ministers at which the details of the 
negotiations with France and Israel were agreed upon. It can thus be safely concluded that 
collusion with Israel was based on broad consensus among those Cabinet members that really 
mattered. On the other hand, it is evident that the Cabinet decision making process was 
structured in such away that the two persons who carried most information, and presumably 
authority, regarding international developments led the discussions at the Cabinet meetings. 
At two meetings at least, at one of which an important decision was taken in principle (18 
October) the role of the chairman has been decisive: Eden structured the debate by not leaving 
room for an exhaustive analysis of the issue, and deferring final decisions to later sessions.
Of course, one wonders whether any symptoms of groupthink can be observed. First, 
the remarkable amount of consensus, both at informal and at the Cabinet level, points to the
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M Later, Monckton claimed that Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, Head, Sandys, Kilmuir, and 
Thomeycroft had been strongly in favour of the plan; quoted by James, without reference to a source, 
A nthony P den  p . 537, footnote; it is not clear, however, to exactly which Cabinet meeting he is 
referring; all ministers mentioned had been present on 23, 24, and 25 October.
illusion of unanimity. This has been especially relevant on 18 October when Eden swayed the 
Cabinet by arguing that ’several senior colleagues’ had agreed to his suggested line of action. 
Silence from traditional opponents of force, such as Monckton and Butler, must have given 
die impression to junior ministers that no line of division existed any longer within the inner 
cabinet.
This brings us to a second symptom: self-censorship. Lloyd has already been observed 
to have decided not to express his doubts, either at the informal or at the Cabinet meetings. 
Indeed, he must have acted as a catalyst of raising support for the Challe-plan, because he 
decided to express serious doubts as to the effectiveness of any diplomatic settlement with 
Egypt. Another Minister who certainly fell prey to self-censorship was Walter Monckton. He 
had sent his letter of resignation on 3 October, but had already written to Eden that he was 
reluctant to leave the Government as ’0  I think it would do harm if I went altogether now 
Q’M. Significantly, Eden accepted his resignation on 18 October only, when he knew the 
Challe-plan had been accepted in rough lines, and offered Monckton the post of Paymaster- 
General57. Monckton felt that his resignation deprived him of his usual influence. On 25 
October he wrote to Lady Violet Bonham Carter, a persistent anti-Eden campaigner within the 
Conservative Party establishment, that ’I well understand the line you would wish me to take, 
but Q I cannot expect to carry the same weight or to have the same intimate knowledge of 
what is going on as I had before. Acknowledging these difficulties I shall struggle on’5*. Yet 
Monckton’s struggles on 25 October were limited to pointing out that under the 1950 Tripartite 
Declaration the United Kingdom was still obliged to assist Egypt against an Israeli attack39. 
Monckton too accepted the Challe-plan. On 18 October Monckton and Lloyd had lunched at 
Brooks’, the Secretary to the Cabinet. Probably then Uoyd told Monckton that he was
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* Moncktoo’s letter of resignation can be found in the Monckton papers, 7(249-250), 3 October 
1956; quote from a letter sent to Eden on 1 October 1956 (in effect another draft of his resignation 
letter), Monckton Papers, 7(238), 1 October 1956, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
57 Eden to Monckton, 18 October 1956, Monckton papers, 7(310-311). At the same time, Anthony 
Head was appointed Minister of Defence. In his letter to Monckton, Eden did not comment on 
Moockton’s remarks on the Suez dispute at all.
31 Monckton to Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Monckton Papers, 7(384), 25 October 1956. This was 
a response to her letter, Monckton papers 7(382-383).
39 The Cabinet minutes do not attribute any considerations to a single person, apart from those made 
by Eden, but in his papers Monckton kept a personal on the tripartite declaration, which on 23
October he asked his personal secretary to keep available; Monckton Papers, 7(345-347).
’unhappy about the whole thing, but he had decided that he could not stand against it’60. 
Therefore, even though Lloyd and Monckton had their doubts, they preferred not to ventilate 
diem, for reasons of their own, but may thus have furthered the impression to junior ministers 
that the inner Cabinet was unanimous.
Another groupthink symptom was the occurrence of a self-appointed mindguard: 
Salisbury advised Monckton to leave the Government ’It would be very embarrassing for you 
if, after having changed offices but stayed in the Government, you were then compelled to 
resign on a question of principle, which was already above the political horizon when you 
made your first decision’61. The same symptom can be observed in die refusal of both Eden, 
Lloyd, and Macmillan to meet with Roger Makins, after the latter had returned on 11 October 
from his post as Ambassador in Washington to take up his new job as Permanent Secretary at 
the treasury62. Makins had been warning against misinterpreting the American attitude 
throughout the crisis, and would spoil the optimism about bringing the crisis to a head.
Another instance of a self-appointed mindguard may have been the absence of a British 
Ambassador in Washington until after the Anglo-French intervention: Eden had allowed 
Makins’s successor Harold Caccia to go by sea instead by plane. Although Eden much 
regretted this afterwards, it must also have been convenient to British policymakers not to have 
direct lines of communications with the State Department63.
The last groupthink symptom that pervades the decision making process since the visit 
of Challe and Gazier was a collective effort to rationalize. What must have appealed to most 
ministers, and which may have persuaded doubters like Buder, was the suggestion that Great 
Britain and France would intervene in order to separate the belligerent parties, and thus might 
appear as policemen, defending international law. Indeed, on 25 October Eden explicidy 
argued that the proposed plan would be acceptable under international law, ’for we should be
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® These words are Clark’s record of a conversation over lunch with Monckton on 2 November 
1956, ’Whitehall diary’, Clark papers, p. 149, entry 2 November 1956.
41 Salisbury to Monckton, Monckton Papers, 7(226), 28 September 1956. It is only fair to add that 
Monckton had asked Salisbury for his opinion when they met on 27 September.
42 Makins in an interview with Alistair Horne; Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 431.
® Young (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, entry 22 April 1960, p. 762. This 
example of a self-appointed mindguard has been found, more by conjecture than by evidence. In the 
final mcwaimmi of the importance of groupthink in chapter 16, I decided not to count this episode as 
a symptom of groupthink.
intervening to prevent interference with the free flow of traffic through the Canal, which was 
an international necessity’6*.
2. The individual variable. It has already been pointed out how the chairman’s handling 
of cabinet meetings affected the decision structure of those gatherings. There are at least two 
instances at which Eden’s behaviour seriously affected the course of events.
(1) Reception of the Challe-plan. Eden, together with Nutting, were the first British 
policymakers die Challe-plan was put forward to. Eden had been urged by a message from 
Mollet to meet with Gazier and Challe. According to Nutting, Eden refused to be assisted by 
anyone from the legal department of die Foreign Office, as this would have been Fitzmaurice 
who was known as an opponent of the use of force65. But much more important was Eden’s 
reaction after Challe’s exposition of the plan. Challe recalls him to be have been ’delighted’46. 
Now, taking account of the situation at IS October, it is not unlikely that the Challe-visit must 
have been welcome to Eden: the Chiefs of Staff were about to issue the Winter-Plan, which 
would weaken the Anglo-French bargaining position at the negotiations at the United Nations, 
while it was getting more evident every day that the American Government was not willing 
to use SCUA as a tool of pressure on Egypt: it was thus becoming more uncertain every day 
whether a solution would be found, either diplomatic or military, which would amount to a 
credible loss of prestige for Egypt. Evidendy, the new plan offered a way out of the dilemma.
(2) Reaching consensus among senior ministers. On 18 october Eden told the Cabinet 
that he reached consensus with several of his senior ministers. We know that at 16 October’s 
informal meeting, Monckton, Lloyd, and Kilmuir had been the only senior ministers present. 
It is unlikely that Eden would have decided in favour of such a drastic course of action without 
the consent of at least Macmillan and Salisbury, and probably Home. We know that Eden did 
not give a full pledge to Mollet and Pineau in Paris on 16 October, and said that he would give 
a definite answer the next day. This implies that Eden must have consulted his senior Ministers 
on 17 October, because Lloyd’s personal notes tell that a confirmation was sent from London 
to Paris on 17 October67. We know that after Eden and Lloyd’s flight to Paris on 16 October,
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"  CM(56)74, 25 October 1956.
45 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, pp. 90-94.
** Maurice Challe, Notre Révolte, pp. 28-29. 
”  FO 800/728.
Eden 'saw a number of Cabinet colleagues taking the precaution to interview them 
individually’**. This corresponds with Monckton’s recollection that he heard of the plan for 
the first time69. Eden’s insistence on receiving his colleagues individually probably testifies 
of his persona] preference to go through with the Challe-plan; meeting them separately 
provided a better opportunity to persuade them to go along with the French plan.
14.5 Conclusions
This discussion of the decision to accept the Challe-plan has revealed that both 
individual and group variables have played a significant role. It has become evident that 
Cabinet meetings were structured by the chairman’s attitude, and that this structuring had 
probably been based on a previously reached consensus among senior ministers. The context 
in which this decision has been taken has been relevant in that the Challe-plan provided for a 
way out of a probable loss of prestige due to prolonged negotiations without strong American 
support, and the likelihood that military preparations would have to be relaxed soon. The 
presentation of the Winter Plan by the Chiefs of Staff suggests that the organizational context 
conditioned die decision making process.
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* Geoffrey McDermott, The Eden Legacy and the Decline of British Diplomacy. Leslie Frewin, 
T onri»n. 1969, p. 148; until the end of August 1956, McDermott was one of three Foreign Office 
officials who knew of political and operational plans; the other two were Patrick Dean and Sir Ivone 
Kirkpatrick. Of course, it might be the case that the major decision was prepared during the Egypt 
Committee’s meeting of 17 October at which Home and MacMillan were present.
*  Monckton in a conversation with William Clark on 2 November; ’Whitehall Diary’, Clark papers,
entry 2 November 1956, p. 149. This suggests that Lloyd’s observation was correct that the meeting 
of 16 Octobrr was of a general nature, and raises doubts about Nutting’s account of him and Monckton 
protesting.
Chapter IS: Decision 6: Military action despite international and national pressure
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15.1 The dilemma
After the decision to adopt the Challe-plan one only had to sit back and wait for events 
to unfurl: after Israel’s attack on Egypt on 29 october, which included a drop of parachutists 
near the Mida-pass as a token threat to the Canal, Mollet and Pineau flew to London on 30 
October. The projected ultimatum was put to both belligerents by the English and French 
Governments, and the armada started sailing from Malta and Cyprus. Problems arose after a 
short moment of reprieve, when all seemed to be going as planned: ’die big decisions are over 
and they [Eden and Lloyd] seem calm and detached’1: in the evening of 30 October it became 
evident that the United States would not support the Anglo-French case at the Security 
Council. The next surprise was die adoption of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, sponsored 
by Yugo-Slavia, which undid die effect of the French and British vetoes at the Security 
Council and transferred the debate to an emergency session of die United Nations’ General 
Assembley.
These unexpected developments confronted British decision makers with an 
unanticipated contingency: how to resist to international pressure until the Armada would have 
arrived at Egypt’s shores? Only now did one fidly realize that it would take the fleet seven 
very long days to sail to Port Said. On 2 November 1956 the Cabinet decided to continue the 
operations as planned, but announced that it would welcome a United Nations intervention 
force in the area. The next day it was decided that the Minister of Defence should go to 
Cyprus to urge for an earlier drop of French and British airborne troops. Military commanders 
at Cyprus, however, were against it, because these troops would have to face strong Egyptian 
resistance while the main assault would not start for another 48 hours.
On 4 November the situation worsened, when Israel seemed willing to comply with 
die United Nations resolution that called for a cease-fire. This would deprive France and Great 
Britain from their pretext to intervene in order to protect the Canal. Operations could proceed, 
only when Israel announced that it would not agree to a cease fire after all, after strong 
pressure from Mollet on Ben Gurion. On 4 November the British Cabinet decided that 
parachutists would be dropped the next day, 24 hours earlier than planned, and one day before 
the main assault.
It will be shown that the British Cabinet was trapped by her decision of 25 October. 
At that time the Challe-plan seemed an ideal way out of obtaining one’s objectives without
1 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 30 october 1956, p. 144.
offending the United States and international public opinion too much. When these fundamental 
assumptions proved incorrect, one faced a painful dilemma: on 4 November it seemed 
inevitable that remaining loyal to one’s pretext implied that no occupation of the Canal Zone 
could take place at all. The objective of provoking Nasser’s downfall seemed further away than 
ever.
15.2 The structure of decision
Before examining this case of entrapment a bit more in detail, it is important to have 
an impression of the structure of the decision making process. Chart 6 presents an overview 
of most relevant meetings.
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Chart 15.1: decision making structure of decision 6
26 Oct 10.30 A.M. 
06.45 P.M.
29 Oct 02.30 P.M.
30 Oct 10.15 A.M. 
afterwards 
03.30 P.M. 
10.00 P.M.
31 Oct 09.45 A.M. 
noon
12.30 P.M.
1 Nov 09.45 A.M. 
10.00 A.M.
02.35 P.M.
03.30 P.M.
04.00 P.M.
10.00 P.M. 
10.45 P.M.
2 Nov 09.45 A.M.
04.30 P.M.
Lloyd has meeting at 10, Downing Street 
Lloyd has meeting at 10, Downing Street
Meeting at 10, Downing Street: at least Lloyd, Eden, Keighdey, 
Dickson, Templer, Mountbatten
Cabinet
Pineau and Mollet meet Lloyd and Eden at 10, Downing Street 
Defence (Transition) Committee
Meeting at 10, Downing Street with at least Kilmuir and Eden present, 
as well as Lloyd; probably Macmillan
D(T)C
Lloyd meets Monckton 
Cabinet
D(T)C
Ministerial meeting in Lloyd’s room at the House of Commons: 
Lloyd, Home, Lennox Boyd, Monckton, Kirkpatrick, Burke Trend2, 
Service ministers, and (can be deduced from notes) Head 
Egypt Committee
Censure motion House of Commons 
’Suez meeting’ (Kilmuir [1964: 275])
3-line whip
Egypt Committee Oasts until 1.30 A.M.)
D(T)C
Cabinet
2 Later, Baron Trend; Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet.
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06.00 P.M. Pineau meets Lloyd
09.30 P.M. Cabinet Oasts until 2 A.M.)
3 Nov 02.00 P.M. Egypt Committee Oasts 1 hour)
10.30 P.M. Meetings at 10, Downing Street, at least Kilmuir is present Oasts until
2.30 A.M.)
4 Nov before Lloyd and Eden at 10, Downing Street
12.30 P.M. Egypt Committee Oasts until 1.30 P.M.)
03.30 P.M. Egypt Committee5
06.30 P.M. Cabinet Oasts until 9.30 P.M.)
Chart 6 allows for several observations. First, foreign policy was conducted from 10, 
Downing Street rather than from the Foreign Office. This had already been the case since 
Challe and Gazier’s visit at Chequers on 14 October (cf. chart 14.1): Lloyd’s diary of 
engagements demonstrates that much of the Foreign Secretary’s time was spent at the Prime 
Minister’s office. This is by itself an indication the strong influence Eden had on the 
formulating and sending of diplomatic exchanges. Eden’s mark should not be exaggerated, 
however; it is very likely, and sometimes demonstrable, that major messages, such as those 
to Eisenhower, were cleared by Macmillan.
Second, a relatively large number of meetings of both the Cabinet and Egypt 
Committee were held. Generally, one could say that the political decisions to go ahead with 
military operations, and to accept an United Nations emergency force if Anglo-French forces 
would be part of them, were taken by the Cabinet at 2 and 4 November. Both meetings were 
preceded, however, by meetings of the Egypt Committee, which each lasted for about three 
hours. It seems that the Egypt Committee was dealing primarily with the implementation of 
military strategy, such as the decision of 1 November not to bomb Egyptian oil installations. 
As soon as politically relevant questions emerged, discussions were transferred to the full 
Cabinet.
Third, it is difficult to give a reasonable assessment of the amount of informal meetings 
taking place. The only unequivocal example is the meeting in Lloyd’s room at the House of 
Commons on 1 November. More puzzling are die meetings at 10, Downing Street on 30 
October, 3 and 4 November4. From various sources it can be deduced that Macmillan and
3 Robertson suggests that Pineau and Bourgès-Manoury flew to London, and met with 'Eden and 
the inner cabinet’; they supposedly argued that any further delay of military operations would be fatal; 
Robertson, Crisis- Inside the Suez Conspiracy, p. 230.
4 Main source is Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 275.
Lloyd were present on 30 October too5. This suggests that throughout this period a small 
group of ministers was present at 10, Downing Street, or were at least contacted.
15.3 Entrapment
In the morning of 30 October the Cabinet agreed unanimously6 to issue an ultimatum 
to Egypt and Israel and to consult the French Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. The 
remaining time was spent discussing the likely attitude of the United States Government. It was 
generally considered unlikely that the United States would respond to an appeal to support the 
action that would be taken, it was deemed possible ’to reduce the offence to American public 
opinion’ and not to alienate the U.S. Government ’more than was absolutely necessary’. This 
was considered indispensable because one expected to have to rely on American economic 
assistance, as British ’reserves of gold and dollars were 0 falling at a dangerously rapid rate’7. 
Although active American support was thus not anticipated, the Cabinet did expect economic 
assistance; one may therefore deduct that silent American approval with some public noises 
was expected. This may explain why the entire Cabinet agreed not to support the American 
proposed Security Council resolution which condemned Israel as an aggressor, thus clearing 
the way for the first British veto at the Security Council that would be pronounced later that 
day.
Until late afternoon all seemed to be going according to plan; small wonder that Eden 
and Lloyd were ’curiously euphoric’*. Then, however, news of the American public reaction 
and the debate at the Security Council came off the tape. Most disturbing was the American 
attitude at the United Nations, once the news of the Anglo-French ultimatum broke through. 
The Americans introduced a resolution that called for Israeli withdrawal and which stated that 
compliance would remove the basis for the Anglo-French ultimatum. At 10 P.M. British 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Dixon, called Lloyd at 10, Downing Street, and made it
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5 Clark records that at 9. IS P.M. U.S. Ambassador Aldrich handed over Eisenhower’s cool reaction 
to the Anglo-French ultimatum. The draft reply to Eisenhower, which was sent that evening, shows 
suggestions by Macmillan. At 10 P.M. Lloyd talked to Pierson Dixon on the phone, British Ambassador 
to the United Nations. Clearly then, both Lloyd and Macmillan were at 10, Downing Street; Clark, 
’Whitehall Diary’, entry 30 October 1956, pp. 143-144.
* ]*t*r that day, Monckton told William Clark that he and Heathcoat Amory had protested against 
iscning an ultimatum, while Sandys and Lennox-Boyd adopted a most hawklike stand; Clark, 'Whitehall 
diary’, entry 30 October 1956, p. 142.
7 CM(56)75, 30 October 1956.
* Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 30 October 1956, p. 144.
clear that the Americans were ’gunning for us hard*, and was afraid he would have to veto9. 
That same evening news came in that Dulles had said that the United States had ’noticed a 
rapid build-up of our forces in Cyprus Q which had started before the Israeli move’. He 
considered the ultimatum a ’pretty brutal affair’ and added that ’we were facing the destruction 
of our trust in each other’10. At 9.15 P.M. Aldrich delivered a very cool message of 
Eisenhower. Eden and Macmillan, however, stuck to their curious rationalization of American 
behaviour, and preferred to separate public and private utterances of Eisenhower’s (see chapter 
17).
Later that night Yugo-Slavia introduced a Uniting for Peace Resolution which called 
for an emergency session of the General Assembley. Lloyd was very disappointed that the 
Americans supported this resolution, because their abstention would have been enough to reject 
the proposal11, which would have given France and Great Britain some breathing space. Now, 
however, die General Assembley would convene at 10 P.M. on 1 November, and it was 
evident which side the United States was likely to take in that debate12. Furthermore, the 
British veto and the start of the bombing of Egyptian targets by the Royal Air Force on 31 
October had caused great turmoil in the House of Commons. Even the Conservative Party was 
increasingly more divided, as the Whips reported13.
In this context one should understand the meeting of Lloyd, Home, Lennox-Boyd, 
Monckton, Kirkpatrick, and assistant secretary to the Cabinet Trend, as well as the three 
service ministers in Lloyd’s room at the Commons at 10 A.M. on 1 November. At this 
meeting developments at the United Nations were discussed. Kirkpatrick said that he expected 
die United Kingdom to leave the United Nations, or to be expelled. The party discussed the 
possibility of asking the United Nations to continue Anglo-French operations as a peace-
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* Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 30 October 1956, p. 144; Lloyd answered ’quite cheerfully’ that 
Dixon had to veto indeed.
10 Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, Telegrams 2205 and 2206, 30 October 1956, PREM 
11/1100.
11 Lloyd, Suez 1956. pp. 199-200; invoking the Uniting for peace procedure is a procedural 
question, the adoption of which required seven votes in favour.
12 As a matter of fact, Dulles would personally lead to crusade against France and Great Britain at
the emergency session of die United Nations General Assembly on 1 and 2 November. He moved a 
resolution aimed at making Israel and Egypt accept a cease fire so that Anglo-French intervention would 
become obsolete. This resolution was adopted with 65 votes in favour, 5 against and 6 abstentions.
11 Cf. James, Anthony Eden, pp. 546-547, 558-560.
keeping operation under U.N.-flag and with a U.N.-commander14. This idea was presented 
to the Egypt Committee that evening.
At this point it became clear how much the British Government was trapped in its own 
pretext. Originally, the Challe-plan had seemed an ideal solution, because France and the 
United Kingdom would appear to be acting under international law, or at least international 
morality, and would thus easily solicit the support of public opinion, especially at home, at the 
United Nations, and in the United States. Moreover, it offered the possibility of reducing the 
offence to pro-English Arab countries: because Israel was bound to profit from an Anglo- 
French military attack on Egypt in any case, the Cabinet preferred to be seen as holding the 
balance between Egypt and Israel rather than as acting together with Israel13.
When the Egypt Committee faced an unexpected situation of mounting domestic and 
international opposition on the evening of 1 November, the solution of transferring the 
responsibility for the Anglo-French ’police action’ to the United Nations seemed the only way 
out within the type of rationalization that British policymakers had created themselves. By 
implication, one was losing sight of one’s main objective, which was reportedly noticed by the 
Minister of Defence, Anthony Head. He ’kept on reminding us [committee] that the first 
objective of this whole operation was to get rid of Nasser; that would never be done by [the] 
U[nited] N[ations]’16. Because it had been decided to use policing as a pretext to achieve its 
real objective, the British Government was constraint to present its case in form of its chosen 
justification17. The issue of handing over the matter to the United Nations was transferred to 
the Cabinet meeting next day. Actually, the Cabinet met twice, the interval allowing for a 
meeting between Pineau and Lloyd (and probably Eden). The Cabinet minutes reveal that real 
worries existed about the split within the Conservative Party. Hard-liners would consider the 
transfer of responsibility to the U.N. as an excuse for abandoning an invasion altogether; soft- 
liners would not understand why an attack on Egypt would be launched, while the U.N. would
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14 Clark, ’Whitehall Diary’, entry 1 November 1956, p. 146; it is unclear whether the meeting was 
responding to the idea of an United Nations emergency force that had been floated by the Canadian 
Foreign Secretary Lester Pearson, or whether one came up with the idea independently. One should 
recall that Home (who was present at this meeting) had already made a similar suggestion at the end of 
July.
15 Cf. CM(56)70, 25 October 1956.
“  Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 1 November 1956, p. 146. Clark’s source was Walter Monckton.
17 This explains the efforts to try to maintain strict consistency between pretext and behaviour,such 
as the Cabinet’s decision of 2 November to suspend the export of arms to Israel; CM(56)78, 2 
November 1956.
have been invited to take over. To make things worse, Pineau had made it clear that the 
French would not accept halting the operation, even though U.N.-policing could be discussed. 
The Cabinet thus decided that it would agree to stop operations if a U.N. force could be 
constituted and if Anglo-French forces would be part of it1*.
Meanwhile, die ships’ slow speed had made the dilemma ever more pressing: how 
could one ’get the invasion started before the UN can make it too hot for us’; Eden reportedly 
kept on repeating that the United Nations was ’our only real danger now’19. The French were 
in a similar hurry. Pineau urged that troops should have landed on Egyptian before the vote 
in the General Assembley would take place. Pineau and General Ely flew to London to 
convince die British of swift action. Ely recalls strong hesitation among the British Chiefs of 
Staff, notably Mountbatten20. At the political level21, it was decided to advance the drop of 
airborne troops to 4 November. This met with heavy resistance of the military on 3 November, 
who thought it military unsound the drop relatively lightly armed troops without an immediate 
sea-borne landing.
The decision to intervene as policemen who would protect the Suez Canal from an 
Egyptian-Israeli war constrained the freedom of Anglo-French action in another way. Although 
at an early stage it had already been decided to try to minimize civilian casualties as much as 
possible in view of the effect on public opinion, the success of such efforts became all the 
more pressing, once the policing task had been chosen as a pretext. The Cabinet thus decided 
to issue a public warning advising to keep clear of all Egyptian airfields, and when news came 
through that die United States was evacuating its citizens by a road which ran through the 
Cairo West airfield, a R.A.F. target, it was decided that every effort should be made to 
postpone the particular attack until evacuation would have been completed22. Similarly, 
Minister of Defence Anthony Head and General Templer were sent to Cyprus on 3 November
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19 Reportedly, Lloyd told Dixon over the phone that ’we can accept anything from the UN so long 
as it doesn’t stop our troops going in’; Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 3 November 1956, p. 149.
20 Ely, Mémoires, ii. Suez...le 13 Mai, pp. 162-164.
21 It is not clear at which meeting, but it may well be the early Cabinet meeting of 2 November, the
minute» of which are being withheld; on the other hand, the fill) Cabinet seldom discussed operational 
military plans. Indirect evidence of this crisis-like decision being taken on 2 November comes from 
Clark’s remarie that on 2 November Eden’s temperature rose to 105 degrees; Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, 
entry 4-5 November 1956, p. 158; Bourgès-Manoury’s contemplation to have the French start the 
invasion unilaterally, may have added to the rise of temperature, Ely, Mémoires.», p. 169.
22 CM(56)76, 31 October 1956.
to tell the Commanders that damage to civilian objects and civilian casualties had be 
minimized, and, logical consequence of the policeman pretext, to confine military operations 
to the Canal zone. This meant that an advance on Cairo was out of the question23. Would that 
be enough to procure Nasser’s downfall ?
The ultimate consequence of entrapment in a pretext was faced on 4 November when 
news came through that Israel and Egypt had accepted the United Nations resolution calling 
for a cease-fire. This would deprive an Anglo-French invasion of its pretext, because both 
belligerents posed no longer a threat to the Canal. Faced with this situation, and worried by 
talk of U.N.-oil sanctions against France and Great Britain, the Cabinet met in the early 
evening of 4 November24. Three courses of action seemed open: (1) go on as planned, 
accepting a United Nations force if French and British troops would part of it, (2) suspend 
operations for 24 hours and see whether the U.N. would accept Anglo-French troops as ’an 
advance guard of the Ultimate United Nations force’, (3) stop operations indefinitely. When 
a formal vote was taken, three ministers favoured the last course, four ministers the second, 
while twelve were in favour of going on. Eden did not consider this enough, although only 
Monckton had indicated that he would not accept a majority decision and ’must reserve his 
position’25. A governmental crisis, however, was averted by the news that Israel had decided 
not to accept the terms of the United Nations Resolution after all. The pretext was restored, 
and operations could continue.
15.4 Dependent and constraining variables
Two variables seem to have affected the decision making: groupthink and the 
organizational context; at the same time Eden’s directive leadership style had a clear impact.
1. Groupthink. At least four elements can be found in this period of entrapment. First, 
in the safety of the pretext of a policing operation, several indications of the presence of the 
illusion of invulnerability among senior ministers and even the full Cabinet can be found. (1) 
On 30 October, when the Cabinet decided to issue the ultimatum to Egypt and Israel as 
planned, Eden and Lloyd acted in a ’curiously euphoric’ manner26; (2) At the Cabinet
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23 Beaufre, The. Suez Expedition, p. 92; Beaufre mentions the evening of 4 November, but Head 
and Templer flew to Cyprus on 3 November; James, Anthony Eden, pp. 564-565.
24 CM(56)79, 4 November 1956.
29 Three different accounts of Eden’s disappointment and consequent behaviour exist; cf. Carlton, 
Britain and the Suez Crisis, pp. 74-75.
* Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 30 October 1956, p. 144
meeting of 4 November, when the news broke of Israel’s refusal to accept a cease-fire, and
thus the pretext was restored, a split in the Cabinet avoided, and operations could proceed,
’tension round the table was immediately relieved’27: ’everybody laughed & banged the table
with relief -except Birch and Monckton, who looked glum’2*. (3) A third, but possibly less
convincing, element of a feeling of invulnerability can be observed in the fact that in the
evening of 5 November, the day of the first landings of French and British parachutists, a
sherry party was held at 10, Downing Street29.
Second, Home’s letter to Eden, written after the crucial 4 November meetings of the
Egypt Committee and the Cabinet, shows a belief in the inherent morality of the group:
My dear Anthony, The stakes you were playing for yesterday [4 November]
were the highest-to lose all or to win all. We are not out of the wood, but we
have won a decisive round. If our country rediscovers its soul and inspiration 
your calm courage will have achieved this miracle. With my unstinted 
admiration, Yours ever, Alec30
Third, pressure was exerted on dissenters. On 1 November already, Monckton told
Clark that he had wanted to resign from the Government, which could have had serious
consequences for the unity of die Conservative Party. Nevertheless, ’WM Q said he only
stayed with the ship at the strong request of the PM Q’3>. Indeed, Monckton’s eventual
decision to stay on counts as an example of self-censorship. All Cabinet decisions on 30 and
31 October, 2 and 4 November were taken unanimously. When Israel appeared to accept a
cease-fire on 4 November, Monckton had said he must reserve his position if military
operations were not deferred indefinitely. Nevertheless, once it became known that Israel did
not accept the U.N.-resolution, Monckton remained silent32. His self-censorship surfaces in
his letter to die Cabinet after Anglo-French operations had been halted:
’I have remained in the Cabinet without resignation because I have not thought 
it right to take a step which I was assured would bring the Government down 
Q. I have always felt that in as much as my opinion was not shared by any of
27 Butler, The Art of the Possible, p. 193.
31 Clarissa Eden’s diary, quoted by James, Anthony Eden, p. 567.
* FO 800/717 (Lloyd’s diary of engagements November 1956).
30 Home to Eden, 5 November 1956, PREM 11/1154, printed in Lamb, Failure of the Eden 
Government, p. 250.
31 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 1 November 1956, p. 147.
33 He may not have had the opportunity to speak up, as ’tension was immediately relieved’, and 
’tables were banged’.
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my colleagues, a certain measure of humility demanded restraint in action on 
my part. Moreover, I did understand the danger of doing nothing because 
Nasser was succeeding in undermining our position throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa Q. I have lived on from day to day Q in the hope that 
I could within the Cabinet contribute towards a settlement as soon as 
possible’33.
The fact that those ministers who favoured stopping altogether (Salisbury, Buchan- 
Hepburn) or postponement (Butler, Kilmuir and Heathcoat-Amory)34, happily joined in the 
general relief about Israel’s refusal to accept a cease-fire testifies of the power of the idea of 
operating as a policeman. Indeed, it should thus count as a collective rationalization of one’s 
behaviour.
Various indications of the occurrence of symptoms of groupthink thus appears at the 
Cabinet level. The next question, however, must be to which extent the individual variable 
helps in understanding the structuring of the decision making process.
2. The individual variable: directive leadership. From the records it is very difficult 
to conclude that Eden, as the chairman, manipulated the discussions of the Cabinet. Especially, 
the minutes of the 4 November meeting suggest that Eden solicited a thorough discussion of 
the consequences of the situation that had occurred now Israel seemed willing to abide with 
a U.N.-resolution. At first, a search for alternative courses of action was held; next, their 
respective advantages and disadvantages were looked for; only then did Eden invite ’each of 
his colleagues to indicate his view on the three alternative courses set out Q’35. He reportedly 
did not vote himself36.
When the Cabinet appeared strongly divided, with two senior Ministers (Kilmuir and 
Butler) voting in favour of postponement, and one in (Salisbury) favour of stopping, Eden is 
said to have taken Butler, Macmillan and Salisbury aside and to have told them that ’if they 
wouldn’t go on then he would have to resign’37. This clearly qualifies as an individual attempt 
to direct the decision making process, as these three ’most senior’ ministers agreed that in that
33 Minute from Monckton to the Cabinet, 7 November 1956; Monckton Papers, 8(39-40).
34 The votes a re  identified by James, Anthony Eden, p. 566.
35 CM(56)79, 4 November 1956.
36 Lamb, Failure of the Eden Government, p. 260.
37 Hffri” » Eden's diary, quoted by James, Anthony Eden, p. 567; two more accounts exist, one 
from Butler, who claims Eden said he must go upstairs and reconsider his position; Butler, The Art of 
the Possible, p. 193; the second reports Eden to have broken down in tears, crying ’You are all
me’, going upstairs to compose himself; James Margach, The Abuse of Power. London, 1978, 
p. 113, quoted by Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, p. 75.
case no-one would be able to form a government3*. However, it would not be necessary to 
discuss the consequences of the vote with die full Cabinet, as news broke that Israel would not 
accept the cease-fire after all; Cabinet unanimity was immediately restored.
3. The organizational context. The presence of group and individual variables at the 
decision making process notwithstanding, it should not be forgotten that the decision making 
process itself has been severely constrained by die logistics of die military plan, once the fleet 
had left Malta, Cyprus and Algiers. It would take the ships 7 days to arrive at Port S_!i, and 
a rapid occupation of Port Said by airborne troops was considered highly imprudent by British 
military planners, because the lightly armed parachutists would not be able to hold out against 
the Egyptian army, while reinforcements would still be far away at sea. Indeed, at the Egypt 
Committee meeting of 3 November the Chiefs of Staff argued that because the Israeli advance 
in the Sinai had caused Egypt to withdraw parts of her troops from the Sinai and redeploy 
them near the Canal. According to the Chiefs, this implied that Port Said had to be heavily 
bombed before die Anglo-French assault, which conflicted with die political objective of 
limiting damage and civilian casualties. Only die next day the original plans could be stuck to, 
when air reconnaissance had revealed that Egyptian forces were withdrawing towards Cairo. 
The nature of military planning is not subject of this research. It is therefore sufficient to note 
that die slow speed of the fleet, coupled with the military’s conviction that an early drop of 
parachutists would be unsound military action, set limits to British decision making39.
4. Domestic politics. Little evidence exist of the effect of growing domestic opposition 
on the decision making process. It seems, however, that British policymakers were worried 
by a potential division within the Tory Party rather than by the public at large. The risk of a
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31 Clarissa Eden’s diary, footnote 310.
39 Nevertheless, it could be hypothesized that the latter argument may have been used by those 
military top officials, such as Mountbatten, to try to delay landings as long as possible, in the view of 
growing international and domestic pressure on the British Government. It should be noted that the 
French had been advocating an early attack right from the moment discussion at the United Nations had 
been transferred from the Security Council to the General Assembley. On 2 November General Ely 
spoke with the British Chiefs of Staff to that effect, while Pineau tried to convince Eden and Lloyd. The 
French military saw no problem in launching an airborne attack with the ships still fir at sea. Now this 
may be due to the overeagerness of the French military to be victorious after so many years of 
humiliation, but the hesitancy of the British military, as well as their meticulous planning, and the 
tendency to sticlc to it, needs explaining. This suggests two possible hypotheses: (1) the invoking of 
standard operation procedures for military planning and implementation, (2) deliberate obstruction of 
the political decision making process; Cf. Alistair Horne, The French Armv and Politics. 1870-1970. 
Peter Bedrick, New York, 1984; Herbet Luethy and David Rodnick, French Motivations in the Suez 
Crisis. The Institute for International Social Research, Princeton, New Jersey, December 1956.
divided Conservative Party affected the British decision of two November to request the 
participation of Anglo-French troops in a U. N. emergency force.
15.5 Concluding remarks
The decision to continue operations despite growing international and domestic 
opposition should thus be understood in terms of the constraining influence of, especially, the 
organizational context, and, to a lesser extent, domestic politics. The decision itself has been 
influenced by groupthink: British decisionmakers preferred to stick to the rationalization that 
the Challe-plan had offered them: the presence of a large number of symptoms of groupthink 
testifies of their entrapment.
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Chapter 16: The independent variables: Operational Code and Groupthink
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16.1 Introduction
Discussion of six decisional conflicts aimed, firstly, to make the reader familiar with 
the complexity of the decision making process during the Suez crisis; secondly, assess the 
presence of four factors in that process (i.e., the Operational Code, Groupthink, the 
organizational context, and considerations of domestic politics). However, it is one thing to 
identify these elements, it is quite another to assess the relative influence of each variable. This 
concerns groupthink in particular: it is not enough to merely conclude that several symptoms 
have occurred: it will be necessary, first, to link their occurrence to the phenomenon’s 
antecedent conditions in order to attribute their presence to group processes rather than third 
variables; and, second, to show that defective decision making resulted.
The basic contention of this chapter is, first, that a small group of British ministers, 
consisting of Eden, Macmillan, Lloyd, Salisbury, Kilmuir, Home, Monckton (up until a certain 
moment), and (in a more qualified manner) Butler, fell prey to groupthink in preparing the 
major decisions in the Egypt Committee, or in informal meetings. Although the Cabinet 
displays an increasing number of groupthink symptoms as well, as the crisis develops, 
consensus at the Cabinet level should partly be explained in political terms, that is, by the 
importance of previous consensus among senior ministers. Second, in several instances Eden’s 
Operational Code adds significandy to explaining the decision making process. Third, I will 
show how Eden, as leader of the small group, fulfilled the crucial function of establishing a 
link between the Operational Code and the Groupthink phenomenon. I shall also argue that 
organizational and domestic variables operated as constraining variables that to a certain extent 
moderated the impact of the independent variables.
16.2 The independent variables
A summary of the structure of the decision making process makes it clear that during 
the development of the Suez crisis, the Egypt Committee became increasingly less and less 
used as unit of decision making, while the number of informal meetings, defined as meetings 
at which three or more senior ministers were present1, steadily expanded. Table 16.1 presents
1 The reader should be aware of two caveats: first of all, many informal meetings have been 
recorded, and have been mentioned in the charts of chapters 10-15, between two ministers. Many of 
those include Eden and Macmillan, Macmillan and Salisbury, Eden and Lloyd, and Macmillan and 
Lloyd, giving more credit to the existence of the presence of a small inner circle. Secondly, I do not 
claim to have given an exhaustive account of all informal meetings; those I have presented can be found 
by the close reading of accounts, memoirs, diaries, and by studying the official records.
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the frequency of meetings of four decision making units (Egypt Committee, Cabinet, Informal 
Group, and Defence (Transition) Committee) throughout the crisis.
Table 16.2 gives an overview of the number of meetings of these decision making units 
related to the period of each decisional conflict:
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Table 16.2: number of meetings of decision making units per decisional conflict
| Informal Egypt Comm Cabinet D(T)C
Decision 1 | 1 9 3 2
Decision 2 2 9 3 6
Decision 3 1 8 4 4
Decision 4 1 4 4 1 2
Decision 5 6 5 5
-
Decision 6 1 4 5 5 3
Total 1 18 40 2 17
Both tables allow for the following conclusions: first, two particular large gaps appear 
in between meetings of the Defence (Transition) Committee between 28 August and 7 
September; and again between 18 September and 30 October. The first of these gaps testifies 
to the readiness of the military and administrative apparatus to embark on an invasion. The 
Defence (Transition) Committee had been installed to deal with all administrative implications 
of military operations against Egypt. For instance, it organized the printing of banknotes that 
could be used in Egyptian territory that would be occupied. Its September meetings were a 
consequence of the military’s change of landing place from Port Said to Alexandria. Similarly, 
the absence of meetings from 18 September to the end of October relates to the state of 
readiness of the troops to implement Musketeer Revise. The committee’s meetings in October 
and November reflect the process of monitoring the actual operations.
Second, one can draw the general conclusion from table 11.2 that an overall shift 
occurs from decisions being taken in the context of frequent Egypt Committee meetings 
towards decisions taken in the context of regular Cabinet meetings, which are surrounded by 
informal meetings of senior ministers. In particular, it is odd to observe in table 11.1 that only 
one Egypt Committee meeting was held between 10 October and 1 November, die period
during which Challe unfurls his plan, die Sfevres negotiations take place, and military 
operations start.
Third, the sheer number of informal meetings surrounding decisions 4 and 5 (the 
decision to refer the matter to die U.N.O., and the decision to adopt the Challe-plan) suggests 
that this habit of informal gathering became the dominant pattern of decision making, although 
it should be added that many Cabinet members were present at those Egypt Committee 
meetings that concern decision 42.
Does this view correspond with the discussion of the six crucial decisions in the 
preceding chapters? As to decision 1, the choice of diplomacy over force, it was argued that 
this decision was effectively taken by the Egypt Committee, but affected by an informal 
meeting on 26 July. Decision 2, sending off the Menzies mission to Egypt, was taken by the 
Egypt Committee, but grounded in two informal meetings. The same can be said of decision
3, the adoption of S.C.U.A. and the simultaneous withdrawal of the pilots. Decision 4, 
reference to the Security Council, was taken on a purely informal basis. Decision 5, accepting 
the Challe plan, was effectively taken by the Cabinet, with an occasional role for the Egypt 
Committee (17 October), but was heavily dependent on consensus among senior ministers, 
previously reached on an informal basis. The last decision 6, continuing military operations, 
was contingent on both the Cabinet and the Egypt Committee meetings that surrounded the 
former’s gatherings, but was seriously affected by an informal meeting on 1 November, 
outside the usual inner circle, in which the compromise of accepting a U.N. emergency force 
was prepared.
16.2.1 Groupthink
If this is the correct pattern, then one would logically expect the occurrence of 
symptoms of groupthink to run parallel to this shift in loci of decision making. This suggestion 
is confirmed in table 16.3 on die next page. The distribution of the symptoms of groupthink 
confirms the pattern of decision making that was alluded to in section 11.1. Towards the end 
of the crisis (decisions 5 & 6), groupthink symptoms do not occur in the Egypt Committee, 
but in the inner group, and especially in the Cabinet. Until that time, apart from the first phase 
of the crisis, symptoms are absent at the Cabinet level, but surface in the Egypt Committee. 
The inner group regularly displays groupthink symptoms, most frequently during deliberations 
as to the London Conference (decision 2).
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2 On 12, 14, and 17 September, there were twelve out of 18 Cabinet members present; on 19 
September, only eleven ministers attended; see also appendix 3.
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Tabel 16.3: Symptoms of groupthink per decision
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Sub (To,
r 1
4
IG* 1 1
EC 1 1
Cab 1 1 2
D 2 5
IG 1 1 1 3
EC 2
2
Cab
D 3 7
IG 1 1 2
EC 1 1 1 1 4
Cab 1 1
D 4 1
IG 1 1
EC 1
Cab - 1
D 5 n i 6 i
IG 2 2 I
EC 1
Cab 1 1 1 i 4 1
D 6 6
IG 1 1
EC I -
Cab 1 1 1 1 1 h
Explanation:
* IG= Inner group
EC= Egypt Committee 
Cab= Cabinet
** Symptoms of groupthink: 1 = illusion of invulnerability; 2=belief in inherent morality; 3= collective 
rationalization; 4=stereotpyes of outgroups; 5 = selfcensorship; 6= illusion of unanimity; 7=direct 
pressure on dissenters; 8-self-appointed mindguards
Note: I have decided not to include one common collective rationalization in explaining the lack of 
American support, that is, the election motive, because it occurs in all three units of decision making 
throughout the crisis, and would thus obscure the differentiation in groupthink symptoms.
On the whole, the picture suggests, first, that during die first months of the crisis an 
inner group prepared decisions, which were effectively taken in the Egypt Committee, while 
towards the end of the crisis an inner group led die dance with the Cabinet rather than the 
Egypt Committee. Second, it can be concluded that the decisions 3, 5, and 6 display most 
symptoms of groupthink. It will appear that precisely these three decisions can be characterized 
by elements of defective decision making.
Of course, it is not sufficient to simply observe the occurrence of symptoms of 
groupthink to establish its relevant role in die decision making process. It will be necessary 
to assess whether the small group fulfills the antecedent conditions that have been formulated 
by Janis. Furthermore, it has to be argued that the occurrence of the symptoms can be related 
to defective decision making in a reasonable way, and, in our case, to the puzzle of Suez. This 
will be postponed to the next chapter. The first requirement, however, is to identify the small 
group.
(A) Identifying the small eroupfs)
In table 16.3 a distinction was made between three small groups which, in different 
degrees, displayed symptoms of groupthink: die Cabinet, the Egypt Committee, and an inner 
group of senior ministers. Is it possible to identify the participants of each decision making 
unit?
1. The Cabinet. Eighteen ministers belonged to the Cabinet, as distinguished from the 
Government3: Sir Anthony Eden (Prime Minister), Lord Salisbury (Lord President of the 
Council), Mr. Selwyn Lloyd (Foreign Secretary), Mr. Macmillan (Chancellor of the 
Exchequer), Mr. Butler (Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons), Lord 
Kilmuir (Lord Chancellor), Sir Walter Monckton (Minister of Defence, until 18 October 1956; 
from that date Paymaster-General), Mr. Head (Minister of Defence from 18 October 1956), 
Mr. Lloyd-George (Home Secretary), Mr. Lennox-Boyd (Colonial Secretary), Lord Home 
(Secretary for Commonwealth Relations), Mr. Stuart (Secretary of State for Scotland), Mr. 
Thorneycroft (President of die Board of Trade), Mr. Sandys (Minister of Housing and Local 
Government), Lord Woolton (Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster), Sir David Eccles 
(Minister of Education), Mr. Heath coat Amory (Minister of Agriculture), and Mr. Peake 
(Minister of Pensions). Most Ministers were present at all Cabinet meetings that were held 
during the crisis. Major absentees had been Butler on 27 July (illness) and 21 August
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3 After 18 October, when Monckton resigned as Minister of Defence, but stayed on as Paymaster- 
General, the full Cabinet consisted of 19 Persons.
(holiday); Monckton on 1 and 2 August (illness); Lloyd on 3 an 9 October (United Nations), 
and Macmillan on 26 September (IMF meeting in Washington).
2. The Egypt Committee. From the records it is possible to calculate who have been 
the most frequent visitors to 40 Egypt Committee meetings between 27 July and 4 November. 
These data are presented in table 16.4:
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Table 16.4: Frequency of attendance at 40 EC meetings
Frequency Policvmaker
38 Eden*
37 Brook (Secretary to the Cabinet)
36 Home*
36 Macmillan*
32 Lloyd*
31 Head#* (Secretary of State for War)
31 Thomey croft*
30 Salisbury*
30 Watkinson# (Minister of Transport)
28 Monckton*
27 Butler*
21 Lennox Boyd*
19 Dickson (Chairman of Chiefs of Staff)
11 Kirkpatrick (Permanent Secretary at FO)
10 Kilmuir*
10 Templer (Imperial General Staff)
9 Mountbatten (First Sea Lord)
8 Jones# (Minister of Fuel and Power)
7 Boyle (Air Chief of Staff)
7 Birch# (Secretary of State for Air)
7 Hailsham# (Secretary of State for the Navy)
6 Heath (Chief Whip)
4 Keightley (Commander Operation Musketeer)
3 Heathcoat Amory*
2 Nutting# (Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office)
2 Powell (?)
2 Ivelaw-Chapman (Air Force)
* Member of the Cabinet
# Member of the Government
Source: calculations based on CAB 134/1216, Public Record Office, Kew.
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Table 16.4 (continued)
Several individuals attended the meetings only once: Davis (naval staff), Snelling 
(Commonwealth Office), Caccia (Foreign Office), Reading (FO), Dean (FO), Lambe (Second 
Sea Lord), Jenkins (Ministry of Transport), Dickson (Foreign Office), Inglis (naval 
Intelligence), Hare (Secretary of State for War).
3. The inner group. It is much more difficult to trace those individuals who constituted 
the inner circle of senior ministers, first, because undoubtedly the number of informal meetings 
on the record, is incomplete; second, because it is known that many informal meetings between 
only two ministers took place; third, because sometimes records miss out some of the 
participants. It was possible to trace the attendance of 12 out of 18 informal meetings with at 
least 3 senior ministers present. Tables 16.5 and 16.6 on page 292 give an overview divided 
by each decisional conflict. Table 16.4 showed that the Egypt Committee was usually attended 
by a group consisting of Eden, Home, Macmillan, Lloyd, Head, Thomeycroft, Salisbury, 
Watkinson, Monckton, and Butler4. Lennox-Boyd and Dickson were regularly present as well. 
Tables 16.5 and 16.6 suggest that those informal meetings of which participation is known, 
were dominated by Eden, Lloyd, and Macmillan, and to a lesser extent by Kilmuir, Butler, 
and Salisbury. A look at the dynamics of participation of Egypt Committee (Appendix 3) and 
informal meetings (table 16.5) reveals that Kilmuir gets involved with the Egypt Committee 
from 10 August onwards, which is reflected in his increasing attendance of informal meetings 
since September. Salisbury, on the contrary, is a frequent visitor of both decision making units 
until the presentation of Challe-plan on 16 October. Although he would attend all Cabinet 
meetings, he no longer appeared in the Egypt Committee or at informal gatherings. This may 
indicate his growing apprehension about the use of force, and his eventual vote in favour of 
halting all operations on the crucial Cabinet meeting of 4 November9.
4 The attendance of Sir Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, raises die question why the man
who might qualify as the best informed civil servant never spoke up at the various meetings. Brook is
portrayed as the most important civil servant at Whitehall during and after World War 2 (together with
Sir Edward Bridges), and as someone who ’did not shrink from pressing his own opinions before
Cabinet or Cabinet committee meetings’. Hennessy suggests that Brook was against military force. 
Although Clark's ’Whitehall diary* does not completely support this contention, the real question that 
Hennessy fails to raise in his book is why Brook, having been present at most Egypt Committee and 
Cabinet meetings, and having presided over the Defence (Transition) Committee which prepared the 
administration of occupied Egyptian territory, did not speak up; Peter Hennessy, Whitehall. Seeker and 
Warburg, London, 1989, pp. 138 ff., 167, quote from p. 147.
3 Salisbury’s change of opinion has never been properly explained; on the eve of the invasion, 
however, Salisbury still approved of the plan, as is shown by his minute to Eden on 29 October; PREM 
11/1129.
Table 16.5 : Attendance of 12 informal meetings
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1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6 Tota
1
Eden 1 1 2 4 2 10
Salisbury 1 1 1 1 4
Lloyd 1 2 1 4 3 9
Home 1 1 1 3
Kilmuir 1 1 2 2 6
Macmillan 1 3 3 1 8
Butler 1 1 3 5
Head 1 3 4
Thomeycroft 1 1
Nutting 1 1
Lennox-Boyd 1 1
Total meetings per decision |  1 - 1 3 4 3 12
Table 16.6 : Number of informal meetings per decisions of which participant are known 
and unknown.
D 1 D 2 D 3 D 4 D 5 D 6 1 Total
known 1 - 1 3 4 3 12
unknown - 2 - 1 2 1 6
total 1 2 1 4 6 4 18
Tables 16.4 and 16.5 therefore allow for the claim that an inner circle existed, 
consisting of Eden, Lloyd, Macmillan, Salisbury, Kilmuir (from mid-August), and Butler*. 
Secondly, these Ministers were also the most frequent visitors of the Egypt Committee; in 
addition, that committee was frequented by Monckton and Home as Senior Ministers, and 
Thomeycroft and Watkinson as Cabinet members, and Head as Secretary of State for War.
It is thus possible to identify three small decision making units: the Cabinet, the Egypt 
Committee, and the inner circle. Janis’s theory specifies several antecedent conditions that may 
further the occurrence of groupthink; to what extent is the occurrence of groupthink in the case 
of Suez related to the presence of these antecedent variables?
(B) Antecedent conditions of groupthink
In his theory of groupthink Janis makes a distinction between three types of antecedent 
conditions which will further premature concurrence-seeking: first, decision makers form a 
cohesive group; second, the existence of a provocative situational context; third, the presence 
of structural organizational faults7. Can British decision making during the Suez crisis be said 
to fulfill these conditions?
1. Ppfoinn piakers form a cohesive group. It is very difficult to assess the degree of 
real cohesion within either Cabinet, the Egypt Committee, or the inner circle. Moreover, it 
will be necessary to take somehow political factors into consideration, as cabinet decision 
making can be conflict-ridden for various reasons'. I will argue that only the inner circle can 
be said to come close to a cohesive group, but that part of those inner group relations should 
be considered from a political perspective.
One way to measure cohesion would be to look at the type of education Cabinet 
members had enjoyed. It appears that all but two had been at Oxford and Cambridge, while 
nine came from Eton9. Although the socialization effect of a common educational background 
(public school) should not be underestimated, it would be equally hazardous to exaggerate its
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* It should be recalled that within the inner group Eden, MacMillan, Lloyd, and Salisbury were the 
ministers who kept in touch with representatives of the United States Government.
7 Cf. chapter 6, pp. 126-127.
* Cf. ’t Hart, Groupthink in Government, chapter 10, or, from a different perspective, Jean Blondel, 
’Decision-Making Processes, Conflicts, and Cabinet Government’, EUI Working Paper No. 88/327. 
European University Institute, Florence, 1988.
* Thomas, The Suez Affair, p. 41.
influence: given the fact that, certainly in those days, Eton and Oxbridge furnished a 
disproportionally large part of British Government officials, the regular occurrence of policy 
divergences, such as the Tory Party’s and Churchill Government’s internal division over the 
Suez Canal Treaty, requires explanation.
It has been suggested that war-time experience might have constituted a factor of 
cohesion during the Suez crisis10. Similarly, it has been argued that the impact of Munich 
1938 had a lasting impact on those Cabinet members who were in politics at the time. Eden, 
Salisbury, Macmillan and Sandys had been opponents of appeasement in 1938, while Butler, 
Lennox-Boyd, Kilmuir, Stuart, and Home had been advocates. Although it is rather speculative 
to establish a direct link between group cohesion and an individual’s attitude towards 
appeasement, it is the case that Salisbury, Macmillan, and Sandys were among the staunchest 
advocates of a tough policy11. Macmillan has afterwards suggested that the divisions within 
the Cabinet perfectly reflected the pre-war division over Munich12, but this is clearly 
incorrect, as Kilmuir, Home, as well as Lennox-Boyd were just as hawkish as Macmillan and 
Salisbury.
The Munich experience may have been important to furthering a certain bond between 
Eden, Salisbury, and Macmillan13, all three central to the decision making process. On the 
whole, however, it is more likely that a variety of considerations explained the relative 
cohesion of the political elite. First of all, opposition to Chamberlain’s appeasing of Mussolini, 
had created strong personal ties between Eden and Salisbury. The latter, then known under the 
name Lord Cranborne, resigned with Eden from the Foreign Office, and is considered to have 
been one of Eden’s few personal friends in politics.
Second, internal party politics and personal ambitions should be taken into account. 
Much has been written about the interpersonal rivalries within the Eden Government. Two 
major sources of conflict stand out: Eden’s tendency to try to dominate foreign policy, and the 
rivalry between Macmillan and Butler to become Eden’s political heir. Although both sources
311
10 Thomas, ibid.: six ministers had served in World War One (Eden, Macmillan, Lloyd George, 
Monckton, Salisbury, Stuart); four in World War Two (Lloyd, Sandys, MacLeod, Buchan-Hepbum).
11 Sandys appears as a hawk in Monckton’s accounts of Cabinet meetings to William Clark, e.g. 
Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 30 October 1956, p. 142.
12 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 155.
13 Although Carlton argues that Eden was not an unequivocal opponent of Munich, he makes it also 
clear that Salisbury and Macmillan were part of the so-called ’Eden-group’ of some 25 Conservative 
M.P.’s who were opposed to appeasement, Carlton, Anthony Eden. A Biography. Allen and Unwin, 
London, 1981, pp. 132-142.
of conflict, arguably, testify to some lack of cohesion of the inner group of the Eden 
Government, it is incorrect to deduce that it seriously hampered decision making during Suez.
In April 19SS Eden appointed Macmillan as his Foreign Secretary, but replaced him 
with Selwyn Lloyd in December, presumably because Macmillan proved to be a much more 
independent Foreign Secretary than Eden had anticipated. Although this is a standard 
interpretation of the dynamics within die Eden Government14, it does not account for 
Macmillan’s pivotal role during Suez from the very start, notably his regular private meetings 
with Eden. Apart from their disagreement on inviting Israel to attack Egypt in early August, 
no major differences occurred between Eden and Macmillan during die crisis. Similarly, 
although Butler’s and Macmillan’s jockeying for position, as potential heir-apparent to Eden 
made some observers accuse them of lack of loyalty towards Eden13, it is difficult to show 
how far this actually affected the decision making process during Suez16.
The ’pecking order’ within the Eden Government is the third factor that should be 
taken into account when estimating the extent of group cohesion. British Governments are 
characterised by a distinctive hierarchy, separating those ministers who are part of the Cabinet 
and those who are not; and secondly separating senior ministers, who form the inner core of 
the Cabinet from the rest17. One consequence of this pecking order was that meetings were 
not always among equals. A proposed course of action carries more weight if supported by a 
number of senior ministers. Conversely, opposition is likely to have more impact if led by a 
senior minister. A second consequence is the occurrence of what might be called status 
incongruity, when someone holds the post of a senior minister, but cannot really be considered 
a senior minister with respect to the other sources of seniority. Such was the case with Selwyn 
Lloyd, who was promoted to die Foreign Office after hardly eight months of Cabinet
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14 E.g., Home, Macmillan. 1894-1956. pp. 374-376; Carlton, Anthony Eden. A Biography, p. 369; 
James, Anthony Eden, pp. 424-425; tension between Eden and Macmillan over foreign policy regularly 
appears in Shuckburgh’s diary Descent to Suez.
15 Such was Clark’s judgment in April 1956: ’these three [Eden, Macmillan, Butler] watch each 
other like hostile lynxes’, Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 6-9 April 1956, p. 70.
'* Of course, the competition itself continued: e.g. Clark describes bow Macmillan had himself 
cheered at before entering 10, Downing Street, apparently revealing his ambitions to become Prime 
Minister, Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 22 August 1956, p. 117.
17 The source of seniority is related to a complicated mixture of someone’s standing within the 
Party, Government experience, and the particular post one holds.
experience. He was clearly not considered to be the equal of other senior ministers1*. Indeed, 
Lloyd had been given the Foreign Office in order to allow Eden more room to manoeuver in 
foreign policy. Lloyd himself accepted this view, when he told Shuckburgh in January 1956 
that he was ’a contented animal. I know I have been over-promoted; there can be no question 
of my disloyalty’19. Obviously then, the voices of senior ministers, such as Macmillan, 
Salisbury, Buder, Monckton, and Kilmuir carried more weight than others’.
The pattern of dependencies within the Cabinet went even further than that. One 
frequent participant of Egypt Committee meetings, Peter Thomeycrofl, President of the Board 
of Trade, had been done a favour by Eden, who had spoken up for him with Churchill in 
1945, when Thorneycroft had lost his constituency in the election20. Similarly, Home had 
been Eden’s Parliamentary Private Secretary in 193721, and had been promoted to Cabinet 
status in April 1955, when he became Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in the 
Eden Government. Their political position may therefore have been closely intertwined with 
Eden’s.
In conclusion, it would be an exaggeration to say that either the Cabinet or the Egypt 
Committee had been a cohesive group, especially because the number of political nuances that 
should be taken into account. Nevertheless, it would be safe to conclude that the larger portion 
of the inner group around Eden, consisting of Macmillan, Salisbury, Kilmuir, Home, and 
Lloyd formed a reasonably cohesive whole, despite the difficulties between Eden and 
Macmillan. Part of this cohesion is grounded in a common pre-war experience (Eden, 
Macmillan, and Salisbury); part should be explained by political dependency relations within 
the Cabinet. This conclusion will appear all the more relevant if it is taken into consideration 
that Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, and Lloyd kept in touch with representatives of the American 
Government during the crisis.
2. A provocative situational context. Janis makes a distinction between high stress 
generated by an external threat and stress arising from temporary low self-esteem of the group. 
Both conditions may further the occurrence of groupthink.
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'* Notably by Macmillan, his predecessor at the Foreign Office, who allegedly mocked with Lloyd 
in front of Eden during the crisis; Horne, Macmillan. 1894-1956. p. 433.
19 Evelyn Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez. Diaries. 1951-6. entry 28 January 1956, p. 327.
* Brifn told Lloyd about this during a conversation on 30 May 1958, when both examined the draft 
of Eden’s memoirs of Suez, Full Circle. FO 800/728.
11 James, Anthony Eden, p. 183.
2.1 High stress. It has been argued in Chapter 9 that the sue crucial decisions that have 
been the subject of analysis can be qualified as so-called conflictual decisions, or hot 
cognitions. These are decision making situations in which every course of action available 
entails the risk of serious losses. This type of decision, presumably, raises the level of stress 
under which decision makers operate. The fundamental conflict, as perceived by British 
policymakers, was that taking strong action would have a strong negative effect on the British 
position in the Middle East, while doing nothing, or not enough, would imply the slow 
deterioration of the British Middle Eastern position because Nasser would gain immensely in 
prestige if he could ’get away with it’. Evidence of the stress generated by decisional conflict 
can be observed with the decision makers’ perception of a negative choice: throughout the 
crisis, they are worried by the prospect that both taking strong action and inaction would have 
a significant impact on British influence in the Middle East. Such perceptions were held by 
such different individuals as Norman Brook, a civil servant central to decision making, Harold 
Macmillan, a clear hawk, ’Bobbery’ Salisbury, a hawk with growing doubts, and Walter 
Monckton, an eventual opponent of force22.
At each crucial decision, the high level of stress generated by this fundamental conflict 
was increased by further considerations, and specific deadlines: how to respond to an equivocal 
outcome of the London Conference, (decision 2), what to do if Nasser gave no clear answer 
to Menzies, how to deal with new American proposals, such as the users’ association 
(decisions 3 and 4), how to react to the likely introduction of the Winter plan (decision 5), 
etc..
2.2 Temporary low self-esteem. Although none of the three causes of low self-esteem 
that Janis distinguishes23 seems directly relevant to British decision makers, it can be argued 
that the Eden Government had not been considered a balanced, stable, and effective 
Government ever since die Cabinet reshuffle of December 1955. Kilmuir even speaks of ’a
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22 Brook, driving William Clark home, told him that ’the dilemma Q is that it will be bad if we do 
not act and will be bad if we do act’, Clark ’Whitehall diary’, entry 9 August 1956, p. 110; on 24 
August Monckton wrote to himself that if Nasser responded with an act of war, ’our difficulties may 
be resolved’, Monckton papers, 6(175-177); that same day Macmillan noted in his diary that ’when we 
take strong action we have had it; if we suffer a diplomatic defeat: we have equally had it’, Horne, 
Macmillan. 1894-1956. diary entry 24 August 1956, pp. 410-411; a similar dilemma was presented to 
the Cabinet by Salisbury on 28 August, CM(56)62. Lloyd would give the same analysis, when asked 
to assess the likely result of prolonged negotiations on 23 October, CM(65)72.
23 Recent failures that make group members’ inadequacies salient; excessive difficulties on current 
decision "miring that lower each member’s sense of self-efficacy; moral dilemmas, provoked by the 
apparent lade of feasible alternatives except the ones that violate ethical standards, Janis, Groupthink. 
pp. 244, 301-302.
dramatic fall in the popularity of the Government and Sir Anthony Eden’24. It has been 
argued that during the first half of 1956 the Government deliberately looked for ways to 
improve its popularity by strong action in the field of foreign affairs, notably Cyprus and 
Buraimi25. Even though the public criticism of the Government and its leadership had 
lessened in the Spring, it is conceivable that the label of weak Government had left its imprint 
on the Government when it had to face the crisis of the nationalization of the Suez Canal 
Company.
Indeed, evidence exists that, at least in the early stages of the crisis, the future of the 
Eden Government was considered closely tied to its handling of the crisis. Clark, Eden’s press 
officer, repeatedly noted that the crisis was Eden’s gravest moment: ’for if he does not act 
strongly and effectively, he will be out’26. Monckton as well thought not taking a tough line 
’would be fatal for the Government’27. Although the political stakes were high, as one would 
reasonably expea in any major foreign policy crisis in which military action is contemplated, 
it would be wrong to conclude that decisionmakers were suffering from a low self-esteem due 
to their recent unpopularity.
3. Structural faults of the organization. Three organizational characteristics seem to 
have been relevant to British decision making: (1) the relative insulation of the group, (2) a 
lack of norms requiring methodical procedures, and (3) directive leadership. Actually, the 
latter two elements, which underline the attitude of the group’s leader towards its deliberations, 
form the bridge between group and individual variable, between groupthink and operational 
code: they form indicators of the crucial leadership plays in structuring the decision making 
process, and thereby in stimulating groupthink; it thus opens up an opportunity for the 
individual’s cognitive belief system to come into play.
3.1 Insulation of the group. British decision makers isolated themselves from the outer 
world to a considerable extent. Four types of insulation affected the decision making process: 
(1) the confinement of military information to the Egypt Committee, (2) the disregard of the 
civil service, (3) the lack of contact with the opposition, and (4) the deliberate decision at the 
beginning of October not to consult the United States Government.
24 Kilmuir, Political Adventure, p. 255; cf. Butler, The Art of the Possible, pp. 182-183.
15 Carlton, Anthony Eden, pp. 399-400.
* Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 29 July 1956, p. 102.
27 Monckton in a conversation with Clark over lunch, Clark, op. cit.. entry 14 August 1956, p. 113.
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1. Military information. It had been decided that information on military planning be
confined to a restricted group of Ministers, effectively those on die Egypt Committee. As a
matter of fact, an entirely new procedure, named Terrapin, was installed to this effect. Despite
the obvious, and reasonable, consideration that military plans should not come out in the open,
the eventual consequence of adopting Terrapin was a lack of information about military
planning at the level of the full Cabinet. In August Duncan Sandys (Housing and Local
Government) had written to Eden to express his worries about this matter. Eden’s reply on
August 22 made clear once more the role of die inner circle in military affairs:
’Knowledge of the details must, for obvious reasons of security, be confined 
within the narrowest possible circle. Such political guidance as the military 
authorities may need in the preparation of their plans must continue to be 
given by me, in consultation with a small number of my most senior Cabinet 
colleagues and, as necessary, such Departmental Ministers as may be directly 
concerned’2*.
The adoption of Terrapin had two important consequences: firstly, the Cabinet was not 
aware of any reservations the military might have about military operations; secondly, the 
Cabinet had to discuss the Challe-plan without any knowledge of the contingencies of military 
planning. By consequence, it had to make decisions about the feasibility of the plan without 
knowing that it would take the fleet about a week to arrive at Port Said. Subsequently, these 
six days would prove fatal in the light of mounting international pressure.
2. Disregard of the civil service. Most civil servants were completely unaware of the 
considerations and decisions made by the Egypt Committee and Cabinet. Actually, only Sir 
Norman Brook, Secretary to the Cabinet, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under-Secretary 
at the Foreign Office, and Patrick Dean, Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, were 
fully informed9 . Moreover, reports from civil servants on such vital matters as financial and 
economic consequences and international law reached decision makers through their Ministers, 
Macmillan, Lloyd, and Kilmuir. The Egypt Committee has thus never been in a position to 
examine all positive and negative aspects of the objectives and alternative courses of action, 
because, first of all, civil servants had to compile reports without full knowledge of political 
and military objectives, and, secondly, because part of die information that reached the
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* Junes, Anthony Eden, p. 499.
9  The same had happened in France where the Omi d’Orsav bad been excluded from the decision
making process, not in the least because it was considered an anti-Israeli, and pro-Arab lobby; Paul Ely,
Mémoires, ii: Suez...le 13 Mai. Plon, 1969, pp. 99,114; Christian Pineau, 19S6. Suez. Robert LafFont,
Paris, 1976, pp. 65-66.
Committee, had to pass several gate-keepers, who sometimes decided to act as self-appointed 
mindguards, and not to pass certain bits of information to their colleagues.
3. Ignoring the opposition. Despite the fact that this crisis was defined as a threat to 
British national interests, British policymakers did not put much effort in trying to solicit 
national support by keeping in touch with opposition parties. Although they had not been 
incorporated in Clement Attlee’s Committee that handled the 1951 Abadan crisis, Eden and 
Churchill had been regularly consulted by Attlee and Morrison30. In the beginning of August 
a certain kind of correspondence had developed between Eden and Gaitskell. Eden’s aim had 
been to extract a promise from Labour’s leader that Gaitskell’s rather belligerent speech in the 
Commons on 2 August still reflected his Party’s mood. After Salisbury, Eden, and Lloyd had 
met with a few representatives of Labour on 14 August, and it had become clear that Labour 
was opposed to the use of force without United Nations approval, contacts were interrupted. 
Instead of trying to involve the opposition, even at an informative level, British decisionmakers 
decided not to keep in touch: on 15 September Macmillan and Eden decided not to respond 
to a letter by Gaitskell, published in The Times the previous day.
4. Leaving the Americans in the dark. The United States Government were no longer 
informed, let alone consulted, about joint policies towards Egypt, after Challe and Gazier had 
visited Chequers to present their ingenious plan. Although this situation perfectly fitted the 
collective rationalizations which British politicians had developed about the American 
attitude31, it contributed to the British surprise at American opposition to the Anglo-French 
policy from 30 October onwards. Moreover, the fact that Great Britain had no Ambassador 
available in Washington between 20 October and 8 November made it very difficult to explain 
this policy to the American Government32.
All this evidence amounts to the conclusion that British decision makers, in the Egypt 
Committee, and even more in the Cabinet constituted a rather insulated group. As such this
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30 Colin Seymour-Ure, ’British "War Cabinets” in Limited Wars: Korea, Suez, and the Falklands’, 
Piihljr. A dm inistration- (62), 1984, pp. 181-200. Eden told Sir Robert Lockhardt in 1948 during the 
1948 Berlin crisis that Churchill and he were kept informed by Attlee and Bevin; Kenneth Young (ed.), 
The Diaries of Sir Robert Lockhart. Volume 2. 1939-1965. Macmillan, 1980, entry 21 August 1948, 
p. 670.
11 Basically, they believed that the Americans did not want to be informed of military action.
32 Sir Roger Makins had been recalled, and had returned to London to take up a new job at the 
Treasury. The new Ambassador, Sir Harold Caccia, had left London, but travelled by ship, thus causing 
this period of almost three weeks during which the United Kingdom was not represented by an 
Ambassador in the United States. In 1960 Eden told Lockhart that he regretted not to have sent Caccia 
by plane; Young, The Diaries of Sir Robert Buree Lockhart, entry 22 April 1960, p. 762. At the time, 
of course, it may have been convenient.
counts as an organizational feature that might have been conducive to the occurrence of 
groupthink.
3.2 Lack of norms requiring methodical procedures. By its very nature the British 
Cabinet is dominated by its Prime Minister, who has certain prerogatives, one of which setting 
its agenda and chairing its meetings. The particular leadership style which each Prime Minister 
develops, will therefore strongly affect the quality of die decision making process. It has been 
observed that Cabinets seldom act like truly collegial bodies that look at matters carefully, 
although they do not make discussion impossible either33. Very few governing bodies have 
developed any formal rules which would contribute to high quality decision making34.
The style that Eden had developed as Prime Minister, certainly did not contribute to 
methodical decision making procedures. He introduced the habit of seeing his senior colleagues 
alone:
’I thought Baldwin’s method of frequent consultation alone with each of his 
principal colleagues was good and I followed it. Q My colleagues knew that 
I was always available to each of them and we saved the Cabinet some extra 
stress of business that way’33.
The charts in chapters 10-15 clearly demonstrate that Eden continued consulting the members
of his inner circle individually in private meetings or over the telephone, especially Macmillan,
Lloyd, Salisbury, and Kilmuir. This may have had its effect on the quality of decision making
surrounding Suez.
3.3 Lack of tradition of impartial leadership. No clear evidence exists that Eden as 
Prime Minister tried to impose his preferences on those of his colleagues. Nevertheless, as a 
Foreign Secretary, Eden had become known for his habit of constantly phoning to 
collaborators about all aspects of policy. This continued after he became Prime Minister, and 
involved especially those ministers who were involved with foreign affairs, such as Macmillan 
and Lloyd, when they were Foreign Secretary, and Home, as Commonwealth Secretary36. 
Eden displayed the same attitude towards his direct subordinates: Clark, Eden’s press
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33 Blondel, 'Decision-making processes, conflicts, and cabinet government’, pp. 26-27.
34 Indeed, much of the American literature on crisis decision making aims at developing such norms, 
and at suggesting to members of the Administration that adopting them might not be bad thing; e.g., 
Alexander L. George, ’The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy’, American Political 
Science Review. (66), 1972, pp. 751-795.
35 Eden, Full Circle, pp. 269-270. Cf. James, Anthony Eden, p. 439.
36 Cf. James, Anthony Eden, p. 411. See also, David Reynolds, ’Eden the Diplomatist, 1931-56: 
Suezside of Statesman?’, History. No. 289, 1989, pp. 65-69.
secretary, in reviewing bis first six months at bis job, noted in bis diary that ’(tjhere never was 
a day when he didn’t ring up one of the P[rivate] Sfecretaries] to worry about something’37.
This evidence of interference does not constitute sufficient ground for the claim that 
the Eden Government until the start of the Suez crisis was characterized by a consistent 
absence of impartial leadership. Interference does not automatically equal imposition. Indeed, 
many heads of Government who have been praised for their leadership style have been known 
as constantly being in touch with their ministers and staff. Franklin Roosevelt and John 
Kennedy (after the Bay of Pigs fiasco) come to mind.
As a matter of fact, in two decisions Eden did not display directive leadership at all. 
In four decisions, however, his handling situation affected the decision making process; in two 
of those cases quite strongly. Eden’s way of chairing meetings of the Egypt Committee and 
the Cabinet has been very important with respect to the simultaneous decision to accept
S.C.U.A. and recall the pilots (decision 3) as well as the decision to adopt the Challe-plan 
(decision 5). In the former case, when it had to be decided how to respond to the results of 
the Menzies mission, Eden tried to rush things through: he wanted to refer the matter to the 
United Nations, so that military operations could start soon afterwards. Similarly, the adoption 
of S.C.U.A. was a result of the way Eden presented the likely American attitude to the Egypt 
Committee and Cabinet, and the personal judgment he added, first mistrusting Dulles’s 
proposal, then going along with it.
The adoption of the Challe-plan was strongly affected, first of all, by the way 
information about the American attitude was distributed: on the Cabinet of 3 October. Eden 
let the text of Dulles’s anti-colonialist press conference pass around the table. Furthermore, 
the way he chaired those Cabinet meetings at which the Challe-plan was discussed, shows that 
he did not shy away from soliciting his colleagues to agree, because the matter had been 
agreed upon by their senior colleagues previously. Clearly then, Eden’s directive leadership 
has hindered the development of an open decision making process regarding both decisions 3 
and 5. As a matter of fact, these decisions display a very high number of symptoms of 
groupthink (7 and 6 respectively).
Decisions 1 and 2 have also been affected by directive leadership; the way the issue 
was defined at the very first Cabinet meeting on 27 July had a lot to do with the way Eden 
chaired the discussion: instead of assuming the role of an impartial chairman, who asks his 
colleagues after their definition of the problem, he chose to open the meeting by giving his
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37 Clark, ’Whitehall diary’, entry 6-9 entry 1956, p. 70. Clark’s diary is full of records of similar 
phonecalls by a worried and interfering Eden.
own view. Later in August, when British decision makers had to make up their minds about 
what should be done after the London Conference, an open decision was made more difficult 
by Eden’s reluctance to share the full contents of messages from the United States Government 
with the Cabinet. Had he done so, American hesitations about the use of force would have 
been more clearly known to the Cabinet.
Two decisions (4 and 6) are hardly affected by directive leadership. This comes as no 
surprise with respect to the decision to refer the matter to the United Nations (decision 4), as 
this decision has been taken informally by Eden, Lloyd, and probably, Macmillan. It is more 
puzzling in the case of the decision to continue operations despite growing international and 
domestic pressure (decision 6), especially because this decision displays a rather high number 
of symptoms of groupthink: as a matter of fact, the records of the Cabinet meetings in the 
relevant period reveal that the Cabinet held open and full discussions in which each member 
was explicitly invited to express his views, and which were characterized by a search for, and 
assessment of, alternative options. The paradox is explained by entrapment: once the Cabinet 
had adopted the Challe-plan, and subsequent events had invited them to put the plan into 
action, all further discussion was held in terms of the agreed plan. Most symptoms of 
groupthink thus reflect collective attempts to stress the positive aspects of the plan and to 
suppress possible negative consequences3*.
Antecedent condition of groupthink: conclusions. If one overlooks the antecedent 
conditions of groupthink, then one could conclude, first, that the inner group of British 
decisionmakers constituted a reasonably cohesive group, but that this cohesion is partly 
grounded in the dependency relationship between senior and junior ministers. Second, British 
policy makers were constantly facing a situation of high stress, provoked by a situation which 
can be characterized as a choice between alternatives that each entail negative consequences. 
Third, they were insulated from the outer world and chaired by a leader who was not used to 
collective decision making, but rather to meeting his colleagues individually. Finally, other 
elements, traditionally partial leadership, and low self-esteem, seem to have been of less 
importance. Nevertheless, although one cannot speak of a lack of tradition of impartial 
leadership, the way Eden chaired the meetings of Egypt Committee and, especially, the 
Cabinet has been relevant in four situations of decisional conflict.
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would be an example of collective over-optimism, cf. ’t Hart, fimunthink in Government, p. 202-203. 
The only known exception has been Anthony Head who in the Egypt Committee kept on reminding 
British policymakers that the real objective was Nasser’s downfall, which would not be guaranteed by 
’protecting the Canal’.
16.2.2 The Operational Code
It has been argued that directive leadership constitutes the connection between 
groupthink and operational code: if the group’s leader restricts decision making, it is very 
likely that his individual belief system will give a clue as to understanding the contents of the 
leader’s approach to the problem that he is facing together with the group. As a matter of fact, 
Eden’s operational code can be said to have been relevant at three instances, all of which 
coincide with Eden displaying directive leadership. All three moments are related to two 
important elements of Eden’s operational code, firstly, his vision that it is possible to reach 
agreements with every actor in international relations, as long as gentleman-like behaviour is 
observed, grounded in the recognition of one’s respective national interest. Secondly, his 
conviction that the United Nations had been reduced to a Cold War and propaganda 
instrument, without much political influence.
Eden’s view of the nature of international relations explains why the Suez crisis started 
in July 1956, rather than in September 1955 (Czech arms deal) or in March 1956 (Glubb 
affair). With the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company Nasser had passed a certain 
threshold: it was no longer possible to reach agreements with a man who defied the essential 
rules of international relations. Eden’s interpreted Dulles’s anti-colonialist press conference in 
October in a similar manner. Having faced an American Secretary of State who blew hot and 
cold without much apparent consistency, Eden (and his colleagues) decided to no longer bother 
about Dulles’s misgivings about S.C.U.A.. Instead, Eisenhower became the new focus of 
British expectations. In terms of Eden’s operational code, Dulles had passed the same threshold 
and had become an unreliable actor in international affairs.
Eden’s view of the nature of the United Nations explains why referring the matter to 
die Security Council was deemed unwise in July (decision 1): no helpful situation was to be 
expected from a body where the Soviet Union would veto any Anglo-French-American 
resolution. Similarly, it explains why Eden thought that going to the United Nations would be 
helpful in September (decision 3): because of the expected Russian veto any discussion would 
be quickly over with, and then military operations could start, unless Egypt would accept the 
18 Powers’ Proposals. Third, Eden’s view of the United Nations contributes to our 
understanding of why British policymakers did not consider the possibility that deliberations 
might be transferred to the General Assembley, with the Uniting for Peace Procedure, and 
might thus provoke strong pressure from international public opinion (decision 5). An Anglo- 
French veto would paralyze the Security Council, and that would be the end of it. 
Nevertheless, this sense of frustration had been infiltrating the inner circle for several days
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before the decision to go to the United Nations was actually taken. It thus counts more as a 
background against which decisions were taken rather than as an immediate response to 
provoked anger.
Lastly, Eden’s initial reaction to Challe’s presentation of his plan, seems the best 
example of an emotive decision rule and could be called the elated choice rule. However, it 
should be taken into account that Eden made no commitment and explicitly said that he had 
to consult his colleagues.
At no instance, therefore, do emotive decision rules occur as decisive factors in 
explaining crucial decisions. They rather reflect the state of mind of Eden and some of his 
Ministers at certain instances during the decision making process.
16.3 Variables that constrain the decision making nrocexs
The analysis of six crucial decisions of the Suez crisis included two factors that acted 
as constraints on the independent variables: the organizational context and considerations of 
domestic politics. Their impact operated through die various decision making units that have 
been distinguished in this study: the Cabinet, die Egypt Committee, and the inner group. Both 
factors have influenced the decision making process to varying degree, but can be said to have 
played a decisive role only once, when in late July an immediate attack on Egypt appeared 
impossible.
16.3.1 The organizational context: bureaucratic politics/organizational processes
The considerations of British policymakers have been influenced by the military 
organization at five instances. First, at the very beginning of the crisis, swift retaliation was 
impossible because the required numb«- of troops and ships were not immediately available. 
Furthermore, a delay of a state of readiness was caused by fundamental changes of the military 
plan, first on 10 August, when the Chiefs of Staff decided to land near Alexandria instead of 
Port Said, and, again, on 7 September, when these plans were reversed to die original target. 
Fourth, the Chiefs’ presentation of a Winter plan made it clear to those British policymakers 
that preferred a vigorous response to Egypt, that they would have to act soon, if measures that 
would give the impression of demobilization, were to be avoided. Finally, the time that elapsed 
between the sailing of the fleet, and the disembarkment of the troops was due to organizational 
constraints. Although these were not directly relevant to the Cabinet’s decision to continue die 
operation, they certainly made it possible that strong domestic and international pressure could
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be mounted against Anglo-French policies. It can thus be concluded that organizational 
constraints have had a significant influence regarding decision 1 only.
16.3.2 Considerations of domestic politics39
British policymakers were permanently aware of the effect their policies would have 
on its support in Parliament and the country at large. Only in two instances, however, can the 
decision making process be said to have been influenced by their domestic considerations. One 
involved the decision to refer the matter to the Security Council; another the decision to 
continue operations as planned.
Parliament was to return from Summer recess in mid-September. British policymakers 
feared that they would be forced to give a pledge that no force would be used without 
permission from the United Nations. Eden succeeded in avoiding such a promise in the 
Commons on 12 September by offering the users' association. In the following days, however, 
Conservative opposition to the use of force without having sought recourse to the United 
Nations, was growing. The British decision to refer the matter to the Security Council was 
partly taken in order to pacify dissenting members within the Conservative Party.
On 2 November, when handing over the ’policing task’ to the United Nations seemed 
to offer a narrow escape from strong international pressure, the Cabinet faced a split of the 
Conservative Party because its hawks would consider that a pretext for aborting the invasion. 
In order not to offend the hardliners, the Cabinet, although accepting U.N. interference, had 
had to insist on the inclusion of Anglo-French forces in a U.N. emergency force. Although 
these domestic considerations narrowed down the range of options available to the Cabinet, 
they did not affect the decision to continue military operations: no U.N.-force had been 
formed, when Anglo-French forces landed in Port Said.
It can therefore be concluded that domestic politics has not been a decisive factor 
during the Suez crisis. Interestingly, when it played a -minor- role, British decision makers
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* Those ffnHi« that deal explicitly with domestic politics during the Suez crisis, do not attempt at 
■ccMciwg to what extent policymakers’ domestic considerations influenced the decision making process; 
e.g., Epstein, British Politics in the Sue* Crias; Jean-Yves Bernard, ’Politique intérieure et décisions 
britanniques Hans la crise de Suez, 1956’, Relations internationales, no. 55, 1988, pp. 303-321.
were affected more by divergences within the Conservative Party40 than by opposition from 
the Labour Party or from the public at large41.
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16.4 Conclusions
In this chapter an attempt was made to assess the relative influence of the various 
factors that might have affected the British decision making process. Table 16.6 on page 308 
presents its findings in a compact way. Individual and group processes have been dominant 
during the decision making process, apart from decision 1, which is to be explained mainly 
by individual and bureaucratic factors. Decisions 2 and 3 seem the product of groupthink 
during inner circle considerations which recurs during the meetings of the Egypt Committee. 
Similarly, decisions 5 and 6 were taken by Cabinet suffering from groupthink, preceded by 
inner group meetings at which the same phenomenon occurs.
Directive leadership forms the bridge between the operational code and groupthink. 
When a leader dominates the decisional process, it is likely that his system of cognitive ideas 
provides a clue to the direction into which he will lead the group. This link between 
operational code, directive leadership and groupthink seems to have been particularly strong 
as to the adoption of the Challe-plan (decision S). This allows for the conclusion that the 
intensified dissatisfaction with the American attitude regarding the function of S.C.U.A. and 
Dulles’s famous anti-colonialist press conference of 2 October have been the catalyst in 
steering British decision makers to the use of force.
40 This confirms Epstein's analysis of domestics politics only to a certain extent, Epstein, British 
Politics in the Suez Crisis, chapter 4; Epstein's emphasis on the influence of the ’Suez-group’ obscures 
the critical moment of early September, when the Government was confronted with a possible defeat 
in Parliam ent, because of the critical number of Conservative M.P.s opposed to the use of force, rather 
than the size of die hardliners of the ’Suez-group’. See, for a discussion of a clear anti-Eden bias in 
Epstein’s analysis, Alexander J. Groth, ’Britain and America: Some Requisites of Executive Leadership 
Compared’, Political Science Quarterly. (85), 2, 1970, pp. 228-232.
41 Exam ples of analyses of public opinion and of the role news papers played, include: Christopher 
Thome, ’Nationalism and Public Opinion in Britain’, Orbis. (10), 4, 1967, pp. 1120-1137; Guillaume 
Parmentier, ’The British Press in the Suez Crisis’, The Historical Journal. (23), 2, 1980, pp. 435-448; 
Ralph Negrine, ’The Press and the Suez Crisis: A Myth Re-Examined’, The Historical Journal. (25), 
4, 1982, pp. 975-983. None, however, aims at showing the possible influence of public opinion and of 
news papers’ editorials on the decision ««airing process. The records suggest that policymakers tended 
to explain away low rates of public support of the Goverament’s handling of the crisis, by reasoning 
that die public wanted them to take an even tougher stand.
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This chapter has identified the relative importance of the various independent and 
constraining variables that pertained to British decision making during the Suez crisis. It has 
not yet been demonstrated, however, that these variables can resolve the puzzle of Suez. The 
link between, on the one hand, Operational Code and Groupthink, and, on the other hand, 
defective decision making still has to be established. This is where we turn to now.
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Chapter 17: Resolving the miTslft nf Sm»y
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17.1 Introduction
In its meeting of 6 November, the Cabinet decided to agree to a cease-fire. That 
morning Anglo-French forces had landed near Port Said and were advancing on Ismailia. 
Three explanations for this decision surface in the Suez literature: (1) The Soviet threat of 5 
November to throw nuclear bombs on London, Paris, and Jerusalem1, (2) The growing 
amount of domestic opposition, most evident in a large anti-Suez demonstration in Trafalgar 
Square on 5 November, and (3) the lack of American support, especially the American refusal 
to support a British loan from the International Monetary Fund, which was urgently needed 
because of the run on the pound that had developed since the Anglo-French u ltim atum  had 
been issued.
British decisionmakers have always denied that the Soviet threat influenced their 
decision to halt the invasion2. As a matter of fact, the Soviet Union had taken a rather 
detached attitude towards the conflict right from the start of the Suez crisis3. British 
policymakers had asked, and obtained, American guarantees that the United States would ’take 
care of the Bear’, if necessary. The British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Sir William 
Hayter, unaware of this American gesture, thought the Soviet threat ’bullying bluff4.
1 Cf. O.M. Smolensky, ’Moscow and the Suez Crisis, 1956’, Political Science Quarterly. (80), 
1965, pp. 581-605.
2 Cf. Eden, Full Circle, pp. 554-556. The records of neither the Cabinet nor the Egypt Committee 
suggest that British decisionmakers counted on Russian paralysis because of their involvement in 
Hungary in October and November 1956. Soviet policies are hardly a consideration at all. Those who 
are interested in the interconnection between the Hungarian and Suez crisis may want to consult: John 
C. Campbell, ’The Soviet Union, the United States, and the Twin Crises of Hungary and Suez’, in 
Louis and Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. pp. 233-253; Brian McCauley, ’Hungary and Suez, 1956: The 
Limits of Soviet and American Power’, Journal of Contemporary History. (16), 1981, pp. 777-800; the 
latter, rather intriguing article, is not mentioned in Campbell’s sources.
3 In early August, the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union even suggested that the Soviets 
’understood the vital necessity of the Middle East position to us’, Hayter to Foreign Office, 7 August 
1956, PREM 11/1099. Later that month the Cabinet considered it possible that the Soviet Union might 
not wish to become too closely involved, CM(56)60, 21 August 1956.
4 Hayter to Foreign Office, Telegram 1564, 6 November 1956, PREM 11/1170; cf. Sir William 
Hayter, The Kremlin and the Embassy. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1966. Peter Wright argues that, 
because MI5 had succeeded in breaking the Egyptian diplomatic code, British policymakers knew of the 
Soviet intention to intervene, and therefore decided to halt the invasion, Peter Wright, Spvcatcher. The 
Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer. Dell, New York, 1988 (1987), pp. 106-108; 
Watt shows that the historical evidence contradicts Wright’s claim; D. Cameron Watt, ’Fall-Out From 
Treachery: Peter Wright and the Spvcatcher Case’, Political Quarterly. (59), 2, 1988, pp. 213-214.
The second explanation may look plausible, but should be qualified. It should be 
remembered that British Cabinets are first of all concerned with consensus within their own 
party, rather than with the opposition9. Actually, it has been argued that one of the principal 
American misperceptions has been the mistaken belief that British politics is generally 
influenced by public opinion, as American politics, rather than by internal party politick. As 
shown above, two moments of a potential split occurred on 1 and 4 November respectively, 
and both were resolved satisfactorily. Especially after the unanimous decision of 4 November 
to continue operations as planned, it was very unlikely that internal dissension could be 
mounted with the support of a senior Minister. Indeed, on 5 November Eden had won the day 
in the Commons when he could announce the fall of Port Said in the middle of a difficult 
debate on British propaganda leaflets: ’the Conservative Members erupted in joy, and Labour 
looked nonplussed for the first time Q’7. Notwithstanding the influence of the Soviet reaction 
and mounting domestic opposition, it seems safe to conclude that the American opposition in 
the United Nations and their refusal to support Sterling contributed most to the halting of all 
operations.
The importance of American opposition brings us back to the puzzle of Suez: why did 
the British Government use force, while it could reasonably have understood that American 
support would not be forthcoming. Clearly, this lack of anticipation of American opposition 
counts as a major example of defective decision making. In this chapter, I will demonstrate 
that this can be explained by the interaction of variables that lie at die individual and small 
group level, the effect of which is generated by decisions involving high levels of stress, but 
which are grounded in cognitive patterns that had been established before the outbreak of the 
crisis situation. British decision making during the Suez crisis can be characterized by at least 
three symptoms of defective decision making. I contend that their occurrence is heavily 
intertwined, and that the failure to anticipate American opposition is the central element on 
which all of diem depend.
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5 Cf. Lord Beloff, The Crisis and its Consequences for the British Conservative Party’, in Louis 
and Owen, o p . cit.. p. 330.
* Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics. Columbia University Press, New York/London, 1970, pp. 80
ff.
7 James, Anthony Eden, p. 572. James was an eyewitness of the debate.
17.2 Defective decision making: the importance of American support
The British expectation that American support would be forthcoming is central to 
understanding the decision making process in Whitehall throughout the crisis. This can be 
illustrated by two important elements of British decision making during the crisis.
1. The run on Sterling. From mid-September the position of Sterling had weakened*. 
In several internal memoranda that month, Sir Edward Bridges, Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, had pointed out to his chief, Macmillan, that Sterling would only survive a military 
adventure in the case of American support 'and a fairly unified Commonwealth’. If Great 
Britain and France decided to go it alone, ’we can expect little or nothing’ to support the 
currency9. Until mid-October the British currency still seemed strong enough10. Shortly 
before the start of hostilities, however, on 26 October Sir Leslie Rowan, a high Treasury 
official, warned Macmillan that towards the end of the year British gold and dollar reserves 
would be below $2,000 million, ’which has always been regarded as a rather crucial dividing 
line’11. Nevertheless, on 30 October, after Eden had announced the Anglo-French ultimatum 
in the Commons, a party of Macmillan, Rowan, and Makins, now Under-Secretary at the 
Treasury, decided not to turn to the I.M.F. for help yet12. Indeed, even mounting American 
opposition at the United Nations did not particularly worry British decision makers: on 2 
November, the Defence Transition Committee, where high Treasury officials were present, 
made the observation that ’Q while sterling was certainly under strain, this was no more than
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* Macmillan told this the Cabinet in a meeting that did not deal with Suez, but with European 
economic integration, CM(56)66, 18 September 1956. (Because the Cabinet did not discuss the Suez 
crisis, this meeting, like the meetings on 31 July and 8 October; [CM(56)55, CM(56)69] does not 
appear in the tables of chapters 10 and 14).
* Minute Bridges to Macmillan, T 236/4188, 7 September 1956; Minute Bridges to Macmillan, T 
236/4188, 11 September 1956.
10 On 17 October the Head of the Bank of England had written to Macmillan that ’the [] Governors 
did not manifest any immediate uneasiness about the present position of the sterling’, T 236/4188.
11 Rowan to Macmillan, 26 October 1956, T 236/4188. Diane Kunz suggests that this calculation 
was known to Macmillan on 2 November. The fact that it was known before the Challe-plan was 
exm itrri implies that Great Britain could have started IMF procedures before military operations were 
to offend the United States; Diane Kunz, ’The Importance of Having Money: The Economic Diplomacy 
of the Suez Crisis’, in Louis and Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. p. 226.
12 Note for the record, record of a discussion of Macmillan, Mains, and Rowan on 30 October 1956 
at 5 P.M., T 236/4188. As a matter of fact, during the Cabinet meeting that morning, when the decision 
to i«r«rvf the ultimatum was formally taken, American economic assistance was discussed and expected, 
if the Americans were not alienated ’more than was absolutely necessary’, CM(56)75, 30 October 1956.
bad been expected and no abnormal movements had taken place’13. Indeed, an I.M.F. loan 
was not asked until 5 November. Obviously, British decision makers believed in American 
support until the Cabinet meeting of 6 November. During that meeting Macmillan obtained 
information that the United States would not start formal I.M.F.-procedures'4.
2. Mounting international pressure. British decision makers were highly surprised at 
the difficulties they encountered at the United Nations while their armada was sailing to Egypt. 
Part of this surprise can be explained by Eden’s conviction that procedures at die Security 
Council would amount to no more than going through the motions. These ideas, however, 
were based on the assumption of at least tacit support of the United States. No-one had 
expected the Americans to lead the opposition against France and Great Britain at the United 
Nations. The decisive American vote in favour of the Uniting for Peace procedure, which 
would transfer the debate to die General Assembley, implying continuous pressure on France 
and Great Britain, baffled British ministers.
The consequences of American refusal of financial and diplomatic support of Anglo- 
French policy, when the crisis eventually came to a head, reflect the pivotal role American 
support played in British planning: British policy makers had counted on American support in 
order to hold out against increased financial strains and mounting international protests. When 
lack of American support changed into opposition, they realized that it would take the assault 
force too long to confront the world with a fait accompli. What processes have been at work 
that blinded British policymakers to the warnings both from the Eisenhower Administration 
and from their own experts in Washington, such as Ambassador Sir Roger Makins?
17.3 Misperceivine the Americans
Throughout the crisis British decision makers remained convinced that the United 
States would support them if they were to use force in the last resort. At the outset of the crisis 
they even thought that the Americans would join them and the French in taking military 
precautions. After the trilateral talks in late July the Egypt Committee took notice of American 
hesitations, but linked these to joint military measures only, not to possible American 
opposition to die use of force in general. Consequently, they concluded that the Americans 
would tacitly approve of an eventual military move. Throughout the crisis British decision 
makers were nevertheless constantly faced with messages in which the United States
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*» D(T)C(56)19, 2 November 1956, CAB 134/815.
14 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, p. 164.
Government expressed strong doubts about the use of force. Three major rationalizations can 
be traced, at the level of mainly the inner group, but also of the Egypt Committee and the 
Cabinet, that served at explaining away American opposition to the use of force. All three, 
however, either disappeared or underwent important change in the period between the last 
week of September and the middle of October.
1. The Panama Canal parallel. First, American opposition to referring the matter to 
the United Nations or the International Court of Justice was explained by American fears of 
the repercussions any such move might have on the international legal position of the Panama 
Canal. If an international body reconfirmed an international waterway, such as the Suez Canal, 
to be on Egyptian territory, Panama might start an argument claiming that the territory of 
international waterway of the Panama Canal might equally be territory of Panama. Once the 
British Government had decided to refer the matter to the Security Council on 23 September, 
the parallel was no longer taken into consideration.
2. The role of the American Presidential Elections. Presidential Elections in the United 
States were due on 6 November. Until mid-October, the British argued that the Americans 
were reluctant to support the use of force, because President Eisenhower was campaigning as 
the President of Peace. It would be unfortunate, therefore, if he were to have to associate 
himself with a major military intervention in the Middle East. American opposition indicated 
that the British and the French had to wait until after the elections. After the adoption of the 
Challe-plan, however, this way of reasoning changed completely. It was now argued that if 
the Eisenhower Administration was confronted with a swift military move in the last days of 
his election campaign, the President would be unable to take a stand against it15.
3. Selective interpretation of the messages from Dulles and Eisenhower. This third 
form of rationalization came in two varieties: one was the tendency to tailor the interpretation 
of the messages from Eisenhower and Dulles to the belief that American support would be 
forthcoming. The second was the habit of distinguishing the messages that Dulles and 
Eisenhower communicated in public from those that were conveyed in private. Both varieties 
had a mutually reassuring effect on the members of the inner circle, and were not questioned 
in either the Egypt Committee or the Cabinet. A major change in this habit occurs towards the 
middle of October: after the adoption of the Challe-plan Dulles is completely ignored, while 
during the crisis itself British policymakers prefer to rely on Eisenhower’s tacit support, and 
tend to interpret his messages accordingly.
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15 Neustadt has explored the argument, but limits his analysis to the second type of rationalization; 
Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics. Columbia University Press, New York, 1970, pp. 66-71.
While these various forms of rationalization persisted and underwent important 
changes, they all share the basic conviction that at least tacit American support would be 
forthcoming, sooner or later, and that diplomatic moves served at waiting for the right 
moment. I will first examine die latter two forms of rationalization more in detail. Next, I will 
show how this perception of the American attitude was die cause of some major faults in the 
British decision making process.
17.3.1 The American Presidential elections
The argument that electoral motives might be behind American hesitations does not 
emerge until the beginning of September 19S6; this suggests that British policymakers still 
expected the United States to support the United Kingdom and France until Dulles comes up 
with the idea of a Users’ Association as a means of continuing the negotiation process after 
a possible failure of the Menzies mission. A shift in argumentation occurs during the first days 
of October 1956: the importance of American elections was first seen as a date after which the 
Americans indicated they would be prepared to support Great Britain and France, at least on 
the diplomatic front; after those days it is interpreted more as a way of once more refraining 
the British and French from military action. This shift seems connected to a shift in the image 
the British held of John Foster Dulles and is accompanied by a change of persons who one 
held to be trustworthy, that is, from Dulles to Eisenhower. At the beginning of September 
19S6 die British and the French were contemplating to refer the Suez dispute to the Security 
Council if the Menzies mission to Cairo were to foil. The French and a large number of British 
decision makers considered this step a prelude to military action. The British, notably Eden 
and Lloyd, had been in contact with the State Department about this move, but encountered 
strong opposition against it from Dulles. As a matter of fact, he was to come up with his idea 
of a Users* Association on 4 September as a way to refrain to British and the French from 
doing so. At that moment, however, the British wished to keep the French ignorant of that new 
development, and preferred to deal with Dulles’ proposal in secret on their own for a few days 
until they would be sure that the Americans were committed to it. On 5 September Lloyd saw 
Pineau in Paris in order to discuss die issue of the Security Council, although he knew of 
Dulles’ new proposal. Pineau emphasized that force should be employed as soon as possible. 
Lloyd answered that, according to him, Dulles wanted an eventual procedure at the Security 
Council to be an honest attempt to reach an agreement. Lloyd ’said that Mr. Dulles seemed 
reasonably determined to impose the will of the 18 nations on Egypt. But he wanted to stop 
us doing so by force, at all events before die U.S. elections. One could sympathize with his
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difficulties. He had said that it would be hard to get even subsidiary economic help to us 
through Congress before then. Until the elections, Mr. Dulles wanted no force used, unless 
there was a clear excuse’,t. Lloyd was not alone in his impression. On 14 September Harold 
Macmillan wrote down in his diary, contemplating the likelihood of American assistance in 
putting stronger economic pressure on Egypt: ’(-) But I cannot see that we can achieve much 
this side of 6 November [the American Presidential election]’17. Macmillan stuck to his 
analysis during his visit to Washington on the occasion of a conference of the International 
Monetary Fund. He used his stay to speak with Dulles, Eisenhower, and Deputy Under­
secretary Robert Murphy. In their conversations he stressed British firmness in their will to 
use force in the last resort. In his messages to Eden, that were seen by Lloyd as well, 
Macmillan repeatedly describes his impression that the United States would have backed Great 
Britain for 100 percent, had there not been an upcoming election: ’I feel sure the President 
understands our problems about Nasser, but he is, of course, in the same position now as we 
were in May 19SS [British General election]’1*. In a record of his conversation with Murphy, 
Macmillan states that, according to Murphy, the U.S. Government can take no important steps 
before 6 November19. The private character of Macmillan’s talk with Eisenhower must have 
contributed to the idea that the Americans could not say in public what they really thought. 
Similarly, Macmillan saw Dulles in private on 25 September, after a more formal meeting at 
which the British ambassador Roger Makins had been present, and reports: ’... some of the 
things he [Dulles] said were very helpful, but might be dangerous to him if they got about in 
the electioneering atmosphere’20.
This impression of being the confidant of Dulles and Eisenhower partly explains why the 
regular warnings of Ambassador Roger Makins were ignored. Already on 9 September Makins 
reminded London that the lack of public American support was ’... not due to the imminence 
of the elections, but (-) a normal manifestation of American public opinion’21. But even 
Makins’s careful observations allowed the British to stick to their convictions. Referring to
14 FO 800/740, Papers of Selwyn Lloyd.
17 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm. 1956-1959. Macmillan, London, etc., 1971, p. 127.
11 FO 800/740 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Macmillan to Eden, Telegram 2004, 25 September 1956.
19 FO 371/120343, Record of a conversation between Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Makins and Mr. 
Murphy, AU 1057/1, 29 September 1956.
30 FO 800/740 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Macmillan to Eden, Telegram 2003, 25 September 1956.
21 FO 800/740 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Makins to Lloyd, Telegram 1849, 9 September 1956.
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Eisenhower’s re-election campaign Makins wrote to Lloyd on 17 September that it remains 
true that the great Republican trump card (-), is peace (-). So (-) there is in my judgment no 
prospect, as the international outlook appears today, that die U.S. will themselves participate 
in military action before November 6’“ . In fact, this analysis allowed Lloyd to explain away 
Eisenhower’s lack of support for Dulles’ tough speeches at the two London Conferences. 
’[Eisenhower] had made no effort to make Nasser understand that he was in for trouble if he 
did not agree to a reasonable setdement. Eisenhower’s mind was concentrated on an election 
campaign, appearing as the candidate who could preserve the peace of the world’9 .
In those days when it seemed that die Americans could be persuaded to take a firm line 
with Nasser by supporting a strong S.C.U.A., the British preferred to ignore Pineau’s 
warnings that the Americans could not be trusted at all and that they would make the British 
and the French wait with the use of force until after the election ’which could mean that we 
should never be able to take such action at all’34. In die beginning of October, however, when 
at a press conference Dulles declared that S.C.U.A. was not supposed to have any real teeth, 
and moreover described British and French policies over Egypt as old fashioned colonialism, 
perceptions at Whitehall took a different course: Dulles’ suggestions were suddenly defined 
as opposite to British interests. On 6 October Eden wrote to Selwyn Lloyd, who was in New 
York in order to defend the British case before the Security Council: ’I think we must never 
forget that Dulles’ purpose is different from ours. The Canal is in no sense vital to the U.S. 
and his game is to string us along at least until Polling Day
It has been alluded to several times that this period is crucial in understanding the course 
British decision making was about to take. Eden seemed fed up with Dulles’ ambiguity and 
his reluctance to commit the United States to a structure of the Users’ Association that would 
be able to put pressure on Egypt in case of alleged misbehaviour by withholding canal dues. 
Eden expressed his fear that time was running out. In a letter to Lloyd he states, commenting 
on die latter’s account of negotiations at the United Nations: ’... it made me fear more than 
ever that our position is being eroded (•). We have been misled so often by Dulles’ ideas that 
we cannot afford to risk another misunderstanding (-). Time is not on our side in this matter.
22 FO 800/740 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Makins to Lloyd, Telegram 1942, 17 September 1956.
s  Lloyd, Suez 1956. p. 168. On the same page Lloyd says ’that he had done it for electioneering 
reason was confirmed when I read again, whilst writing this book, an opinion sent to us from 
Washington on 17th September by Roger Makins’.
34 PREM 11/1100, Jebb to Foreign Office, Telegram 295, 9 September 1956.
25 FO 800/741 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Eden to Lloyd, Telegram 1063, 6 October 1956.
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I am glad you are standing firm with the French and so stiffening Duties. That is the only way 
to a solution’26. At this point Eden seemed worried that soon he would no longer be able to 
back this diplomatic effort by threatening with military action, as since 2 October the British 
Chiefs of Staff had been working on the Winter Plan. It is unlikely that Eden just wanted to 
go ahead with military action at that stage, as the meeting between the French General Maurice 
Challe and Eden, at which the first steps on the path to collusion with Israel were to be made, 
did not take place until 14 October.
The election argument no longer surfaces after the Challe visit of 14 October. Pineau 
suggests that on 16 October, when Eden and Lloyd flew to Paris for talks that were related to 
Challe’s presentation, Eden showed Mollet and Pineau a message from Eisenhower which said 
that it would be better for the British and die French to wait with military action until after the 
elections; to which Pineau claims to have responded that elections did not make a difference 
at all27. Indeed, when Pineau returned to London on October, 23, the French Foreign 
Secretary, Eden, and Lloyd concluded that the Americans would be too busy because of the 
elections: it would thus be best to act now3*.
The Cabinet minutes show that on 25 October, when the Cabinet discussed the 
contingency of an Israeli invasion of Egypt, the argumentation of Eden and Lloyd had 
completely changed. In spite of objections that ’there was no prospect of securing the support 
or approval of the United States Government’, Eden argued that the U.S. Government would 
support an Anglo-French operation to separate the fighting parties and secure the Canal, as it 
would be defensible in international law and as ’... the United States had acted in conformity 
with these principles on many occasions in the last hundred years’29. The American 
Presidential elections were of no concern to the Cabinets held between 18 October and 6 
November. This can be explained by the self deceiving idea that a policing action in the Suez 
Canal area would be evidently defensible under international law.
The election argument mainly appears in the evaluations of those members of the inner 
circle who directly contacted leading American politicians: Lloyd with Dulles, Eden with 
Eisenhower, Macmillan with both of them. This confirms the existence of a small group of
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M FO 800/741 Selwyn Lloyd Papers, Eden to Lloyd, Telegram 1078, 8 October 1956.
17 fTiristian Pineau, 1956 Suez. Robert Laffont, Paris, 1976, pp. 124-125. No mentioning of this 
in the accounts of this meeting by Eden, Full Circle, pp. 510-514, nor in Lloyd, Suez, pp. 173-175.
a  This can be concluded from Lloyd’s minute to himself in which he summarizes the talks on 23 
October; FO 800/725.
8 Quotations from CAB 128/30, CM(56)74, 25 October 1956.
decision makers, more restricted than the Egypt Committee, liable to symptoms of Groupthink: 
in spite of contradicting evidence, Eden, Lloyd and Macmillan reassured each other in their 
belief that the Americans were willing to support them if only the elections would be out of 
the way. The misperception is corrected when Dulles’ statements on S.C.U.A. and 
colonialism provoke a deep sentiment of disillusion among members of the inner circle. It did 
not lead, however, to a correction of the false belief; on the contrary, it led to a further closing 
off of the already severely limited perceptiveness of British decision makers, and to the 
interruption of consultations with the Americans about further plans.
17.3.2 Separating messages from Dulles and Eisenhower
Throughout the crisis both Dulles and Eisenhower expressed their strong reluctance to 
the use of force. However, they never explicitly told the British that they would not approve 
of it, or even oppose it. Both had hoped to take the sting out of the wasp by exploiting every 
possible diplomatic means, thus postponing the decision to intervene as long as possible so that 
a satisfactory diplomatic settlement could be worked out. Unfortunately, one confusing element 
appeared in their communications with die British: they persisted in approving of Anglo-French 
military precautions, first, because they genuinely thought this would put Nasser under 
pressure to reach a satisfactory agreement, and, second, because they did not want to alienate 
their allies too much. This element offered British policy makers ample room to misinterpret 
the messages from the Eisenhower Administration. This misconstruction came in three 
varieties: one was to engage in misreading, whenever an American message was received. The 
second was thinking that Dulles and Eisenhower could be considered apart. The third was to 
make a distinction between private and public utterances of Dulles and Eisenhower. The 
eventual consequence would be a tragical misinterpretation of the American attitude at the 
height of the crisis.
a) Misreading messages. Two important examples of misreading occurred during the 
crisis. (1) When Dulles arrived in London on 1 August, for trilateral discussions, he carried 
a letter from Eisenhower to Eden. Dulles had noticed himself that Eisenhower’s letter 
contained an important ambiguity as to the purpose of holding an international conference. He 
therefore handed over his own interpretation of that passage, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings. As it happened, Eden preferred to belief Eisenhower’s words and 
concluded: T he  President did not rule out the use of force*. (2) When on 5 September 
Eisenhower made a statement to the American Press in which he declared to be committed to
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a peaceful settlement of the dispute, Macmillan made an effort to read into that statement the 
conclusion that Eisenhower still did not exclude military force, in the last resort30.
b) Separating Dulles and Eisenhower. In his letter of 3 September the American President 
had already told Eden that he thought military force would not be needed in order to make 
Nasser give way. In the margin on this letter, Eden scribbled ’Foster advocated going on’ 
[taking military precautions and making military plans]31. This reflects the tendency to explain 
away unwelcome news by relying on what Dulles had said.
c) Separating public and private utterances. British policymakers, especially, Eden, 
Lloyd, Macmillan, and Salisbury, met with Dulles in private during the trilateral talks, the 
London Conference, and the S.C.U.A. conference. Moreover, Macmillan met both Dulles and 
Eisenhower in private when he travelled to Washington for a meeting of the I.M.F.. 
Furthermore, Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador to the United States, communicated the 
contents of several talks he had with Dulles, which left room for being misconstrued by 
policymakers in Whitehall. British policymakers were thus able to believe that private 
American statements were of more value than public utterances.
For instance, Eisenhower’s letter of 8 September which strongly discouraged the use of 
force, was handed over to Makins by Dulles. In a subsequent telegram, Makins conveyed 
Dulles’s accompanying words, which went much further than the contents of the President’s 
letter: Dulles thought it possible to occupy several key points along the Canal. Moreover, he 
added that the President did not rule out the use of force in the last resort. This phrase was 
immediately marked by Eden with his pencil32. Especially, Macmillan’s visit to the White 
House and to Dulles’s has been crucial in this respect. Macmillan was convinced that the 
United States would tacitly support an Anglo-French move against Nasser. He told this to Eden 
when he came back in early October. More than that, his opinion carried much weight because 
in a meeting between Eden, Lloyd,and himself, he insisted, when Lloyd warned of Dulles’s 
intransigence: ’I had a few words with Ike. Of course he’s an ill man, but as brave as ever.
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D I don’t think there is going to be any trouble from Ike-he and I understand each other-he’s 
not going to make any real trouble if we have to do something drastic’9 .
The latter episode illustrates the break that occurred in the first two weeks of October: 
British policymakers increasingly ignored the American Secretary of State and directed their 
attention to Eisenhower instead, relying on Macmillan’s assurances that die President was with 
them. After the adoption of the Challe-plan, contacts with the United States were broken off, 
the British continued planning on the assumption that tacit American approval was 
forthcoming. This would eventually lead to a fatal misinterpretation of Eisenhower’s messages 
when France and Great Britain issued their ultimatum to Israel and Egypt, by itself a perfect 
example of how private and public American messages were given a different meaning.
When the news broke of the Israeli invasion of Egypt, British policymakers had to re­
open the lines of communication with Washington that had been sealed off since mid-October. 
The exchange of letters between Eden and Eisenhower that followed is usually presented as 
yet another example of Eden’s incapacity to appreciate clear English sentences that precluded 
any American support for military adventures. In the context of collective rationalization, 
however, it is explicable why Eden thought limited American support to be forthcoming. It is 
too simple to suggest that Eden was acting foolishly.
Anglo-American understanding was severely damaged by the fact that Eden sent a 
message to Eisenhower about the contents of his speech to the House of Commons only three 
hours beforehand. Eisenhower therefore had to learn of the French and British ultimatum to 
Egypt and Israel from press reports. Much has since been made of Eisenhower’s ’stunningly 
cold and formal message which he went so far as to release to the press’, which was addressed 
to "Dear Prime Minister" instead of ’Dear Anthony", and which was signed "Sincerely, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower" and not with the usual "warm regards, as ever, Ike E."M.
It is generally accepted that Eisenhower wanted to snub Eden in public and that Eden 
should have understood the American position once and for all35. The interesting 
phenomenon, however, is that Eden did not feel humiliated at all, and, for a while, remained 
convinced of limited American support. In order to sustain his perception, he separated the
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private messages of the President from the public ones, and he was not alone in doing so. That 
Tuesday, 30 October 1956, several messages between Eden and Eisenhower crossed each 
other36, thus forming a source of misunderstanding. It is important to realize that, when Eden 
sent his telegram in which he explained why he was ’asking for Port Said and Ismailia and 
Suez*37, he had not yet received Eisenhower’s second message of that day. When that 
telegram reached Eden, it spoke a rather cautious language: ’it seems obvious that your 
Government and ours hold somewhat different attitudes toward the Tripartite Declaration of 
1950. In any event I shall earnestly and even anxiously watch the unfolding situation’3*. 
Shortly afterwards, the American Ambassador Aldrich delivered Ike’s ’cold and formal* 
message to Eden over the phone, which clearly had been written without Eisenhower having 
read Eden’s explanatory note. It is very likely that Eden understood that Eisenhower was angry 
by having had to learn the news from the press, but not necessarily that the President was 
completely opposed to his policy.
First, many authors have underlined that Eden, by issuing the ultimatum, had opted for 
a course of action that contradicted the 1950 Tripartite Declaration that was still fully 
supported by the United States. The Declaration was, as a matter of fact, subject of Ike’s 
second letter to Eden on 30 October 195639. This Declaration, issued in 1950 by Great 
Britain, France and the United States, said that they would try and balance the flow of arms 
to Israel and Arab countries and would seek each other’s advice if either party crossed the 
1948 armistice lines. As Aronson shows, however, this declaration had never been an 
instrument for the enforcement of the territorial status quo, but rather a justification for 
weapon delivery to all parties in the region40. As a matter of fact, when Eden visited 
Washington as Prime Minister in January 1956, Dulles had told him that the declaration was 
in itself no assurance that the United States would honour its commitment to enforce the
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territorial status quo41. It is therefore not unlikely that Eden did not give that much weight
to Eisenhower’s paragraphs that asked for respect for the Tripartite Declaration.
Second, and more importantly, Eden chose to separate Eisenhower’s private messages
from Ike’s public statement that Tuesday. This is revealed by Eden’s message of 31
October42. It is instructive to quote it at full length.
T have received your formal message, and I see that its substance has already been 
published. I realise that you wrote in this way in order to avoid encroaching upon 
the confidential nature of our personal exchanges. But, in the view of the publicity 
given to it, I shall be obliged in our Parliamentary discussions, which are to be 
resumed tomorrow, to comment on some of the points made in your letter in order 
to justify British policy and action. For this purpose, I think I must be free to make 
public the substance, though not, of course, the full text, of die two messages 
which I sent to you in the course of today. I am sure vou will understand143.
This letter shows that Eden thought Eisenhower’s public statement was to be interpreted 
differently from their private correspondence. It suggests that he thought the American 
President somehow had to say nasty things about the British for domestic purposes, but that 
he tacidy agreed with the British point of view, given his relatively accommodating earlier 
messages44. All the more because Eisenhower responded to Eden on the same day with a 
short note stating: ’By all means, feel free to use any part of the exchanges between us that 
you see fit’41. What else could Eden conclude than that he ’had no reason at this moment [30 
October 1956] to suppose that the United States would oppose us at the United Nations upon 
almost every point’46. One could suggest that this misperception, consistently sustained
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throughout the early days of the Sinai war, was another example of Eden’s idiosyncracy. The 
draft of Eden’s message to Eisenhower, however, reveals that the underlined parts of the draft 
were added as ’amendments suggested by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’47. This suggests 
that the interpretation of the American attitude to the British and French ultimatum was not as 
much a product of the obscure thinking of one individual, but the result of cognitive processes 
among more than one British decision maker4*.
17.4 The consequences of counting on American support
The British had thus made themselves believe that American support would be
forthcoming. No-one anticipated their active opposition at the United Nations or obstruction
of I.M.F.-procedures that would give some relieve to the falling British currency. British hopes
lasted until the very moment troops would go ashore. Some doubts appear in Eden’s message
to Eisenhower of 4 November:
’We would be happy to hand over to an international organisation as soon as we 
possibly can. No-one feels more strongly about this than Harold who has to 
provide the money Q. I am sending you this message in the hope that you will at 
least understand the grievous decisions we have had to make. 1 was deeply moved 
by your last message before our military action, although I was not able to reply 
to it as I would have liked it at the time. If you cannot approve, I would like you 
at least to understand the terrible decisions that we have had to make’49.
Throughout the crisis until the last moment British politicians remained fairly confident 
that the Americans would eventually support them in resorting to force. By consequence, when 
faced with painful short-term dilemmas, such as an equivocal outcome of the London 
Conference, they reasoned that the time was not yet ripe for military intervention backed by 
the United States, unless it could be justified under international law. It therefore comes as no 
surprise that the urge to keep intact the belief in eventual American support was the source of 
three major elements of defective decision making: (1) the failure to examine the risks and 
drawbacks of the preferred course of action, (2) the avoidance of experts’ opinions as well as
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the biased interpretation of available expert knowledge, (3) the failure to clearly spell out 
objectives.
17.4.1 No examination of risks and drawbacks: the withdrawal of the pilots.
At the beginning of August the Company employed 205 pilots, who helped pass ships 
through the Canal, 61 of which were British, 53 French, 40 Egyptian, and 51 others. Fifty- 
eight of these were on leave and had indicated that they did not want to return to Egypt to 
serve under die newly installed Egyptian Canal Authority*.
The decision to withdraw the pilots was taken in order to create a pretext for military 
intervention that should be acceptable even to the Americans. Dulles’ plan for a users’ 
association meant further diplomatic delay. In this period British decision makers started 
arguing that the United States wanted them to wait until after die Presidential elections. 
Creating chaos in the Canal would constitute a legitimate basis for action. However, in doing 
so they faced perceived the following dilemma: on the one hand, they wanted to slap Nasser 
in the face by withdrawing all non-Egyptian pilots. In this way, it would be shown to the 
world that Egypt was unable to operate the Canal in a decent way. On the other hand, one did 
not want to bring traffic to a halt, as they would be accused of having caused the effective 
closure if the Canal, while the very reason why they were opposing Nasser’s move had been 
the grievance that Egyptian rule could not guarantee the effective flow of traffic51. British 
ministers failed in their appreciation of the role of Western pilots. As a matter of fact, either 
aspect of this dilemma started from the assumption that withdrawal could bring the traffic in 
the Canal to a standstill. After the eventual departure of the non-Egyptian pilots, faithful to 
their Company, it appeared that the Egyptians were perfecdy capable of managing the Canal: 
on 16 September they let pass 40 ships - more than the average number32.
In his memoirs Eden suggests that the British and French Governments had constantly 
urged the pilots to stay33. This, however, is only part of the truth. The possible withdrawal
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of the pilots was always seen as a possible useful instrument of putting pressure on Nasser. 
Each time the Egypt Committee faced an important step to take, the weapon was mentioned. 
Two such critical moments occurred: the first during the second week of August when the 
British faced the possibility of Egypt rejecting the outcome of the London Conference 
altogether. The second moment came when Dulles presented the users’ association as a way 
of avoiding a crisis as a consequence of the failure of the Menzies mission. At both instances, 
British policymakers considered withdrawal of the pilots as a way to bring matters to a head, 
because they assumed the Egyptians would not be able to guarantee die operation of the 
Canal54.
The puzzling aspect is that right from the beginning of the crisis it was known that a very 
small number of pilots, or no pilots at all, would be needed to help ships sail through the 
Canal. On 29 July Selwyn Lloyd, in a discussion with the American envoy Robert Murphy and 
the French Foreign Secretary Christian Pineau, had agreed ’[] that it would be possible to 
continue operating the Canal without pilots. Risks would be increased, but most masters would 
be capable of taking their ship through in their own’15. This consideration was discussed even 
in the Egypt Committee’s meeting of 14 August, when it was concluded that ’the withdrawal 
of all French and British pilots would not necessarily bring a halt to all the movement of 
shipping through the Suez Canal fl’56- Still, it remains curious that no-one followed up on this 
analysis. Indeed, no doubts were raised at the next meeting two days later57. As long as one 
was able to procrastinate a decision by pointing out that it would be better to wait and see how 
the London Conference would develop, there was no urgency in re-examining one’s 
assumptions. By the time tension was rising, which first occurs towards the end of the London 
Conference around 21 August, every reason to re-examine had disappeared because of the 
perceived need to do something in order not to let Nasser get away with the Canal. The 
following 3 days were characterized by the search for a casus belli to which aim the standstill 
of the operation of the Canal seemed a useful instrument. William Clark notes in his diary on
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23 August, that ’[a] good deal of effort now is going into trying to find a proper pretext for 
taking military action’*. Tension was temporarily lessened when Monckton spoke up against 
the use of force in the Egypt Committee on 24 August, urging to take to matter to the United 
Nations before taking military action.
Pressure was rising, however, immediately after Dulles launched his idea of a users’ 
association. Moreover, the Suez Canal Company had become impatient: it was supposed to 
hand over its pilots, facilities and knowledge to the users* club, and therefore was not overly 
happy to see itself being outmanoeuvred by Dulles’s proposal, and thus had an interest in the 
occurrence of disorder in the Canal. On 9 September the British Ambassador to France, Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb, reported that Pineau was urging die British Government to have the pilots 
withdrawn before Dulles would come up with another bright idea which could make the pilots 
have to stay on39. On 6 September the news broke through internally that Nasser had rejected 
the proposals put forward to him by the Menzies mission. The next day the Egypt Committee 
’□ reached the conclusion that matters must now be left to their course and that no further 
advice should be given to the employees of the Suez Canal Company40. In a communication 
on 11 September the Suez Canal Company advised its pilots to leave Egypt.
Nasser’s success in managing the Canal was a bitter disappointment to the British and 
French Governments, but could have been avoided if due consideration had been given to the 
possibility that only a few or even no pilots at all would be enough to help ships sail through 
die Canal. It is unknown whether one actually relied on the expertise of the Suez Canal 
Company. Its Director, Georges-Picot, denies to have ever suggested that the Egyptians would 
be unable to operate the Canal on their own61, but it appears from the documents that no 
independent advice was sought62.
It is curious that even after Nasser had proven to be perfectly capable of managing the 
Canal, British decision makers persisted in the correctness of their assumption. On 17
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September a Cabinet committee chaired by Harold Macmillan observed that the withdrawal of 
the non-Egyptian pilots had had no result so far. It was admitted that ’[] it was possible that 
the difficulties of pilotage had been exaggerated’ but serious difficulties in operating the Canal 
were expected to arise within a few days®. That afternoon voices in the Egypt Committee 
suggested to increase the number of ships in the Canal in order to complicate the flow of 
traffic64. Only when the Egyptians proved able to manage the Canal for another week, was 
the assumption of Egyptian incapacity finally replaced by external complications: the Cabinet 
concluded on September 26 that ’under bad weather conditions, which might occur shortly, 
the operation of the Canal might be expected to become less efficient’65. As a matter of fact, 
traffic was not to be interrupted until the Anglo-French intervention started.
The story of the pilots is a major example of groupthink: doubts as to the underlying 
assumption were known to Selwyn Lloyd right from the beginning of the crisis; reservations 
were expressed in the Egypt Committee meeting of 14 August; and yet, no-one had the 
courage to raise the issue or to ask for expert knowledge, each time when the withdrawal of 
pilots was considered a way out of a difficult situation. As long as international negotiations 
continued, procrastination of a decision was the most attractive temporary solution to the 
perceived dilemma of teasing Nasser and offending international public opinion. But the more 
time constraints were perceived, the more attractive it became to hold on to the assumption of 
Egyptian inability. One week later, Dulles’s obscure move of a users’ club, coupled with 
pressure from the French and the Suez Canal Company, triggered off the decision to give it 
a try.
17.4.2 Failure to look for and listen to outside experts: the use of international law
The British Government is equipped with a special organization that should provide the 
Government with legal advice: the Law Officers. Moreover, the Foreign Office itself has a 
similar branch, at the time of Suez headed by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. It is clear that during 
the crisis the Egypt Committee was seldom confronted with the views of the Government’s 
legal advisers. As a matter of fact, the presentation of legal advice was mostly in the hands of 
the Lord Chancellor, Kilmuir. Moreover, the way in which legal advice was sought and 
considered suggests the existence of further evidence that (1) decision making during Suez was
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dominated by an inner circle, even smaller than the Egypt Committee, in which Lord Kilmuir 
played an important role; (2) that legal advice was serving the purpose (a) of finding a way 
out of a perceived choice dilemma and (b) of rallying both public opinion and internal 
dissenters behind a tough policy line.
Kilmuir’s central role in die inner circle becomes clear from a letter by Fitzmaurice to 
his colleagues at the legal department of the Foreign Office at 1 November, when it had 
become clear that the United Kingdom had started employing force against Egypt46. He stated 
that both he and the deputy legal adviser at the Foreign Office, F.A. Vallat, had resisted the 
use of force:
’there are a number of minutes, notes and papers to that effect, some at least of 
which have been seen by the Foreign Secretary, and at least one of which formed 
the basis of a paper for the Cabinet Committee on Suez, which means that it was 
seen by the principal Ministers concerned. The Prime Minister has however taken 
his advice on the matter from the Lord Chancellor and virtually all the legal 
argument which the Government have put forward on die question of the use of 
force, and which I have constantly queried, have emanated from that quarter’.
Fitzmaurice added that throughout the crisis he had never been consulted on the matter 
by the Lord Chancellor*7.
At its first meeting after Nasser’s act of nationalizing the Canal Company on 27 July, 
the Cabinet judged that the very act of nationalization was unlikely to be illegal as Nasser had 
promised compensation for the Company’s shareholders. The reaction of the British 
Government was therefore thought to be better grounded in aspects of international law*. 
Three different questions had to be answered throughout the crisis: first, whether Nasser’s act 
constituted a breach of international law; second, whether his action justified a military reply; 
and finally, whether a resort to force required explicit permission of the United Nations. The 
first two of these legal questions were dealt with from the very beginning, the latter recurring 
throughout die entire crisis period; the third matter was a point of discussion notably in the 
period during which the Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies and his delegation were 
received by Nasser (3 September 1956) and the British Cabinet faced the dilemma of what to 
do if the Menzies mission were to fail to produce a satisfactory result.
1. A breach of international law ? On 28 July the legal advisers at the Foreign Office 
presented their doubts whether the nationalization of the Canal Company was a violation of
“  The previous day the Royal Air Force had bombed targets in Egypt.
47 Letter from Fitzmaurice to all his colleagues, 1 November 1956, FO 800/748.
•  CM (56) 54, 27 July 1956.
the letter the 1888 Constantinople Convention which secured the international character of the 
Canal. Possibly, it meant a breach of the Convention’s spirit, but it was unlikely that military 
action could thus be justified. Certain economic and diplomatic moves were allowed under 
international law, but from the outset the legal advisers made it clear that the Canal Company 
was not permitted to call back the people it employed in running the canal69. This document 
was probably seen by Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd, but did not reach the Egypt 
Committee, nor the Cabinet. What did reach the Egypt Committee on 1 August was a one-page 
document, probably drafted by the Lord Chancellor himself0, after having been discussed 
by a meeting of ministers held on the evening of 31 July 195671. It was concluded first, that 
Egypt used the threat of force to keep British and French subjects working in the canal, that 
Egypt therefore admitted that it could not operate the Canal in accordance with the 1888 
Convention obligations, and second, that the act of nationalization itself was a breach of 
international law.
These conclusions differed considerably from those reached by the legal advisers at the 
Foreign Office at 28 July. Legal Adviser Fitzmaurice inquired with Attorney General 
Manningham-Buller after his opinion. Their correspondence on 1 and 2 August shows that both 
agreed that the Lord Chancellor’s conclusions about an Egyptian threat to employees and the 
operation of the Canal itself could not be upheld. Munningham-Buller told Fitzmaurice that 
he had sent a letter to the Foreign Secretary expressing his views for use in the Commons 
debate on 2 August72. It is known, however, that Selwyn Lloyd used the Lord Chancellor’s 
draft instead, which Kilmuir had handed to him at the Cabinet meeting of 31 July73. The
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fact that according to the records Lord Kilmuir did not start attending the Egypt Committee meetings 
until 14 August 1956 (although he was present at Cabinet meetings, of course), we must conclude that 
a top level informal meeting has taken place that evening.
72 Marston, ibid.. pp. 780-781.
n CAB 21/3314. The Cabinet meeting on 31 July 1956 did not deal with Suez, CM(56)55. Marston 
says that a note at the Law Officers’ Department stated that Kilmuir agreed to Manningham-Buller’s
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British Government therefore was not exposed to the possibility that Egypt did not pose a 
threat to the Canal and its pilots, nor to Fitzmaurice’s opinion that it might not even have 
breached the 1888 Convention. Nevertheless, considerations of international law were hardly 
made during the first days of the crisis when the British and the French were considering a 
quick military move either by airborne troops or by an invasion from Libya.
2. Is military action justified? The question of justification of military action became 
important when the British Government was facing the contingencies of a possible failure of 
the Menzies mission to Egypt. This period starts with the decision of the London Conference 
at 23 August to send Menzies to Nasser until 12 September when the British Government 
formally adopted Dulles’s proposal for a Users’ Association (SCUA). The dilemma was what 
to do if Nasser did not give in completely. Would military action then be justified, or should 
one first go to the United Nations?
From mid-August Fitzmaurice had tried to communicate to those who mattered that the 
use of military force was not justified under international law. He wrote to that effect to 
Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Harold Caccia, on 13 August, twice to Sir 
Ivone Kirkpatrick, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office on 29 and 31 August, 
and to the Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor’s department on 6 September in hope 
to reach the ears of Kilmuir74. It is unlikely that Fitzmaurice’s warnings would reach the 
Egypt Committee, or Selwyn Lloyd, through Kirkpatrick, during the crisis had expressed his 
disappointment with the lawyers’ interpretation of international law71. Kilmuir was not likely 
to discuss in detail Fitzmaurice’s point of view at the Egypt Committee or Cabinet. From the 
very beginning he had argued within the Cabinet and with the Law Officers that force was 
permissible under international law76. Fitzmaurice’s letter to Caccia of 13 August actually 
reached Selwyn Lloyd and it may have had its influence or. the paper the Foreign Secretary 
prepared for the meeting of the Egypt Committee on 20 August. This presented a survey of 
possible Egyptian actions that might justify military action. Selwyn Lloyd pointed out that
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views to be circulated to the Egypt Committee, ibid.. p. 780, note 25, but no evidence exists that this 
was actually done.
74 Marston, ibid.. pp. 783-7.
71 Kirkpatrick was very critical of the position that force was permitted only if British subjects were 
murdered in large numbers; Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle. Memoirs. London, Macmillan, 1959, 
pp. 262-263.
*  Cf. Earl of Kilmuir, Political Adventure. The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir. Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, London, 1964, p. 268.
nationalization alone was not enough77. It is clear, however, that the pressure of the situation, 
the uncertainty about what to do, once the London Conference would be over, made the 
decisionmakers look for those acts that would justify military action.
The Menzies mission brought temporary relief. By the time Nasser was about to receive 
the delegation of the 18 countries that had convoked the London Conference, around 3 
September, the dilemma was back on die table. This time Dulles came up with S.C.U.A., 
asking the British through diplomatic channels to accept this plan without yet turning to the 
United Nations. The British did not know whether this was another American attempt at 
delaying military action, or a genuine attempt to extract significant promises from Egypt. 
Kilmuir, in a letter to Eden, argued that the foundation of such a thing as S.C.U.A. would be 
very obscure in terms of what the 1888 Convention allowed the users to do. The Convention 
could be enforced ’only by economic and physical pressure, and, in the last resort, by force’; 
S.C.U.A. would make it more difficult to justify such a move in terms of the 1888 
Convention7*.
Eventually, on 11 September the Egypt Committee decided to go along with the 
Americans, but simultaneously agreed to have the Suez Canal Company recall its pilots from 
the Canal. Belligerent Ministers thus tried to provoke a situation that might justify force, as 
mentioned in Lloyd’s paper of 20 August, unaware of the legal advisers’ original warning of 
28 July that Nasser’s behaviour might not justify the pilots’ withdrawal; the warning that had 
not reached the Committee due to the intervention of the Lord Chancellor in their draft.
Kilmuir, in a speech to the House of Lords on 12 September, the day that S.C.U.A. was 
officially announced, came very close to saying that the 1888 Convention allowed for military 
intervention. Five days later Fitzmaurice sent a letter to the Attorney-General, pointing out that 
in this speech Kilmuir had misinterpreted certain scholars of international law79. Fitzmaurice 
probably hoped to influence the decision making process by sending his interpretations the 
Lord Chancellor’s Office*0.
77 CAB 134/1217, EC(56)26.
71 Minute Kilmuir to Eden, 6 September 1956, PREM 11/1100.
79 Marston, p. 788.
10 When, as a member of Lloyd’s delegation, at the United Nations at the negotiations between 
Egypt, Britain, and France during the first half of October, Fitzmaurice wrote to his Deputy at 
Whitehall, Vallat, about the long term consequences of the use of force for the United Kingdom. He 
added: ’I should be grateful if you would address a minute to the right quarter in the above terms (-). 
It should be seen by an Under-Secretary and also by Kirkpatrick. If there were any way of conveying
(continued...)
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3. Was U.N.-permission necessary? When British decisionmakers had to make up their 
mind about whether to go to die United Nations or to accept Dulles’s ambiguous proposal for 
a Users’ Association, some were afraid that reference to the United Nations implied that force 
could only be used after explicit permission would have been obtained from the Security 
Council. These doubts echoed Lloyd’s paper of 20 August which stated that ’a considerable 
section of world opinion’ held military action permissible as self-defence, collective self- 
defence, or under U.N. authority only*1. At the Cabinet meeting of 11 September, that was 
to adopt the S.C.U.A.-proposal, Kiimuir argued that failure of S.C.U.A. due to obstruction 
on the part of Egypt did not imply that under international law Great Britain (and France) 
should have to turn to the United Nations and wait for permission: ’we should be fully justified 
in having recourse to force and submitting the issue simultaneously to die Security Council’*2. 
Kilmuir’s line of argument did not convince all members, notably Minister of Defence Walter 
Monckton, who insisted on S.C.U.A. as a prelude to further diplomatic moves at the United 
Nations, and Harold Macmillan, who considered S.C.U.A. as a prelude to the use of force. 
The adoption of S.C.U.A. thus served the purpose of maintaining unanimity in the Cabinet. 
Eden masterly postponed dissension by summing up that ’we should be justified in the last 
resort in using force to restore the situation’, if peaceful means should all fail0 .
Considerations of international law were no longer made at Cabinet or Committee level 
when negotiations were taking place at the United Nations (first half of October). Kiimuir had 
asked the Law Officers for a note on military action should the Security Council foil to take 
effective action. On 12 October they told Kiimuir that Egypt had not acted in any way as to 
justify force. Kiimuir did not agree with their analysis and wrote another in which he thought 
military action permissible because the doctrine of self-defence should be extended from 
nation-states to include international entities such as the Canal. The Law Officers could not 
accept Kilmuir’s reformulation*4 and the Attorney-General prepared a memorandum to the
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it through the Private Secretaries at No. 10, I should like this to be done. It might also not be a bad 
thing to send a copy to Dobson at the Lord Chancellor’s Department, as it is more likely that it is in 
that Quarter that the PM obtains his advice’. Fitzmaurice to Vallat, FO 800/747, 9 October 19S6.
11 Marston, ’Legal advice on the Suez crisis’, p. 782.
c  CAB 128/30, CM 64(56), 11 September 1956.
”  ibid..
M Because the United Kingdom had recognized, as recently as 1954 when the new Canal Treaty had 
been concluded, that the Canal formed an integral part of Egypt’s territory, and could thus not be 
compared to international territories, such as Tangier, Trieste, or the trust territories.
Prime Minister in order to convey his views on the matter. However, he did not send it off 
directly to 10 Downing Street, but had it commented upon by Kilmuir. The only paper that 
eventually reached the Prime Minister’s Office was Kilmuir’s final draft of his own paper on 
21 October; it emphasized the justification of force in case of breakdown of law and order in 
the Canal leading to its blocking*3.
Two curious elements emerge: first, the compliance of civil servants with administrative 
practice despite their strong doubts about Governmental policies. The Law Officers submitted 
all their memoranda to Kilmuir and sent him even the draft of their memorandum that was to 
warn the Prime Minister of important flaws in the Lord Chancellor’s line of arguing. Second, 
Kilmuir clearly acted as, what Janis would call, a self-appointed mindguard. More than once 
did he prevent the opinion of legal experts from arriving at the decision making center. 
Similarly, in his own presentations of legal arguments he would state his own case, invoking 
the authority of one of the few Professors of International Law that supported his 
interpretations, Professor Arthur Goodhart of Oxford16. At the Cabinet of 28 August (an 
important one because Monckton raised the principle question of the use of force) Kilmuir used 
Goodhart’s letter in order to make the point that force was justified in more instances than 
direct attack*7. No balanced discussion of international legal arguments was held, and, it must 
be added, no-one asked for it.
An analysis of the role the legal argument in the decision making process in the period 
from the nationalization until the emergence of the Challe-plan around 16 October permits the 
following three conclusions:
(1) Most international legal arguments that reached the formal decision making units, the 
Cabinet and the Egypt Committee, came from David Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, apart from 
Selwyn Lloyd’s paper of 18 August, which was based on the advice from Fitzmaurice.
(2) On the whole, neither the Cabinet nor the Egypt Committee, with the exception of 
Monckton, bothered much about the legal discussion as such. Both seemed more interested in 
exploiting the possibilities international law offered to them. This can be shown by the fact that 
Selwyn Lloyd’s paper which raised doubts about the use of force in the light of Egypt’s
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first three weeks of October can be distilled from Marston’s discussion, 'Legal Advice on the Suez 
crisis’, pp. 791-797.
M Goodhart had published a letter in The Times on 11 August which supported Kilmuir’s 
interpretation. Goodhart called on Kilmuir on 10 or 11 September, and left him all sorts of material to 
use for his speech to the House of Lords the following day; Marston, ibid.. pp. 778-779.
r  CAB 128/30, CM 62(56), 28 August 1956.
policies, was used as a summary of opportunities that Nasser might offer in future which 
would justify forceful retaliation: interference with British warships; actions that would 
endanger the lives of British subjects; refusal to a British ship of passage through the Canal; 
or interference with military installations at the Suez base. Of course, the move the British 
expected most results from, the recalling of the Canal Company’s pilots is another example. 
It has been shown that, due to Kilmuir’s monopoly over the legal argument, this decision was 
taken without the British politicians having seen Fitzmaurice’s opinion on the illegality of such 
an act.
(3) Especially in August, international legal arguments were used to influence both public 
opinion and internal dissenters. In a letter to Eden, sent on 22 August, Lord President, 
Salisbury, tried to argue that Egypt’s act of nationalization meant a breach of international law. 
Eden wrote ’I think it is excellent* and suggested that the memo should become a speech or 
an article**. Similarly, Eden and Lloyd asked the Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert 
Menzies, who had arrived in London to attend the London Conference, to state his opinion on 
the international legal aspects of the issue on television as a counteroffensive against opinions 
that had been published in the British press during the first half of August. Menzies did so on 
13 August*9. Interna] dissent was worrying Eden’s inner circle when at the Egypt Committee 
meeting of 24 August Walter Monckton raised general doubts about the use of force (which 
he was to repeat in the Cabinet four days later), and found the Lord Privy Seal, Butler, among 
his supporters. In a letter to Eden, written after that meeting, Salisbury, referring to 
Monckton’s and Butler’s doubts, wrote:
’(-) the case for force will clearly need to be closely and cogently argued by those of us who 
agree with it 0- Have you by any chance had a word with David Kilmuir ? I think he is v[ery] 
sound on the whole thing, and he might be of use with colleagues’40. This explains why 
Kilmuir at die Cabinet meeting of 28 August explicidy presented Professor Goodhart’s 
argument on the use of force in international law.
The discussion of international law and the use of force acquires a completely different 
character after the presentation of General Challe’s plan to intervene militarily if Israel were 
to attack Egypt. It was generally accepted in the Cabinet that such an intervention could be
352
** Salisbury to Eden, 22 August 1956, PREM 11/1113.
** Menzies, Afternoon Light, pp. 150-151.
M Salisbury to Eden, 24 August 1956, PREM 11/1152.
justified under international law because presumably the British and French forces would be 
going in order to prevent an interruption of the free flow of traffic through the Canal because 
of an Israeli-Egyptian war. Kilmuir presented such an argument in a memorandum to the 
Cabinet on 29 October, entitled ’The Right of Intervention’91.
Once the Challe-plan had been presented to senior ministers on 15 an 16 October, legal 
justifications became to dominate the decision making process. Exactly because the Challe-plan 
had the advantage of the seemingness of justifiability under international law, British 
decisionmakers, in their contact with Israeli politicians through French intermediaries, hinted 
that they wanted to hold on to that legal figleaf, and therefore preferred not only to issue an 
ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel to stay away from the Suez Canal, with which Israel was 
not supposed to comply, of course, in order to make it possible to French and British forces 
to actually intervene, but indicated that they wanted to throw bombs on Israeli forces as well.
These details would not be known to the Cabinet, but in their deliberations about whether 
or not to adopt the idea of armed intervention in case of an Anglo-Israeli war, Cabinet 
members never put the issue of legal justification into doubt.
17.4.3 Failure to spell out objectives: the decision to return to Egypt despite the 1954 Canal 
Treaty
British policy makers were caught in a dilemma regarding the consequences of an attack 
on Egypt. They had proclaimed the restoration of international control of Canal as their official 
aim. At the same time, they wanted the downfall of Nasser. Of course, this was never 
officially proclaimed because it would offend international public opinion. The Arab world and 
the United States would never agree to an occupation of a large proportion of Egyptian 
territory. However, military action which remained confined to the Canal area might not 
provoke Nasser’s removal. This dilemma was felt more sharply, once the Challe-plan had been 
adopted, which drew its justification even stronger from arguments related to the free flow of 
traffic through an international waterway rather than to the removal of a dictator. The only 
way out of the dilemma was to believe in the immediate fall of Nasser once military operations 
would begin and to limit any occupation to the Canal area92.
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92 This line of reasoning is displayed by Selwyn Lloyd in a memorandum to the Egypt Committee 
on 20 August: he suggests that military action will automatically lead to the overthrow of the Nasser 
regime, which would allow Anglo-French forces to withdraw from Egyptian territory and to keep a
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As a consequence, British policymakers not prepared to face the various contingencies 
of such a move: first, they were very reluctant to consider the possibility that Anglo-French 
troops might have to stay longer in Egypt in order to protect a new, presumably anglophile 
government: indeed, die Chiefs of Staff warned that this might require the occupation of Cairo 
and possibly Alexandria93. Second, they preferred not to think of the possibility that Nasser 
might not be quickly removed, thus forcing Anglo-French troops to march to Cairo to that 
effect. Actually, British policy makers did not even consider whether any Egyptian politician 
or military was likely to overthrow Nasser and take his place94.
British policy-makers thus did not want to get involved in the occupation of a substantial 
portion of Egyptian territory. They were very anxious not to return to a situation which had 
cost so much effort to get out of only two years earlier: on November 4, Eden wrote to 
Eisenhower that ’we do not want occupation of Egypt, we could not afford it, and that is one 
of many reasons why we got out of Suez two years ago’99. Occupation had to be avoided in 
order not to offend the Arab world and international public opinion, not in the least American. 
This required the early collapse of Nasser’s regime. The Cabinet agreed that this would only 
be possible if military operations were quick and successful96. No-one took account of the 
long period it would take to bring the troops to Egypt.
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«mall force near the Canal. Lloyd added that Nasser was known to be very unpopular in Egypt; 
EC(26)28, PREM 11/1100. Evidence of British occupation plans can be found in the records of the 
meetings of the Defence (Transition) Committee, which designed plans for running the Canal, 
controlling occupied territory, and had already made an arrangement for Occupation Currency on 3 
August; CAB 134/815.
n Memorandum of the Chiefs of Staff, EC memo EC(56)63, 25 October 1956, PREM 11/1103. 
Only Walter Monckton had warned the Cabinet on 28 August that it would prove very difficult to get 
the troops out of Egypt ooce they would have landed, CM(56)62, 28 August 1956, PREM 11/1104.
** Apparendy, Butler, Macmillan and Lloyd told Canadian Foreign Secretary Sir Lester Pearson in 
December 1956 that they had had no idea who could replace Nasser; Michael G. Fry, ’Canada, the 
North Atlantic, and the U.N.’ in Louis and Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. p. 294; very litde is known of any 
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message that he did not seek to reoccupy his thrown; 19 September 1956, PREM 11/1118; Toumoux 
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1’Affaire Ben Bella. Suez, la Cagoule. 13 mai. Pe Gaulle au Pouvoir. Plon, Paris, 1960 p. 163.
* Eden to Eisenhower, 4 November 1956, Telegram 520/56, PREM 11/1100.
* CM(56)73, 24 October 1956.
17.5 Independent variables and defective decision making
The puzzle of Suez can only be resolved by making understandable the British 
misperception of the American attitude towards the conflict. Throughout the entire crisis 
British policymakers were confident that American support would be forthcoming. In the first 
stages of the crisis they thought that the Americans needed to be persuaded of how seriously 
Great Britain approached die situation. After the trilateral talks with Dulles, American 
hesitations about the use of force were explained away by various rationalizations, which were 
adapted to new circumstances once the Challe-plan was adopted.
This misperception was predominandy present at the level of the inner group: Eden, 
Macmillan, Lloyd and Salisbury formed the narrow circle that stayed in touch with the United 
States Government. Nevertheless, the expectation of American support was shared by their 
colleagues in both the Egypt Committee and the Cabinet. Although the various types of 
collective rationalization mainly appear within the inner circle, it can be safely concluded that 
misreading the Americans was a product of groupthink at all three levels of decision making.
Furthermore, important elements of defective decision making, closely related to this 
misperception, were the results of groupthink as well. First, the Company’s pilots were 
recalled, even though at the level of the Egypt Committee knowledge had been available that 
such a move might be of no avail. Second, the Cabinet as well as the Egypt Committee 
preferred to continue believing that force was lawful, despite Lloyd’s memorandum that had 
made it painfully clear that the British Government was left with very few possibilities that 
would justify military action under international law. Third, because they preferred not to 
offend the United States by occupying large parts of Egypt, no-one in the Egypt Committee 
or Cabinet, apart from Head, spoke up in order to warn against the irreconcilability of the twin 
objectives of protecting the Canal and toppling Nasser.
The operational code is useful to understand two important changes of attitude which 
occurs in the beginning of October: first, British politicians prefer to ignore Dulles and start 
relying completely on their conviction that Eisenhower in his public messages has shown to 
sympathize with the British position. Second, the argument of Presidential elections is now 
used to as a reason to proceed with the plan, rather than to wait until after the elections. 
Clearly then, the first two weeks of October hide the key to understanding the British decision 
to use force. Part of the explanation can be offered by the Operational Code: it had become 
clear that Dulles was unwilling to use the users’ association as a means to put pressure on 
Nasser. In Eden’s eyes, the American Secretary of State had thus entered the category of 
actors in world politics that did not play the game according to the rules that Eden thought
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essential. These processes of misperception, and the consequent process of defective decision 
making can be understood as the product of the stress generated by the dilemmas of the so- 
called crucial dilemmas. As a matter of fact, the occurrence of symptoms of defective decision 
making seems correlated to the occurrence of many symptoms of groupthink: the issue of 
withdrawing the pilots is playing in the period of decisions 2 and 3, both characterized by a 
high number of groupthink symptoms at the level of both the inner group and the Egypt 
Committee. Similarly, the twisting of international law coincides with the presence of a large 
number of groupthink symptoms regarding decisions 2, 3, 5, and 6.
Of course, the conclusion that groupthink and operational code are related to defective 
decision making is an important one. The operational code, although apparently of limited 
explicatory value, is methodologically more interesting, because its reliance on master beliefs 
allows for predicting at forehand the probable terms within which an individual decision maker 
will define and handle a stressful situation. Groupthink, on the other hand, is related to the 
operational code in that it can, but need not, be related to high levels of stress. An analysis 
of groupthink does not include the testing of an hypothesis comparable to the master belief of 
the operational code. Yet, the present analysis of the Suez crisis suggests that several of the 
key participants of the inner group, notably Eden, Lloyd, Macmillan and Salisbury, responded 
to American hesitations in a manner that strikingly resembles what has been called the 
attitudinal prism of the foreign policy establishment.
The British misperception of the American attitude is rooted in both the expectations and 
the experiences that had been established by die so-called Anglo-American security regime in 
the 1945-1956 period. Basically, British policymakers remained convinced that the United 
States recognized the special interests of the United Kingdom in the Middle East; they had not 
been able to perceive a growing independent American policy towards the Middle East, and 
had actually considered American Middle Eastern policies as malleable to their own, such as 
in die case of die 1954 Suez Canal Treaty. This pattern is repeated in the Suez crisis. High 
hopes of American support were grounded in the British conviction that the United States 
would recognize that Nasser’s policies constituted a threat to vital British interests in the area. 
When full American support did not come forward forthwith, British policy makers adopted 
one of their familiar tactics to cajole the Americans to align with them: during the first weeks 
o f die crisis until the end of the London Conference, the British tried to exaggerate their case 
in order to make clear to the Americans that they meant serious business. They were convinced 
that die Americans needed a lead, as usual in Middle Eastern afUairs. The same pattern is 
displayed during the discussions around the proposal of a users’ association: British policy
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makers agreed to go along with Dulles’s vague idea, because they were confident that they 
could persuade the United States Government into using the payment of shipping dues to the 
new association as a lever on Nasser. As a matter of fact, they used their proven postwar 
method of persuasion by incessantly imprinting on the Eisenhower Administration that Nasser 
was an instrument in the hands of Communism. Eden’s letters to the American President 
emphasized this aspect from the outset until the end of the crisis.
When these policies did not bring immediate results, British policymakers, confronted 
with various crucial decisions, each of which represented a weighty dilemma, engaged in 
various different types of rationalization in order to maintain their cognitive balance: in order 
to reassure themselves of the expectation grounded in their attitudinal prism, namely that 
American support was forthcoming, they had to explain away signs of American opposition 
to the use of force.
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PART V: CONCLUSIONS


Chapter 18: Conclusions
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18.1 Introduction
This concluding chapter will deal with two sets of questions. First, it will be necessary 
to return to the research questions that have been formulated at the outset of this study. Next, 
it will be useful to try to assess whether the particular approach that has been adopted to study 
the Suez crisis has resulted in an interpretation of the decision making process in the United 
Kingdom that differs from traditional views.
18.2 Addressing the research Questions
Two major research questions have been the subject of this study: (1) to what extent 
does neorealism explain Anglo-American relations between 1945 and 1956 in a satisfactory 
way? (2) Do tools from cognitive psychology that put emphasis on the influence of individual 
foreign policy makers complement a neorealist analysis of that period? Both questions assume 
that this particular case study is a relevant subject in order to assess the strengths and 
weaknesses of the neorealist approach to the study of international relations. It was argued that 
neorealist authors consider the Suez crisis a piece of evidence of their theory of balance-of- 
power, which predicted different outcomes as a consequence of a change in the configuration 
of the international political system: France and the United Kingdom were no longer able to 
act as great powers because the distribution of power within the international system had 
changed to the benefit of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union.
This seemingly obvious case raises some serious question, however, that cannot be 
answered by a neorealist analysis. It leaves large portions of postwar French and British 
foreign policies unexplained: it is unable to account for the limited wars in which both 
countries were engaged before the Suez crisis, and also, at least Great Britain, until ten years 
after that humiliating episode. Moreover, it cannot explain why British policymakers, who had 
acknowledged American world leadership, and who had decided that Egypt was no longer of 
strategic value to the United Kingdom, decided to intervene with force, despite American 
opposition against it.
Neorealism’s inability to account for these phenomena finds its origins in its exclusive 
emphasis on the nation-state, the international system, and the distribution of capabilities as 
the variables that are needed to explain international politics: this attention to rather static 
elements allows it to draw a general picture of world affairs, but the neglect of processes that
play at the level of individual foreign policy makers is its consequence. On the one hand, this 
reveals its strength: neorealism is able to give a parsimonious theory of state behaviour in 
different configurations of the international system; on the other hand, paradoxically, it entails 
its weakness: not willing to take elite perceptions into account, it assumes that the actual 
operation of the system’s constraints and opportunities is automatic. Yet, it has been borne out 
by this study that an understanding of the actual operation of those systemic influences requires 
the incorporation of the perceptions and expectations of foreign policymakers, that is, of 
variables, that lie beyond the system and the nation-state.
In order to be able to answer research question two, individual cognitive beliefs have 
been put forward as an instrument to assess the effects of the perceptions and expectations of 
foreign policy makers. For this purpose, the operational code construct was selected as an 
appropriate technique. It was made clear, however, that individual cognitive belief systems 
operate within the context of the general orientation of policymakers towards world affairs, 
their so-called attitudinal prism. Furthermore, taking into consideration that in Western 
countries major foreign policy decisions are often taken by more than one individual, it was 
deemed necessary to take small group dynamics into account. It was found that the behaviour 
of small groups can be intimately linked to a leader’s cognitive belief system, if the way he 
handles the small group qualifies as directive leadership.
An analysis of British decision making during die Suez crisis demonstrated that the 
operational code of Anthony Eden contributes significantly to the understanding of two out of 
six so-called decisional conflicts: his attitude to both the decision to prefer diplomacy over 
force, and the decision to accept the Challe-plan has been affected by Eden’s cognitive belief 
system; groupthink appears to have played a role in most decisional conflicts, notably 
regarding the decisions to send the Menzies mission to Cairo, the decision to accept S.C.U.A. 
but to withdraw the Company’s pilots at the same time, as well as the decisions to accept the 
Challe-plan and to continue its implementation, despite growing opposition. Interestingly, it 
was found that, as the crisis developed, decision making was increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of an inner circle around Eden, which fell prey to groupthink.
Despite the influence of individual and group variables, the decision making process 
has been constrained, at several instances, by the organizational and domestic context in which 
British policymakers had to operate. Especially the limitations of various military options, and 
the regular changes of the military’s assessment of them, affected the decision making process. 
This was notably the case at the beginning and towards the end of the crisis.
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It has been shown, however, that the puzzle of Suez can only be resolved by moving 
reference to individual and group variables. British policymakers refused to appreciate 
American opposition to the use of force, and ignored the risks they would be exposed to by 
going to an area that they had decided to leave for good reasons only two years earlier. The 
British Cabinet remained blind to these dangers, because of the operation of groupthink at the 
level of the Cabinet, the Egypt Committee, and especially the inner circle around Eden. Eden’s 
leadership style, and the impact of his cognitive belief system, contributed to that process at 
two instances: when British ministers determined the nature of the problem and when they 
adopted the Challe-plan. Eden’s operational code has shown its value especially in explaining 
why the British decided to go it alone and to ignore further suggestions from the American 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.
The origins of the British attitude, however, lie in the perception of the nature of 
Anglo-American relations, that had been constructed in their experiences with the so-called 
Anglo-American security regime between 1945 and 1956. They had come to believe that the 
United States acknowledged British primacy in the Middle East. Moreover, they were 
confident that the United States could be cajoled into supporting the United Kingdom in its 
defence of its Middle Eastern interests, by making use of the prospect of Communist 
penetration of the area. In this sense, the attitudinal prism of foreign policy makers can be a 
valuable tool in assessing the actual operation of systemic constraints on the behaviour of its 
units.
Looking back on the tools that have been employed in the empirical part of this study, 
it must be admitted that the usefulness of the operational code is a bit disappointing, especially 
when one takes into consideration the amount of work that has to be put in its constructing. 
Moreover, the rather influential role of the attitudinal prism is a matter of concern: its 
previously designed categories of beliefs constituted the methodological advantage of the 
operational code over other techniques. The attitudinal prism of the Brecher-model does not 
work with detailed, preconceived notions about beliefs. It will thus be much more difficult to 
engage in a comparative analysis of the influence of cognitive beliefs, if one will have to rely 
on the atttftidinal prism rather than the operational code.
Regarding groupthink, it should be emphasized that the present analysis of the Suez 
crisis suggests the existence of a link between the presence of symptoms of groupthink and the 
occurrence of elements of defective decision making: the puzzle of Suez cannot be resolved 
without reference to the notion of groupthink. However, at various moments, the occurrence 
of premature concurrence-seeking seems intimately linked to the directive leadership style of
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Anthony Eden. Finally, a tentative conclusion might be that groupthink sometimes activates 
several central beliefs that are present at die level of the foreign policy elite: the importance 
of beliefs that are present in die attitudinal prism of British policymakers points into that 
direction.
In conclusion, the perceptions and expectations of foreign policymakers have to be 
included in an analysis of the actual operation of systemic constraints and opportunities on the 
units of the system. Cognitive beliefs of foreign policy makers provide a possibility to bridge 
the gap between the system and its units. Tools from cognitive psychology, such as the 
operational code, the attitudinal prism, and groupthink offer practical solutions to the question 
of how to analyze systemic influences. The present study points to the need for neorealist 
theories to develop their notions of socialization rather than to rely on competition as the 
mechanism which explains die impact of systemic variables on international politics.
18.3 The Suez crisis
A complete historical reconstruction of the Suez crisis has not been the purpose of this 
study. It seems clear, however, that an analysis from the point of view of political science and 
cognitive psychology puts the crisis in a different perspective than most historical studies offer. 
Four points are worth mentioning.
First, the reconstruction of the decision making process that was presented in this study 
suggests that British decisions were the product of a small inner group rather than one 
individual. The strong evidence of die occurrence of groupthink, coupled with the relative 
weak influence of Eden’s operational code, points to a small number of ministers who shared 
certain objectives and views, and who carried decisions in both the Egypt Committee and the 
full Cabinet. By consequence, it is unfair to attribute the policy fiasco that Suez certainly was, 
to Anthony Eden alone.
Second, the composition of the inner group puts a larger burden on certain individuals 
that became known as opponents of the use of force. This is especially true for R.A. Butler, 
who has been present at many crucial meetings of the inner group and who helped in preparing 
the Cabinet for accepting the Chaile-plan.
Third, the analysis of six decisional conflicts with die use of die operational code and 
groupthink has made it abundantly clear that the period during which the plan for a users’ 
association was seriously discussed, has been the fatal phase of the Suez crisis. For the British 
the users’ association was the instrument of extracting a commitment from the United States
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that they would support Great Britain in putting serious pressure on Egypt. At the same time, 
when the United States showed reluctance to such a commitment, British policymakers could 
have realized that their conception of the nature of Anglo-American relations was a false one, 
and that the Americans could no longer be persuaded to defend British interests in the Middle 
East by talking about the threat of Communism. British policymakers preferred to ignore all 
alarming signs: instead, they decided to go it alone and to leave the Americans in the dark as 
to their real intentions. Meanwhile, with the use of several techniques of collective 
rationalization, they continued believing that American support would be forthcoming all the 
same.
Finally, if the analysis that was presented in this study is correct, it must be concluded 
that one popular historical explanation of British decision making may not be that powerful 
after all. Most historical studies stress the importance of the historical parallel that British 
policymakers drew between the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and Hitler’s 
invasion of the Rhineland in 1936. It is often contended that the analysis of the situation by, 
especially, Eden, Salisbury, and Macmillan was founded on that historical analogy: Nasser was 
a dictator ftom the category to which also Mussolini and Hitler belonged; the seizure of the 
Canal Company was a minor threat, just like the remilitarization of the Rhineland had 
constituted a minor threat. However, if Nasser was not checked immediately, he would 
develop into an aggressive dictator. In short, British policymakers supposedly did not want to 
commit the same error that had been made in the 1930s.
The records, however, show very little evidence of the presence of this historical 
analogy in the minds of British ministers. Of course, this could be taken to mean that 
consensus existed among British policymakers about the strength of the parallel, so that it 
would not appear in the minutes. Actually, the historical analogy surfaces in the records in two 
types of circumstances: (1) when a split appears in the Cabinet or in Parliament, such as 
towards the end of August and in the beginning of September; (2) when the United States 
Government has to be convinced that it should support the British position. This is especially 
the case in Eden’s letters to President Eisenhower.
According to me, this suggests that the parallel with the 1930s was first of all a 
technique of persuasion. It was used to restore unanimity when Monckton and, to a certain 
extent, Butler revolted in the Egypt Committee and the Cabinet on 24 and 28 August 
respectively. It was again employed in September when the Conservative Party in the 
Commons was about to split on the issue of force.
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In his letters to Eisenhower, Eden regularly compares Nasser to Mussolini and warns 
the American President that he was effectively in the hands of the Soviets, just as Mussolini 
was in the hands of Hitler. The employment of the analogy fits die attitudinal prism: it was 
regular practice for British policymakers to try to obtain American support by making use of 
the existence of a communist threat in the Middle East.
Furthermore, it is significant that Eden insistently compares Nasser with Mussolini 
rather than Hitler. This can be explained by Eden’s cognitive belief system: it should be 
remembered that as Foreign Secretary in the 1930s, Eden had always been worried more by 
Mussolini than by Hitler. Until well into 1939, his view was that it was possible to reach some 
kind of agreement with Hitler, while he had considered Mussolini a ’gangster’ who was 
completely untrustworthy. In terms of Eden’s operational code, Mussolini did not respect 
certain codes of international behaviour that Eden considered die essence of foreign affiairs. 
Eden started comparing Nasser with Mussolini in january 19561. This may indicate that at that 
moment Eden started to distrust Nasser as someone who might not uphold certain standards 
of international conduct. Nationalizing the Suez Canal Company must have been the final proof 
of his lack of trustworthiness. Eden’s employment of the analogy with the 1930s should thus 
be interpreted in terms of his master belief rather than as the application of an analogy with 
the 1930s.
18.4 Final remarks
The study of the constraining influence of the international system on its units should 
take the perceptions and expectations of political elites into account. Individual cognitive 
beliefs and small group dynamics constitute an important instrument for such an analysis. This 
study has argued that the employment of these variables are indispensable to a study of die 
adaptation of the United Kingdom to the reality of the new bipolar world. A number of 
complementary case studies could provide some more insight into this process of socialization: 
for instance, it would be interesting to analyze the 1951 Abadan crisis into some more detail. 
Its similarity to die Suez crisis is striking, yet its outcome was the complete opposite: die 
Labour Government yielded to strong American pressure and decided not to use force, 
although troops had already been flown into the area. It would be interesting to assess die role 
of the cognitive beliefs of members of the Labour Government at the time. An analysis of 
small group dynamics during the Abadan crisis might produce an interesting comparison with
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1 Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, entry 29 January 1956, p. 327.
the Suez crisis: in both crises a small Cabinet committee was installed to deal with a similar 
situation.
Further case studies should also serve the purpose of assessing the relative value of the 
various approaches to the study of cognitive beliefs. This study suggests that the method, 
which would be suitable for comparative research, the operational code, might be of limited 
value. The attitudinal prism, however, although based on much vaguer categories, proved to 
be very useful to an analysis of Anglo-American relations. It is, therefore, of great importance 
to refine the notion of the attitudinal prism, in order to stimulate systematic comparative 
research on the influence of cognitive beliefs.
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Appendix 1: The possible contribution of rational choice theory
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Just as cognitive psychology, rational choice theory also emphasizes the role of 
individuals. It argues that politics can be explained by choices of individual actors, who pursue 
their self-interest. Collective decisions can thus be explained in terms of individual 
preferences1. Rational choice theory touches this study in two ways. First, in its strictest form, 
it could be claimed that international decisions should be explained by the preferences of 
individuals. A more modest approach would be to identify actors of world politics, such as 
nation-states, with individual actors. This is done by, e.g., Keohane in his study of 
international regimes2, and by Bueno de Mesquita in his study of war initiation’.
Second, it would be possible to explain the behaviour of die foreign policy elite, and 
thus of nation-states, in terms of rational choice theory. It has been objected, however, that 
rational choice theory is based on assumptions that do not contribute to a sufficient 
understanding of reality. Actors are supposed to have extensive and clear knowledge of their 
environment, clear and stable preferences, as well as skills that allow them to compute the 
choice of the best alternative. In reality, however, individuals are constrained by the limits of 
their cognitive abilities which set boundaries on the rationality of their behaviour4.
To a certain extent, an individual’s operational code could be considered a picture of 
his bounded rationality. However, even knowledge of his bounded rationality leaves 
unexplained why individuals develop certain norms which constrain their behaviour: Anthony 
Eden’s operational code shows how important he judged gentleman-like behaviour for the 
conduct of foreign affairs. An analysis of the Suez crisis bears out that Eden did not rationally 
pursue his self-interest, obtaining support from the United States in order to avoid diplomatic 
defeat; he ignored Dulles’s clear warnings, partly because Dulles did not live up to Eden’s 
norm of gentleman-like behaviour.
But even if rational choice theory were able to take account of norms, it would remain 
unable to account for small group processes: the surprising element of British decision making 
during the Suez crisis constituted in the neglect of available information: throughout the crisis 
it had been known that the United States would not support an Anglo-French intervention, yet 
British decision makers preferred to ignore it. Thus, even the existence of extensive knowledge 
of the environment, an important assumption of rational choice theory, does not guarantee that 
individuals will act upon that information. Groupthink explains why British decision makers 
preferred to ignore the information available.
The impact of individual variables thus cannot be reduced to the rational pursuit of 
preferences. Moreover, as this study has underlined, foreign policy decisions are also affected 
by the institutional setting of domestic politics and bureaucratic organizations. It would thus 
be wrong to aim at an explanation exclusively in terms of individual preferences.
1 Cf. Kristen Renwick-Monroe, ’The Theory of Rational Action: Its Origins and Usefulness for 
Political Science’, in Kristen Renwick-Monroe (ed.), The Economic Approach to Politics. A Critical 
Reassessment of the Theory of Rational Action. Harper Collins, New York, 1991, pp. 1-5.
2 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 65-84.
3 Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap.
4 Ren wick Monroe, ’The Theory of Rational Action’, pp. 4-5; Adrienne WindhofF-H&itier, 
’Institutions, Interests and Political Choice’, in Adrienne Windhoff-Hlritier and Roland Czada (eds.), 
Political Choice. Institutions. Rules, and the Limits of Rationality. Campus/Westview, 
Frankfurt/Boulder, 1991, pp. 29-31.
Appendix 2: When was the start of the Suez crisis?
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It is come to date the start of the Suez crisis to 26 July 1956, the day on which Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal Company. This study is no exception. However, it could be argued 
that relations between Egypt and the United Kingdom had started to deteriorate long before 
that date. As a matter of fact, it has been suggested that Nasser’s move was an act Eden had 
long been waiting for. Nutting has become noted for his account of Eden’s reaction after 
Jordan’s King Hussein’s dismissal of General Glubb, presumably at Egyptian instigation: ’I 
want Nasser destroyed, not removed, destroyed’1. This has been taken to mean that Eden 
wanted to remove Nasser from power as soon as possible. If this interpretation is correct, it 
would imply that Anglo-Egyptian relations had reached crisis proportions long before July 
1956.
The records show that the Glubb-afiair has indeed been important in setting the stage 
for what was to come. Nevertheless, I think that this material has been misinterpreted to a 
certain extent. I contend that the abandonment of appeasing Nasser, as it is called in the 
records, had less to do with Eden’s personal dislike of the Egyptian leader, than with 
traditional British attempts to get American support for their traditional Middle East policy 
which focused on strengthening the role of Iraq and the Baghdad Pact.
To illustrate this point, it is important to return to the Czech arms deal of September
1955, when Egypt bought arms in the Eastern bloc, much to the annoyance of the United 
States and Great Britain. At the Cabinet meeting of 4 October 1955, Eden had said that he 
’saw no advantage to bring pressure upon die Nasser regime, e.g. Q obstructing Egyptian 
policies in regard to the High Dam’. They decided not to put too much pressure on Nasser, 
as it was ’doubtful whether such pressure could be made effective and a rebuff would be bad 
for our prestige in the Middle East’. Instead, the Cabinet preferred to isolate Egypt from the 
other Arab states’2. A fortnight later, Eden even went as for as to say that Nasser’s ’decision 
to accept the Soviet offer was understandable, if regrettable’, considering that he depended on 
his army’s support, and the West did not supply him with any arms3.
What actually happened, was an increased British effort to convince the United States 
Government of the danger of Soviet penetration in the Middle East, which was facilitated by 
the Czech arms deal. Indeed, Eden and Macmillan accelerated their pressure on the 
Eisenhower Administration to sponsor the Aswan Dam project with a loan together with 
Britain and the World Bank4. In December 1955 Great Britain and the United States presented 
their offer to Egypt. The plan did not include a long-term guarantee of assistance, because the 
Western countries wanted to review the amount of aid each year, in an attempt to use the 
Aswan loan as a means to tie Egypt to the West5.
1 Nutting, No End of a Lesson, p. 34; Horne suggests that portions of the original draft of the book 
have been excised; Home, Macmillan. 1894-1956. pp. 397, 493, note 8; Kyle quotes a personal letter 
of Nutting’s in which Nutting testifies that Eden had actually said; ’I want him murdered’; Kyle, Suez, 
pp. 99, 581, note 53.
2 CAB 128(34)8, 4 October 1955, p. 10, Public Record Office. Kew.
3 CAB 128(35)7, 20 October 1955.
4 Aronson, From Sideshow to Centeretage. pp. 156-157; Aronson relies on the interviews with 
Aldrich, Hoover and Humphrey, stored at John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection.
5 Aronson, ibid.. p. 161.
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British efforts in late 195S should therefore be interpreted as part of their traditional 
game -to use the Communist danger to persuade the United States to pursue a policy that 
would run parallel to British interests. In this context the Anglo-American talks of 
January/February 1956 become much more relevant: their objective was to coordinate both 
countries’ policies towards the Middle East. British officials, notably Evelyn Shuckburgh, by 
then Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office responsible for the Middle East, 
emphasized Nasser’s support of the left in Syria, and his responsibility for the failure of the 
Templer mission in December that had aimed at persuading Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact. 
During these talks Dulles said that Nasser’s attitude towards the Aswan Dam proposal would 
give an important clue to Egypt’s foreign policy in general, but added that a solution to the 
lsraeli-Egyptian dispute was a prerequisite for full American support of the Baghdad pact6. 
Therefore, by 1 March 1956, when General Glubb was dismissed by King Hussein, the British 
had succeeded in making the Americans cautious about Egypt’s relations with the Soviet 
Union, and therefore more appreciative of British efforts to strengthen the Baghdad Pact.
During the preceding two months, General Glubb, as Commander of the Arab Legion, 
had sent several reports of Egyptian subversive activities in Jordan, including a campaign to 
persuade young King Hussein to dismiss him. On 28 February Duke, the British Ambassador 
to Jordan, reported of rumours that the King was about to sack Glubb, which he actually did 
two days later, although the decision was not made public. For two days, telegrams were 
frantically exchanged between London and Amman in which Eden, who was conducting 
Foreign Affairs while Lloyd was touring the Middle East, hoped to undo the decision. Indeed 
the Jordanian Prime Minister had suggested that Glubb’s dismissal might be temporary in order 
to enhance the King’s domestic prestige. On 2 March, however, Glubb’s dismissal was 
announced by a Jordanian radio broadcast, actually before Eden’s telegram had reached 
Hussein. Nevertheless, in his messages to King Hussein (through Ambassador Duke), Eden 
remained rather constructive: first, he asked for the remaining British officers to remain in 
their posts, and when they were dismissed, he wanted them to be employed ’in comparable 
positions in the Legion’7.
A remarkable difference appears between the relative moderate responses in the official 
telegrams and the anger and emotion which Glubb’s dismissal provoked within Whitehall. It 
was perceived as a severe blow to British prestige in the Middle East, and was thought to have 
severe repercussions. The event provoked a full revision of Middle East policy by Senior 
Ministers on 5 March 1956*. It was decided that some examples of strong action in the region 
should be set: it was thus agreed to deport Cypriot Archbishop Makarios; furthermore, an
6 Aronson, ibid.. pp. 164-166.
7 This account is based on FO 371/121540: VJ 1201/1 (2 Jan 1956); VJ 1201/2 (22 Feb 1956); VJ 
1201/3 (28 Feb 1956); VJ 1201/4 (28 Feb 1956); VJ 1201/9 Telegrams 274, 276 (1 Mar 1956); VJ 
1201/6 (1 mar 1956); VJ 1201/11, Telegrams 346, 347 (2 mar 1956); VJ 1201/13 Telegram 13 (1 Mar 
1956), VJ 1201/14 Telegram 139; VJ 1201/18G/20/22, Telegram 289 (2 mar 1956); VJ 1201/21, 
Telegrams 358, 138/56 (3 Mar 1956), all at Public Record Office. Kew; telegram from Mallory (US 
Embassy London to State Department), Department of State Central Files, 741.551/3-256, in Foreign 
R»l»tinnc of the United States 1955-1957. Volume 13, Near East, Jordan, Yemen, edited by John P. 
Glennon, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1988, pp. 26-28.
* Present were Eden, Salisbury, Macmillan, Butler, Lennox-Boyd. Heath, Brook, Temple, Boyle, 
Kifkpatrick, Nutting, and Shuckburgh; Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, p. 343, entry 5 March 1956.
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intervention in Bahrain was considered, because stones had been thrown at Lloyd only two 
days before9.
Much more importantly, however, senior ministers judged that once more an effort 
should be made to win over the Americans to the Baghdad Pact. Nutting’s account of the 
Ministers’ meeting, in his telegram to Lloyd, who was on his way to a conference in Karachi, 
is revealing in many ways: ’Americans now seem ready to take additional responsibilities in 
ME and are looking to us for advice [] Implicit in above policy is abandonment of appeasement 
of Nasser. This may be unwelcome to Americans but fact remains that appeasement has not 
paid and I suggest you should leave Dulles in no doubt about our suspicions of growing 
contacts between Egypt and Soviet Russia. Latest information on Aswan Dam negotiations 
suggests that Egyptians may well be playing double game’10. Three considerations are 
relevant in this respect.
First, the dismissal of Glubb was not judged by the British Cabinet as the result of an 
act by Nasser. It is therefore not true that somehow in early March Eden started a personal 
war with the Egyptian leader; although, reportedly, Eden compared him with Mussolini11. 
In short, the Cabinet’s response was not a response to Nasser12, but rather a reaction to the 
perception that the dismissal of Glubb had affected British prestige in the Middle East.
Second, the Cabinet’s reaction was, rather predictably, to strengthen die Baghdad Pact 
and to try to cajole the Americans into more active support to that effect. Nutting’s telegram 
reveals how much propaganda value British Government officials attached to potential contacts 
between the Soviet Union and Egypt as a means of influencing American opinion.
Third, it shows that in March 19S6 the British still believed that the Americans would 
look to Great Britain for advice on Middle Eastern affairs. Although the American 
Government, by that time, had reached die conclusion that Nasser’s nationalism was less and 
less serving American political interests in the Middle East13, the Americans were not 
prepared to commit themselves to support the Baghdad Pact openly, as Dulles told Lloyd in 
Karachi on 8 March 195614. Testimony of the seriousness of this British attempt to exploit 
the Glubb-affair comes from the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, who reported 
that the British seemed willing to reach an agreement about the problem of the border-line of 
the Buraimi oasis, when he told Kirkpatrick that the matter was equally important as the 
strengthening the Baghdad Pact [the United States thought a settlement of die Buraimi dispute 
would draw Saudi Arabia away from Egyptian influence]13. For the sake of Anglo-American 
cooperation against Egypt die British Government seemed willing to give in on an issue to
* In his diary Shuckburgh suggests that the Cabinet was simply eager to take any strong action, ’to 
show that we are still alive and kicking, and they thought Bahrain a good place because of the recent 
stoning of Selwyn Lloyd’. Descent to Suez, p. 344.
10 FO 800/734, Telegram 531, Nutting to Lloyd, 5 March 1956, Public Record Office. Kew.
11 On 3 March 1956, according to Shuckburgh’s diary, Descent to Suez, p. 341, entry 3 March.
12 Indeed, the Foreign Office would not be able to find evidence that either the Saudis or the 
Egyptians were involved in Glubb’s dismissal, as reported by Winthrop Aldrich to State Department on 
9 March 1956, FRUS. 1955-1957. p. 28, footnote 6.
13 Aronson, From Sideshow to Centerstace. p. 168.
14 Lloyd, Suez 1956. A Personal Account, p. 54
15 Aldrich to State, 5 march 1956, reporting on a conversation with Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, 
Department State Central Files, 741.551/3-556, FRUS 1955-1957. Volume 13, pp. 28-29.
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which they had attached great importance until then: the United Kingdom had occupied the 
Buraimi oasis only a few months before in order to protect the area from Saudi claims.
The most precious prize was therefore further intensive Anglo-American coordination 
of Middle East policy, based on the consensus that at some stage a tougher line towards Nasser 
would be the likely outcome. Its first victim would be the Aswan loan: when on 9 March the 
American Anderson mission failed, which aimed to drawing Egypt and Israel closer by 
arranging a face to face meeting between Ben Gurion and Nasser16, pressure to discontinue 
the offer quickly mounted, and Eisenhower and Dulles concluded that Nasser was not the man 
on which they could build American Middle Eastern policy. Significandy, by that time British 
and American Chiefs of Staffs had started consultations about coordinating military 
emergencies in the area.
It is therefore rather difficult to give a correct assessment of the importance of the 
Glubb affair. On the one hand, it is true that a policy reorientation followed, part of which 
implied the abandonment of wooing Egypt. But, more than developing some kind of strategy 
against Nasser, the reorientation was aimed at making the United States more appreciative of 
British interests in the area, and therefore less inclined to consider Egypt as the pivot of 
Middle Eastern stability, and more positive towards the role of British client states, notably 
Iraq. Evidence exists that early in April the British Government was still willing to come to 
an agreement with Egypt about anti-British propaganda: ’I [Lloyd] was still in two minds about 
how we should deal with Nasser Q I said I did not despair of even actually doing business with 
Nasser, but I thought that success had gone to his head’17. Although the parallel between 
Nasser and Mussolini was used during the Glubb affair, it is unclear to which extent this 
remained in the minds of the policy makers11.
It seems therefore save to date the start of the Suez crisis to the moment at which the 
news of Egypt’s act of nationalization reached British decision makers, that is in the evening 
of 26 July 1956. The Glubb affair has certainly added to an increase in threat perceptions, but
16 Aronson, From Sideshow to Centerstage. p. 165; the Anderson mission was part of the larger 
’Alpha’ project, which was a secret initiative of the United Kingdom and the United States to bring 
about a comprehensive settlement for the Arab-Israeli dispute; cf. Shimon Shamir, ’The Collapse of 
Project Alpha’, in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds.), Suez 1956. The Crisis and its 
Consequences. Oxford University Press, Oxford etc., 1989 (1991), pp. 73-100.
17 FO 800/735, Conversation between Chauvel (French Ambassador) and Selwyn Lloyd, V 1072/39,
6 April 1956. Only two days before had Lloyd instructed the British Ambassador in Cairo to ask Nasser 
’for some concrete indication [] that more friendly relations are indeed their wish', FO 800/735, 
Telegram 988, Lloyd to Trevelyan, 3 April 1956.
" At 11 March 1956 French Prime Minister Mollet visited Chequers. In his talks with Eden he 
draws a parallel with the 1930s. Eden’s reaction, however, is very difficult to interpret: ’He [Mollet] 
could compare the situation with the situation in 1938 or 1939. The allies had never understood Hitler 
until it was too late. In Hitler they had had to face pan Germanism. After that had come the threat of 
pan Slavism which was still with us. What we now saw in North Africa was the alliance between pan 
Slavism and pan Islam. All this was in the works of Nasser, just as Hider’s policy had been written 
down in Mein Kampf []’. Eden replied that ’it was very difficult to know how to deal with Nasser. He 
[Eden] was quite sure that we had been right to make an agreement on the Canal Zone base. The 
importance of Nasser lay in the influence of Egypt in the Arab world Q We had to find a way of dealing 
with Nasser without putting the Arab world against us □’. He added that sending arms to Israel certainly 
would not help; FO 800/734, WF 1051/9,11 March 1956, record of a conversation between Mollet and 
Eden. For one thing, this seems a rather moderate reaction of Eden’s, not one heartily agreeing with 
Mollet’s analysis, but rather specifying the different circumstances in the Middle East from Europe. I 
tain» that as an indicator that the parallel was not (yet) that powerful in guiding British policy.
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Great Britain’s rather mild policies in the Spring of 1956 suggest that the situation had not yet 
reached crisis proportions: there is no evidence of the perception of either time constraints or 
the likelihood of hostilities.
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Appendix 3
The attendance of 40 Egypt Committee meetings between 26 July 1956 and 6 
November 1956
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1. Primary Sources
The files at the Public Record Office (PRO) at Kew which have been used in this study 
are labelled AIR (Air Ministry), ADM (Admiralty), CAB (Cabinet Office), DEFE (Ministry 
of Defence), DO (Commonwealth Office), FO (Foreign Office), FO 800 (Personal Files of the 
Foreign Secretary), LCO (Lord Chancellor’s Office), PREM (Prime Minister’s Office), T 
(Treasury), WO (War Office). For the recomposition of the decision making process, extensive 
use has been made of the files under FO 800/713-717, which hold Selwyn Lloyd’s personal 
diary of engagements between July and November 1956.
Many documents that are referred to in this study can be found in the official 
publications of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States, the British 
Documents on Foreign Policy and the Foreign Relations of the United States series. The 
correct references appear in the footnotes.
Both the Monckton Papers and William Clark’s diary of his period as Eden’s press 
counsellor are in the Bodleian Library at Oxford. The archives of the French Socialist Party 
SFIO (Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière) can be found at the Organisation 
Universitaire de Recherche Socialiste in Paris.
Alistair Home’s biography of Harold Macmillan, properly presented here as a secon­
dary source, offers many excerpts from Macmillan’s personal diary and should thus partly 
count as a primary source.
Primary sources should, of course, be handled with care. This is particularly true for 
documents that seem genuine accounts of men and events, such as the diaries of William Clark 
and Evelyn Shuckburgh. Both worked closely with Anthony Eden and used their diaries to gain 
some relief from the pressures at work. As to Shuckburgh’s account, it should be kept in mind 
that his judgment of Eden and his policies changed substantially after his appointment as 
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office dealing with Middle Eastern Affairs in May 1954. Part 
of this changed attitude can certainly be attributed to identification with a new role: as Under­
secretary Shuckburgh was responsible for the secret ’Alpha’-Project which aimed at a 
settlement between Israel and her neighbours. Part of Shuckburgh’s statements thus reflect his 
interests as Under-Secretary which differed from those he had as Eden’s Principal Private 
Secretary.
Most books on Suez use Clark’s memoirs From Three Worlds (London, 1986). It 
seems more correct to use the original diary (although it may have been edited later as well), 
while keeping in mind that towards the end of crisis his account is becoming blurred by his 
outrage over the Challe-plan. Clark’s account, however, is an important source for the 
reconstruction of the decision making process, and for inside information on important 
meetings because of Clark’s regular lunches with Monckton and Brook.
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